rewarding
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@ -8,17 +8,18 @@ voters need to recover from voting on such forks.
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* Many forks may be votable by different voters, and each voter may see a
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different set of votable forks. The selected forks should eventually converge
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for the network.
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for the cluster.
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* Reward based votes have an associated risk. Voters should have the ability to
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configure how much risk they take on.
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* The [cost of rollback](#cost-of-rollback) is important to clients that rely on
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a measure of Consistency. It needs to be computable, and increase
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super-linearly for older votes.
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* The [cost of rollback](#cost-of-rollback) needs to be computable. It is
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important to clients that rely on some measurable form of Consistency. The
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costs to break consistency need to be computable, and increase super-linearly
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for older votes.
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* ASIC speeds are different between nodes, and attackers could employ Proof of
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History ASICS that are much faster than the rest of the network. Consensus
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History ASICS that are much faster than the rest of the cluster. Consensus
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needs to be resistant to attacks that exploit the variability in Proof of
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History ASIC speed.
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@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ votes.
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### Slashing and Rewards
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Voters should be rewarded for selecting the fork that the rest of the network
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Voters should be rewarded for selecting the fork that the rest of the cluster
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selected as often as possible. This is well-aligned with generating a reward
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when the vote stack is full and the oldest vote needs to be dequeued. Thus a
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reward should be generated for each successful dequeue.
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@ -125,10 +126,10 @@ confirmed *fork A*.
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### Thresholds
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Each voter can independently set a threshold of network commitment to a fork
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Each voter can independently set a threshold of cluster commitment to a fork
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before that voter commits to a fork. For example, at vote stack index 7, the
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lockout is 256 time units. A voter may withhold votes and let votes 0-7 expire
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unless the vote at index 7 has at greater than 50% commitment in the network.
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unless the vote at index 7 has at greater than 50% commitment in the cluster.
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This allows each voter to independently control how much risk to commit to a
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fork. Committing to forks at a higher frequency would allow the voter to earn
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more rewards.
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@ -140,9 +141,9 @@ These parameters need to be tuned.
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* Number of votes in the stack before dequeue occurs (32).
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* Rate of growth for lockouts in the stack (2x).
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* Starting default lockout (2).
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* Threshold depth for minimum network commitment before committing to the fork
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* Threshold depth for minimum cluster commitment before committing to the fork
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(8).
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* Minimum network commitment size at threshold depth (50%+).
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* Minimum cluster commitment size at threshold depth (50%+).
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### Free Choice
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@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ service. Two options exits for voter:
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* a voter can withhold a vote to observe multiple forks before voting
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In both cases, the voters in the network have several forks to pick from
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In both cases, the voters in the cluster have several forks to pick from
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concurrently, even though each fork represents a different height. In both
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cases it is impossible for the protocol to detect if the voter behavior is
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intentional or not.
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@ -196,14 +197,14 @@ must satisfy the *Greedy Choice* rule.
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3. Fork must have a greater amount of cluster transaction fees.
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This attack is then limited to censoring the previous leaders fees, and
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individual transactions. But it cannot halt the network, or reduce the
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individual transactions. But it cannot halt the cluster, or reduce the
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validator set compared to the concurrent fork. Fee censorship is limited to
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access fees going to the leaders but not the validators.
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### ASIC Rollback
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An attacker generates a concurrent fork from an older block to try to rollback
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the network. In this attack the concurrent fork is competing with forks that
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the cluster. In this attack the concurrent fork is competing with forks that
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have already been voted on. This attack is limited by the exponential growth of
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the lockouts.
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