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docs/spec/slashing/state-machine.md
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## Transaction & State Machine Interaction Overview # State Machine Interaction Overview
### Conceptual overview ## Conceptual overview
#### States ### States
At any given time, there are any number of validator candidates registered in the state machine. At any given time, there are any number of validator candidates registered in the state machine.
Each block, the top `n` candidates who are not jailed become *bonded*, meaning that they may propose and vote on blocks. Each block, the top `n` candidates who are not jailed become *bonded*, meaning that they may propose and vote on blocks.
Validators who are *bonded* are *at stake*, meaning that part or all of their stake is at risk if they commit a protocol fault. Validators who are *bonded* are *at stake*, meaning that part or all of their stake is at risk if they commit a protocol fault.
#### Slashing period ### Slashing period
In order to mitigate the impact of initially likely categories of non-malicious protocol faults, the Cosmos Hub implements for each validator In order to mitigate the impact of initially likely categories of non-malicious protocol faults, the Cosmos Hub implements for each validator
a *slashing period*, in which the amount by which a validator can be slashed is capped at the punishment for the worst violation. For example, a *slashing period*, in which the amount by which a validator can be slashed is capped at the punishment for the worst violation. For example,
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ A new slashing period starts whenever a validator is bonded and ends whenever th
The amount of tokens slashed relative to validator power for infractions committed within the slashing period, whenever they are discovered, is capped The amount of tokens slashed relative to validator power for infractions committed within the slashing period, whenever they are discovered, is capped
at the punishment for the worst infraction (which for the Cosmos Hub at launch will be double-signing a block). at the punishment for the worst infraction (which for the Cosmos Hub at launch will be double-signing a block).
##### ASCII timelines #### ASCII timelines
*Code* *Code*
@ -57,11 +57,11 @@ Multiple infractions are committed within a single slashing period then later di
The validator then unjails themself and rebonds, then commits a fourth infraction - which is discovered and punished at the full amount, since a new slashing period started The validator then unjails themself and rebonds, then commits a fourth infraction - which is discovered and punished at the full amount, since a new slashing period started
when they unjailed and rebonded. when they unjailed and rebonded.
### Transactions ## Transactions
In this section we describe the processing of transactions for the `slashing` module. In this section we describe the processing of transactions for the `slashing` module.
#### TxUnjail ### TxUnjail
If a validator was automatically unbonded due to downtime and wishes to come back online & If a validator was automatically unbonded due to downtime and wishes to come back online &
possibly rejoin the bonded set, it must send `TxUnjail`: possibly rejoin the bonded set, it must send `TxUnjail`:
@ -98,11 +98,11 @@ If the validator has enough stake to be in the top hundred, they will be automat
and all delegators still delegated to the validator will be rebonded and begin to again collect and all delegators still delegated to the validator will be rebonded and begin to again collect
provisions and rewards. provisions and rewards.
### Interactions ## Interactions
In this section we describe the "hooks" - slashing module code that runs when other events happen. In this section we describe the "hooks" - slashing module code that runs when other events happen.
#### Validator Bonded ### Validator Bonded
Upon successful bonding of a validator (a given validator changing from "unbonded" state to "bonded" state, Upon successful bonding of a validator (a given validator changing from "unbonded" state to "bonded" state,
which may happen on delegation, on unjailing, etc), we create a new `SlashingPeriod` structure for the which may happen on delegation, on unjailing, etc), we create a new `SlashingPeriod` structure for the
@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ onValidatorBonded(address sdk.ValAddress)
return return
``` ```
#### Validator Unbonded ### Validator Unbonded
When a validator is unbonded, we update the in-progress `SlashingPeriod` with the current block as the `EndHeight`: When a validator is unbonded, we update the in-progress `SlashingPeriod` with the current block as the `EndHeight`:
@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ onValidatorUnbonded(address sdk.ValAddress)
return return
``` ```
#### Validator Slashed ### Validator Slashed
When a validator is slashed, we look up the appropriate `SlashingPeriod` based on the validator When a validator is slashed, we look up the appropriate `SlashingPeriod` based on the validator
address and the time of infraction, cap the fraction slashed as `max(SlashFraction, SlashedSoFar)` address and the time of infraction, cap the fraction slashed as `max(SlashFraction, SlashedSoFar)`
@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ whereas if they had `1000` steak bonded initially, the total amount slashed woul
This means that any slashing events which utilize the slashing period (are capped-per-period) **must** *also* jail the validator when the infraction is discovered. This means that any slashing events which utilize the slashing period (are capped-per-period) **must** *also* jail the validator when the infraction is discovered.
Otherwise it would be possible for a validator to slash themselves intentionally at a low bond, then increase their bond but no longer be at stake since they would have already hit the `SlashedSoFar` cap. Otherwise it would be possible for a validator to slash themselves intentionally at a low bond, then increase their bond but no longer be at stake since they would have already hit the `SlashedSoFar` cap.
### State Cleanup ## State Cleanup
Once no evidence for a given slashing period can possibly be valid (the end time plus the unbonding period is less than the current time), Once no evidence for a given slashing period can possibly be valid (the end time plus the unbonding period is less than the current time),
old slashing periods should be cleaned up. This will be implemented post-launch. old slashing periods should be cleaned up. This will be implemented post-launch.

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docs/spec/slashing/state.md
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## State # State
### Signing Info ## Signing Info
Every block includes a set of precommits by the validators for the previous block, Every block includes a set of precommits by the validators for the previous block,
known as the LastCommit. A LastCommit is valid so long as it contains precommits from +2/3 of voting power. known as the LastCommit. A LastCommit is valid so long as it contains precommits from +2/3 of voting power.
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Where:
* `JailedUntil` is set whenever the candidate is revoked due to downtime * `JailedUntil` is set whenever the candidate is revoked due to downtime
* `SignedBlocksCounter` is a counter kept to avoid unnecessary array reads. `SignedBlocksBitArray.Sum() == SignedBlocksCounter` always. * `SignedBlocksCounter` is a counter kept to avoid unnecessary array reads. `SignedBlocksBitArray.Sum() == SignedBlocksCounter` always.
### Slashing Period ## Slashing Period
A slashing period is a start and end block height associated with a particular validator, A slashing period is a start and end block height associated with a particular validator,
within which only the "worst infraction counts": the total amount of slashing for within which only the "worst infraction counts": the total amount of slashing for