diff --git a/src/circuit/mod.rs b/src/circuit/mod.rs
index cf27c34..073926a 100644
--- a/src/circuit/mod.rs
+++ b/src/circuit/mod.rs
@@ -9,7 +9,23 @@ pub mod lookup;
 pub mod ecc;
 pub mod pedersen_hash;
 
-use bellman::SynthesisError;
+use pairing::{
+    PrimeField,
+    PrimeFieldRepr,
+};
+
+use bellman::{
+    SynthesisError,
+    ConstraintSystem,
+    Circuit
+};
+
+use jubjub::{
+    JubjubEngine,
+    Unknown,
+    FixedGenerators,
+    edwards
+};
 
 trait Assignment<T> {
     fn get(&self) -> Result<&T, SynthesisError>;
@@ -23,3 +39,817 @@ impl<T> Assignment<T> for Option<T> {
         }
     }
 }
+
+const MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH: usize = 29;
+
+pub struct Spend<'a, E: JubjubEngine> {
+    pub params: &'a E::Params,
+    /// Value of the note being spent
+    pub value: Option<u64>,
+    /// Randomness that will hide the value
+    pub value_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
+    /// Key which allows the proof to be constructed
+    /// as defense-in-depth against a flaw in the
+    /// protocol that would otherwise be exploitable
+    /// by a holder of a viewing key.
+    pub rsk: Option<E::Fs>,
+    /// The public key that will be re-randomized for
+    /// use as a nullifier and signing key for the
+    /// transaction.
+    pub ak: Option<edwards::Point<E, Unknown>>,
+    /// The diversified base used to compute pk_d.
+    pub g_d: Option<edwards::Point<E, Unknown>>,
+    /// The randomness used to hide the note commitment data
+    pub commitment_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
+    /// The authentication path of the commitment in the tree
+    pub auth_path: Vec<Option<(E::Fr, bool)>>
+}
+
+impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
+    fn synthesize<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(self, cs: &mut CS) -> Result<(), SynthesisError>
+    {
+        // Booleanize the value into little-endian bit order
+        let value_bits = boolean::u64_into_allocated_bits_be(
+            cs.namespace(|| "value"),
+            self.value
+        )?
+        .into_iter()
+        .rev() // Little endian bit order
+        .map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+        {
+            let gv = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
+                cs.namespace(|| "compute the value in the exponent"),
+                FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentValue,
+                &value_bits,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+        
+            // Booleanize the randomness
+            let hr = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
+                cs.namespace(|| "hr"),
+                self.value_randomness
+            )?
+            .into_iter()
+            .rev() // Little endian bit order
+            .map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+            let hr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
+                cs.namespace(|| "computation of randomization for value commitment"),
+                FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentRandomness,
+                &hr,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+
+            let gvhr = gv.add(
+                cs.namespace(|| "computation of value commitment"),
+                &hr,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+
+            // Expose the value commitment publicly
+            let value_commitment_x = cs.alloc_input(
+                || "value commitment x",
+                || {
+                    Ok(*gvhr.x.get_value().get()?)
+                }
+            )?;
+
+            cs.enforce(
+                || "value commitment x equals input",
+                |lc| lc + value_commitment_x,
+                |lc| lc + CS::one(),
+                |lc| lc + gvhr.x.get_variable()
+            );
+
+            let value_commitment_y = cs.alloc_input(
+                || "value commitment y",
+                || {
+                    Ok(*gvhr.y.get_value().get()?)
+                }
+            )?;
+
+            cs.enforce(
+                || "value commitment y equals input",
+                |lc| lc + value_commitment_y,
+                |lc| lc + CS::one(),
+                |lc| lc + gvhr.y.get_variable()
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Compute rk = [rsk] ProvingPublicKey
+        let rk;
+        {
+            // Witness rsk as bits
+            let rsk = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
+                cs.namespace(|| "rsk"),
+                self.rsk
+            )?
+            .into_iter()
+            .rev() // We need it in little endian bit order
+            .map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e)).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+            // NB: We don't ensure that the bit representation of rsk
+            // is "in the field" (Fs) because it's not used except to
+            // demonstrate the prover knows it. If they know a
+            // congruency then that's equivalent.
+
+            rk = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
+                cs.namespace(|| "computation of rk"),
+                FixedGenerators::ProvingPublicKey,
+                &rsk,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+        }
+
+        // Prover witnesses ak (ensures that it's on the curve)
+        let ak = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
+            cs.namespace(|| "ak"),
+            self.ak,
+            self.params
+        )?;
+
+        // Unpack ak and rk for input to BLAKE2s
+        let mut vk = vec![];
+        {
+            let mut ak_x = ak.x.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack ak.x")
+            )?;
+            let mut ak_y = ak.y.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack ak.y")
+            )?;
+
+            // We want the representation in little endian bit order
+            ak_x.reverse();
+            ak_y.reverse();
+
+            vk.extend(ak_y);
+            vk.push(ak_x[0].clone());
+        }
+        let mut rho_preimage = vec![];
+        {
+            let mut rk_x = rk.x.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack rk.x")
+            )?;
+            let mut rk_y = rk.y.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack rk.y")
+            )?;
+
+            // We want the representation in little endian bit order
+            rk_x.reverse();
+            rk_y.reverse();
+
+            vk.extend(rk_y.iter().cloned());
+            vk.push(rk_x[0].clone());
+
+            rho_preimage.extend(rk_y.iter().cloned());
+            rho_preimage.push(rk_x[0].clone());
+        }
+
+        assert_eq!(vk.len(), 512);
+
+        // Compute the incoming viewing key
+        let mut ivk = blake2s::blake2s(
+            cs.namespace(|| "computation of ivk"),
+            &vk
+        )?;
+
+        // Little endian bit order
+        ivk.reverse();
+        ivk.truncate(251); // drop_5
+
+        // Witness g_d
+        let g_d = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
+            cs.namespace(|| "witness g_d"),
+            self.g_d,
+            self.params
+        )?;
+
+        // Compute pk_d
+        let pk_d = g_d.mul(
+            cs.namespace(|| "compute pk_d"),
+            &ivk,
+            self.params
+        )?;
+
+        // Compute note contents
+        let mut note_contents = vec![];
+        note_contents.extend(value_bits);
+        {
+            // Unpack g_d for inclusion in the note.
+            let mut g_d_x = g_d.x.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack g_d.x")
+            )?;
+            let mut g_d_y = g_d.y.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack g_d.y")
+            )?;
+
+            // We want the representation in little endian bit order
+            g_d_x.reverse();
+            g_d_y.reverse();
+
+            note_contents.extend(g_d_y);
+            note_contents.push(g_d_x[0].clone());
+        }
+        {
+            // Unpack g_d for inclusion in the note.
+            let mut pk_d_x = pk_d.x.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack pk_d.x")
+            )?;
+            let mut pk_d_y = pk_d.y.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack pk_d.y")
+            )?;
+
+            // We want the representation in little endian bit order
+            pk_d_x.reverse();
+            pk_d_y.reverse();
+
+            note_contents.extend(pk_d_y);
+            note_contents.push(pk_d_x[0].clone());
+        }
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            note_contents.len(),
+            64 + // value
+            256 + // g_d
+            256 // p_d
+        );
+
+        // Compute the hash of the note contents
+        let mut cm = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
+            cs.namespace(|| "note content hash"),
+            pedersen_hash::Personalization::NoteCommitment,
+            &note_contents,
+            self.params
+        )?;
+
+        {
+            // Booleanize the randomness
+            let cmr = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
+                cs.namespace(|| "cmr"),
+                self.commitment_randomness
+            )?
+            .into_iter()
+            .rev() // We need it in little endian bit order
+            .map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+            let cmr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
+                cs.namespace(|| "computation of commitment randomness"),
+                FixedGenerators::NoteCommitmentRandomness,
+                &cmr,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+
+            cm = cm.add(
+                cs.namespace(|| "randomization of note commitment"),
+                &cmr,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+        }
+
+        assert_eq!(self.auth_path.len(), MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH);
+
+        let mut position_bits = vec![];
+
+        // Injective encoding.
+        let mut cur = cm.x.clone();
+
+        for (i, e) in self.auth_path.into_iter().enumerate() {
+            let cs = &mut cs.namespace(|| format!("merkle tree hash {}", i));
+
+            let cur_is_right = boolean::Boolean::from(boolean::AllocatedBit::alloc(
+                cs.namespace(|| "position bit"),
+                e.map(|e| e.1)
+            )?);
+
+            position_bits.push(cur_is_right.clone());
+
+            let path_element = num::AllocatedNum::alloc(
+                cs.namespace(|| "path element"),
+                || {
+                    Ok(e.get()?.0)
+                }
+            )?;
+
+            let (xl, xr) = num::AllocatedNum::conditionally_reverse(
+                cs.namespace(|| "conditional reversal of preimage"),
+                &cur,
+                &path_element,
+                &cur_is_right
+            )?;
+
+            // We don't need to be strict, because the function is
+            // collision-resistant.
+            let mut preimage = vec![];
+            preimage.extend(xl.into_bits(cs.namespace(|| "xl into bits"))?);
+            preimage.extend(xr.into_bits(cs.namespace(|| "xr into bits"))?);
+
+            cur = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
+                cs.namespace(|| "computation of pedersen hash"),
+                pedersen_hash::Personalization::MerkleTree(MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH - i),
+                &preimage,
+                self.params
+            )?.x; // Injective encoding
+        }
+
+        assert_eq!(position_bits.len(), MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH);
+
+        // TODO: cur is now the root of the tree, expose it as public input
+
+        let tmp = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
+            cs.namespace(|| "g^position"),
+            FixedGenerators::NullifierPosition,
+            &position_bits,
+            self.params
+        )?;
+
+        cm = cm.add(
+            cs.namespace(|| "faerie gold prevention"),
+            &tmp,
+            self.params
+        )?;
+
+        // Let's compute rho = BLAKE2s(rk || cm + position)
+        {
+            // Unpack g_d for inclusion in the note.
+            let mut cm_x = cm.x.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack (cm + position).x")
+            )?;
+            let mut cm_y = cm.y.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack (cm + position).y")
+            )?;
+
+            // We want the representation in little endian bit order
+            cm_x.reverse();
+            cm_y.reverse();
+
+            rho_preimage.extend(cm_y);
+            rho_preimage.push(cm_x[0].clone());
+        }
+        
+        let mut rho = blake2s::blake2s(
+            cs.namespace(|| "rho computation"),
+            &rho_preimage
+        )?;
+
+        // Little endian bit order
+        rho.reverse();
+        rho.truncate(251); // drop_5
+
+        // Compute nullifier
+        let nf = ak.mul(
+            cs.namespace(|| "computation of nf"),
+            &rho,
+            self.params
+        )?;
+
+        // TODO: expose nf as public input
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_input_circuit_with_bls12_381() {
+    use pairing::bls12_381::*;
+    use rand::{SeedableRng, Rng, XorShiftRng};
+    use ::circuit::test::*;
+    use jubjub::{JubjubBls12, fs};
+
+    let params = &JubjubBls12::new();
+    let rng = &mut XorShiftRng::from_seed([0x3dbe6259, 0x8d313d76, 0x3237db17, 0xe5bc0654]);
+
+    let value: u64 = 1;
+    let value_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
+    let ak: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params);
+    let g_d: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params);
+    let p_d: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params);
+    let commitment_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
+    let esk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
+    let rsk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
+    let auth_path = vec![Some((rng.gen(), false)); 29];
+
+    {
+        let mut cs = TestConstraintSystem::<Bls12>::new();
+
+        let instance = Spend {
+            params: params,
+            value: Some(1),
+            value_randomness: Some(value_randomness),
+            rsk: Some(rsk),
+            ak: Some(ak),
+            g_d: Some(g_d),
+            commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness),
+            auth_path: auth_path
+        };
+
+        instance.synthesize(&mut cs).unwrap();
+
+        assert!(cs.is_satisfied());
+
+        assert_eq!(cs.num_constraints(), 99816);
+    }
+
+    // use bellman::groth16::*;
+
+    // let groth_params = generate_random_parameters::<Bls12, _, _>(Spend {
+    //     params: params,
+    //     value: None,
+    //     value_randomness: None,
+    //     rsk: None,
+    //     ak: None,
+    //     g_d: None,
+    //     commitment_randomness: None,
+    //     auth_path: vec![None; 29]
+    // }, rng).unwrap();
+
+    // let pvk = prepare_verifying_key(&groth_params.vk);
+
+    // use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+    // // Let's benchmark stuff!
+    // const SAMPLES: u32 = 50;
+    // let mut total_proving = Duration::new(0, 0);
+
+    // for _ in 0..SAMPLES {
+    //     let start = Instant::now();
+    //     {
+    //         let c = Spend {
+    //             params: params,
+    //             value: Some(1),
+    //             value_randomness: Some(value_randomness.clone()),
+    //             rsk: Some(rsk.clone()),
+    //             ak: Some(ak.clone()),
+    //             g_d: Some(g_d.clone()),
+    //             commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness.clone()),
+    //             auth_path: auth_path.clone()
+    //         };
+
+    //         create_random_proof(c, &groth_params, rng).unwrap();
+    //     }
+    //     total_proving += start.elapsed();
+    // }
+
+    // let proving_avg = total_proving / SAMPLES;
+    // let proving_avg = proving_avg.subsec_nanos() as f64 / 1_000_000_000f64
+    //                   + (proving_avg.as_secs() as f64);
+
+    // panic!("Average proving time: {:?} seconds", proving_avg);
+}
+
+/// This is an output circuit instance.
+pub struct Output<'a, E: JubjubEngine> {
+    pub params: &'a E::Params,
+    /// Value of the note being created
+    pub value: Option<u64>,
+    /// Randomness that will hide the value
+    pub value_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
+    /// The diversified base, computed by GH(d)
+    pub g_d: Option<edwards::Point<E, Unknown>>,
+    /// The diversified address point, computed by GH(d)^ivk
+    pub p_d: Option<edwards::Point<E, Unknown>>,
+    /// The randomness used to hide the note commitment data
+    pub commitment_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
+    /// The ephemeral secret key for DH with recipient
+    pub esk: Option<E::Fs>
+}
+
+impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Output<'a, E> {
+    fn synthesize<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(self, cs: &mut CS) -> Result<(), SynthesisError>
+    {
+        // Booleanize the value into little-endian bit order
+        let value_bits = boolean::u64_into_allocated_bits_be(
+            cs.namespace(|| "value"),
+            self.value
+        )?
+        .into_iter()
+        .rev() // Little endian bit order
+        .map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+        {
+            let gv = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
+                cs.namespace(|| "compute the value in the exponent"),
+                FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentValue,
+                &value_bits,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+        
+            // Booleanize the randomness
+            let hr = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
+                cs.namespace(|| "hr"),
+                self.value_randomness
+            )?
+            .into_iter()
+            .rev() // Little endian bit order
+            .map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+            let hr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
+                cs.namespace(|| "computation of randomization for value commitment"),
+                FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentRandomness,
+                &hr,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+
+            let gvhr = gv.add(
+                cs.namespace(|| "computation of value commitment"),
+                &hr,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+
+            // Expose the value commitment publicly
+            let value_commitment_x = cs.alloc_input(
+                || "value commitment x",
+                || {
+                    Ok(*gvhr.x.get_value().get()?)
+                }
+            )?;
+
+            cs.enforce(
+                || "value commitment x equals input",
+                |lc| lc + value_commitment_x,
+                |lc| lc + CS::one(),
+                |lc| lc + gvhr.x.get_variable()
+            );
+
+            let value_commitment_y = cs.alloc_input(
+                || "value commitment y",
+                || {
+                    Ok(*gvhr.y.get_value().get()?)
+                }
+            )?;
+
+            cs.enforce(
+                || "value commitment y equals input",
+                |lc| lc + value_commitment_y,
+                |lc| lc + CS::one(),
+                |lc| lc + gvhr.y.get_variable()
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Let's start to construct our note
+        let mut note_contents = vec![];
+        note_contents.extend(value_bits);
+
+        // Let's deal with g_d
+        {
+            let g_d = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
+                cs.namespace(|| "witness g_d"),
+                self.g_d,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+
+            // Check that g_d is not of small order
+            {
+                let g_d = g_d.double(
+                    cs.namespace(|| "first doubling of g_d"),
+                    self.params
+                )?;
+                let g_d = g_d.double(
+                    cs.namespace(|| "second doubling of g_d"),
+                    self.params
+                )?;
+                let g_d = g_d.double(
+                    cs.namespace(|| "third doubling of g_d"),
+                    self.params
+                )?;
+
+                // (0, -1) is a small order point, but won't ever appear here
+                // because cofactor is 2^3, and we performed three doublings.
+                // (0, 1) is the neutral element, so checking if x is nonzero
+                // is sufficient to prevent small order points here.
+                g_d.x.assert_nonzero(cs.namespace(|| "check not inf"))?;
+            }
+
+            // Unpack g_d for inclusion in the note.
+            let mut g_d_x = g_d.x.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack g_d.x")
+            )?;
+            let mut g_d_y = g_d.y.into_bits_strict(
+                cs.namespace(|| "unpack g_d.y")
+            )?;
+
+            // We want the representation in little endian bit order
+            g_d_x.reverse();
+            g_d_y.reverse();
+
+            note_contents.extend(g_d_y);
+            note_contents.push(g_d_x[0].clone());
+
+            // Compute epk from esk
+            let esk = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
+                cs.namespace(|| "esk"),
+                self.esk
+            )?
+            .into_iter()
+            .rev() // We need it in little endian bit order
+            .map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+            let epk = g_d.mul(
+                cs.namespace(|| "epk computation"),
+                &esk,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+
+            // Expose epk publicly
+            let epk_x = cs.alloc_input(
+                || "epk x",
+                || {
+                    Ok(*epk.x.get_value().get()?)
+                }
+            )?;
+
+            cs.enforce(
+                || "epk x equals input",
+                |lc| lc + epk_x,
+                |lc| lc + CS::one(),
+                |lc| lc + epk.x.get_variable()
+            );
+
+            let epk_y = cs.alloc_input(
+                || "epk y",
+                || {
+                    Ok(*epk.y.get_value().get()?)
+                }
+            )?;
+
+            cs.enforce(
+                || "epk y equals input",
+                |lc| lc + epk_y,
+                |lc| lc + CS::one(),
+                |lc| lc + epk.y.get_variable()
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Now let's deal with p_d. We don't do any checks and
+        // essentially allow the prover to witness any 256 bits
+        // they would like.
+        {
+            let p_d = self.p_d.map(|e| e.into_xy());
+
+            let y_contents = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
+                cs.namespace(|| "p_d bits of y"),
+                p_d.map(|e| e.1)
+            )?
+            .into_iter()
+            .rev() // We need it in little endian bit order
+            .map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+            let sign_bit = boolean::Boolean::from(boolean::AllocatedBit::alloc(
+                cs.namespace(|| "p_d bit of x"),
+                p_d.map(|e| e.0.into_repr().is_odd())
+            )?);
+
+            note_contents.extend(y_contents);
+            note_contents.push(sign_bit);
+        }
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            note_contents.len(),
+            64 + // value
+            256 + // g_d
+            256 // p_d
+        );
+
+        // Compute the hash of the note contents
+        let mut cm = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
+            cs.namespace(|| "note content hash"),
+            pedersen_hash::Personalization::NoteCommitment,
+            &note_contents,
+            self.params
+        )?;
+
+        {
+            // Booleanize the randomness
+            let cmr = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
+                cs.namespace(|| "cmr"),
+                self.commitment_randomness
+            )?
+            .into_iter()
+            .rev() // We need it in little endian bit order
+            .map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+            let cmr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
+                cs.namespace(|| "computation of commitment randomness"),
+                FixedGenerators::NoteCommitmentRandomness,
+                &cmr,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+
+            cm = cm.add(
+                cs.namespace(|| "randomization of note commitment"),
+                &cmr,
+                self.params
+            )?;
+        }
+
+        // Only the x-coordinate of the output is revealed,
+        // since we know it is prime order, and we know that
+        // the x-coordinate is an injective encoding for
+        // prime-order elements.
+        let commitment_input = cs.alloc_input(
+            || "commitment input",
+            || {
+                Ok(*cm.x.get_value().get()?)
+            }
+        )?;
+
+        cs.enforce(
+            || "commitment input correct",
+            |lc| lc + commitment_input,
+            |lc| lc + CS::one(),
+            |lc| lc + cm.x.get_variable()
+        );
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_output_circuit_with_bls12_381() {
+    use pairing::bls12_381::*;
+    use rand::{SeedableRng, Rng, XorShiftRng};
+    use ::circuit::test::*;
+    use jubjub::{JubjubBls12, fs};
+
+    let params = &JubjubBls12::new();
+    let rng = &mut XorShiftRng::from_seed([0x3dbe6259, 0x8d313d76, 0x3237db17, 0xe5bc0654]);
+
+    let value: u64 = 1;
+    let value_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
+    let g_d: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params);
+    let p_d: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params);
+    let commitment_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
+    let esk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
+
+    {
+        let mut cs = TestConstraintSystem::<Bls12>::new();
+
+        let instance = Output {
+            params: params,
+            value: Some(1),
+            value_randomness: Some(value_randomness),
+            g_d: Some(g_d.clone()),
+            p_d: Some(p_d.clone()),
+            commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness),
+            esk: Some(esk.clone())
+        };
+
+        instance.synthesize(&mut cs).unwrap();
+
+        assert!(cs.is_satisfied());
+
+        assert_eq!(cs.num_constraints(), 8315);
+    }
+
+    // use bellman::groth16::*;
+
+    // let groth_params = generate_random_parameters::<Bls12, _, _>(Output {
+    //     params: params,
+    //     value: None,
+    //     value_randomness: None,
+    //     g_d: None,
+    //     p_d: None,
+    //     commitment_randomness: None,
+    //     esk: None
+    // }, rng).unwrap();
+
+    // let pvk = prepare_verifying_key(&groth_params.vk);
+
+    // use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+    // // Let's benchmark stuff!
+    // const SAMPLES: u32 = 50;
+    // let mut total_proving = Duration::new(0, 0);
+
+    // for _ in 0..SAMPLES {
+    //     let start = Instant::now();
+    //     {
+    //         let c = Output {
+    //             params: params,
+    //             value: Some(1),
+    //             value_randomness: Some(value_randomness),
+    //             g_d: Some(g_d.clone()),
+    //             p_d: Some(p_d.clone()),
+    //             commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness),
+    //             esk: Some(esk.clone())
+    //         };
+
+    //         create_random_proof(c, &groth_params, rng).unwrap();
+    //     }
+    //     total_proving += start.elapsed();
+    // }
+
+    // let proving_avg = total_proving / SAMPLES;
+    // let proving_avg = proving_avg.subsec_nanos() as f64 / 1_000_000_000f64
+    //                   + (proving_avg.as_secs() as f64);
+
+    // panic!("Average proving time: {:?} seconds", proving_avg);
+}