# End-Block ## Slashing Tendermint blocks can include [Evidence](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/develop/docs/spec/blockchain/blockchain.md#evidence), which indicates that a validator committed malicious behaviour. The relevant information is forwarded to the application as [ABCI Evidence](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/develop/abci/types/types.proto#L259), so the validator an be accordingly punished. For some `evidence` to be valid, it must satisfy: `evidence.Timestamp >= block.Timestamp - MAX_EVIDENCE_AGE` where `evidence.Timestamp` is the timestamp in the block at height `evidence.Height` and `block.Timestamp` is the current block timestamp. If valid evidence is included in a block, the validator's stake is reduced by `SLASH_PROPORTION` of what their stake was when the infraction occurred (rather than when the evidence was discovered). We want to "follow the stake": the stake which contributed to the infraction should be slashed, even if it has since been redelegated or started unbonding. We first need to loop through the unbondings and redelegations from the slashed validator and track how much stake has since moved: ``` slashAmountUnbondings := 0 slashAmountRedelegations := 0 unbondings := getUnbondings(validator.Address) for unbond in unbondings { if was not bonded before evidence.Height or started unbonding before unbonding period ago { continue } burn := unbond.InitialTokens * SLASH_PROPORTION slashAmountUnbondings += burn unbond.Tokens = max(0, unbond.Tokens - burn) } // only care if source gets slashed because we're already bonded to destination // so if destination validator gets slashed our delegation just has same shares // of smaller pool. redels := getRedelegationsBySource(validator.Address) for redel in redels { if was not bonded before evidence.Height or started redelegating before unbonding period ago { continue } burn := redel.InitialTokens * SLASH_PROPORTION slashAmountRedelegations += burn amount := unbondFromValidator(redel.Destination, burn) destroy(amount) } ``` We then slash the validator: ``` curVal := validator oldVal := loadValidator(evidence.Height, evidence.Address) slashAmount := SLASH_PROPORTION * oldVal.Shares slashAmount -= slashAmountUnbondings slashAmount -= slashAmountRedelegations curVal.Shares = max(0, curVal.Shares - slashAmount) ``` This ensures that offending validators are punished the same amount whether they act as a single validator with X stake or as N validators with collectively X stake. ## Automatic Unbonding At the beginning of each block, we update the signing info for each validator and check if they should be automatically unbonded: ``` height := block.Height for val in block.Validators: signInfo = SigningInfo.Get(val.Address) if signInfo == nil{ signInfo.StartHeight = height } index := signInfo.IndexOffset % SIGNED_BLOCKS_WINDOW signInfo.IndexOffset++ previous = SigningBitArray.Get(val.Address, index) // update counter if array has changed if previous and val in block.AbsentValidators: SigningBitArray.Set(val.Address, index, false) signInfo.SignedBlocksCounter-- else if !previous and val not in block.AbsentValidators: SigningBitArray.Set(val.Address, index, true) signInfo.SignedBlocksCounter++ // else previous == val not in block.AbsentValidators, no change // validator must be active for at least SIGNED_BLOCKS_WINDOW // before they can be automatically unbonded for failing to be // included in 50% of the recent LastCommits minHeight = signInfo.StartHeight + SIGNED_BLOCKS_WINDOW minSigned = SIGNED_BLOCKS_WINDOW / 2 if height > minHeight AND signInfo.SignedBlocksCounter < minSigned: signInfo.JailedUntil = block.Time + DOWNTIME_UNBOND_DURATION slash & unbond the validator SigningInfo.Set(val.Address, signInfo) ```