Crappy mock-up of the circuit.

This commit is contained in:
Sean Bowe 2018-02-22 11:36:44 -07:00
parent 4b6623cf44
commit ba7298de3f
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GPG Key ID: 95684257D8F8B031
1 changed files with 831 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -9,7 +9,23 @@ pub mod lookup;
pub mod ecc;
pub mod pedersen_hash;
use bellman::SynthesisError;
use pairing::{
PrimeField,
PrimeFieldRepr,
};
use bellman::{
SynthesisError,
ConstraintSystem,
Circuit
};
use jubjub::{
JubjubEngine,
Unknown,
FixedGenerators,
edwards
};
trait Assignment<T> {
fn get(&self) -> Result<&T, SynthesisError>;
@ -23,3 +39,817 @@ impl<T> Assignment<T> for Option<T> {
}
}
}
const MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH: usize = 29;
pub struct Spend<'a, E: JubjubEngine> {
pub params: &'a E::Params,
/// Value of the note being spent
pub value: Option<u64>,
/// Randomness that will hide the value
pub value_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
/// Key which allows the proof to be constructed
/// as defense-in-depth against a flaw in the
/// protocol that would otherwise be exploitable
/// by a holder of a viewing key.
pub rsk: Option<E::Fs>,
/// The public key that will be re-randomized for
/// use as a nullifier and signing key for the
/// transaction.
pub ak: Option<edwards::Point<E, Unknown>>,
/// The diversified base used to compute pk_d.
pub g_d: Option<edwards::Point<E, Unknown>>,
/// The randomness used to hide the note commitment data
pub commitment_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
/// The authentication path of the commitment in the tree
pub auth_path: Vec<Option<(E::Fr, bool)>>
}
impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
fn synthesize<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(self, cs: &mut CS) -> Result<(), SynthesisError>
{
// Booleanize the value into little-endian bit order
let value_bits = boolean::u64_into_allocated_bits_be(
cs.namespace(|| "value"),
self.value
)?
.into_iter()
.rev() // Little endian bit order
.map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
{
let gv = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
cs.namespace(|| "compute the value in the exponent"),
FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentValue,
&value_bits,
self.params
)?;
// Booleanize the randomness
let hr = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
cs.namespace(|| "hr"),
self.value_randomness
)?
.into_iter()
.rev() // Little endian bit order
.map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let hr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
cs.namespace(|| "computation of randomization for value commitment"),
FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentRandomness,
&hr,
self.params
)?;
let gvhr = gv.add(
cs.namespace(|| "computation of value commitment"),
&hr,
self.params
)?;
// Expose the value commitment publicly
let value_commitment_x = cs.alloc_input(
|| "value commitment x",
|| {
Ok(*gvhr.x.get_value().get()?)
}
)?;
cs.enforce(
|| "value commitment x equals input",
|lc| lc + value_commitment_x,
|lc| lc + CS::one(),
|lc| lc + gvhr.x.get_variable()
);
let value_commitment_y = cs.alloc_input(
|| "value commitment y",
|| {
Ok(*gvhr.y.get_value().get()?)
}
)?;
cs.enforce(
|| "value commitment y equals input",
|lc| lc + value_commitment_y,
|lc| lc + CS::one(),
|lc| lc + gvhr.y.get_variable()
);
}
// Compute rk = [rsk] ProvingPublicKey
let rk;
{
// Witness rsk as bits
let rsk = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
cs.namespace(|| "rsk"),
self.rsk
)?
.into_iter()
.rev() // We need it in little endian bit order
.map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e)).collect::<Vec<_>>();
// NB: We don't ensure that the bit representation of rsk
// is "in the field" (Fs) because it's not used except to
// demonstrate the prover knows it. If they know a
// congruency then that's equivalent.
rk = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
cs.namespace(|| "computation of rk"),
FixedGenerators::ProvingPublicKey,
&rsk,
self.params
)?;
}
// Prover witnesses ak (ensures that it's on the curve)
let ak = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
cs.namespace(|| "ak"),
self.ak,
self.params
)?;
// Unpack ak and rk for input to BLAKE2s
let mut vk = vec![];
{
let mut ak_x = ak.x.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack ak.x")
)?;
let mut ak_y = ak.y.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack ak.y")
)?;
// We want the representation in little endian bit order
ak_x.reverse();
ak_y.reverse();
vk.extend(ak_y);
vk.push(ak_x[0].clone());
}
let mut rho_preimage = vec![];
{
let mut rk_x = rk.x.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack rk.x")
)?;
let mut rk_y = rk.y.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack rk.y")
)?;
// We want the representation in little endian bit order
rk_x.reverse();
rk_y.reverse();
vk.extend(rk_y.iter().cloned());
vk.push(rk_x[0].clone());
rho_preimage.extend(rk_y.iter().cloned());
rho_preimage.push(rk_x[0].clone());
}
assert_eq!(vk.len(), 512);
// Compute the incoming viewing key
let mut ivk = blake2s::blake2s(
cs.namespace(|| "computation of ivk"),
&vk
)?;
// Little endian bit order
ivk.reverse();
ivk.truncate(251); // drop_5
// Witness g_d
let g_d = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
cs.namespace(|| "witness g_d"),
self.g_d,
self.params
)?;
// Compute pk_d
let pk_d = g_d.mul(
cs.namespace(|| "compute pk_d"),
&ivk,
self.params
)?;
// Compute note contents
let mut note_contents = vec![];
note_contents.extend(value_bits);
{
// Unpack g_d for inclusion in the note.
let mut g_d_x = g_d.x.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack g_d.x")
)?;
let mut g_d_y = g_d.y.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack g_d.y")
)?;
// We want the representation in little endian bit order
g_d_x.reverse();
g_d_y.reverse();
note_contents.extend(g_d_y);
note_contents.push(g_d_x[0].clone());
}
{
// Unpack g_d for inclusion in the note.
let mut pk_d_x = pk_d.x.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack pk_d.x")
)?;
let mut pk_d_y = pk_d.y.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack pk_d.y")
)?;
// We want the representation in little endian bit order
pk_d_x.reverse();
pk_d_y.reverse();
note_contents.extend(pk_d_y);
note_contents.push(pk_d_x[0].clone());
}
assert_eq!(
note_contents.len(),
64 + // value
256 + // g_d
256 // p_d
);
// Compute the hash of the note contents
let mut cm = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
cs.namespace(|| "note content hash"),
pedersen_hash::Personalization::NoteCommitment,
&note_contents,
self.params
)?;
{
// Booleanize the randomness
let cmr = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
cs.namespace(|| "cmr"),
self.commitment_randomness
)?
.into_iter()
.rev() // We need it in little endian bit order
.map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let cmr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
cs.namespace(|| "computation of commitment randomness"),
FixedGenerators::NoteCommitmentRandomness,
&cmr,
self.params
)?;
cm = cm.add(
cs.namespace(|| "randomization of note commitment"),
&cmr,
self.params
)?;
}
assert_eq!(self.auth_path.len(), MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH);
let mut position_bits = vec![];
// Injective encoding.
let mut cur = cm.x.clone();
for (i, e) in self.auth_path.into_iter().enumerate() {
let cs = &mut cs.namespace(|| format!("merkle tree hash {}", i));
let cur_is_right = boolean::Boolean::from(boolean::AllocatedBit::alloc(
cs.namespace(|| "position bit"),
e.map(|e| e.1)
)?);
position_bits.push(cur_is_right.clone());
let path_element = num::AllocatedNum::alloc(
cs.namespace(|| "path element"),
|| {
Ok(e.get()?.0)
}
)?;
let (xl, xr) = num::AllocatedNum::conditionally_reverse(
cs.namespace(|| "conditional reversal of preimage"),
&cur,
&path_element,
&cur_is_right
)?;
// We don't need to be strict, because the function is
// collision-resistant.
let mut preimage = vec![];
preimage.extend(xl.into_bits(cs.namespace(|| "xl into bits"))?);
preimage.extend(xr.into_bits(cs.namespace(|| "xr into bits"))?);
cur = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
cs.namespace(|| "computation of pedersen hash"),
pedersen_hash::Personalization::MerkleTree(MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH - i),
&preimage,
self.params
)?.x; // Injective encoding
}
assert_eq!(position_bits.len(), MERKLE_TREE_DEPTH);
// TODO: cur is now the root of the tree, expose it as public input
let tmp = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
cs.namespace(|| "g^position"),
FixedGenerators::NullifierPosition,
&position_bits,
self.params
)?;
cm = cm.add(
cs.namespace(|| "faerie gold prevention"),
&tmp,
self.params
)?;
// Let's compute rho = BLAKE2s(rk || cm + position)
{
// Unpack g_d for inclusion in the note.
let mut cm_x = cm.x.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack (cm + position).x")
)?;
let mut cm_y = cm.y.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack (cm + position).y")
)?;
// We want the representation in little endian bit order
cm_x.reverse();
cm_y.reverse();
rho_preimage.extend(cm_y);
rho_preimage.push(cm_x[0].clone());
}
let mut rho = blake2s::blake2s(
cs.namespace(|| "rho computation"),
&rho_preimage
)?;
// Little endian bit order
rho.reverse();
rho.truncate(251); // drop_5
// Compute nullifier
let nf = ak.mul(
cs.namespace(|| "computation of nf"),
&rho,
self.params
)?;
// TODO: expose nf as public input
Ok(())
}
}
#[test]
fn test_input_circuit_with_bls12_381() {
use pairing::bls12_381::*;
use rand::{SeedableRng, Rng, XorShiftRng};
use ::circuit::test::*;
use jubjub::{JubjubBls12, fs};
let params = &JubjubBls12::new();
let rng = &mut XorShiftRng::from_seed([0x3dbe6259, 0x8d313d76, 0x3237db17, 0xe5bc0654]);
let value: u64 = 1;
let value_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
let ak: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params);
let g_d: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params);
let p_d: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params);
let commitment_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
let esk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
let rsk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
let auth_path = vec![Some((rng.gen(), false)); 29];
{
let mut cs = TestConstraintSystem::<Bls12>::new();
let instance = Spend {
params: params,
value: Some(1),
value_randomness: Some(value_randomness),
rsk: Some(rsk),
ak: Some(ak),
g_d: Some(g_d),
commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness),
auth_path: auth_path
};
instance.synthesize(&mut cs).unwrap();
assert!(cs.is_satisfied());
assert_eq!(cs.num_constraints(), 99816);
}
// use bellman::groth16::*;
// let groth_params = generate_random_parameters::<Bls12, _, _>(Spend {
// params: params,
// value: None,
// value_randomness: None,
// rsk: None,
// ak: None,
// g_d: None,
// commitment_randomness: None,
// auth_path: vec![None; 29]
// }, rng).unwrap();
// let pvk = prepare_verifying_key(&groth_params.vk);
// use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
// // Let's benchmark stuff!
// const SAMPLES: u32 = 50;
// let mut total_proving = Duration::new(0, 0);
// for _ in 0..SAMPLES {
// let start = Instant::now();
// {
// let c = Spend {
// params: params,
// value: Some(1),
// value_randomness: Some(value_randomness.clone()),
// rsk: Some(rsk.clone()),
// ak: Some(ak.clone()),
// g_d: Some(g_d.clone()),
// commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness.clone()),
// auth_path: auth_path.clone()
// };
// create_random_proof(c, &groth_params, rng).unwrap();
// }
// total_proving += start.elapsed();
// }
// let proving_avg = total_proving / SAMPLES;
// let proving_avg = proving_avg.subsec_nanos() as f64 / 1_000_000_000f64
// + (proving_avg.as_secs() as f64);
// panic!("Average proving time: {:?} seconds", proving_avg);
}
/// This is an output circuit instance.
pub struct Output<'a, E: JubjubEngine> {
pub params: &'a E::Params,
/// Value of the note being created
pub value: Option<u64>,
/// Randomness that will hide the value
pub value_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
/// The diversified base, computed by GH(d)
pub g_d: Option<edwards::Point<E, Unknown>>,
/// The diversified address point, computed by GH(d)^ivk
pub p_d: Option<edwards::Point<E, Unknown>>,
/// The randomness used to hide the note commitment data
pub commitment_randomness: Option<E::Fs>,
/// The ephemeral secret key for DH with recipient
pub esk: Option<E::Fs>
}
impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Output<'a, E> {
fn synthesize<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(self, cs: &mut CS) -> Result<(), SynthesisError>
{
// Booleanize the value into little-endian bit order
let value_bits = boolean::u64_into_allocated_bits_be(
cs.namespace(|| "value"),
self.value
)?
.into_iter()
.rev() // Little endian bit order
.map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
{
let gv = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
cs.namespace(|| "compute the value in the exponent"),
FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentValue,
&value_bits,
self.params
)?;
// Booleanize the randomness
let hr = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
cs.namespace(|| "hr"),
self.value_randomness
)?
.into_iter()
.rev() // Little endian bit order
.map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let hr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
cs.namespace(|| "computation of randomization for value commitment"),
FixedGenerators::ValueCommitmentRandomness,
&hr,
self.params
)?;
let gvhr = gv.add(
cs.namespace(|| "computation of value commitment"),
&hr,
self.params
)?;
// Expose the value commitment publicly
let value_commitment_x = cs.alloc_input(
|| "value commitment x",
|| {
Ok(*gvhr.x.get_value().get()?)
}
)?;
cs.enforce(
|| "value commitment x equals input",
|lc| lc + value_commitment_x,
|lc| lc + CS::one(),
|lc| lc + gvhr.x.get_variable()
);
let value_commitment_y = cs.alloc_input(
|| "value commitment y",
|| {
Ok(*gvhr.y.get_value().get()?)
}
)?;
cs.enforce(
|| "value commitment y equals input",
|lc| lc + value_commitment_y,
|lc| lc + CS::one(),
|lc| lc + gvhr.y.get_variable()
);
}
// Let's start to construct our note
let mut note_contents = vec![];
note_contents.extend(value_bits);
// Let's deal with g_d
{
let g_d = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
cs.namespace(|| "witness g_d"),
self.g_d,
self.params
)?;
// Check that g_d is not of small order
{
let g_d = g_d.double(
cs.namespace(|| "first doubling of g_d"),
self.params
)?;
let g_d = g_d.double(
cs.namespace(|| "second doubling of g_d"),
self.params
)?;
let g_d = g_d.double(
cs.namespace(|| "third doubling of g_d"),
self.params
)?;
// (0, -1) is a small order point, but won't ever appear here
// because cofactor is 2^3, and we performed three doublings.
// (0, 1) is the neutral element, so checking if x is nonzero
// is sufficient to prevent small order points here.
g_d.x.assert_nonzero(cs.namespace(|| "check not inf"))?;
}
// Unpack g_d for inclusion in the note.
let mut g_d_x = g_d.x.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack g_d.x")
)?;
let mut g_d_y = g_d.y.into_bits_strict(
cs.namespace(|| "unpack g_d.y")
)?;
// We want the representation in little endian bit order
g_d_x.reverse();
g_d_y.reverse();
note_contents.extend(g_d_y);
note_contents.push(g_d_x[0].clone());
// Compute epk from esk
let esk = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
cs.namespace(|| "esk"),
self.esk
)?
.into_iter()
.rev() // We need it in little endian bit order
.map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let epk = g_d.mul(
cs.namespace(|| "epk computation"),
&esk,
self.params
)?;
// Expose epk publicly
let epk_x = cs.alloc_input(
|| "epk x",
|| {
Ok(*epk.x.get_value().get()?)
}
)?;
cs.enforce(
|| "epk x equals input",
|lc| lc + epk_x,
|lc| lc + CS::one(),
|lc| lc + epk.x.get_variable()
);
let epk_y = cs.alloc_input(
|| "epk y",
|| {
Ok(*epk.y.get_value().get()?)
}
)?;
cs.enforce(
|| "epk y equals input",
|lc| lc + epk_y,
|lc| lc + CS::one(),
|lc| lc + epk.y.get_variable()
);
}
// Now let's deal with p_d. We don't do any checks and
// essentially allow the prover to witness any 256 bits
// they would like.
{
let p_d = self.p_d.map(|e| e.into_xy());
let y_contents = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
cs.namespace(|| "p_d bits of y"),
p_d.map(|e| e.1)
)?
.into_iter()
.rev() // We need it in little endian bit order
.map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let sign_bit = boolean::Boolean::from(boolean::AllocatedBit::alloc(
cs.namespace(|| "p_d bit of x"),
p_d.map(|e| e.0.into_repr().is_odd())
)?);
note_contents.extend(y_contents);
note_contents.push(sign_bit);
}
assert_eq!(
note_contents.len(),
64 + // value
256 + // g_d
256 // p_d
);
// Compute the hash of the note contents
let mut cm = pedersen_hash::pedersen_hash(
cs.namespace(|| "note content hash"),
pedersen_hash::Personalization::NoteCommitment,
&note_contents,
self.params
)?;
{
// Booleanize the randomness
let cmr = boolean::field_into_allocated_bits_be(
cs.namespace(|| "cmr"),
self.commitment_randomness
)?
.into_iter()
.rev() // We need it in little endian bit order
.map(|e| boolean::Boolean::from(e))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let cmr = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
cs.namespace(|| "computation of commitment randomness"),
FixedGenerators::NoteCommitmentRandomness,
&cmr,
self.params
)?;
cm = cm.add(
cs.namespace(|| "randomization of note commitment"),
&cmr,
self.params
)?;
}
// Only the x-coordinate of the output is revealed,
// since we know it is prime order, and we know that
// the x-coordinate is an injective encoding for
// prime-order elements.
let commitment_input = cs.alloc_input(
|| "commitment input",
|| {
Ok(*cm.x.get_value().get()?)
}
)?;
cs.enforce(
|| "commitment input correct",
|lc| lc + commitment_input,
|lc| lc + CS::one(),
|lc| lc + cm.x.get_variable()
);
Ok(())
}
}
#[test]
fn test_output_circuit_with_bls12_381() {
use pairing::bls12_381::*;
use rand::{SeedableRng, Rng, XorShiftRng};
use ::circuit::test::*;
use jubjub::{JubjubBls12, fs};
let params = &JubjubBls12::new();
let rng = &mut XorShiftRng::from_seed([0x3dbe6259, 0x8d313d76, 0x3237db17, 0xe5bc0654]);
let value: u64 = 1;
let value_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
let g_d: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params);
let p_d: edwards::Point<Bls12, Unknown> = edwards::Point::rand(rng, params);
let commitment_randomness: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
let esk: fs::Fs = rng.gen();
{
let mut cs = TestConstraintSystem::<Bls12>::new();
let instance = Output {
params: params,
value: Some(1),
value_randomness: Some(value_randomness),
g_d: Some(g_d.clone()),
p_d: Some(p_d.clone()),
commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness),
esk: Some(esk.clone())
};
instance.synthesize(&mut cs).unwrap();
assert!(cs.is_satisfied());
assert_eq!(cs.num_constraints(), 8315);
}
// use bellman::groth16::*;
// let groth_params = generate_random_parameters::<Bls12, _, _>(Output {
// params: params,
// value: None,
// value_randomness: None,
// g_d: None,
// p_d: None,
// commitment_randomness: None,
// esk: None
// }, rng).unwrap();
// let pvk = prepare_verifying_key(&groth_params.vk);
// use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
// // Let's benchmark stuff!
// const SAMPLES: u32 = 50;
// let mut total_proving = Duration::new(0, 0);
// for _ in 0..SAMPLES {
// let start = Instant::now();
// {
// let c = Output {
// params: params,
// value: Some(1),
// value_randomness: Some(value_randomness),
// g_d: Some(g_d.clone()),
// p_d: Some(p_d.clone()),
// commitment_randomness: Some(commitment_randomness),
// esk: Some(esk.clone())
// };
// create_random_proof(c, &groth_params, rng).unwrap();
// }
// total_proving += start.elapsed();
// }
// let proving_avg = total_proving / SAMPLES;
// let proving_avg = proving_avg.subsec_nanos() as f64 / 1_000_000_000f64
// + (proving_avg.as_secs() as f64);
// panic!("Average proving time: {:?} seconds", proving_avg);
}