* Dump PickleDb after transaction sends/confirmation
* Dump PickleDb on ctrlc
* Don't exit during tests
* Add build_messages helper and test db dump
* Add send_messages helper and test db dump
* Add combined test
* Add log_transaction_confirmations helper and test db dump
* Add update_finalized_transactions test
* Return error instead of process::exit
* Close TestValidator
* Add helpers to covert between sdk types
* Add distribute-spl-tokens to args and arg-parsing
* Build spl-token transfer-checked instructions
* Check spl-token balances properly
* Add display handling to support spl-token
* Small refactor to allow failures in allocation iter
* Use Associated Token Account for spl-token distributions
* Add spl token support to balances command
* Update readme
* Add spl-token tests
* Rename spl-tokens file
* Move a couple more things out of commands
* Stop requiring lockup_date heading for non-stake distributions
* Use epsilon for allocation retention
* Revert solana-tokens to RpcClient
* Fixup check_payer_balances tests
* Use RpcClient::new_with_commitment in other tests
Co-authored-by: Tyera Eulberg <tyera@solana.com>
* Add TestValidator::new_with_fees constructor, and warning for low bootstrap_validator_lamports
* Add logging to solana-tokens integration test to help catch low bootstrap_validator_lamports in the future
* Reasonable TestValidator mint_lamports
* Output more inflation calc details in ledger-tool
* Fix broken ci...
* Rename confusing variables
* Fix panic by wrapping PointValue with Opiton...
* Minor modifications
* Remove explict needless flush; Drop already does
* Yet another csv field adjustments
* Add data_size and rename epochs to earned_epochs
* Introduce null_tracer
* Unwrap Option in new_from_parent_with_tracer
* Don't shorten identifiers
* Allow irrefutable_let_patterns temporalily
* More null_tracer
* More field adjustments
https://hackerone.com/reports/991106
> It’s possible to use UDP gossip protocol to amplify DDoS attacks. An attacker
> can spoof IP address in UDP packet when sending PullRequest to the node.
> There's no any validation if provided source IP address is not spoofed and
> the node can send much larger PullResponse to victim's IP. As I checked,
> PullRequest is about 290 bytes, while PullResponse is about 10 kB. It means
> that amplification is about 34x. This way an attacker can easily perform DDoS
> attack both on Solana node and third-party server.
>
> To prevent it, need for example to implement ping-pong mechanism similar as
> in Ethereum: Before accepting requests from remote client needs to validate
> his IP. Local node sends Ping packet to the remote node and it needs to reply
> with Pong packet that contains hash of matching Ping packet. Content of Ping
> packet is unpredictable. If hash from Pong packet matches, local node can
> remember IP where Ping packet was sent as correct and allow further
> communication.
>
> More info:
> https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv4.md#endpoint-proof
> https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv4.md#wire-protocol
The commit adds a PingCache, which maintains records of remote nodes
which have returned a valid response to a ping message, and on-the-fly
ping messages pending a pong response from the remote node.
When handling pull-requests, those from addresses which have not passed
the ping-pong check are filtered out, and additionally ping packets are
added for addresses which need to be (re)verified.
* Follow up to persistent tower
* Ignore for now...
* Hard-code validator identities for easy reasoning
* Add a test for opt. conf violation without tower
* Fix compile with rust < 1.47
* Remove unused method
* More move of assert tweak to the asser pr
* Add comments
* Clean up
* Clean the test addressing various review comments
* Clean up a bit
* Add Blockstore protobuf cf type
* Add Rewards message to proto and make generated pub
* Convert Rewards cf to ProtobufColumn
* Add bench
* Adjust tags
* Move solana proto definitions and conversion methods to new crate