Tenets:
1. Limit thread names to 15 characters
2. Prefix all Solana-controlled threads with "sol"
3. Use Camel case. It's more character dense than Snake or Kebab case
This change sets the receive_window for non-staked node to 1 * PACKET_DATA_SIZE, and maps the staked nodes's connection's receive_window between 1.2 * PACKET_DATA_SIZE to 10 * PACKET_DATA_SIZE based on the stakes.
The changes is based on Quinn library change to support per connection receive_window tweak at the server side. quinn-rs/quinn#1393
* Use client certs in QUIC to get peer's stake
* fixes to cert processing
* integrate the code
* clippy
* more cleanup
* sort cargo deps
* test fixes
* info -> debug
Packets are at the boundary of the system where, vast majority of the
time, they are received from an untrusted source. Raw indexing into the
data buffer can open attack vectors if the offsets are invalid.
Validating offsets beforehand is verbose and error prone.
The commit updates Packet::data() api to take a SliceIndex and always to
return an Option. The call-sites are so forced to explicitly handle the
case where the offsets are invalid.
Bytes past Packet.meta.size are not valid to read from.
The commit makes the buffer field private and instead provides two
methods:
* Packet::data() which returns an immutable reference to the underlying
buffer up to Packet.meta.size. The rest of the buffer is not valid to
read from.
* Packet::buffer_mut() which returns a mutable reference to the entirety
of the underlying buffer to write into. The caller is responsible to
update Packet.meta.size after writing to the buffer.
Upcoming changes to PacketBatch to support variable sized packets will
modify the internals of PacketBatch. So, this change removes usage of
the internal packet struct and instead uses accessors (which are
currently just wrappers of Vector functions but will change down the
road).
Jon Cinque
Brennan Watt
Michael Vines
Lijun Wang
Pankaj Garg
behzad nouri
steviez
Justin Starry
sakridge
Jeff Biseda
Christian Drappi
carllin
anatoly yakovenko