Merge branch 'develop' into rigel/piggy-bank-fee-spec
This commit is contained in:
Christopher Goes
commit
15b4b338df
|
|
@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ v Before smashing the submit button please review the checkboxes.
|
|||
v If a checkbox is n/a - please still include it but + a little note why
|
||||
☺ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -->
|
||||
|
||||
- Targeted PR against correct branch (see [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/develop/CONTRIBUTING.md#pr-targeting))
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Linked to github-issue with discussion and accepted design OR link to spec that describes this work.
|
||||
- [ ] Wrote tests
|
||||
- [ ] Updated relevant documentation (`docs/`)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,5 +1,14 @@
|
|||
# Changelog
|
||||
|
||||
## 0.24.2
|
||||
|
||||
*August 22nd, 2018*
|
||||
|
||||
BUG FIXES
|
||||
|
||||
* Tendermint
|
||||
- Fix unbounded consensus WAL growth
|
||||
|
||||
## 0.24.1
|
||||
|
||||
*August 21st, 2018*
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -133,6 +133,17 @@ Libraries need not follow the model strictly, but would be wise to.
|
|||
|
||||
The SDK utilizes [semantic versioning](https://semver.org/).
|
||||
|
||||
### PR Targeting
|
||||
|
||||
Ensure that you base and target your PR on the correct branch:
|
||||
- `release/vxx.yy.zz` for a merge into a release candidate
|
||||
- `master` for a merge of a release
|
||||
- `develop` in the usual case
|
||||
|
||||
All feature additions should be targeted against `develop`. Bug fixes for an outstanding release candidate
|
||||
should be targeted against the release candidate branch. Release candidate branches themselves should be the
|
||||
only pull requests targeted directly against master.
|
||||
|
||||
### Development Procedure:
|
||||
- the latest state of development is on `develop`
|
||||
- `develop` must never fail `make test` or `make test_cli`
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -165,13 +165,12 @@
|
|||
|
||||
[[projects]]
|
||||
branch = "master"
|
||||
digest = "1:a361611b8c8c75a1091f00027767f7779b29cb37c456a71b8f2604c88057ab40"
|
||||
digest = "1:12247a2e99a060cc692f6680e5272c8adf0b8f572e6bce0d7095e624c958a240"
|
||||
name = "github.com/hashicorp/hcl"
|
||||
packages = [
|
||||
".",
|
||||
"hcl/ast",
|
||||
"hcl/parser",
|
||||
"hcl/printer",
|
||||
"hcl/scanner",
|
||||
"hcl/strconv",
|
||||
"hcl/token",
|
||||
|
|
@ -424,7 +423,7 @@
|
|||
version = "v0.9.2"
|
||||
|
||||
[[projects]]
|
||||
digest = "1:26146cdb2811ce481e72138439b9b1aa17a64d54364f96bb92f97a9ef8ba4f01"
|
||||
digest = "1:4f15e95fe3888cc75dd34f407d6394cbc7fd3ff24920851b92b295f6a8b556e6"
|
||||
name = "github.com/tendermint/tendermint"
|
||||
packages = [
|
||||
"abci/client",
|
||||
|
|
@ -487,8 +486,8 @@
|
|||
"version",
|
||||
]
|
||||
pruneopts = "UT"
|
||||
revision = "013b9cef642f875634c614019ab13b17570778ad"
|
||||
version = "v0.23.0"
|
||||
revision = "81df19e68ab1519399fccf0cab81cb75bf9d782e"
|
||||
version = "v0.23.1-rc0"
|
||||
|
||||
[[projects]]
|
||||
digest = "1:bf6d9a827ea3cad964c2f863302e4f6823170d0b5ed16f72cf1184a7c615067e"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
|
|||
|
||||
[[override]]
|
||||
name = "github.com/tendermint/tendermint"
|
||||
version = "=v0.23.0"
|
||||
version = "=v0.23.1-rc0"
|
||||
|
||||
[[constraint]]
|
||||
name = "github.com/bartekn/go-bip39"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
2
Makefile
2
Makefile
|
|
@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ test_sim_gaia_nondeterminism:
|
|||
|
||||
test_sim_gaia_fast:
|
||||
@echo "Running quick Gaia simulation. This may take several minutes..."
|
||||
@go test ./cmd/gaia/app -run TestFullGaiaSimulation -SimulationEnabled=true -SimulationNumBlocks=200 -timeout 24h
|
||||
@go test ./cmd/gaia/app -run TestFullGaiaSimulation -SimulationEnabled=true -SimulationNumBlocks=50 -v -timeout 24h
|
||||
|
||||
test_sim_gaia_slow:
|
||||
@echo "Running full Gaia simulation. This may take awhile!"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -16,8 +16,9 @@ BREAKING CHANGES
|
|||
* Gaia
|
||||
* Make the transient store key use a distinct store key. [#2013](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/pull/2013)
|
||||
* [x/stake] \#1901 Validator type's Owner field renamed to Operator; Validator's GetOwner() renamed accordingly to comply with the SDK's Validator interface.
|
||||
* [docs] [#2001](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/pull/2001) Update slashing spec for slashing period
|
||||
* [x/stake, x/slashing] [#1305](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/1305) - Rename "revoked" to "jailed"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* SDK
|
||||
* [core] \#1807 Switch from use of rational to decimal
|
||||
* [types] \#1901 Validator interface's GetOwner() renamed to GetOperator()
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
|||
# Slashing module specification
|
||||
|
||||
## Abstract
|
||||
|
||||
This section specifies the slashing module of the Cosmos SDK, which implements functionality
|
||||
first outlined in the [Cosmos Whitepaper](https://cosmos.network/about/whitepaper) in June 2016.
|
||||
|
||||
The slashing module enables Cosmos SDK-based blockchains to disincentivize any attributable action
|
||||
by a protocol-recognized actor with value at stake by penalizing them ("slashing").
|
||||
|
||||
Penalties may include, but are not limited to:
|
||||
- Burning some amount of their stake
|
||||
- Removing their ability to vote on future blocks for a period of time.
|
||||
|
||||
This module will be used by the Cosmos Hub, the first hub in the Cosmos ecosystem.
|
||||
|
||||
## Contents
|
||||
|
||||
1. **[Overview](overview.md)**
|
||||
1. **[State](state.md)**
|
||||
1. [SigningInfo](state.md#signing-info)
|
||||
1. [SlashingPeriod](state.md#slashing-period)
|
||||
1. **[Transactions](transactions.md)**
|
||||
1. [Unjail](transactions.md#unjail)
|
||||
1. **[Hooks](hooks.md)**
|
||||
1. [Validator Bonded](hooks.md#validator-bonded)
|
||||
1. [Validator Unbonded](hooks.md#validator-unbonded)
|
||||
1. [Validator Slashed](hooks.md#validator-slashed)
|
||||
1. **[Begin Block](begin-block.md)**
|
||||
1. [Evidence handling](begin-block.md#evidence-handling)
|
||||
1. [Uptime tracking](begin-block.md#uptime-tracking)
|
||||
1. **[Future Improvements](future-improvements.md)**
|
||||
1. [State cleanup](future-improvements.md#state-cleanup)
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
|
|||
# End-Block
|
||||
# Begin-Block
|
||||
|
||||
## Slashing
|
||||
## Evidence handling
|
||||
|
||||
Tendermint blocks can include
|
||||
[Evidence](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/develop/docs/spec/blockchain/blockchain.md#evidence), which indicates that a validator
|
||||
committed malicious behaviour. The relevant information is forwarded to the
|
||||
committed malicious behavior. The relevant information is forwarded to the
|
||||
application as [ABCI
|
||||
Evidence](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/develop/abci/types/types.proto#L259), so the validator an be accordingly punished.
|
||||
Evidence](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/develop/abci/types/types.proto#L259) in `abci.RequestBeginBlock`
|
||||
so that the validator an be accordingly punished.
|
||||
|
||||
For some `evidence` to be valid, it must satisfy:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -75,7 +76,9 @@ This ensures that offending validators are punished the same amount whether they
|
|||
act as a single validator with X stake or as N validators with collectively X
|
||||
stake.
|
||||
|
||||
## Automatic Unbonding
|
||||
The amount slashed for all double signature infractions committed within a single slashing period is capped as described in [state-machine.md](state-machine.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Uptime tracking
|
||||
|
||||
At the beginning of each block, we update the signing info for each validator and check if they should be automatically unbonded:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -113,3 +116,5 @@ for val in block.Validators:
|
|||
|
||||
SigningInfo.Set(val.Address, signInfo)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The amount slashed for downtime slashes is *not* capped by the slashing period in which they are committed, although they do reset it (since the validator is unbonded).
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
|||
## State Cleanup
|
||||
|
||||
Once no evidence for a given slashing period can possibly be valid (the end time plus the unbonding period is less than the current time),
|
||||
old slashing periods should be cleaned up. This will be implemented post-launch.
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
|||
## Hooks
|
||||
|
||||
In this section we describe the "hooks" - slashing module code that runs when other events happen.
|
||||
|
||||
### Validator Bonded
|
||||
|
||||
Upon successful bonding of a validator (a given validator entering the "bonded" state,
|
||||
which may happen on delegation, on unjailing, etc), we create a new `SlashingPeriod` structure for the
|
||||
now-bonded validator, which `StartHeight` of the current block, `EndHeight` of `0` (sentinel value for not-yet-ended),
|
||||
and `SlashedSoFar` of `0`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
onValidatorBonded(address sdk.ValAddress)
|
||||
|
||||
slashingPeriod = SlashingPeriod{
|
||||
ValidatorAddr : address,
|
||||
StartHeight : CurrentHeight,
|
||||
EndHeight : 0,
|
||||
SlashedSoFar : 0,
|
||||
}
|
||||
setSlashingPeriod(slashingPeriod)
|
||||
|
||||
return
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Validator Unbonded
|
||||
|
||||
When a validator is unbonded, we update the in-progress `SlashingPeriod` with the current block as the `EndHeight`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
onValidatorUnbonded(address sdk.ValAddress)
|
||||
|
||||
slashingPeriod = getSlashingPeriod(address, CurrentHeight)
|
||||
slashingPeriod.EndHeight = CurrentHeight
|
||||
setSlashingPeriod(slashingPeriod)
|
||||
|
||||
return
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Validator Slashed
|
||||
|
||||
When a validator is slashed, we look up the appropriate `SlashingPeriod` based on the validator
|
||||
address and the time of infraction, cap the fraction slashed as `max(SlashFraction, SlashedSoFar)`
|
||||
(which may be `0`), and update the `SlashingPeriod` with the increased `SlashedSoFar`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
beforeValidatorSlashed(address sdk.ValAddress, fraction sdk.Rat, infractionHeight int64)
|
||||
|
||||
slashingPeriod = getSlashingPeriod(address, infractionHeight)
|
||||
totalToSlash = max(slashingPeriod.SlashedSoFar, fraction)
|
||||
slashingPeriod.SlashedSoFar = totalToSlash
|
||||
setSlashingPeriod(slashingPeriod)
|
||||
|
||||
remainderToSlash = slashingPeriod.SlashedSoFar - totalToSlash
|
||||
fraction = remainderToSlash
|
||||
|
||||
continue with slashing
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
|||
## Conceptual overview
|
||||
|
||||
### States
|
||||
|
||||
At any given time, there are any number of validators registered in the state machine.
|
||||
Each block, the top `n = MaximumBondedValidators` validators who are not jailed become *bonded*, meaning that they may propose and vote on blocks.
|
||||
Validators who are *bonded* are *at stake*, meaning that part or all of their stake and their delegators' stake is at risk if they commit a protocol fault.
|
||||
|
||||
### Slashing period
|
||||
|
||||
In order to mitigate the impact of initially likely categories of non-malicious protocol faults, the Cosmos Hub implements for each validator
|
||||
a *slashing period*, in which the amount by which a validator can be slashed is capped at the punishment for the worst violation. For example,
|
||||
if you misconfigure your HSM and double-sign a bunch of old blocks, you'll only be punished for the first double-sign (and then immediately jailed,
|
||||
so that you have a chance to reconfigure your setup). This will still be quite expensive and desirable to avoid, but slashing periods somewhat blunt
|
||||
the economic impact of unintentional misconfiguration.
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike the unbonding period, the slashing period doesn't have a fixed length. A new slashing period starts whenever a validator is bonded and ends
|
||||
whenever the validator is unbonded (which will happen if the validator is jailed). The amount of tokens slashed relative to validator power for infractions
|
||||
committed within the slashing period, whenever they are discovered, is capped at the punishment for the worst infraction
|
||||
(which for the Cosmos Hub at launch will be double-signing a block).
|
||||
|
||||
#### ASCII timelines
|
||||
|
||||
*Code*
|
||||
|
||||
*[* : timeline start
|
||||
*]* : timeline end
|
||||
*<* : slashing period start
|
||||
*>* : slashing period end
|
||||
*C<sub>n</sub>* : infraction `n` committed
|
||||
*D<sub>n</sub>* : infraction `n` discovered
|
||||
*V<sub>b</sub>* : validator bonded
|
||||
*V<sub>u</sub>* : validator unbonded
|
||||
|
||||
*Single infraction*
|
||||
|
||||
<----------------->
|
||||
[----------C<sub>1</sub>----D<sub>1</sub>,V<sub>u</sub>-----]
|
||||
|
||||
A single infraction is committed then later discovered, at which point the validator is unbonded and slashed at the full amount for the infraction.
|
||||
|
||||
*Multiple infractions*
|
||||
|
||||
<--------------------------->
|
||||
[----------C<sub>1</sub>--C<sub>2</sub>---C<sub>3</sub>---D<sub>1</sub>,D<sub>2</sub>,D<sub>3</sub>V<sub>u</sub>-----]
|
||||
|
||||
Multiple infractions are committed within a single slashing period then later discovered, at which point the validator is unbonded and slashed for only the worst infraction.
|
||||
|
||||
*Multiple infractions after rebonding*
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<---------------------------> <------------->
|
||||
[----------C<sub>1</sub>--C<sub>2</sub>---C<sub>3</sub>---D<sub>1</sub>,D<sub>2</sub>,D<sub>3</sub>V<sub>u</sub>---V<sub>b</sub>---C<sub>4</sub>----D<sub>4</sub>,V<sub>u</sub>--]
|
||||
|
||||
Multiple infractions are committed within a single slashing period then later discovered, at which point the validator is unbonded and slashed for only the worst infraction.
|
||||
The validator then unjails themself and rebonds, then commits a fourth infraction - which is discovered and punished at the full amount, since a new slashing period started
|
||||
when they unjailed and rebonded.
|
||||
|
||||
### Safety note
|
||||
|
||||
Slashing is capped fractionally per period, but the amount of total bonded stake associated with any given validator can change (by an unbounded amount) over that period.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, with MaxFractionSlashedPerPeriod = `0.5`, if a validator is initially slashed at `0.4` near the start of a period when they have 100 stake bonded,
|
||||
then later slashed at `0.4` when they have `1000` stake bonded, the total amount slashed is just `40 + 100 = 140` (since the latter slash is capped at `0.1`) -
|
||||
whereas if they had `1000` stake bonded initially, the first offense would have been slashed for `400` stake and the total amount slashed would have been `400 + 100 = 500`.
|
||||
|
||||
This means that any slashing events which utilize the slashing period (are capped-per-period) **must also** jail the validator when the infraction is discovered.
|
||||
Otherwise it would be possible for a validator to slash themselves intentionally at a low bond, then increase their bond but no longer be at stake since they would have already hit the `SlashedSoFar` cap.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
## State
|
||||
# State
|
||||
|
||||
### Signing Info
|
||||
## Signing Info
|
||||
|
||||
Every block includes a set of precommits by the validators for the previous block,
|
||||
known as the LastCommit. A LastCommit is valid so long as it contains precommits from +2/3 of voting power.
|
||||
|
|
@ -36,10 +36,11 @@ The information stored for tracking validator liveness is as follows:
|
|||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type ValidatorSigningInfo struct {
|
||||
StartHeight int64
|
||||
IndexOffset int64
|
||||
JailedUntil int64
|
||||
SignedBlocksCounter int64
|
||||
StartHeight int64 // Height at which the validator became able to sign blocks
|
||||
IndexOffset int64 // Offset into the signed block bit array
|
||||
JailedUntilHeight int64 // Block height until which the validator is jailed,
|
||||
// or sentinel value of 0 for not jailed
|
||||
SignedBlocksCounter int64 // Running counter of signed blocks
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
|
@ -49,3 +50,31 @@ Where:
|
|||
* `IndexOffset` is incremented each time the candidate was a bonded validator in a block (and may have signed a precommit or not).
|
||||
* `JailedUntil` is set whenever the candidate is jailed due to downtime
|
||||
* `SignedBlocksCounter` is a counter kept to avoid unnecessary array reads. `SignedBlocksBitArray.Sum() == SignedBlocksCounter` always.
|
||||
|
||||
## Slashing Period
|
||||
|
||||
A slashing period is a start and end block height associated with a particular validator,
|
||||
within which only the "worst infraction counts" (see the [Overview](overview.md)): the total
|
||||
amount of slashing for infractions committed within the period (and discovered whenever) is
|
||||
capped at the penalty for the worst offense.
|
||||
|
||||
This period starts when a validator is first bonded and ends when a validator is slashed & jailed
|
||||
for any reason. When the validator rejoins the validator set (perhaps through unjailing themselves,
|
||||
and perhaps also changing signing keys), they enter into a new period.
|
||||
|
||||
Slashing periods are indexed in the store as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
- SlashingPeriod: ` 0x03 | ValTendermintAddr | StartHeight -> amino(slashingPeriod) `
|
||||
|
||||
This allows us to look up slashing period by a validator's address, the only lookup necessary,
|
||||
and iterate over start height to efficiently retrieve the most recent slashing period(s)
|
||||
or those beginning after a given height.
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type SlashingPeriod struct {
|
||||
ValidatorAddr sdk.ValAddress // Tendermint address of the validator
|
||||
StartHeight int64 // Block height at which slashing period begin
|
||||
EndHeight int64 // Block height at which slashing period ended
|
||||
SlashedSoFar sdk.Rat // Fraction slashed so far, cumulative
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,19 +1,40 @@
|
|||
## Transactions
|
||||
|
||||
### TxProveLive
|
||||
In this section we describe the processing of transactions for the `slashing` module.
|
||||
|
||||
If a validator was automatically unbonded due to liveness issues and wishes to
|
||||
assert it is still online, it can send `TxProveLive`:
|
||||
### Unjail
|
||||
|
||||
```golang
|
||||
type TxProveLive struct {
|
||||
PubKey crypto.PubKey
|
||||
If a validator was automatically unbonded due to downtime and wishes to come back online &
|
||||
possibly rejoin the bonded set, it must send `TxUnjail`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
type TxUnjail struct {
|
||||
ValidatorAddr sdk.AccAddress
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
handleMsgUnjail(tx TxUnjail)
|
||||
|
||||
validator = getValidator(tx.ValidatorAddr)
|
||||
if validator == nil
|
||||
fail with "No validator found"
|
||||
|
||||
if !validator.Jailed
|
||||
fail with "Validator not jailed, cannot unjail"
|
||||
|
||||
info = getValidatorSigningInfo(operator)
|
||||
if block time < info.JailedUntil
|
||||
fail with "Validator still jailed, cannot unjail until period has expired"
|
||||
|
||||
// Update the start height so the validator won't be immediately unbonded again
|
||||
info.StartHeight = BlockHeight
|
||||
setValidatorSigningInfo(info)
|
||||
|
||||
validator.Jailed = false
|
||||
setValidator(validator)
|
||||
|
||||
return
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
All delegators in the temporary unbonding pool which have not
|
||||
transacted to move will be bonded back to the now-live validator and begin to
|
||||
once again collect provisions and rewards.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
TODO: pseudo-code
|
||||
```
|
||||
If the validator has enough stake to be in the top `n = MaximumBondedValidators`, they will be automatically rebonded,
|
||||
and all delegators still delegated to the validator will be rebonded and begin to again collect
|
||||
provisions and rewards.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ package version
|
|||
|
||||
const Maj = "0"
|
||||
const Min = "24"
|
||||
const Fix = "1"
|
||||
const Fix = "2"
|
||||
|
||||
const Version = "0.24.1"
|
||||
const Version = "0.24.2"
|
||||
|
||||
// GitCommit set by build flags
|
||||
var GitCommit = ""
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue