https://hackerone.com/reports/991106
> It’s possible to use UDP gossip protocol to amplify DDoS attacks. An attacker
> can spoof IP address in UDP packet when sending PullRequest to the node.
> There's no any validation if provided source IP address is not spoofed and
> the node can send much larger PullResponse to victim's IP. As I checked,
> PullRequest is about 290 bytes, while PullResponse is about 10 kB. It means
> that amplification is about 34x. This way an attacker can easily perform DDoS
> attack both on Solana node and third-party server.
>
> To prevent it, need for example to implement ping-pong mechanism similar as
> in Ethereum: Before accepting requests from remote client needs to validate
> his IP. Local node sends Ping packet to the remote node and it needs to reply
> with Pong packet that contains hash of matching Ping packet. Content of Ping
> packet is unpredictable. If hash from Pong packet matches, local node can
> remember IP where Ping packet was sent as correct and allow further
> communication.
>
> More info:
> https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv4.md#endpoint-proof
> https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv4.md#wire-protocol
The commit adds a PingCache, which maintains records of remote nodes
which have returned a valid response to a ping message, and on-the-fly
ping messages pending a pong response from the remote node.
When handling pull-requests, those from addresses which have not passed
the ping-pong check are filtered out, and additionally ping packets are
added for addresses which need to be (re)verified.
Based on run-time profiles, the majority time of new_pull_requests is
spent building bloom filters, in hashing and bit-vec ops.
This commit builds crds filters in parallel using rayon constructs. The
added benchmark shows ~5x speedup (4-core machine, 8 threads).
filter_crds_values checks every crds filter against every hash value:
https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/blob/ee646aa7/core/src/crds_gossip_pull.rs#L432
which can be inefficient if the filter's bit-mask only matches small
portion of the entire crds table.
This commit shards crds values into separate tables based on shard_bits
first bits of their hash prefix. Given a (mask, mask_bits) filter,
filtering crds can be done by inspecting only relevant shards.
If CrdsFilter.mask_bits <= shard_bits, then precisely only the crds
values which match (mask, mask_bits) bit pattern are traversed.
If CrdsFilter.mask_bits > shard_bits, then approximately only
1/2^shard_bits of crds values are inspected.
Benchmarking on a gce cluster of 20 nodes, I see ~10% improvement in
generate_pull_responses metric, but with larger clusters, crds table and
2^mask_bits are both larger, so the impact should be more significant.
* Update account-decoder to spl-token v2.0
* Update transaction-status to spl-token v2.0
* Update rpc to spl-token v2.0
* Update getTokenSupply to pull from Mint directly
* Fixup to spl-token v2.0.1
* Remove support for Budget
Also:
* Make "pay" command a deprecated alias for the "transfer" command
* chore: remove budget from web3.js
* Drop Budget depedency from core
Validators no longer ship with builtin Budget