Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
teor 4d608d3224
Stop doing thousands of time checks each time we connect to a peer (#3106)
* Stop checking the entire AddressBook for each connection attempt

* Stop redundant peer time checks within the address book

* Stop calling `Instant::now` 3 times for each address book update

* Only get the time once each time an address book method is called

* Update outdated comment

* Use an OrderedMap to efficiently store address book peers

* Add address book order tests
2021-12-03 15:09:43 -03:00
Janito Vaqueiro Ferreira Filho 11b5a33651
Security: Avoid reconnecting to peers that are likely unreachable (#3030)
* Add a `Duration32::from_days` constructor

Make it simpler to construct a `Duration32` representing a certain
number of days.

* Add `MetaAddr::was_not_recently_seen` method

A helper method to check if a peer was never seen before or if it was
last seen a long time ago. This will be one of the conditions to
consider a peer as unreachable.

* Add `MetaAddr::is_probably_unreachable` method

A helper method to check if a peer should be considered unreachable. It
is considered unreachable if recent connection attempts have failed and
it was not recently seen.

If a peer is considered unreachable, Zebra shouldn't attempt to connect
to it again.

* Do not keep trying to connect to unreachable peer

A peer is probably unreachable if it was last seen a long time ago and
if it's last connection attempt failed.

* Test `was_not_recently_seen`

Redo the calculation on arbitrary `MetaAddr`s.

* Test `is_probably_unreachable`

Redo the calculation on arbitrary `MetaAddr`s.

* Test if probably unreachable peers are ignored

Given an `AddressBook` with a list of arbitrary `MetaAddr`s, check that
none of the peers listed for a reconnection is probably unreachable.

* Rename unit test to improve clarity

Remove the double negative from the name.

Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>

* Rename constant to `MAX_RECENT_PEER_AGE`

Make the purpose of the constant clearer.

Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>

* Rename method to `last_seen_is_recent`

Remove the double negative from the name.

* Rename method to `is_probably_reachable`

Avoid having to negate the result of the method in security critical
filter.

* Move check into `is_ready_for_connection_attempt`

Make sure the check is used in any place that requires a peer that's
ready for a connection attempt.

* Improve test documention

Describe the goal of the test better.

Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>

* Improve `is_probably_reachable` documentation

List the conditions as bullet points.

Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>

* Document what happens when peers have no last seen time

Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
2021-11-10 23:51:22 +00:00
Janito Vaqueiro Ferreira Filho b68202c68a
Security: Zebra should stop gossiping unreachable addresses to other nodes, Action: re-deploy all nodes (#2392)
* Rename some methods and constants for clarity

Using the following commands:

```
fastmod '\bis_ready_for_attempt\b' is_ready_for_connection_attempt
  # One instance required a tweak, because of the ASCII diagram.
fastmod '\bwas_recently_live\b' has_connection_recently_responded
fastmod '\bwas_recently_attempted\b' was_connection_recently_attempted
fastmod '\bwas_recently_failed\b' has_connection_recently_failed
fastmod '\bLIVE_PEER_DURATION\b' MIN_PEER_RECONNECTION_DELAY
```

* Use `Instant::elapsed` for conciseness

Instead of `Instant::now().saturating_duration_since`. They're both
equivalent, and `elapsed` only panics if the `Instant` is somehow
synthetically generated.

* Allow `Duration32` to be created in other crates

Export the `Duration32` from the `zebra_chain::serialization` module.

* Add some new `Duration32` constructors

Create some helper `const` constructors to make it easy to create
constant durations. Add methods to create a `Duration32` from seconds,
minutes and hours.

* Avoid gossiping unreachable peers

When sanitizing the list of peers to gossip, remove those that we
haven't seen in more than three hours.

* Test if unreachable addresses aren't gossiped

Create a property test with random addreses inserted into an
`AddressBook`, and verify that the sanitized list of addresses does not
contain any addresses considered unreachable.

* Test if new alternate address isn't gossipable

Create a new alternate peer, because that type of `MetaAddr` does not
have `last_response` or `untrusted_last_seen` times. Verify that the
peer is not considered gossipable.

* Test if local listener is gossipable

The `MetaAddr` representing the local peer's listening address should
always be considered gossipable.

* Test if gossiped peer recently seen is gossipable

Create a `MetaAddr` representing a gossiped peer that was reported to be
seen recently. Check that the peer is considered gossipable.

* Test peer reportedly last seen in the future

Create a `MetaAddr` representing a peer gossiped and reported to have
been last seen in a time that's in the future. Check that the peer is
considered gossipable, to check that the fallback calculation is working
as intended.

* Test gossiped peer reportedly seen long ago

Create a `MetaAddr` representing a gossiped peer that was reported to
last have been seen a long time ago. Check that the peer is not
considered gossipable.

* Test if just responded peer is gossipable

Create a `MetaAddr` representing a peer that has just responded and
check that it is considered gossipable.

* Test if recently responded peer is gossipable

Create a `MetaAddr` representing a peer that last responded within the
duration a peer is considered reachable. Verify that the peer is
considered gossipable.

* Test peer that responded long ago isn't gossipable

Create a `MetaAddr` representing a peer that last responded outside the
duration a peer is considered reachable. Verify that the peer is not
considered gossipable.
2021-06-29 05:12:27 +00:00
teor 1a57023eac
Security: Use canonical SocketAddrs to avoid duplicate peer connections, Feature: Send local listener to peers (#2276)
* Always send our local listener with the latest time

Previously, whenever there was an inbound request for peers, we would
clone the address book and update it with the local listener.

This had two impacts:
- the listener could conflict with an existing entry,
  rather than unconditionally replacing it, and
- the listener was briefly included in the address book metrics.

As a side-effect, this change also makes sanitization slightly faster,
because it avoids some useless peer filtering and sorting.

* Skip listeners that are not valid for outbound connections

* Filter sanitized addresses Zebra based on address state

This fix correctly prevents Zebra gossiping client addresses to peers,
but still keeps the client in the address book to avoid reconnections.

* Add a full set of DateTime32 and Duration32 calculation methods

* Refactor sanitize to use the new DateTime32/Duration32 methods

* Security: Use canonical SocketAddrs to avoid duplicate connections

If we allow multiple variants for each peer address, we can make multiple
connections to that peer.

Also make sure sanitized MetaAddrs are valid for outbound connections.

* Test that address books contain the local listener address

Co-authored-by: Janito Vaqueiro Ferreira Filho <janito.vff@gmail.com>
2021-06-22 02:16:59 +00:00
teor 4d22a0bae9
Security: Limit reconnection rate to individual peers (#2275)
* Security: Limit reconnection rate to individual peers

Reconnection Rate

Limit the reconnection rate to each individual peer by applying the
liveness cutoff to the attempt, responded, and failure time fields.
If any field is recent, the peer is skipped.

The new liveness cutoff skips any peers that have recently been attempted
or failed. (Previously, the liveness check was only applied if the peer
was in the `Responded` state, which could lead to repeated retries of
`Failed` peers, particularly in small address books.)

Reconnection Order

Zebra prefers more useful peer states, then the earliest attempted,
failed, and responded times, then the most recent gossiped last seen
times.

Before this change, Zebra took the most recent time in all the peer time
fields, and used that time for liveness and ordering. This led to
confusion between trusted and untrusted data, and success and failure
times.

Unlike the previous order, the new order:
- tries all peers in each state, before re-trying any peer in that state,
  and
- only checks the the gossiped untrusted last seen time
  if all other times are equal.

* Preserve the later time if changes arrive out of order

* Update CandidateSet::next documentation

* Update CandidateSet state diagram

* Fix variant names in comments

* Explain why timestamps can be left out of MetaAddrChanges

* Add a simple test for the individual peer retry limit

* Only generate valid Arbitrary PeerServices values

* Add an individual peer retry limit AddressBook and CandidateSet test

* Stop deleting recently live addresses from the address book

If we delete recently live addresses from the address book, we can get a
new entry for them, and reconnect too rapidly.

* Rename functions to match similar tokio API

* Fix docs for service sorting

* Clarify a comment

* Cleanup a variable and comments

* Remove blank lines in the CandidateSet state diagram

* Add a multi-peer proptest that checks outbound attempt fairness

* Fix a comment typo

Co-authored-by: Janito Vaqueiro Ferreira Filho <janito.vff@gmail.com>

* Simplify time maths in MetaAddr

* Create a Duration32 type to simplify calculations and comparisons

* Rename variables for clarity

* Split a string constant into multiple lines

* Make constants match rustdoc order

Co-authored-by: Janito Vaqueiro Ferreira Filho <janito.vff@gmail.com>
2021-06-18 09:30:44 -03:00
teor ebe1c9f88e
Add a DateTime32 type for 32-bit serialized times (#2210)
* Add a DateTime32 type for 32-bit serialized times
* Use DateTime32 for MetaAddr.last_seen
* Create and use a `DateTime32::now` method
2021-05-31 12:52:34 +10:00