Network Privacy in Blockchains - Part 2
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@ -18,12 +18,43 @@ Separate groups discussion on the network anonymization protocols (Some are fict
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- MimbleWimble / [Grin](https://github.com/mimblewimble/grin)
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- Whisper Protocol ([Ethereum](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Whisper))
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- Tumblers
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- Noise networks
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- Use Tor / Use Signal
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- Use [Wireguard](https://www.wireguard.com/)
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- Broadcasted Encryption
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- Randomized Transaction Handling
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- [Kovri](https://github.com/monero-project/kovri) - Monero
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- [Kovri](https://github.com/monero-project/kovri) - used in Monero. Onion routing style like tor but different approach (DHT Node discovery, Uni-directional routing (closer to free route mixnets), designed for low latency networks, probably works well for P2P but may not work well for client-server architecture).
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- Mixnets
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Each group posted their proposals on the window and the rest put star stickers on their preferred proposals:
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![Proposals Scored by stars with a view of Montreal under construction](/img/network-privacy-in-blockchains.JPG)
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Top Rated:
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- Kovri
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- Dandelion
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Research Ideas:
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- Node Random Path selection
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---
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2018.06.27 14:10-15:10 - Isis Agora Lovecruft - Part 2
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... [missed the beginning of the discussion]
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Discussion:
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- Discussion regarding how Dandelion Protocol works, One example: [Grin Spec](https://github.com/mimblewimble/grin/blob/master/doc/dandelion/dandelion.md)
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- Timing attacks by an entity that runs multiple (many) nodes in the network
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- Issue with being always online on the protocols like Signal
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- Mix networks High latency privacy network, pool up transactions to achieve anonymity
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- Chose a route in advance by the client
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- None of the nodes have access to where the transaction comes from and leaves to
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- Not good when nodes are not consistently online, need more stable networks
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- Cascade mixing
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- At least requires one honest node on a path for everyone to use this one path
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- Traffic Analysis Resistant Messaging: [katzenpost](https://github.com/katzenpost)
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- Originally designed for e-voting and e-mail
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- If used in Blockchain networks, it can't be used for miner nodes, as the high latency might lead to network forks and higher rate for orphaned blocks.
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- Some discussion on possible attacks such as [eclipse attack](https://www.usenix.org/node/190891), [sybil attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack), 51% attack.
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