Auto merge of #4331 - zcash:hotfix-v2.1.1-1, r=ebfull
Hotfix v2.1.1-1 The commits in this PR have been reviewed internally by our team.
This commit is contained in:
Homu
commit
e93586a0c4
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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Zcash 2.1.1
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Zcash 2.1.1-1
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||||
<img align="right" width="120" height="80" src="doc/imgs/logo.png">
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||||
===========
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||||
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||||
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ AC_PREREQ([2.60])
|
|||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_MAJOR, 2)
|
||||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_MINOR, 1)
|
||||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION, 1)
|
||||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD, 50)
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||||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD, 51)
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||||
define(_ZC_BUILD_VAL, m4_if(m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD < 25), 1, m4_incr(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD), m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD < 50), 1, m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD - 24), m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD == 50), 1, , m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD - 50)))
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||||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_SUFFIX, m4_if(m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD < 25), 1, _CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION-beta$1, m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD < 50), 1, _CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION-rc$1, m4_eval(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD == 50), 1, _CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION, _CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION-$1)))
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define(_CLIENT_VERSION_IS_RELEASE, true)
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@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
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zcash (2.1.1+1) stable; urgency=critical
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* 2.1.1-1 release.
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||||
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-- Electric Coin Company <team@electriccoin.co> Thu, 06 Feb 2020 16:53:19 -0700
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zcash (2.1.1) stable; urgency=medium
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* 2.1.1 release.
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||||
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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---
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||||
name: "zcash-2.1.1"
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name: "zcash-2.1.1-1"
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enable_cache: true
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distro: "debian"
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suites:
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@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
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Zcash Contributors
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||||
==================
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Jack Grigg (923)
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Jack Grigg (925)
|
||||
Simon Liu (460)
|
||||
Sean Bowe (288)
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||||
Sean Bowe (291)
|
||||
Eirik Ogilvie-Wigley (212)
|
||||
Daira Hopwood (145)
|
||||
Daira Hopwood (155)
|
||||
Wladimir J. van der Laan (89)
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||||
Jay Graber (89)
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||||
Taylor Hornby (84)
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@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
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.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.47.11.
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||||
.TH ZCASH-CLI "1" "January 2020" "zcash-cli v2.1.1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.TH ZCASH-CLI "1" "February 2020" "zcash-cli v2.1.1-1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.SH NAME
|
||||
zcash-cli \- manual page for zcash-cli v2.1.1
|
||||
zcash-cli \- manual page for zcash-cli v2.1.1-1
|
||||
.SH DESCRIPTION
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||||
Zcash RPC client version v2.1.1
|
||||
Zcash RPC client version v2.1.1\-1
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
In order to ensure you are adequately protecting your privacy when using Zcash,
|
||||
please see <https://z.cash/support/security/>.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
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@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
|||
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.47.11.
|
||||
.TH ZCASH-TX "1" "January 2020" "zcash-tx v2.1.1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.TH ZCASH-TX "1" "February 2020" "zcash-tx v2.1.1-1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.SH NAME
|
||||
zcash-tx \- manual page for zcash-tx v2.1.1
|
||||
zcash-tx \- manual page for zcash-tx v2.1.1-1
|
||||
.SH DESCRIPTION
|
||||
Zcash zcash\-tx utility version v2.1.1
|
||||
Zcash zcash\-tx utility version v2.1.1\-1
|
||||
.SS "Usage:"
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
zcash\-tx [options] <hex\-tx> [commands]
|
||||
|
|
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|||
|
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@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
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|||
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.47.11.
|
||||
.TH ZCASHD "1" "January 2020" "zcashd v2.1.1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.TH ZCASHD "1" "February 2020" "zcashd v2.1.1-1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.SH NAME
|
||||
zcashd \- manual page for zcashd v2.1.1
|
||||
zcashd \- manual page for zcashd v2.1.1-1
|
||||
.SH DESCRIPTION
|
||||
Zcash Daemon version v2.1.1
|
||||
Zcash Daemon version v2.1.1\-1
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
In order to ensure you are adequately protecting your privacy when using Zcash,
|
||||
please see <https://z.cash/support/security/>.
|
||||
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@ -67,6 +67,12 @@ Imports blocks from external blk000??.dat file on startup
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|||
.IP
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||||
Keep at most <n> unconnectable transactions in memory (default: 100)
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||||
.HP
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||||
\fB\-maxtimeadjustment=\fR<n>
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||||
.IP
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||||
Maximum allowed median peer time offset adjustment, in seconds. Local
|
||||
perspective of time may be influenced by peers forward or backward by
|
||||
this amount. (default: 0 seconds, maximum: 1500 seconds)
|
||||
.HP
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||||
\fB\-par=\fR<n>
|
||||
.IP
|
||||
Set the number of script verification threads (\fB\-16\fR to 16, 0 = auto, <0 =
|
||||
|
|
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|||
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
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Notable changes
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||||
===============
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||||
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This release fixes a security issue described at
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https://z.cash/support/security/announcements/security-announcement-2020-02-06/ .
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This release also adds a `-maxtimeadjustment` option to set the maximum time, in
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||||
seconds, by which the node's clock can be adjusted based on the clocks of its
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peer nodes. This option defaults to 0, meaning that no such adjustment is performed.
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This is a change from the previous behaviour, which was to adjust the clock by up
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to 70 minutes forward or backward. The maximum setting for this option is now
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25 minutes (1500 seconds).
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Fix for incorrect banning of nodes during syncing
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||||
-------------------------------------------------
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After activation of the Blossom network upgrade, a node that is syncing the
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block chain from before Blossom would incorrectly ban peers that send it a
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Blossom transaction. This resulted in slower and less reliable syncing (#4283).
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Changelog
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=========
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Daira Hopwood (10):
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Move check for block times that are too far ahead of adjusted time, to ContextualCheckBlock.
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||||
Improve messages for timestamp rules.
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||||
Add constant for how far a block timestamp can be ahead of adjusted time. Loosely based on https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/e57a1fd8999800b3fc744d45bb96354cae294032
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Soft fork: restrict block timestamps to be no more than 90 minutes after the MTP of the previous block.
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Adjust the miner to satisfy consensus regarding future timestamps relative to median-time-past.
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Enable future timestamp soft fork at varying heights according to network.
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Cosmetic: brace style in ContextualCheckBlockHeader.
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Add -maxtimeadjustment with default of 0 instead of the 4200 seconds used in Bitcoin Core.
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Fix ContextualCheckBlock test (the ban score should be 100 since these are mined transactions).
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Add string argument to static_asserts to satisfy C++11.
|
||||
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Jack Grigg (2):
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||||
test: Update RPC test cache generation to handle new consensus rule
|
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Apply a consistent ban policy within ContextualCheckTransaction
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||||
|
||||
Sean Bowe (3):
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Release notes for vulnerability and -maxtimeadjustment option.
|
||||
make-release.py: Versioning changes for 2.1.1-1.
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||||
make-release.py: Updated manpages for 2.1.1-1.
|
||||
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||||
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@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ import re
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|||
|
||||
from authproxy import AuthServiceProxy
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||||
|
||||
PRE_BLOSSOM_BLOCK_TARGET_SPACING = 150
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||||
POST_BLOSSOM_BLOCK_TARGET_SPACING = 75
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||||
|
||||
def p2p_port(n):
|
||||
return 11000 + n + os.getpid()%999
|
||||
def rpc_port(n):
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||||
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@ -109,6 +112,27 @@ def initialize_chain(test_dir):
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|||
bitcoind and bitcoin-cli must be in search path.
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||||
"""
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||||
|
||||
# Due to the consensus change fix for the timejacking attack, we need to
|
||||
# ensure that the cache is pretty fresh. Specifically, we need the median
|
||||
# time past of the chain tip of the cache to be no more than 90 minutes
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||||
# behind the current local time, or else mined blocks will be rejected by
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# all nodes, halting the test. With Sapling active by default, this requires
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||||
# the chain tip itself to be no more than 75 minutes behind the current
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# local time.
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||||
#
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# We address this here, by regenerating the cache if it is more than 60
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||||
# minutes old. This gives 15 minutes of slack initially that an RPC test has
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||||
# to complete in, if it is started right at the oldest cache time. Within an
|
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# individual test, the first five calls to `generate` will each advance the
|
||||
# median time past of the chain tip by 2.5 minutes (with Sapling active by
|
||||
# default). Therefore, if the logic between the completion of any two
|
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# adjacent calls to `generate` within a test takes longer than 2.5 minutes,
|
||||
# the excess will subtract from the slack.
|
||||
if os.path.isdir(os.path.join("cache", "node0")):
|
||||
if os.stat("cache").st_mtime + (60 * 60) < time.time():
|
||||
print("initialize_chain(): Removing stale cache")
|
||||
shutil.rmtree("cache")
|
||||
|
||||
if not os.path.isdir(os.path.join("cache", "node0")):
|
||||
devnull = open("/dev/null", "w+")
|
||||
# Create cache directories, run bitcoinds:
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||||
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@ -140,17 +164,20 @@ def initialize_chain(test_dir):
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# Create a 200-block-long chain; each of the 4 nodes
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# gets 25 mature blocks and 25 immature.
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||||
# blocks are created with timestamps 10 minutes apart, starting
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# at 1 Jan 2014
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block_time = 1388534400
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# Blocks are created with timestamps 2.5 minutes apart (matching the
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||||
# chain defaulting above to Sapling active), starting 200 * 2.5 minutes
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||||
# before the current time.
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||||
block_time = int(time.time()) - (200 * PRE_BLOSSOM_BLOCK_TARGET_SPACING)
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for i in range(2):
|
||||
for peer in range(4):
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||||
for j in range(25):
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||||
set_node_times(rpcs, block_time)
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||||
rpcs[peer].generate(1)
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||||
block_time += 10*60
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||||
block_time += PRE_BLOSSOM_BLOCK_TARGET_SPACING
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||||
# Must sync before next peer starts generating blocks
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||||
sync_blocks(rpcs)
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||||
# Check that local time isn't going backwards
|
||||
assert_greater_than(time.time() + 1, block_time)
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||||
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||||
# Shut them down, and clean up cache directories:
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stop_nodes(rpcs)
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||||
|
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|||
25
src/chain.h
25
src/chain.h
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@ -17,6 +17,31 @@
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static const int SPROUT_VALUE_VERSION = 1001400;
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static const int SAPLING_VALUE_VERSION = 1010100;
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||||
/**
|
||||
* Maximum amount of time that a block timestamp is allowed to be ahead of the
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* median-time-past of the previous block.
|
||||
*/
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||||
static const int64_t MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP = 90 * 60;
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||||
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||||
/**
|
||||
* Maximum amount of time that a block timestamp is allowed to be ahead of the
|
||||
* current network-adjusted time.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static const int64_t MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_ADJUSTED = 2 * 60 * 60;
|
||||
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||||
/**
|
||||
* Timestamp window used as a grace period by code that compares external
|
||||
* timestamps (such as timestamps passed to RPCs, or wallet key creation times)
|
||||
* to block timestamps.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static const int64_t TIMESTAMP_WINDOW = MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_ADJUSTED + 60;
|
||||
|
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static_assert(MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_ADJUSTED > MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP,
|
||||
"MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_ADJUSTED must be greater than MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP");
|
||||
static_assert(TIMESTAMP_WINDOW > MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_ADJUSTED,
|
||||
"TIMESTAMP_WINDOW must be greater than MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_ADJUSTED");
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class CBlockFileInfo
|
||||
{
|
||||
public:
|
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@ -323,6 +323,23 @@ public:
|
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consensus.vUpgrades[Consensus::UPGRADE_HEARTWOOD].nActivationHeight =
|
||||
Consensus::NetworkUpgrade::NO_ACTIVATION_HEIGHT;
|
||||
|
||||
// On testnet we activate this rule 6 blocks after Blossom activation. From block 299188 and
|
||||
// prior to Blossom activation, the testnet minimum-difficulty threshold was 15 minutes (i.e.
|
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// a minimum difficulty block can be mined if no block is mined normally within 15 minutes):
|
||||
// <https://zips.z.cash/zip-0205#change-to-difficulty-adjustment-on-testnet>
|
||||
// However the median-time-past is 6 blocks behind, and the worst-case time for 7 blocks at a
|
||||
// 15-minute spacing is ~105 minutes, which is exceeds the limit imposed by the soft fork of
|
||||
// 90 minutes.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// After Blossom, the minimum difficulty threshold time is changed to 6 times the block target
|
||||
// spacing, which is 7.5 minutes:
|
||||
// <https://zips.z.cash/zip-0208#minimum-difficulty-blocks-on-the-test-network>
|
||||
// 7 times that is 52.5 minutes which is well within the limit imposed by the soft fork.
|
||||
|
||||
static_assert(6 * Consensus::POST_BLOSSOM_POW_TARGET_SPACING * 7 < MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP - 60,
|
||||
"MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP is too low given block target spacing");
|
||||
consensus.nFutureTimestampSoftForkHeight = consensus.vUpgrades[Consensus::UPGRADE_BLOSSOM].nActivationHeight + 6;
|
||||
|
||||
// The best chain should have at least this much work.
|
||||
consensus.nMinimumChainWork = uint256S("0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001dbb4c4224");
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
|
|||
#define CLIENT_VERSION_MAJOR 2
|
||||
#define CLIENT_VERSION_MINOR 1
|
||||
#define CLIENT_VERSION_REVISION 1
|
||||
#define CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD 50
|
||||
#define CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD 51
|
||||
|
||||
//! Set to true for release, false for prerelease or test build
|
||||
#define CLIENT_VERSION_IS_RELEASE true
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ namespace Consensus {
|
|||
return NetworkUpgradeState(nHeight, *this, idx) == UPGRADE_ACTIVE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool Params::FutureTimestampSoftForkActive(int nHeight) const {
|
||||
return nHeight >= nFutureTimestampSoftForkHeight;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int Params::Halving(int nHeight) const {
|
||||
// zip208
|
||||
// Halving(height) :=
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ struct Params {
|
|||
*/
|
||||
bool NetworkUpgradeActive(int nHeight, Consensus::UpgradeIndex idx) const;
|
||||
|
||||
bool FutureTimestampSoftForkActive(int nHeight) const;
|
||||
|
||||
uint256 hashGenesisBlock;
|
||||
|
||||
bool fCoinbaseMustBeShielded;
|
||||
|
|
@ -126,6 +128,47 @@ struct Params {
|
|||
int nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated;
|
||||
int nMajorityWindow;
|
||||
NetworkUpgrade vUpgrades[MAX_NETWORK_UPGRADES];
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Default block height at which the future timestamp soft fork rule activates.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Genesis blocks are hard-coded into the binary for all networks
|
||||
* (mainnet, testnet, regtest), and have now-ancient timestamps. So we need to
|
||||
* handle the case where we might use the genesis block's timestamp as the
|
||||
* median-time-past.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* GetMedianTimePast() is implemented such that the chosen block is the
|
||||
* median of however many blocks we are able to select up to
|
||||
* nMedianTimeSpan = 11. For example, if nHeight == 6:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ,-<pmedian ,-<pbegin ,-<pend
|
||||
* [-, -, -, -, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] -
|
||||
*
|
||||
* and thus pbegin[(pend - pbegin)/2] will select block height 3, assuming
|
||||
* that the block timestamps are all greater than the genesis block's
|
||||
* timestamp. For regtest mode, this is a valid assumption; we generate blocks
|
||||
* deterministically and in-order. For mainnet it was true in practice, and
|
||||
* we aren't going to be starting a new chain linked directly from the mainnet
|
||||
* genesis block.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Therefore, for regtest and mainnet we only risk using the regtest genesis
|
||||
* block's timestamp for nHeight < 2 (as GetMedianTimePast() uses floor division).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Separately, for mainnet this is also necessary because there was a long time
|
||||
* between starting to find the mainnet genesis block (which was mined with a
|
||||
* single laptop) and mining the block at height 1. For any new mainnet chain
|
||||
* using Zcash code, the soft fork rule would be enabled from the start so that
|
||||
* miners would limit their timestamps accordingly.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For testnet, the future timestamp soft fork rule was violated for many
|
||||
* blocks prior to Blossom activation. At Blossom, the time threshold for the
|
||||
* (testnet-specific) minimum difficulty rule was changed in such a way that
|
||||
* starting from shortly after the Blossom activation, no further blocks
|
||||
* violate the soft fork rule. So for testnet we override the soft fork
|
||||
* activation height in chainparams.cpp.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int nFutureTimestampSoftForkHeight = 2;
|
||||
|
||||
/** Proof of work parameters */
|
||||
unsigned int nEquihashN = 0;
|
||||
unsigned int nEquihashK = 0;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
|
|||
// Deprecation policy:
|
||||
// * Shut down 16 weeks' worth of blocks after the estimated release block height.
|
||||
// * A warning is shown during the 2 weeks' worth of blocks prior to shut down.
|
||||
static const int APPROX_RELEASE_HEIGHT = 698112;
|
||||
static const int APPROX_RELEASE_HEIGHT = 719034;
|
||||
static const int WEEKS_UNTIL_DEPRECATION = 16;
|
||||
static const int DEPRECATION_HEIGHT = APPROX_RELEASE_HEIGHT + (WEEKS_UNTIL_DEPRECATION * 7 * 24 * 48);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ TEST_F(ContextualCheckBlockTest, BlockSproutRulesRejectOtherTx) {
|
|||
|
||||
{
|
||||
SCOPED_TRACE("BlockSproutRulesRejectOverwinterTx");
|
||||
ExpectInvalidBlockFromTx(CTransaction(mtx), 0, "tx-overwinter-not-active");
|
||||
ExpectInvalidBlockFromTx(CTransaction(mtx), 100, "tx-overwinter-not-active");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Make it a Sapling transaction
|
||||
|
|
@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ TEST_F(ContextualCheckBlockTest, BlockSproutRulesRejectOtherTx) {
|
|||
|
||||
{
|
||||
SCOPED_TRACE("BlockSproutRulesRejectSaplingTx");
|
||||
ExpectInvalidBlockFromTx(CTransaction(mtx), 0, "tx-overwinter-not-active");
|
||||
ExpectInvalidBlockFromTx(CTransaction(mtx), 100, "tx-overwinter-not-active");
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ TEST_F(ContextualCheckBlockTest, BlockOverwinterRulesRejectOtherTx) {
|
|||
|
||||
{
|
||||
SCOPED_TRACE("BlockOverwinterRulesRejectSaplingTx");
|
||||
ExpectInvalidBlockFromTx(CTransaction(mtx), 0, "bad-overwinter-tx-version-group-id");
|
||||
ExpectInvalidBlockFromTx(CTransaction(mtx), 100, "bad-overwinter-tx-version-group-id");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -318,6 +318,6 @@ TEST_F(ContextualCheckBlockTest, BlockSaplingRulesRejectOtherTx) {
|
|||
|
||||
{
|
||||
SCOPED_TRACE("BlockSaplingRulesRejectOverwinterTx");
|
||||
ExpectInvalidBlockFromTx(CTransaction(mtx), 0, "bad-sapling-tx-version-group-id");
|
||||
ExpectInvalidBlockFromTx(CTransaction(mtx), 100, "bad-sapling-tx-version-group-id");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ TEST(checktransaction_tests, BadTxnsOversize) {
|
|||
|
||||
// ... but fails contextual ones!
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
EXPECT_FALSE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 1, 100));
|
||||
EXPECT_FALSE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 1, true));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
|
@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ TEST(checktransaction_tests, BadTxnsOversize) {
|
|||
|
||||
MockCValidationState state;
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(CheckTransactionWithoutProofVerification(tx, state));
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 1, 100));
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 1, true));
|
||||
|
||||
// Revert to default
|
||||
RegtestDeactivateSapling();
|
||||
|
|
@ -503,11 +503,18 @@ TEST(checktransaction_tests, bad_txns_invalid_joinsplit_signature) {
|
|||
CTransaction tx(mtx);
|
||||
|
||||
MockCValidationState state;
|
||||
// during initial block download, DoS ban score should be zero, else 100
|
||||
// during initial block download, for transactions being accepted into the
|
||||
// mempool (and thus not mined), DoS ban score should be zero, else 10
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(0, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-invalid-joinsplit-signature", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, 100, [](const CChainParams&) { return true; });
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, false, [](const CChainParams&) { return true; });
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-invalid-joinsplit-signature", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, false, [](const CChainParams&) { return false; });
|
||||
// for transactions that have been mined in a block, DoS ban score should
|
||||
// always be 100.
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-invalid-joinsplit-signature", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, 100, [](const CChainParams&) { return false; });
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, true, [](const CChainParams&) { return true; });
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-invalid-joinsplit-signature", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, true, [](const CChainParams&) { return false; });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST(checktransaction_tests, non_canonical_ed25519_signature) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -520,7 +527,7 @@ TEST(checktransaction_tests, non_canonical_ed25519_signature) {
|
|||
{
|
||||
CTransaction tx(mtx);
|
||||
MockCValidationState state;
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, 100));
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, true));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Copied from libsodium/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref10/open.c
|
||||
|
|
@ -540,11 +547,18 @@ TEST(checktransaction_tests, non_canonical_ed25519_signature) {
|
|||
CTransaction tx(mtx);
|
||||
|
||||
MockCValidationState state;
|
||||
// during initial block download, DoS ban score should be zero, else 100
|
||||
// during initial block download, for transactions being accepted into the
|
||||
// mempool (and thus not mined), DoS ban score should be zero, else 10
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(0, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-invalid-joinsplit-signature", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, 100, [](const CChainParams&) { return true; });
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, false, [](const CChainParams&) { return true; });
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-invalid-joinsplit-signature", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, false, [](const CChainParams&) { return false; });
|
||||
// for transactions that have been mined in a block, DoS ban score should
|
||||
// always be 100.
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-invalid-joinsplit-signature", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, 100, [](const CChainParams&) { return false; });
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, true, [](const CChainParams&) { return true; });
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-invalid-joinsplit-signature", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, true, [](const CChainParams&) { return false; });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST(checktransaction_tests, OverwinterConstructors) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -806,7 +820,7 @@ TEST(checktransaction_tests, OverwinterVersionNumberHigh) {
|
|||
UNSAFE_CTransaction tx(mtx);
|
||||
MockCValidationState state;
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-tx-overwinter-version-too-high", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 1, 100);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 1, true);
|
||||
|
||||
// Revert to default
|
||||
UpdateNetworkUpgradeParameters(Consensus::UPGRADE_OVERWINTER, Consensus::NetworkUpgrade::NO_ACTIVATION_HEIGHT);
|
||||
|
|
@ -841,11 +855,18 @@ TEST(checktransaction_tests, OverwinterNotActive) {
|
|||
|
||||
CTransaction tx(mtx);
|
||||
MockCValidationState state;
|
||||
// during initial block download, DoS ban score should be zero, else 100
|
||||
// during initial block download, for transactions being accepted into the
|
||||
// mempool (and thus not mined), DoS ban score should be zero, else 10
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(0, false, REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-not-active", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 1, 100, [](const CChainParams&) { return true; });
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, false, [](const CChainParams&) { return true; });
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-not-active", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, false, [](const CChainParams&) { return false; });
|
||||
// for transactions that have been mined in a block, DoS ban score should
|
||||
// always be 100.
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-not-active", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 1, 100, [](const CChainParams&) { return false; });
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, true, [](const CChainParams&) { return true; });
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-not-active", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, 0, true, [](const CChainParams&) { return false; });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// This tests a transaction without the fOverwintered flag set, against the Overwinter consensus rule set.
|
||||
|
|
@ -862,7 +883,7 @@ TEST(checktransaction_tests, OverwinterFlagNotSet) {
|
|||
CTransaction tx(mtx);
|
||||
MockCValidationState state;
|
||||
EXPECT_CALL(state, DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-flag-not-set", false)).Times(1);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 1, 100);
|
||||
ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 1, true);
|
||||
|
||||
// Revert to default
|
||||
UpdateNetworkUpgradeParameters(Consensus::UPGRADE_OVERWINTER, Consensus::NetworkUpgrade::NO_ACTIVATION_HEIGHT);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ TEST(TransactionBuilder, TransparentToSapling)
|
|||
EXPECT_EQ(tx.valueBalance, -40000);
|
||||
|
||||
CValidationState state;
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 2, 0));
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 2, true));
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(state.GetRejectReason(), "");
|
||||
|
||||
// Revert to default
|
||||
|
|
@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ TEST(TransactionBuilder, SaplingToSapling) {
|
|||
EXPECT_EQ(tx.valueBalance, 10000);
|
||||
|
||||
CValidationState state;
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 3, 0));
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 3, true));
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(state.GetRejectReason(), "");
|
||||
|
||||
// Revert to default
|
||||
|
|
@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ TEST(TransactionBuilder, SaplingToSprout) {
|
|||
EXPECT_EQ(tx.valueBalance, 35000);
|
||||
|
||||
CValidationState state;
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 3, 0));
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 3, true));
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(state.GetRejectReason(), "");
|
||||
|
||||
// Revert to default
|
||||
|
|
@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ TEST(TransactionBuilder, SproutToSproutAndSapling) {
|
|||
EXPECT_EQ(tx.valueBalance, -5000);
|
||||
|
||||
CValidationState state;
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 4, 0));
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), 4, true));
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(state.GetRejectReason(), "");
|
||||
|
||||
// Revert to default
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
|
|||
#include "script/standard.h"
|
||||
#include "script/sigcache.h"
|
||||
#include "scheduler.h"
|
||||
#include "timedata.h"
|
||||
#include "txdb.h"
|
||||
#include "torcontrol.h"
|
||||
#include "ui_interface.h"
|
||||
|
|
@ -356,6 +357,7 @@ std::string HelpMessage(HelpMessageMode mode)
|
|||
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-dbcache=<n>", strprintf(_("Set database cache size in megabytes (%d to %d, default: %d)"), nMinDbCache, nMaxDbCache, nDefaultDbCache));
|
||||
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-loadblock=<file>", _("Imports blocks from external blk000??.dat file on startup"));
|
||||
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-maxorphantx=<n>", strprintf(_("Keep at most <n> unconnectable transactions in memory (default: %u)"), DEFAULT_MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS));
|
||||
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-maxtimeadjustment=<n>", strprintf(_("Maximum allowed median peer time offset adjustment, in seconds. Local perspective of time may be influenced by peers forward or backward by this amount. (default: %u seconds, maximum: %u seconds)"), DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT, LIMIT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT));
|
||||
strUsage += HelpMessageOpt("-par=<n>", strprintf(_("Set the number of script verification threads (%u to %d, 0 = auto, <0 = leave that many cores free, default: %d)"),
|
||||
-GetNumCores(), MAX_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS, DEFAULT_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS));
|
||||
#ifndef WIN32
|
||||
|
|
@ -982,6 +984,11 @@ bool AppInit2(boost::thread_group& threadGroup, CScheduler& scheduler)
|
|||
fPruneMode = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int64_t nMaxTimeAdjustment = GetArg("-maxtimeadjustment", DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT);
|
||||
if (nMaxTimeAdjustment < 0 || nMaxTimeAdjustment > LIMIT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT) {
|
||||
return InitError(strprintf(_("-maxtimeadjustment must be in the range 0 to %u seconds"), LIMIT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
RegisterAllCoreRPCCommands(tableRPC);
|
||||
#ifdef ENABLE_WALLET
|
||||
bool fDisableWallet = GetBoolArg("-disablewallet", false);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
154
src/main.cpp
154
src/main.cpp
|
|
@ -763,69 +763,96 @@ unsigned int GetP2SHSigOpCount(const CTransaction& tx, const CCoinsViewCache& in
|
|||
* 1. AcceptToMemoryPool calls CheckTransaction and this function.
|
||||
* 2. ProcessNewBlock calls AcceptBlock, which calls CheckBlock (which calls CheckTransaction)
|
||||
* and ContextualCheckBlock (which calls this function).
|
||||
* 3. The isInitBlockDownload argument is only to assist with testing.
|
||||
* 3. For consensus rules that relax restrictions (where a transaction that is invalid at
|
||||
* nHeight can become valid at a later height), we make the bans conditional on not
|
||||
* being in Initial Block Download mode.
|
||||
* 4. The isInitBlockDownload argument is a function parameter to assist with testing.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
bool ContextualCheckTransaction(
|
||||
const CTransaction& tx,
|
||||
CValidationState &state,
|
||||
const CChainParams& chainparams,
|
||||
const int nHeight,
|
||||
const int dosLevel,
|
||||
const bool isMined,
|
||||
bool (*isInitBlockDownload)(const CChainParams&))
|
||||
{
|
||||
const int DOS_LEVEL_BLOCK = 100;
|
||||
// DoS level set to 10 to be more forgiving.
|
||||
const int DOS_LEVEL_MEMPOOL = 10;
|
||||
|
||||
// For constricting rules, we don't need to account for IBD mode.
|
||||
auto dosLevelConstricting = isMined ? DOS_LEVEL_BLOCK : DOS_LEVEL_MEMPOOL;
|
||||
// For rules that are relaxing (or might become relaxing when a future
|
||||
// network upgrade is implemented), we need to account for IBD mode.
|
||||
auto dosLevelPotentiallyRelaxing = isMined ? DOS_LEVEL_BLOCK : (
|
||||
isInitBlockDownload(chainparams) ? 0 : DOS_LEVEL_MEMPOOL);
|
||||
|
||||
bool overwinterActive = chainparams.GetConsensus().NetworkUpgradeActive(nHeight, Consensus::UPGRADE_OVERWINTER);
|
||||
bool saplingActive = chainparams.GetConsensus().NetworkUpgradeActive(nHeight, Consensus::UPGRADE_SAPLING);
|
||||
bool isSprout = !overwinterActive;
|
||||
|
||||
// If Sprout rules apply, reject transactions which are intended for Overwinter and beyond
|
||||
if (isSprout && tx.fOverwintered) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(isInitBlockDownload(chainparams) ? 0 : dosLevel,
|
||||
error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): overwinter is not active yet"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-not-active");
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelPotentiallyRelaxing,
|
||||
error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): overwinter is not active yet"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-not-active");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (saplingActive) {
|
||||
// Reject transactions with valid version but missing overwintered flag
|
||||
if (tx.nVersion >= SAPLING_MIN_TX_VERSION && !tx.fOverwintered) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(dosLevel, error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): overwintered flag must be set"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwintered-flag-not-set");
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelConstricting,
|
||||
error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): overwintered flag must be set"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwintered-flag-not-set");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reject transactions with non-Sapling version group ID
|
||||
if (tx.fOverwintered && tx.nVersionGroupId != SAPLING_VERSION_GROUP_ID) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(isInitBlockDownload(chainparams) ? 0 : dosLevel,
|
||||
error("CheckTransaction(): invalid Sapling tx version"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-sapling-tx-version-group-id");
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelPotentiallyRelaxing,
|
||||
error("CheckTransaction(): invalid Sapling tx version"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-sapling-tx-version-group-id");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reject transactions with invalid version
|
||||
if (tx.fOverwintered && tx.nVersion < SAPLING_MIN_TX_VERSION ) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckTransaction(): Sapling version too low"),
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelConstricting,
|
||||
error("CheckTransaction(): Sapling version too low"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-tx-sapling-version-too-low");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reject transactions with invalid version
|
||||
if (tx.fOverwintered && tx.nVersion > SAPLING_MAX_TX_VERSION ) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckTransaction(): Sapling version too high"),
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelPotentiallyRelaxing,
|
||||
error("CheckTransaction(): Sapling version too high"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-tx-sapling-version-too-high");
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (overwinterActive) {
|
||||
// Reject transactions with valid version but missing overwinter flag
|
||||
if (tx.nVersion >= OVERWINTER_MIN_TX_VERSION && !tx.fOverwintered) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(dosLevel, error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): overwinter flag must be set"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-flag-not-set");
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelConstricting,
|
||||
error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): overwinter flag must be set"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-flag-not-set");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reject transactions with non-Overwinter version group ID
|
||||
if (tx.fOverwintered && tx.nVersionGroupId != OVERWINTER_VERSION_GROUP_ID) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(isInitBlockDownload(chainparams) ? 0 : dosLevel,
|
||||
error("CheckTransaction(): invalid Overwinter tx version"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-overwinter-tx-version-group-id");
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelPotentiallyRelaxing,
|
||||
error("CheckTransaction(): invalid Overwinter tx version"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-overwinter-tx-version-group-id");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reject transactions with invalid version
|
||||
if (tx.fOverwintered && tx.nVersion > OVERWINTER_MAX_TX_VERSION ) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckTransaction(): overwinter version too high"),
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelPotentiallyRelaxing,
|
||||
error("CheckTransaction(): overwinter version too high"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-tx-overwinter-version-too-high");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -834,14 +861,16 @@ bool ContextualCheckTransaction(
|
|||
if (overwinterActive) {
|
||||
// Reject transactions intended for Sprout
|
||||
if (!tx.fOverwintered) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(dosLevel, error("ContextualCheckTransaction: overwinter is active"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-active");
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelConstricting,
|
||||
error("ContextualCheckTransaction: overwinter is active"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-active");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that all transactions are unexpired
|
||||
if (IsExpiredTx(tx, nHeight)) {
|
||||
// Don't increase banscore if the transaction only just expired
|
||||
int expiredDosLevel = IsExpiredTx(tx, nHeight - 1) ? dosLevel : 0;
|
||||
int expiredDosLevel = IsExpiredTx(tx, nHeight - 1) ? dosLevelConstricting : 0;
|
||||
return state.DoS(expiredDosLevel, error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): transaction is expired"), REJECT_INVALID, "tx-overwinter-expired");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -851,8 +880,10 @@ bool ContextualCheckTransaction(
|
|||
// Size limits
|
||||
BOOST_STATIC_ASSERT(MAX_BLOCK_SIZE > MAX_TX_SIZE_BEFORE_SAPLING); // sanity
|
||||
if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION) > MAX_TX_SIZE_BEFORE_SAPLING)
|
||||
return state.DoS(100, error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): size limits failed"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize");
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelPotentiallyRelaxing,
|
||||
error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): size limits failed"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
uint256 dataToBeSigned;
|
||||
|
|
@ -867,6 +898,8 @@ bool ContextualCheckTransaction(
|
|||
try {
|
||||
dataToBeSigned = SignatureHash(scriptCode, tx, NOT_AN_INPUT, SIGHASH_ALL, 0, consensusBranchId);
|
||||
} catch (std::logic_error ex) {
|
||||
// A logic error should never occur because we pass NOT_AN_INPUT and
|
||||
// SIGHASH_ALL to SignatureHash().
|
||||
return state.DoS(100, error("CheckTransaction(): error computing signature hash"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "error-computing-signature-hash");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -882,9 +915,10 @@ bool ContextualCheckTransaction(
|
|||
dataToBeSigned.begin(), 32,
|
||||
tx.joinSplitPubKey.begin()
|
||||
) != 0) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(isInitBlockDownload(chainparams) ? 0 : 100,
|
||||
error("CheckTransaction(): invalid joinsplit signature"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-invalid-joinsplit-signature");
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelPotentiallyRelaxing,
|
||||
error("CheckTransaction(): invalid joinsplit signature"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-invalid-joinsplit-signature");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -906,8 +940,10 @@ bool ContextualCheckTransaction(
|
|||
))
|
||||
{
|
||||
librustzcash_sapling_verification_ctx_free(ctx);
|
||||
return state.DoS(100, error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): Sapling spend description invalid"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-sapling-spend-description-invalid");
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelPotentiallyRelaxing,
|
||||
error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): Sapling spend description invalid"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-sapling-spend-description-invalid");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -921,6 +957,9 @@ bool ContextualCheckTransaction(
|
|||
))
|
||||
{
|
||||
librustzcash_sapling_verification_ctx_free(ctx);
|
||||
// This should be a non-contextual check, but we check it here
|
||||
// as we need to pass over the outputs anyway in order to then
|
||||
// call librustzcash_sapling_final_check().
|
||||
return state.DoS(100, error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): Sapling output description invalid"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-sapling-output-description-invalid");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -934,8 +973,10 @@ bool ContextualCheckTransaction(
|
|||
))
|
||||
{
|
||||
librustzcash_sapling_verification_ctx_free(ctx);
|
||||
return state.DoS(100, error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): Sapling binding signature invalid"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-sapling-binding-signature-invalid");
|
||||
return state.DoS(
|
||||
dosLevelPotentiallyRelaxing,
|
||||
error("ContextualCheckTransaction(): Sapling binding signature invalid"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-sapling-binding-signature-invalid");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
librustzcash_sapling_verification_ctx_free(ctx);
|
||||
|
|
@ -1249,9 +1290,8 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa
|
|||
if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state, verifier))
|
||||
return error("AcceptToMemoryPool: CheckTransaction failed");
|
||||
|
||||
// DoS level set to 10 to be more forgiving.
|
||||
// Check transaction contextually against the set of consensus rules which apply in the next block to be mined.
|
||||
if (!ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), nextBlockHeight, 10)) {
|
||||
if (!ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, Params(), nextBlockHeight, false)) {
|
||||
return error("AcceptToMemoryPool: ContextualCheckTransaction failed");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -3692,11 +3732,6 @@ bool CheckBlockHeader(
|
|||
return state.DoS(50, error("CheckBlockHeader(): proof of work failed"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash");
|
||||
|
||||
// Check timestamp
|
||||
if (block.GetBlockTime() > GetAdjustedTime() + 2 * 60 * 60)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(error("CheckBlockHeader(): block timestamp too far in the future"),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new");
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -3769,35 +3804,62 @@ bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(
|
|||
{
|
||||
const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = chainParams.GetConsensus();
|
||||
uint256 hash = block.GetHash();
|
||||
if (hash == consensusParams.hashGenesisBlock)
|
||||
if (hash == consensusParams.hashGenesisBlock) {
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert(pindexPrev);
|
||||
|
||||
int nHeight = pindexPrev->nHeight+1;
|
||||
|
||||
// Check proof of work
|
||||
if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams))
|
||||
if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams)) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: incorrect proof of work", __func__),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check timestamp against prev
|
||||
if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
|
||||
return state.Invalid(error("%s: block's timestamp is too early", __func__),
|
||||
auto medianTimePast = pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast();
|
||||
if (block.GetBlockTime() <= medianTimePast) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(error("%s: block at height %d, timestamp %d is not later than median-time-past %d",
|
||||
__func__, nHeight, block.GetBlockTime(), medianTimePast),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (fCheckpointsEnabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Check future timestamp soft fork rule introduced in v2.1.1-1.
|
||||
// This retrospectively activates at block height 2 for mainnet and regtest,
|
||||
// and 6 blocks after Blossom activation for testnet.
|
||||
// Explanations of these activation heights are in src/consensus/params.h
|
||||
// and chainparams.cpp.
|
||||
//
|
||||
if (consensusParams.FutureTimestampSoftForkActive(nHeight) &&
|
||||
block.GetBlockTime() > medianTimePast + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(error("%s: block at height %d, timestamp %d is too far ahead of median-time-past, limit is %d",
|
||||
__func__, nHeight, block.GetBlockTime(), medianTimePast + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-far-ahead-of-mtp");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check timestamp
|
||||
auto nTimeLimit = GetAdjustedTime() + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_ADJUSTED;
|
||||
if (block.GetBlockTime() > nTimeLimit) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(error("%s: block at height %d, timestamp %d is too far ahead of adjusted time, limit is %d",
|
||||
__func__, nHeight, block.GetBlockTime(), nTimeLimit),
|
||||
REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (fCheckpointsEnabled) {
|
||||
// Don't accept any forks from the main chain prior to last checkpoint
|
||||
CBlockIndex* pcheckpoint = Checkpoints::GetLastCheckpoint(chainParams.Checkpoints());
|
||||
if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight)
|
||||
if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight) {
|
||||
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)", __func__, nHeight));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reject block.nVersion < 4 blocks
|
||||
if (block.nVersion < 4)
|
||||
if (block.nVersion < 4) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(error("%s : rejected nVersion<4 block", __func__),
|
||||
REJECT_OBSOLETE, "bad-version");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -3813,7 +3875,7 @@ bool ContextualCheckBlock(
|
|||
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction& tx, block.vtx) {
|
||||
|
||||
// Check transaction contextually against consensus rules at block height
|
||||
if (!ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, nHeight, 100)) {
|
||||
if (!ContextualCheckTransaction(tx, state, chainparams, nHeight, true)) {
|
||||
return false; // Failure reason has been set in validation state object
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ bool ContextualCheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, cons
|
|||
|
||||
/** Check a transaction contextually against a set of consensus rules */
|
||||
bool ContextualCheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state,
|
||||
const CChainParams& chainparams, int nHeight, int dosLevel,
|
||||
const CChainParams& chainparams, int nHeight, bool isMined,
|
||||
bool (*isInitBlockDownload)(const CChainParams&) = IsInitialBlockDownload);
|
||||
|
||||
/** Apply the effects of this transaction on the UTXO set represented by view */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -99,7 +99,13 @@ public:
|
|||
|
||||
void UpdateTime(CBlockHeader* pblock, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev)
|
||||
{
|
||||
pblock->nTime = std::max(pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast()+1, GetAdjustedTime());
|
||||
auto medianTimePast = pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast();
|
||||
auto nTime = std::max(medianTimePast + 1, GetAdjustedTime());
|
||||
// See the comment in ContextualCheckBlockHeader() for background.
|
||||
if (consensusParams.FutureTimestampSoftForkActive(pindexPrev->nHeight + 1)) {
|
||||
nTime = std::min(nTime, medianTimePast + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP);
|
||||
}
|
||||
pblock->nTime = nTime;
|
||||
|
||||
// Updating time can change work required on testnet:
|
||||
if (consensusParams.nPowAllowMinDifficultyBlocksAfterHeight != boost::none) {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ void test_simple_joinsplit_invalidity(uint32_t consensusBranchId, CMutableTransa
|
|||
jsdesc->nullifiers[1] = GetRandHash();
|
||||
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(CheckTransactionWithoutProofVerification(newTx, state));
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(!ContextualCheckTransaction(newTx, state, Params(), 0, 100));
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(!ContextualCheckTransaction(newTx, state, Params(), 0, true));
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(state.GetRejectReason() == "bad-txns-invalid-joinsplit-signature");
|
||||
|
||||
// Empty output script.
|
||||
|
|
@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ void test_simple_joinsplit_invalidity(uint32_t consensusBranchId, CMutableTransa
|
|||
) == 0);
|
||||
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(CheckTransactionWithoutProofVerification(newTx, state));
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(ContextualCheckTransaction(newTx, state, Params(), 0, 100));
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(ContextualCheckTransaction(newTx, state, Params(), 0, true));
|
||||
}
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Ensure that values within the joinsplit are well-formed.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ void AddTimeData(const CNetAddr& ip, int64_t nOffsetSample)
|
|||
int64_t nMedian = vTimeOffsets.median();
|
||||
std::vector<int64_t> vSorted = vTimeOffsets.sorted();
|
||||
// Only let other nodes change our time by so much
|
||||
if (abs64(nMedian) < 70 * 60)
|
||||
if (abs64(nMedian) <= GetArg("-maxtimeadjustment", DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT))
|
||||
{
|
||||
nTimeOffset = nMedian;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,6 +10,16 @@
|
|||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
#include <vector>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "chain.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static const int64_t DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT = 0;
|
||||
static const int64_t LIMIT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT = 25 * 60;
|
||||
|
||||
static_assert(LIMIT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT * 2 < MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP,
|
||||
"LIMIT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT is too high given MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP");
|
||||
static_assert(MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP + LIMIT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT < MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_ADJUSTED,
|
||||
"LIMIT_MAX_TIME_ADJUSTMENT is too high given MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_MTP and MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME_ADJUSTED");
|
||||
|
||||
class CNetAddr;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -448,8 +448,9 @@ UniValue importwallet_impl(const UniValue& params, bool fHelp, bool fImportZKeys
|
|||
pwalletMain->ShowProgress("", 100); // hide progress dialog in GUI
|
||||
|
||||
CBlockIndex *pindex = chainActive.Tip();
|
||||
while (pindex && pindex->pprev && pindex->GetBlockTime() > nTimeBegin - 7200)
|
||||
while (pindex && pindex->pprev && pindex->GetBlockTime() > nTimeBegin - TIMESTAMP_WINDOW) {
|
||||
pindex = pindex->pprev;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!pwalletMain->nTimeFirstKey || nTimeBegin < pwalletMain->nTimeFirstKey)
|
||||
pwalletMain->nTimeFirstKey = nTimeBegin;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2523,8 +2523,9 @@ int CWallet::ScanForWalletTransactions(CBlockIndex* pindexStart, bool fUpdate)
|
|||
|
||||
// no need to read and scan block, if block was created before
|
||||
// our wallet birthday (as adjusted for block time variability)
|
||||
while (pindex && nTimeFirstKey && (pindex->GetBlockTime() < (nTimeFirstKey - 7200)))
|
||||
while (pindex && nTimeFirstKey && pindex->GetBlockTime() < nTimeFirstKey - TIMESTAMP_WINDOW) {
|
||||
pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ShowProgress(_("Rescanning..."), 0); // show rescan progress in GUI as dialog or on splashscreen, if -rescan on startup
|
||||
double dProgressStart = Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.Checkpoints(), pindex, false);
|
||||
|
|
@ -4347,8 +4348,9 @@ void CWallet::GetKeyBirthTimes(std::map<CKeyID, int64_t> &mapKeyBirth) const {
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Extract block timestamps for those keys
|
||||
for (std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*>::const_iterator it = mapKeyFirstBlock.begin(); it != mapKeyFirstBlock.end(); it++)
|
||||
mapKeyBirth[it->first] = it->second->GetBlockTime() - 7200; // block times can be 2h off
|
||||
for (std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*>::const_iterator it = mapKeyFirstBlock.begin(); it != mapKeyFirstBlock.end(); it++) {
|
||||
mapKeyBirth[it->first] = it->second->GetBlockTime() - TIMESTAMP_WINDOW; // block times can be off
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool CWallet::AddDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key, const std::string &value)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue