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rust-secp256k1
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Merge pull request #36 from rust-bitcoin/2018-07-minor-fixes 

Minor fixes
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Andrew Poelstra 2018-07-25 13:17:28 +00:00 committed by GitHub
parent 9b51ed3e2c bc773fbdce
commit 1ad4afcd03
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2 changed files with 5 additions and 3 deletions
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2
README.md
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
### rust-secp256k1
`rust-secp256k1` is a wrapper around ![libsecp256k1](https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1),
a C library by Peter Wuille for producing ECDSA signatures using the SECG curve
a C library by Pieter Wuille for producing ECDSA signatures using the SECG curve
`secp256k1`. This library
* exposes type-safe Rust bindings for all `libsecp256k1` functions
* implements key generation

6
src/lib.rs
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@ -402,7 +402,9 @@ pub struct Secp256k1<C> {
phantom: PhantomData<C>
}
// The underlying secp context does not contain any references to memory it does not own
unsafe impl<C> Send for Secp256k1<C> {}
// The API does not permit any mutation of `Secp256k1` objects except through `&mut` references
unsafe impl<C> Sync for Secp256k1<C> {}
impl<C> Clone for Secp256k1<C> {
@ -456,7 +458,7 @@ impl Secp256k1<VerifyOnly> {
impl<C> Secp256k1<C> {
/// (Re)randomizes the Secp256k1 context for cheap sidechannel resistence;
/// (Re)randomizes the Secp256k1 context for cheap sidechannel resistance;
/// see comment in libsecp256k1 commit d2275795f by Gregory Maxwell
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "rand"))]
pub fn randomize<R: Rng>(&mut self, rng: &mut R) {
@ -467,7 +469,7 @@ impl<C> Secp256k1<C> {
// This function cannot fail; it has an error return for future-proofing.
// We do not expose this error since it is impossible to hit, and we have
// precedent for not exposing impossible errors (for example in
// `PublicKey::from_secret_key` where it is impossble to create an invalid
// `PublicKey::from_secret_key` where it is impossible to create an invalid
// secret key through the API.)
// However, if this DOES fail, the result is potentially weaker side-channel
// resistance, which is deadly and undetectable, so we take out the entire