Place Sapling circuit into submodule.
This commit is contained in:
Sean Bowe
parent
ca202ef304
commit
21625d69e0
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@ -11,28 +11,10 @@ pub mod ecc;
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pub mod pedersen_hash;
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pub mod multipack;
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use pairing::{
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PrimeField,
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PrimeFieldRepr,
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};
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pub mod sapling;
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use bellman::{
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SynthesisError,
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ConstraintSystem,
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Circuit
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};
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use jubjub::{
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JubjubEngine,
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FixedGenerators
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};
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use constants;
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use primitives::{
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ValueCommitment,
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ProofGenerationKey,
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PaymentAddress
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SynthesisError
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};
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// TODO: This should probably be removed and we
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@ -53,721 +35,3 @@ impl<T> Assignment<T> for Option<T> {
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}
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}
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}
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/// This is an instance of the `Spend` circuit.
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pub struct Spend<'a, E: JubjubEngine> {
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pub params: &'a E::Params,
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/// Pedersen commitment to the value being spent
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pub value_commitment: Option<ValueCommitment<E>>,
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/// Key required to construct proofs for spending notes
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/// for a particular spending key
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pub proof_generation_key: Option<ProofGenerationKey<E>>,
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/// The payment address associated with the note
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pub payment_address: Option<PaymentAddress<E>>,
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/// The randomness of the note commitment
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pub commitment_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
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/// The authentication path of the commitment in the tree
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pub auth_path: Vec<Option<(E::Fr, bool)>>
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}
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/// This is an output circuit instance.
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pub struct Output<'a, E: JubjubEngine> {
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pub params: &'a E::Params,
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/// Pedersen commitment to the value being spent
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pub value_commitment: Option<ValueCommitment<E>>,
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/// The payment address of the recipient
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pub payment_address: Option<PaymentAddress<E>>,
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/// The randomness used to hide the note commitment data
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pub commitment_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
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/// The ephemeral secret key for DH with recipient
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pub esk: Option<E::Fs>
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}
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/// Exposes a Pedersen commitment to the value as an
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/// input to the circuit
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fn expose_value_commitment<E, CS>(
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mut cs: CS,
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value_commitment: Option<ValueCommitment<E>>,
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params: &E::Params
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) -> Result<Vec<boolean::Boolean>, SynthesisError>
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where E: JubjubEngine,
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CS: ConstraintSystem<E>
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{
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// Booleanize the value into little-endian bit order
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let value_bits = boolean::u64_into_boolean_vec_le(
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cs.namespace(|| "value"),
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value_commitment.as_ref().map(|c| c.value)
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)?;
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// Compute the note value in the exponent
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let gv = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
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cs.namespace(|| "compute the value in the exponent"),
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FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentValue,
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&value_bits,
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params
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)?;
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// Booleanize the randomness. This does not ensure
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// the bit representation is "in the field" because
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// it doesn't matter for security.
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let hr = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
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cs.namespace(|| "hr"),
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value_commitment.as_ref().map(|c| c.randomness)
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)?;
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// Compute the randomness in the exponent
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let hr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
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cs.namespace(|| "computation of randomization for value commitment"),
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FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentRandomness,
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&hr,
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params
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)?;
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// Compute the Pedersen commitment to the value
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let gvhr = gv.add(
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cs.namespace(|| "computation of value commitment"),
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&hr,
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params
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)?;
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// Expose the commitment as an input to the circuit
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gvhr.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "commitment point"))?;
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Ok(value_bits)
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}
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impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
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fn synthesize<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(self, cs: &mut CS) -> Result<(), SynthesisError>
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{
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let value_bits = expose_value_commitment(
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cs.namespace(|| "value commitment"),
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self.value_commitment,
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self.params
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)?;
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// Compute rk = [rsk] ProvingPublicKey
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let rk;
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{
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// Witness rsk as bits
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let rsk = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
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cs.namespace(|| "rsk"),
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self.proof_generation_key.as_ref().map(|k| k.rsk.clone())
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)?;
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// NB: We don't ensure that the bit representation of rsk
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// is "in the field" (Fs) because it's not used except to
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// demonstrate the prover knows it. If they know a
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// congruency then that's equivalent.
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// Compute rk = [rsk] ProvingPublicKey
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rk = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
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cs.namespace(|| "computation of rk"),
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FixedGenerators::ProofGenerationKey,
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&rsk,
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self.params
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)?;
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}
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// Prover witnesses ak (ensures that it's on the curve)
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let ak = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
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cs.namespace(|| "ak"),
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self.proof_generation_key.as_ref().map(|k| k.ak.clone()),
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self.params
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)?;
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// There are no sensible attacks on small order points
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// of ak (that we're aware of!) but it's a cheap check,
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// so we do it.
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ak.assert_not_small_order(
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cs.namespace(|| "ak not small order"),
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self.params
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)?;
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// Unpack ak and rk for input to BLAKE2s
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// This is the "viewing key" preimage for CRH^ivk
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let mut vk = vec![];
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vk.extend(
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ak.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of ak"))?
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);
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// This is the nullifier randomness preimage for PRF^nr
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let mut nr_preimage = vec![];
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// Extend vk and nr preimages with the representation of
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// rk.
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{
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let repr_rk = rk.repr(
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cs.namespace(|| "representation of rk")
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)?;
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vk.extend(repr_rk.iter().cloned());
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nr_preimage.extend(repr_rk);
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}
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assert_eq!(vk.len(), 512);
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assert_eq!(nr_preimage.len(), 256);
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// Compute the incoming viewing key ivk
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let mut ivk = blake2s::blake2s(
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cs.namespace(|| "computation of ivk"),
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&vk,
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constants::CRH_IVK_PERSONALIZATION
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)?;
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// Little endian bit order
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ivk.reverse();
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// drop_5 to ensure it's in the field
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ivk.truncate(E::Fs::CAPACITY as usize);
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// Witness g_d. Ensures the point is on the
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// curve, but not its order. If the prover
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// manages to witness a commitment in the
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// tree, then the Output circuit would have
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// already guaranteed this.
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let g_d = {
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// This binding is to avoid a weird edge case in Rust's
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// ownership/borrowing rules. self is partially moved
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// above, but the closure for and_then will have to
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// move self (or a reference to self) to reference
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// self.params, so we have to copy self.params here.
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let params = self.params;
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ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
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cs.namespace(|| "witness g_d"),
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self.payment_address.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.g_d(params)),
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self.params
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)?
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};
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// Check that g_d is not small order. Technically, this check
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// is already done in the Output circuit, and this proof ensures
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// g_d is bound to a product of that check, but for defense in
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// depth let's check it anyway. It's cheap.
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g_d.assert_not_small_order(cs.namespace(|| "g_d not small order"), self.params)?;
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// Compute pk_d = g_d^ivk
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let pk_d = g_d.mul(
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cs.namespace(|| "compute pk_d"),
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&ivk,
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self.params
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)?;
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// Compute note contents
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// value (in big endian) followed by g_d and pk_d
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let mut note_contents = vec![];
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note_contents.extend(value_bits.into_iter().rev());
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note_contents.extend(
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g_d.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of g_d"))?
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);
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note_contents.extend(
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pk_d.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of pk_d"))?
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);
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assert_eq!(
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note_contents.len(),
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64 + // value
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256 + // g_d
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256 // p_d
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);
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// Compute the hash of the note contents
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let mut cm = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
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cs.namespace(|| "note content hash"),
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pedersen_hash::Personalization::NoteCommitment,
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¬e_contents,
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self.params
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)?;
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{
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// Booleanize the randomness for the note commitment
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let cmr = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
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cs.namespace(|| "cmr"),
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self.commitment_randomness
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)?;
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// Compute the note commitment randomness in the exponent
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let cmr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
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cs.namespace(|| "computation of commitment randomness"),
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FixedGenerators::NoteCommitmentRandomness,
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&cmr,
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self.params
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)?;
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// Randomize the note commitment. Pedersen hashes are not
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// themselves hiding commitments.
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cm = cm.add(
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cs.namespace(|| "randomization of note commitment"),
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&cmr,
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self.params
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)?;
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}
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let tree_depth = self.auth_path.len();
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// This will store (least significant bit first)
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// the position of the note in the tree, for use
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// in nullifier computation.
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let mut position_bits = vec![];
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// This is an injective encoding, as cur is a
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// point in the prime order subgroup.
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let mut cur = cm.get_x().clone();
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for (i, e) in self.auth_path.into_iter().enumerate() {
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let cs = &mut cs.namespace(|| format!("merkle tree hash {}", i));
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// Determines if the current subtree is the "right" leaf at this
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// depth of the tree.
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let cur_is_right = boolean::Boolean::from(boolean::AllocatedBit::alloc(
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cs.namespace(|| "position bit"),
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e.map(|e| e.1)
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)?);
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// Push this boolean for nullifier computation later
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position_bits.push(cur_is_right.clone());
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// Witness the authentication path element adjacent
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// at this depth.
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let path_element = num::AllocatedNum::alloc(
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cs.namespace(|| "path element"),
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|| {
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Ok(e.get()?.0)
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}
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)?;
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// Swap the two if the current subtree is on the right
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let (xl, xr) = num::AllocatedNum::conditionally_reverse(
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cs.namespace(|| "conditional reversal of preimage"),
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&cur,
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&path_element,
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&cur_is_right
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)?;
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// We don't need to be strict, because the function is
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// collision-resistant. If the prover witnesses a congruency,
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// they will be unable to find an authentication path in the
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// tree with high probability.
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let mut preimage = vec![];
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preimage.extend(xl.into_bits_le(cs.namespace(|| "xl into bits"))?);
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preimage.extend(xr.into_bits_le(cs.namespace(|| "xr into bits"))?);
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// Compute the new subtree value
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cur = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
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cs.namespace(|| "computation of pedersen hash"),
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pedersen_hash::Personalization::MerkleTree(i),
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&preimage,
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self.params
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)?.get_x().clone(); // Injective encoding
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}
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assert_eq!(position_bits.len(), tree_depth);
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// Expose the anchor
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cur.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "anchor"))?;
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// Compute the cm + g^position for preventing
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// faerie gold attacks
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{
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// Compute the position in the exponent
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let position = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
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cs.namespace(|| "g^position"),
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FixedGenerators::NullifierPosition,
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&position_bits,
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self.params
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)?;
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// Add the position to the commitment
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cm = cm.add(
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cs.namespace(|| "faerie gold prevention"),
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&position,
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self.params
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)?;
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}
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// Let's compute nr = BLAKE2s(rk || cm + position)
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nr_preimage.extend(
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cm.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of cm"))?
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);
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assert_eq!(nr_preimage.len(), 512);
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// Compute nr
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let mut nr = blake2s::blake2s(
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cs.namespace(|| "nr computation"),
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&nr_preimage,
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constants::PRF_NR_PERSONALIZATION
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)?;
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// Little endian bit order
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nr.reverse();
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// We want the randomization in the field to
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// simplify outside code.
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// TODO: This isn't uniformly random.
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nr.truncate(E::Fs::CAPACITY as usize);
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// Compute nullifier
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let nf = ak.mul(
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cs.namespace(|| "computation of nf"),
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&nr,
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self.params
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)?;
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// Expose the nullifier publicly
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nf.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "nullifier"))?;
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Output<'a, E> {
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fn synthesize<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(self, cs: &mut CS) -> Result<(), SynthesisError>
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{
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let value_bits = expose_value_commitment(
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cs.namespace(|| "value commitment"),
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self.value_commitment,
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self.params
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)?;
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// Let's start to construct our note, which contains
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// value (big endian)
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let mut note_contents = vec![];
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note_contents.extend(value_bits.into_iter().rev());
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// Let's deal with g_d
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{
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let params = self.params;
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// Prover witnesses g_d, ensuring it's on the
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// curve.
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let g_d = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
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cs.namespace(|| "witness g_d"),
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self.payment_address.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.g_d(params)),
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self.params
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)?;
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// g_d is ensured to be large order. The relationship
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// between g_d and pk_d ultimately binds ivk to the
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// note. If this were a small order point, it would
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// not do this correctly, and the prover could
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// double-spend by finding random ivk's that satisfy
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// the relationship.
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//
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// Further, if it were small order, epk would be
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// small order too!
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g_d.assert_not_small_order(
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cs.namespace(|| "g_d not small order"),
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self.params
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)?;
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// Extend our note contents with the representation of
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// g_d.
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note_contents.extend(
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g_d.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of g_d"))?
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);
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// Booleanize our ephemeral secret key
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let esk = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
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cs.namespace(|| "esk"),
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self.esk
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)?;
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// Create the ephemeral public key from g_d.
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let epk = g_d.mul(
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cs.namespace(|| "epk computation"),
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&esk,
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self.params
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)?;
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// Expose epk publicly.
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epk.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "epk"))?;
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}
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// Now let's deal with pk_d. We don't do any checks and
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// essentially allow the prover to witness any 256 bits
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// they would like.
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{
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// Just grab pk_d from the witness
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let pk_d = self.payment_address.as_ref().map(|e| e.pk_d.into_xy());
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// Witness the y-coordinate, encoded as little
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// endian bits (to match the representation)
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let y_contents = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
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cs.namespace(|| "pk_d bits of y"),
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pk_d.map(|e| e.1)
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)?;
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// Witness the sign bit
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let sign_bit = boolean::Boolean::from(boolean::AllocatedBit::alloc(
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cs.namespace(|| "pk_d bit of x"),
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pk_d.map(|e| e.0.into_repr().is_odd())
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)?);
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// Extend the note with pk_d representation
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note_contents.extend(y_contents);
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note_contents.push(sign_bit);
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}
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assert_eq!(
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note_contents.len(),
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64 + // value
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256 + // g_d
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256 // p_d
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);
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// Compute the hash of the note contents
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||||
let mut cm = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "note content hash"),
|
||||
pedersen_hash::Personalization::NoteCommitment,
|
||||
¬e_contents,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Booleanize the randomness
|
||||
let cmr = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "cmr"),
|
||||
self.commitment_randomness
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the note commitment randomness in the exponent
|
||||
let cmr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "computation of commitment randomness"),
|
||||
FixedGenerators::NoteCommitmentRandomness,
|
||||
&cmr,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Randomize our note commitment
|
||||
cm = cm.add(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "randomization of note commitment"),
|
||||
&cmr,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Only the x-coordinate of the output is revealed,
|
||||
// since we know it is prime order, and we know that
|
||||
// the x-coordinate is an injective encoding for
|
||||
// prime-order elements.
|
||||
cm.get_x().inputize(cs.namespace(|| "commitment"))?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_input_circuit_with_bls12_381() {
|
||||
use pairing::{Field, BitIterator};
|
||||
use pairing::bls12_381::*;
|
||||
use rand::{SeedableRng, Rng, XorShiftRng};
|
||||
use ::circuit::test::*;
|
||||
use jubjub::{JubjubBls12, fs, edwards};
|
||||
|
||||
let params = &JubjubBls12::new();
|
||||
let rng = &mut XorShiftRng::from_seed([0x3dbe6259, 0x8d313d76, 0x3237db17, 0xe5bc0654]);
|
||||
|
||||
let tree_depth = 32;
|
||||
|
||||
let value_commitment = ValueCommitment {
|
||||
value: rng.gen(),
|
||||
randomness: rng.gen()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let rsk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
|
||||
let ak = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params).mul_by_cofactor(params);
|
||||
|
||||
let proof_generation_key = ::primitives::ProofGenerationKey {
|
||||
ak: ak.clone(),
|
||||
rsk: rsk.clone()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let viewing_key = proof_generation_key.into_viewing_key(params);
|
||||
|
||||
let payment_address;
|
||||
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let diversifier = ::primitives::Diversifier(rng.gen());
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(p) = viewing_key.into_payment_address(
|
||||
diversifier,
|
||||
params
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
payment_address = p;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let g_d = payment_address.diversifier.g_d(params).unwrap();
|
||||
let commitment_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
|
||||
let auth_path = vec![Some((rng.gen(), rng.gen())); tree_depth];
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut cs = TestConstraintSystem::<Bls12>::new();
|
||||
|
||||
let instance = Spend {
|
||||
params: params,
|
||||
value_commitment: Some(value_commitment.clone()),
|
||||
proof_generation_key: Some(proof_generation_key.clone()),
|
||||
payment_address: Some(payment_address.clone()),
|
||||
commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness),
|
||||
auth_path: auth_path.clone()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
instance.synthesize(&mut cs).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(cs.is_satisfied());
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.num_constraints(), 101018);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.hash(), "eedcef5fd638e0168ae4d53ac58df66f0acdabea46749cc5f4b39459c8377804");
|
||||
|
||||
let expected_value_cm = value_commitment.cm(params).into_xy();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.num_inputs(), 6);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(0, "ONE"), Fr::one());
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(1, "value commitment/commitment point/x/input variable"), expected_value_cm.0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(2, "value commitment/commitment point/y/input variable"), expected_value_cm.1);
|
||||
|
||||
let note = ::primitives::Note {
|
||||
value: value_commitment.value,
|
||||
g_d: g_d.clone(),
|
||||
pk_d: payment_address.pk_d.clone(),
|
||||
r: commitment_randomness.clone()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut position = 0u64;
|
||||
let mut cur = note.cm(params);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get("randomization of note commitment/x3/num"), cur);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i, val) in auth_path.into_iter().enumerate()
|
||||
{
|
||||
let (uncle, b) = val.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut lhs = cur;
|
||||
let mut rhs = uncle;
|
||||
|
||||
if b {
|
||||
::std::mem::swap(&mut lhs, &mut rhs);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut lhs: Vec<bool> = BitIterator::new(lhs.into_repr()).collect();
|
||||
let mut rhs: Vec<bool> = BitIterator::new(rhs.into_repr()).collect();
|
||||
|
||||
lhs.reverse();
|
||||
rhs.reverse();
|
||||
|
||||
cur = ::pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash::<Bls12, _>(
|
||||
::pedersen_hash::Personalization::MerkleTree(i),
|
||||
lhs.into_iter()
|
||||
.take(Fr::NUM_BITS as usize)
|
||||
.chain(rhs.into_iter().take(Fr::NUM_BITS as usize)),
|
||||
params
|
||||
).into_xy().0;
|
||||
|
||||
if b {
|
||||
position |= 1 << i;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let expected_nf = note.nf(&viewing_key, position, params);
|
||||
let expected_nf_xy = expected_nf.into_xy();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(3, "anchor/input variable"), cur);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(4, "nullifier/x/input variable"), expected_nf_xy.0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(5, "nullifier/y/input variable"), expected_nf_xy.1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_output_circuit_with_bls12_381() {
|
||||
use pairing::{Field};
|
||||
use pairing::bls12_381::*;
|
||||
use rand::{SeedableRng, Rng, XorShiftRng};
|
||||
use ::circuit::test::*;
|
||||
use jubjub::{JubjubBls12, fs, edwards};
|
||||
|
||||
let params = &JubjubBls12::new();
|
||||
let rng = &mut XorShiftRng::from_seed([0x3dbe6258, 0x8d313d76, 0x3237db17, 0xe5bc0654]);
|
||||
|
||||
let value_commitment = ValueCommitment {
|
||||
value: rng.gen(),
|
||||
randomness: rng.gen()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let rsk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
|
||||
let ak = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params).mul_by_cofactor(params);
|
||||
|
||||
let proof_generation_key = ::primitives::ProofGenerationKey {
|
||||
ak: ak.clone(),
|
||||
rsk: rsk.clone()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let viewing_key = proof_generation_key.into_viewing_key(params);
|
||||
|
||||
let payment_address;
|
||||
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let diversifier = ::primitives::Diversifier(rng.gen());
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(p) = viewing_key.into_payment_address(
|
||||
diversifier,
|
||||
params
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
payment_address = p;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let commitment_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
|
||||
let esk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut cs = TestConstraintSystem::<Bls12>::new();
|
||||
|
||||
let instance = Output {
|
||||
params: params,
|
||||
value_commitment: Some(value_commitment.clone()),
|
||||
payment_address: Some(payment_address.clone()),
|
||||
commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness),
|
||||
esk: Some(esk.clone())
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
instance.synthesize(&mut cs).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(cs.is_satisfied());
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.num_constraints(), 7827);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.hash(), "2896f259ad7a50c83604976ee9362358396d547b70f2feaf91d82d287e4ffc1d");
|
||||
|
||||
let expected_cm = payment_address.create_note(
|
||||
value_commitment.value,
|
||||
commitment_randomness,
|
||||
params
|
||||
).expect("should be valid").cm(params);
|
||||
|
||||
let expected_value_cm = value_commitment.cm(params).into_xy();
|
||||
|
||||
let expected_epk = payment_address.g_d(params).expect("should be valid").mul(esk, params);
|
||||
let expected_epk_xy = expected_epk.into_xy();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.num_inputs(), 6);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(0, "ONE"), Fr::one());
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(1, "value commitment/commitment point/x/input variable"), expected_value_cm.0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(2, "value commitment/commitment point/y/input variable"), expected_value_cm.1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(3, "epk/x/input variable"), expected_epk_xy.0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(4, "epk/y/input variable"), expected_epk_xy.1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(5, "commitment/input variable"), expected_cm);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,748 @@
|
|||
use pairing::{
|
||||
PrimeField,
|
||||
PrimeFieldRepr,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use bellman::{
|
||||
SynthesisError,
|
||||
ConstraintSystem,
|
||||
Circuit
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use jubjub::{
|
||||
JubjubEngine,
|
||||
FixedGenerators
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use constants;
|
||||
|
||||
use primitives::{
|
||||
ValueCommitment,
|
||||
ProofGenerationKey,
|
||||
PaymentAddress
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use super::Assignment;
|
||||
use super::boolean;
|
||||
use super::ecc;
|
||||
use super::pedersen_hash;
|
||||
use super::blake2s;
|
||||
use super::num;
|
||||
|
||||
/// This is an instance of the `Spend` circuit.
|
||||
pub struct Spend<'a, E: JubjubEngine> {
|
||||
pub params: &'a E::Params,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Pedersen commitment to the value being spent
|
||||
pub value_commitment: Option<ValueCommitment<E>>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Key required to construct proofs for spending notes
|
||||
/// for a particular spending key
|
||||
pub proof_generation_key: Option<ProofGenerationKey<E>>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The payment address associated with the note
|
||||
pub payment_address: Option<PaymentAddress<E>>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The randomness of the note commitment
|
||||
pub commitment_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The authentication path of the commitment in the tree
|
||||
pub auth_path: Vec<Option<(E::Fr, bool)>>
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// This is an output circuit instance.
|
||||
pub struct Output<'a, E: JubjubEngine> {
|
||||
pub params: &'a E::Params,
|
||||
|
||||
/// Pedersen commitment to the value being spent
|
||||
pub value_commitment: Option<ValueCommitment<E>>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The payment address of the recipient
|
||||
pub payment_address: Option<PaymentAddress<E>>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The randomness used to hide the note commitment data
|
||||
pub commitment_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
|
||||
|
||||
/// The ephemeral secret key for DH with recipient
|
||||
pub esk: Option<E::Fs>
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Exposes a Pedersen commitment to the value as an
|
||||
/// input to the circuit
|
||||
fn expose_value_commitment<E, CS>(
|
||||
mut cs: CS,
|
||||
value_commitment: Option<ValueCommitment<E>>,
|
||||
params: &E::Params
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<boolean::Boolean>, SynthesisError>
|
||||
where E: JubjubEngine,
|
||||
CS: ConstraintSystem<E>
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Booleanize the value into little-endian bit order
|
||||
let value_bits = boolean::u64_into_boolean_vec_le(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "value"),
|
||||
value_commitment.as_ref().map(|c| c.value)
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the note value in the exponent
|
||||
let gv = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "compute the value in the exponent"),
|
||||
FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentValue,
|
||||
&value_bits,
|
||||
params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Booleanize the randomness. This does not ensure
|
||||
// the bit representation is "in the field" because
|
||||
// it doesn't matter for security.
|
||||
let hr = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "hr"),
|
||||
value_commitment.as_ref().map(|c| c.randomness)
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the randomness in the exponent
|
||||
let hr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "computation of randomization for value commitment"),
|
||||
FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentRandomness,
|
||||
&hr,
|
||||
params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the Pedersen commitment to the value
|
||||
let gvhr = gv.add(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "computation of value commitment"),
|
||||
&hr,
|
||||
params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Expose the commitment as an input to the circuit
|
||||
gvhr.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "commitment point"))?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(value_bits)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
|
||||
fn synthesize<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(self, cs: &mut CS) -> Result<(), SynthesisError>
|
||||
{
|
||||
let value_bits = expose_value_commitment(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "value commitment"),
|
||||
self.value_commitment,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute rk = [rsk] ProvingPublicKey
|
||||
let rk;
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Witness rsk as bits
|
||||
let rsk = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "rsk"),
|
||||
self.proof_generation_key.as_ref().map(|k| k.rsk.clone())
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// NB: We don't ensure that the bit representation of rsk
|
||||
// is "in the field" (Fs) because it's not used except to
|
||||
// demonstrate the prover knows it. If they know a
|
||||
// congruency then that's equivalent.
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute rk = [rsk] ProvingPublicKey
|
||||
rk = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "computation of rk"),
|
||||
FixedGenerators::ProofGenerationKey,
|
||||
&rsk,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Prover witnesses ak (ensures that it's on the curve)
|
||||
let ak = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "ak"),
|
||||
self.proof_generation_key.as_ref().map(|k| k.ak.clone()),
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// There are no sensible attacks on small order points
|
||||
// of ak (that we're aware of!) but it's a cheap check,
|
||||
// so we do it.
|
||||
ak.assert_not_small_order(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "ak not small order"),
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Unpack ak and rk for input to BLAKE2s
|
||||
|
||||
// This is the "viewing key" preimage for CRH^ivk
|
||||
let mut vk = vec![];
|
||||
vk.extend(
|
||||
ak.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of ak"))?
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// This is the nullifier randomness preimage for PRF^nr
|
||||
let mut nr_preimage = vec![];
|
||||
|
||||
// Extend vk and nr preimages with the representation of
|
||||
// rk.
|
||||
{
|
||||
let repr_rk = rk.repr(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "representation of rk")
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
vk.extend(repr_rk.iter().cloned());
|
||||
nr_preimage.extend(repr_rk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(vk.len(), 512);
|
||||
assert_eq!(nr_preimage.len(), 256);
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the incoming viewing key ivk
|
||||
let mut ivk = blake2s::blake2s(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "computation of ivk"),
|
||||
&vk,
|
||||
constants::CRH_IVK_PERSONALIZATION
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Little endian bit order
|
||||
ivk.reverse();
|
||||
|
||||
// drop_5 to ensure it's in the field
|
||||
ivk.truncate(E::Fs::CAPACITY as usize);
|
||||
|
||||
// Witness g_d. Ensures the point is on the
|
||||
// curve, but not its order. If the prover
|
||||
// manages to witness a commitment in the
|
||||
// tree, then the Output circuit would have
|
||||
// already guaranteed this.
|
||||
let g_d = {
|
||||
// This binding is to avoid a weird edge case in Rust's
|
||||
// ownership/borrowing rules. self is partially moved
|
||||
// above, but the closure for and_then will have to
|
||||
// move self (or a reference to self) to reference
|
||||
// self.params, so we have to copy self.params here.
|
||||
let params = self.params;
|
||||
|
||||
ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "witness g_d"),
|
||||
self.payment_address.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.g_d(params)),
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that g_d is not small order. Technically, this check
|
||||
// is already done in the Output circuit, and this proof ensures
|
||||
// g_d is bound to a product of that check, but for defense in
|
||||
// depth let's check it anyway. It's cheap.
|
||||
g_d.assert_not_small_order(cs.namespace(|| "g_d not small order"), self.params)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute pk_d = g_d^ivk
|
||||
let pk_d = g_d.mul(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "compute pk_d"),
|
||||
&ivk,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute note contents
|
||||
// value (in big endian) followed by g_d and pk_d
|
||||
let mut note_contents = vec![];
|
||||
note_contents.extend(value_bits.into_iter().rev());
|
||||
note_contents.extend(
|
||||
g_d.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of g_d"))?
|
||||
);
|
||||
note_contents.extend(
|
||||
pk_d.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of pk_d"))?
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
note_contents.len(),
|
||||
64 + // value
|
||||
256 + // g_d
|
||||
256 // p_d
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the hash of the note contents
|
||||
let mut cm = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "note content hash"),
|
||||
pedersen_hash::Personalization::NoteCommitment,
|
||||
¬e_contents,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Booleanize the randomness for the note commitment
|
||||
let cmr = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "cmr"),
|
||||
self.commitment_randomness
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the note commitment randomness in the exponent
|
||||
let cmr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "computation of commitment randomness"),
|
||||
FixedGenerators::NoteCommitmentRandomness,
|
||||
&cmr,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Randomize the note commitment. Pedersen hashes are not
|
||||
// themselves hiding commitments.
|
||||
cm = cm.add(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "randomization of note commitment"),
|
||||
&cmr,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let tree_depth = self.auth_path.len();
|
||||
|
||||
// This will store (least significant bit first)
|
||||
// the position of the note in the tree, for use
|
||||
// in nullifier computation.
|
||||
let mut position_bits = vec![];
|
||||
|
||||
// This is an injective encoding, as cur is a
|
||||
// point in the prime order subgroup.
|
||||
let mut cur = cm.get_x().clone();
|
||||
|
||||
for (i, e) in self.auth_path.into_iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
let cs = &mut cs.namespace(|| format!("merkle tree hash {}", i));
|
||||
|
||||
// Determines if the current subtree is the "right" leaf at this
|
||||
// depth of the tree.
|
||||
let cur_is_right = boolean::Boolean::from(boolean::AllocatedBit::alloc(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "position bit"),
|
||||
e.map(|e| e.1)
|
||||
)?);
|
||||
|
||||
// Push this boolean for nullifier computation later
|
||||
position_bits.push(cur_is_right.clone());
|
||||
|
||||
// Witness the authentication path element adjacent
|
||||
// at this depth.
|
||||
let path_element = num::AllocatedNum::alloc(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "path element"),
|
||||
|| {
|
||||
Ok(e.get()?.0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Swap the two if the current subtree is on the right
|
||||
let (xl, xr) = num::AllocatedNum::conditionally_reverse(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "conditional reversal of preimage"),
|
||||
&cur,
|
||||
&path_element,
|
||||
&cur_is_right
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// We don't need to be strict, because the function is
|
||||
// collision-resistant. If the prover witnesses a congruency,
|
||||
// they will be unable to find an authentication path in the
|
||||
// tree with high probability.
|
||||
let mut preimage = vec![];
|
||||
preimage.extend(xl.into_bits_le(cs.namespace(|| "xl into bits"))?);
|
||||
preimage.extend(xr.into_bits_le(cs.namespace(|| "xr into bits"))?);
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the new subtree value
|
||||
cur = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "computation of pedersen hash"),
|
||||
pedersen_hash::Personalization::MerkleTree(i),
|
||||
&preimage,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?.get_x().clone(); // Injective encoding
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(position_bits.len(), tree_depth);
|
||||
|
||||
// Expose the anchor
|
||||
cur.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "anchor"))?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the cm + g^position for preventing
|
||||
// faerie gold attacks
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Compute the position in the exponent
|
||||
let position = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "g^position"),
|
||||
FixedGenerators::NullifierPosition,
|
||||
&position_bits,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Add the position to the commitment
|
||||
cm = cm.add(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "faerie gold prevention"),
|
||||
&position,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Let's compute nr = BLAKE2s(rk || cm + position)
|
||||
nr_preimage.extend(
|
||||
cm.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of cm"))?
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(nr_preimage.len(), 512);
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute nr
|
||||
let mut nr = blake2s::blake2s(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "nr computation"),
|
||||
&nr_preimage,
|
||||
constants::PRF_NR_PERSONALIZATION
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Little endian bit order
|
||||
nr.reverse();
|
||||
|
||||
// We want the randomization in the field to
|
||||
// simplify outside code.
|
||||
// TODO: This isn't uniformly random.
|
||||
nr.truncate(E::Fs::CAPACITY as usize);
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute nullifier
|
||||
let nf = ak.mul(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "computation of nf"),
|
||||
&nr,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Expose the nullifier publicly
|
||||
nf.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "nullifier"))?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Output<'a, E> {
|
||||
fn synthesize<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(self, cs: &mut CS) -> Result<(), SynthesisError>
|
||||
{
|
||||
let value_bits = expose_value_commitment(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "value commitment"),
|
||||
self.value_commitment,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Let's start to construct our note, which contains
|
||||
// value (big endian)
|
||||
let mut note_contents = vec![];
|
||||
note_contents.extend(value_bits.into_iter().rev());
|
||||
|
||||
// Let's deal with g_d
|
||||
{
|
||||
let params = self.params;
|
||||
|
||||
// Prover witnesses g_d, ensuring it's on the
|
||||
// curve.
|
||||
let g_d = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "witness g_d"),
|
||||
self.payment_address.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.g_d(params)),
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// g_d is ensured to be large order. The relationship
|
||||
// between g_d and pk_d ultimately binds ivk to the
|
||||
// note. If this were a small order point, it would
|
||||
// not do this correctly, and the prover could
|
||||
// double-spend by finding random ivk's that satisfy
|
||||
// the relationship.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Further, if it were small order, epk would be
|
||||
// small order too!
|
||||
g_d.assert_not_small_order(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "g_d not small order"),
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Extend our note contents with the representation of
|
||||
// g_d.
|
||||
note_contents.extend(
|
||||
g_d.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of g_d"))?
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Booleanize our ephemeral secret key
|
||||
let esk = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "esk"),
|
||||
self.esk
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Create the ephemeral public key from g_d.
|
||||
let epk = g_d.mul(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "epk computation"),
|
||||
&esk,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Expose epk publicly.
|
||||
epk.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "epk"))?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now let's deal with pk_d. We don't do any checks and
|
||||
// essentially allow the prover to witness any 256 bits
|
||||
// they would like.
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Just grab pk_d from the witness
|
||||
let pk_d = self.payment_address.as_ref().map(|e| e.pk_d.into_xy());
|
||||
|
||||
// Witness the y-coordinate, encoded as little
|
||||
// endian bits (to match the representation)
|
||||
let y_contents = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "pk_d bits of y"),
|
||||
pk_d.map(|e| e.1)
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Witness the sign bit
|
||||
let sign_bit = boolean::Boolean::from(boolean::AllocatedBit::alloc(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "pk_d bit of x"),
|
||||
pk_d.map(|e| e.0.into_repr().is_odd())
|
||||
)?);
|
||||
|
||||
// Extend the note with pk_d representation
|
||||
note_contents.extend(y_contents);
|
||||
note_contents.push(sign_bit);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
note_contents.len(),
|
||||
64 + // value
|
||||
256 + // g_d
|
||||
256 // p_d
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the hash of the note contents
|
||||
let mut cm = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "note content hash"),
|
||||
pedersen_hash::Personalization::NoteCommitment,
|
||||
¬e_contents,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Booleanize the randomness
|
||||
let cmr = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "cmr"),
|
||||
self.commitment_randomness
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Compute the note commitment randomness in the exponent
|
||||
let cmr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "computation of commitment randomness"),
|
||||
FixedGenerators::NoteCommitmentRandomness,
|
||||
&cmr,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Randomize our note commitment
|
||||
cm = cm.add(
|
||||
cs.namespace(|| "randomization of note commitment"),
|
||||
&cmr,
|
||||
self.params
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Only the x-coordinate of the output is revealed,
|
||||
// since we know it is prime order, and we know that
|
||||
// the x-coordinate is an injective encoding for
|
||||
// prime-order elements.
|
||||
cm.get_x().inputize(cs.namespace(|| "commitment"))?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_input_circuit_with_bls12_381() {
|
||||
use pairing::{Field, BitIterator};
|
||||
use pairing::bls12_381::*;
|
||||
use rand::{SeedableRng, Rng, XorShiftRng};
|
||||
use ::circuit::test::*;
|
||||
use jubjub::{JubjubBls12, fs, edwards};
|
||||
|
||||
let params = &JubjubBls12::new();
|
||||
let rng = &mut XorShiftRng::from_seed([0x3dbe6259, 0x8d313d76, 0x3237db17, 0xe5bc0654]);
|
||||
|
||||
let tree_depth = 32;
|
||||
|
||||
let value_commitment = ValueCommitment {
|
||||
value: rng.gen(),
|
||||
randomness: rng.gen()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let rsk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
|
||||
let ak = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params).mul_by_cofactor(params);
|
||||
|
||||
let proof_generation_key = ::primitives::ProofGenerationKey {
|
||||
ak: ak.clone(),
|
||||
rsk: rsk.clone()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let viewing_key = proof_generation_key.into_viewing_key(params);
|
||||
|
||||
let payment_address;
|
||||
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let diversifier = ::primitives::Diversifier(rng.gen());
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(p) = viewing_key.into_payment_address(
|
||||
diversifier,
|
||||
params
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
payment_address = p;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let g_d = payment_address.diversifier.g_d(params).unwrap();
|
||||
let commitment_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
|
||||
let auth_path = vec![Some((rng.gen(), rng.gen())); tree_depth];
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut cs = TestConstraintSystem::<Bls12>::new();
|
||||
|
||||
let instance = Spend {
|
||||
params: params,
|
||||
value_commitment: Some(value_commitment.clone()),
|
||||
proof_generation_key: Some(proof_generation_key.clone()),
|
||||
payment_address: Some(payment_address.clone()),
|
||||
commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness),
|
||||
auth_path: auth_path.clone()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
instance.synthesize(&mut cs).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(cs.is_satisfied());
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.num_constraints(), 101018);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.hash(), "eedcef5fd638e0168ae4d53ac58df66f0acdabea46749cc5f4b39459c8377804");
|
||||
|
||||
let expected_value_cm = value_commitment.cm(params).into_xy();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.num_inputs(), 6);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(0, "ONE"), Fr::one());
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(1, "value commitment/commitment point/x/input variable"), expected_value_cm.0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(2, "value commitment/commitment point/y/input variable"), expected_value_cm.1);
|
||||
|
||||
let note = ::primitives::Note {
|
||||
value: value_commitment.value,
|
||||
g_d: g_d.clone(),
|
||||
pk_d: payment_address.pk_d.clone(),
|
||||
r: commitment_randomness.clone()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut position = 0u64;
|
||||
let mut cur = note.cm(params);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get("randomization of note commitment/x3/num"), cur);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i, val) in auth_path.into_iter().enumerate()
|
||||
{
|
||||
let (uncle, b) = val.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut lhs = cur;
|
||||
let mut rhs = uncle;
|
||||
|
||||
if b {
|
||||
::std::mem::swap(&mut lhs, &mut rhs);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut lhs: Vec<bool> = BitIterator::new(lhs.into_repr()).collect();
|
||||
let mut rhs: Vec<bool> = BitIterator::new(rhs.into_repr()).collect();
|
||||
|
||||
lhs.reverse();
|
||||
rhs.reverse();
|
||||
|
||||
cur = ::pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash::<Bls12, _>(
|
||||
::pedersen_hash::Personalization::MerkleTree(i),
|
||||
lhs.into_iter()
|
||||
.take(Fr::NUM_BITS as usize)
|
||||
.chain(rhs.into_iter().take(Fr::NUM_BITS as usize)),
|
||||
params
|
||||
).into_xy().0;
|
||||
|
||||
if b {
|
||||
position |= 1 << i;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let expected_nf = note.nf(&viewing_key, position, params);
|
||||
let expected_nf_xy = expected_nf.into_xy();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(3, "anchor/input variable"), cur);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(4, "nullifier/x/input variable"), expected_nf_xy.0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(5, "nullifier/y/input variable"), expected_nf_xy.1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_output_circuit_with_bls12_381() {
|
||||
use pairing::{Field};
|
||||
use pairing::bls12_381::*;
|
||||
use rand::{SeedableRng, Rng, XorShiftRng};
|
||||
use ::circuit::test::*;
|
||||
use jubjub::{JubjubBls12, fs, edwards};
|
||||
|
||||
let params = &JubjubBls12::new();
|
||||
let rng = &mut XorShiftRng::from_seed([0x3dbe6258, 0x8d313d76, 0x3237db17, 0xe5bc0654]);
|
||||
|
||||
let value_commitment = ValueCommitment {
|
||||
value: rng.gen(),
|
||||
randomness: rng.gen()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let rsk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
|
||||
let ak = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params).mul_by_cofactor(params);
|
||||
|
||||
let proof_generation_key = ::primitives::ProofGenerationKey {
|
||||
ak: ak.clone(),
|
||||
rsk: rsk.clone()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let viewing_key = proof_generation_key.into_viewing_key(params);
|
||||
|
||||
let payment_address;
|
||||
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let diversifier = ::primitives::Diversifier(rng.gen());
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(p) = viewing_key.into_payment_address(
|
||||
diversifier,
|
||||
params
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
payment_address = p;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let commitment_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
|
||||
let esk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut cs = TestConstraintSystem::<Bls12>::new();
|
||||
|
||||
let instance = Output {
|
||||
params: params,
|
||||
value_commitment: Some(value_commitment.clone()),
|
||||
payment_address: Some(payment_address.clone()),
|
||||
commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness),
|
||||
esk: Some(esk.clone())
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
instance.synthesize(&mut cs).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(cs.is_satisfied());
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.num_constraints(), 7827);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.hash(), "2896f259ad7a50c83604976ee9362358396d547b70f2feaf91d82d287e4ffc1d");
|
||||
|
||||
let expected_cm = payment_address.create_note(
|
||||
value_commitment.value,
|
||||
commitment_randomness,
|
||||
params
|
||||
).expect("should be valid").cm(params);
|
||||
|
||||
let expected_value_cm = value_commitment.cm(params).into_xy();
|
||||
|
||||
let expected_epk = payment_address.g_d(params).expect("should be valid").mul(esk, params);
|
||||
let expected_epk_xy = expected_epk.into_xy();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.num_inputs(), 6);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(0, "ONE"), Fr::one());
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(1, "value commitment/commitment point/x/input variable"), expected_value_cm.0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(2, "value commitment/commitment point/y/input variable"), expected_value_cm.1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(3, "epk/x/input variable"), expected_epk_xy.0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(4, "epk/y/input variable"), expected_epk_xy.1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(cs.get_input(5, "commitment/input variable"), expected_cm);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue