BTCP-Rebase/src/wallet/wallet.cpp

4131 lines
143 KiB
C++
Raw Normal View History

// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2016 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#include <wallet/wallet.h>
#include <base58.h>
#include <checkpoints.h>
#include <chain.h>
#include <wallet/coincontrol.h>
#include <consensus/consensus.h>
#include <consensus/validation.h>
#include <fs.h>
#include <wallet/init.h>
#include <key.h>
#include <keystore.h>
#include <validation.h>
#include <net.h>
#include <policy/fees.h>
#include <policy/policy.h>
#include <policy/rbf.h>
#include <primitives/block.h>
#include <primitives/transaction.h>
#include <script/script.h>
#include <scheduler.h>
#include <timedata.h>
#include <txmempool.h>
#include <util.h>
#include <utilmoneystr.h>
#include <wallet/fees.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <future>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/replace.hpp>
#include <boost/thread.hpp>
std::vector<CWalletRef> vpwallets;
2015-12-19 05:27:15 -08:00
/** Transaction fee set by the user */
CFeeRate payTxFee(DEFAULT_TRANSACTION_FEE);
unsigned int nTxConfirmTarget = DEFAULT_TX_CONFIRM_TARGET;
bool bSpendZeroConfChange = DEFAULT_SPEND_ZEROCONF_CHANGE;
bool fWalletRbf = DEFAULT_WALLET_RBF;
const char * DEFAULT_WALLET_DAT = "wallet.dat";
const uint32_t BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT = 0x80000000;
2015-04-28 07:48:28 -07:00
/**
* Fees smaller than this (in satoshi) are considered zero fee (for transaction creation)
* Override with -mintxfee
*/
CFeeRate CWallet::minTxFee = CFeeRate(DEFAULT_TRANSACTION_MINFEE);
/**
* If fee estimation does not have enough data to provide estimates, use this fee instead.
* Has no effect if not using fee estimation
* Override with -fallbackfee
*/
CFeeRate CWallet::fallbackFee = CFeeRate(DEFAULT_FALLBACK_FEE);
2014-07-03 11:25:32 -07:00
CFeeRate CWallet::m_discard_rate = CFeeRate(DEFAULT_DISCARD_FEE);
const uint256 CMerkleTx::ABANDON_HASH(uint256S("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"));
/** @defgroup mapWallet
*
* @{
*/
struct CompareValueOnly
{
bool operator()(const CInputCoin& t1,
const CInputCoin& t2) const
{
return t1.txout.nValue < t2.txout.nValue;
}
};
std::string COutput::ToString() const
{
return strprintf("COutput(%s, %d, %d) [%s]", tx->GetHash().ToString(), i, nDepth, FormatMoney(tx->tx->vout[i].nValue));
}
class CAffectedKeysVisitor : public boost::static_visitor<void> {
private:
const CKeyStore &keystore;
std::vector<CKeyID> &vKeys;
public:
CAffectedKeysVisitor(const CKeyStore &keystoreIn, std::vector<CKeyID> &vKeysIn) : keystore(keystoreIn), vKeys(vKeysIn) {}
void Process(const CScript &script) {
txnouttype type;
std::vector<CTxDestination> vDest;
int nRequired;
if (ExtractDestinations(script, type, vDest, nRequired)) {
for (const CTxDestination &dest : vDest)
boost::apply_visitor(*this, dest);
}
}
void operator()(const CKeyID &keyId) {
if (keystore.HaveKey(keyId))
vKeys.push_back(keyId);
}
void operator()(const CScriptID &scriptId) {
CScript script;
if (keystore.GetCScript(scriptId, script))
Process(script);
}
2017-08-25 19:55:52 -07:00
void operator()(const WitnessV0ScriptHash& scriptID)
{
CScriptID id;
CRIPEMD160().Write(scriptID.begin(), 32).Finalize(id.begin());
CScript script;
if (keystore.GetCScript(id, script)) {
Process(script);
}
}
void operator()(const WitnessV0KeyHash& keyid)
{
CKeyID id(keyid);
if (keystore.HaveKey(id)) {
vKeys.push_back(id);
}
}
template<typename X>
void operator()(const X &none) {}
};
const CWalletTx* CWallet::GetWalletTx(const uint256& hash) const
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.find(hash);
if (it == mapWallet.end())
return nullptr;
return &(it->second);
}
CPubKey CWallet::GenerateNewKey(CWalletDB &walletdb, bool internal)
2012-02-18 06:02:36 -08:00
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
bool fCompressed = CanSupportFeature(FEATURE_COMPRPUBKEY); // default to compressed public keys if we want 0.6.0 wallets
2012-02-18 06:06:32 -08:00
CKey secret;
// Create new metadata
int64_t nCreationTime = GetTime();
CKeyMetadata metadata(nCreationTime);
// use HD key derivation if HD was enabled during wallet creation
if (IsHDEnabled()) {
DeriveNewChildKey(walletdb, metadata, secret, (CanSupportFeature(FEATURE_HD_SPLIT) ? internal : false));
} else {
secret.MakeNewKey(fCompressed);
}
2012-02-18 06:06:32 -08:00
// Compressed public keys were introduced in version 0.6.0
if (fCompressed) {
SetMinVersion(FEATURE_COMPRPUBKEY);
}
2012-02-18 06:06:32 -08:00
CPubKey pubkey = secret.GetPubKey();
assert(secret.VerifyPubKey(pubkey));
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()] = metadata;
UpdateTimeFirstKey(nCreationTime);
if (!AddKeyPubKeyWithDB(walletdb, secret, pubkey)) {
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": AddKey failed");
}
return pubkey;
2012-02-18 06:02:36 -08:00
}
void CWallet::DeriveNewChildKey(CWalletDB &walletdb, CKeyMetadata& metadata, CKey& secret, bool internal)
{
// for now we use a fixed keypath scheme of m/0'/0'/k
CKey key; //master key seed (256bit)
CExtKey masterKey; //hd master key
CExtKey accountKey; //key at m/0'
CExtKey chainChildKey; //key at m/0'/0' (external) or m/0'/1' (internal)
CExtKey childKey; //key at m/0'/0'/<n>'
// try to get the master key
if (!GetKey(hdChain.masterKeyID, key))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": Master key not found");
masterKey.SetMaster(key.begin(), key.size());
// derive m/0'
// use hardened derivation (child keys >= 0x80000000 are hardened after bip32)
masterKey.Derive(accountKey, BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
// derive m/0'/0' (external chain) OR m/0'/1' (internal chain)
assert(internal ? CanSupportFeature(FEATURE_HD_SPLIT) : true);
accountKey.Derive(chainChildKey, BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT+(internal ? 1 : 0));
// derive child key at next index, skip keys already known to the wallet
do {
// always derive hardened keys
// childIndex | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT = derive childIndex in hardened child-index-range
// example: 1 | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT == 0x80000001 == 2147483649
if (internal) {
chainChildKey.Derive(childKey, hdChain.nInternalChainCounter | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
metadata.hdKeypath = "m/0'/1'/" + std::to_string(hdChain.nInternalChainCounter) + "'";
hdChain.nInternalChainCounter++;
}
else {
chainChildKey.Derive(childKey, hdChain.nExternalChainCounter | BIP32_HARDENED_KEY_LIMIT);
metadata.hdKeypath = "m/0'/0'/" + std::to_string(hdChain.nExternalChainCounter) + "'";
hdChain.nExternalChainCounter++;
}
} while (HaveKey(childKey.key.GetPubKey().GetID()));
secret = childKey.key;
metadata.hdMasterKeyID = hdChain.masterKeyID;
// update the chain model in the database
if (!walletdb.WriteHDChain(hdChain))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": Writing HD chain model failed");
}
bool CWallet::AddKeyPubKeyWithDB(CWalletDB &walletdb, const CKey& secret, const CPubKey &pubkey)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
// CCryptoKeyStore has no concept of wallet databases, but calls AddCryptedKey
// which is overridden below. To avoid flushes, the database handle is
// tunneled through to it.
bool needsDB = !pwalletdbEncryption;
if (needsDB) {
pwalletdbEncryption = &walletdb;
}
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddKeyPubKey(secret, pubkey)) {
if (needsDB) pwalletdbEncryption = nullptr;
2011-06-25 05:57:32 -07:00
return false;
}
if (needsDB) pwalletdbEncryption = nullptr;
2014-07-26 12:05:11 -07:00
// check if we need to remove from watch-only
CScript script;
script = GetScriptForDestination(pubkey.GetID());
if (HaveWatchOnly(script)) {
RemoveWatchOnly(script);
}
script = GetScriptForRawPubKey(pubkey);
if (HaveWatchOnly(script)) {
2014-07-26 12:05:11 -07:00
RemoveWatchOnly(script);
}
2014-07-26 12:05:11 -07:00
if (!IsCrypted()) {
return walletdb.WriteKey(pubkey,
secret.GetPrivKey(),
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()]);
}
return true;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
}
bool CWallet::AddKeyPubKey(const CKey& secret, const CPubKey &pubkey)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
return CWallet::AddKeyPubKeyWithDB(walletdb, secret, pubkey);
}
bool CWallet::AddCryptedKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey,
const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddCryptedKey(vchPubKey, vchCryptedSecret))
return false;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (pwalletdbEncryption)
return pwalletdbEncryption->WriteCryptedKey(vchPubKey,
vchCryptedSecret,
mapKeyMetadata[vchPubKey.GetID()]);
else
return CWalletDB(*dbw).WriteCryptedKey(vchPubKey,
vchCryptedSecret,
mapKeyMetadata[vchPubKey.GetID()]);
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
}
bool CWallet::LoadKeyMetadata(const CKeyID& keyID, const CKeyMetadata &meta)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
UpdateTimeFirstKey(meta.nCreateTime);
mapKeyMetadata[keyID] = meta;
return true;
}
bool CWallet::LoadScriptMetadata(const CScriptID& script_id, const CKeyMetadata &meta)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // m_script_metadata
UpdateTimeFirstKey(meta.nCreateTime);
m_script_metadata[script_id] = meta;
return true;
}
bool CWallet::LoadCryptedKey(const CPubKey &vchPubKey, const std::vector<unsigned char> &vchCryptedSecret)
{
return CCryptoKeyStore::AddCryptedKey(vchPubKey, vchCryptedSecret);
}
/**
* Update wallet first key creation time. This should be called whenever keys
* are added to the wallet, with the oldest key creation time.
*/
void CWallet::UpdateTimeFirstKey(int64_t nCreateTime)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
if (nCreateTime <= 1) {
// Cannot determine birthday information, so set the wallet birthday to
// the beginning of time.
nTimeFirstKey = 1;
} else if (!nTimeFirstKey || nCreateTime < nTimeFirstKey) {
nTimeFirstKey = nCreateTime;
}
}
bool CWallet::AddCScript(const CScript& redeemScript)
{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddCScript(redeemScript))
return false;
return CWalletDB(*dbw).WriteCScript(Hash160(redeemScript), redeemScript);
}
bool CWallet::LoadCScript(const CScript& redeemScript)
{
/* A sanity check was added in pull #3843 to avoid adding redeemScripts
* that never can be redeemed. However, old wallets may still contain
* these. Do not add them to the wallet and warn. */
if (redeemScript.size() > MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE)
{
std::string strAddr = EncodeDestination(CScriptID(redeemScript));
LogPrintf("%s: Warning: This wallet contains a redeemScript of size %i which exceeds maximum size %i thus can never be redeemed. Do not use address %s.\n",
__func__, redeemScript.size(), MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE, strAddr);
return true;
}
return CCryptoKeyStore::AddCScript(redeemScript);
}
bool CWallet::AddWatchOnly(const CScript& dest)
{
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::AddWatchOnly(dest))
return false;
const CKeyMetadata& meta = m_script_metadata[CScriptID(dest)];
UpdateTimeFirstKey(meta.nCreateTime);
NotifyWatchonlyChanged(true);
return CWalletDB(*dbw).WriteWatchOnly(dest, meta);
}
bool CWallet::AddWatchOnly(const CScript& dest, int64_t nCreateTime)
{
m_script_metadata[CScriptID(dest)].nCreateTime = nCreateTime;
return AddWatchOnly(dest);
}
2014-07-26 12:05:11 -07:00
bool CWallet::RemoveWatchOnly(const CScript &dest)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
if (!CCryptoKeyStore::RemoveWatchOnly(dest))
return false;
if (!HaveWatchOnly())
NotifyWatchonlyChanged(false);
if (!CWalletDB(*dbw).EraseWatchOnly(dest))
return false;
2014-07-26 12:05:11 -07:00
return true;
}
bool CWallet::LoadWatchOnly(const CScript &dest)
{
return CCryptoKeyStore::AddWatchOnly(dest);
}
bool CWallet::Unlock(const SecureString& strWalletPassphrase)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
CCrypter crypter;
2016-11-09 23:00:05 -08:00
CKeyingMaterial _vMasterKey;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
for (const MasterKeyMap::value_type& pMasterKey : mapMasterKeys)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
if(!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
2016-11-09 23:00:05 -08:00
if (!crypter.Decrypt(pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey, _vMasterKey))
continue; // try another master key
2016-11-09 23:00:05 -08:00
if (CCryptoKeyStore::Unlock(_vMasterKey))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
return true;
}
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
return false;
}
bool CWallet::ChangeWalletPassphrase(const SecureString& strOldWalletPassphrase, const SecureString& strNewWalletPassphrase)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
bool fWasLocked = IsLocked();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
Lock();
CCrypter crypter;
2016-11-09 23:00:05 -08:00
CKeyingMaterial _vMasterKey;
for (MasterKeyMap::value_type& pMasterKey : mapMasterKeys)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
if(!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strOldWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
2016-11-09 23:00:05 -08:00
if (!crypter.Decrypt(pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey, _vMasterKey))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
return false;
2016-11-09 23:00:05 -08:00
if (CCryptoKeyStore::Unlock(_vMasterKey))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
int64_t nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod);
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = static_cast<unsigned int>(pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations * (100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime))));
nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod);
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = (pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations + static_cast<unsigned int>(pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations * 100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime)))) / 2;
if (pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations < 25000)
pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations = 25000;
LogPrintf("Wallet passphrase changed to an nDeriveIterations of %i\n", pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
if (!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strNewWalletPassphrase, pMasterKey.second.vchSalt, pMasterKey.second.nDeriveIterations, pMasterKey.second.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
2016-11-09 23:00:05 -08:00
if (!crypter.Encrypt(_vMasterKey, pMasterKey.second.vchCryptedKey))
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
return false;
CWalletDB(*dbw).WriteMasterKey(pMasterKey.first, pMasterKey.second);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
if (fWasLocked)
Lock();
return true;
}
}
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
return false;
}
2012-04-15 13:10:54 -07:00
void CWallet::SetBestChain(const CBlockLocator& loc)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
2012-04-15 13:10:54 -07:00
walletdb.WriteBestBlock(loc);
}
bool CWallet::SetMinVersion(enum WalletFeature nVersion, CWalletDB* pwalletdbIn, bool fExplicit)
2012-02-18 05:55:02 -08:00
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // nWalletVersion
2012-02-18 05:55:02 -08:00
if (nWalletVersion >= nVersion)
return true;
// when doing an explicit upgrade, if we pass the max version permitted, upgrade all the way
if (fExplicit && nVersion > nWalletMaxVersion)
nVersion = FEATURE_LATEST;
2012-02-18 05:55:02 -08:00
nWalletVersion = nVersion;
if (nVersion > nWalletMaxVersion)
nWalletMaxVersion = nVersion;
2012-02-18 05:55:02 -08:00
{
CWalletDB* pwalletdb = pwalletdbIn ? pwalletdbIn : new CWalletDB(*dbw);
2012-02-18 05:55:02 -08:00
if (nWalletVersion > 40000)
pwalletdb->WriteMinVersion(nWalletVersion);
if (!pwalletdbIn)
delete pwalletdb;
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::SetMaxVersion(int nVersion)
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // nWalletVersion, nWalletMaxVersion
// cannot downgrade below current version
if (nWalletVersion > nVersion)
return false;
nWalletMaxVersion = nVersion;
return true;
}
std::set<uint256> CWallet::GetConflicts(const uint256& txid) const
{
std::set<uint256> result;
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.find(txid);
if (it == mapWallet.end())
return result;
const CWalletTx& wtx = it->second;
std::pair<TxSpends::const_iterator, TxSpends::const_iterator> range;
for (const CTxIn& txin : wtx.tx->vin)
{
if (mapTxSpends.count(txin.prevout) <= 1)
continue; // No conflict if zero or one spends
range = mapTxSpends.equal_range(txin.prevout);
2016-09-02 09:19:01 -07:00
for (TxSpends::const_iterator _it = range.first; _it != range.second; ++_it)
result.insert(_it->second);
}
return result;
}
bool CWallet::HasWalletSpend(const uint256& txid) const
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
auto iter = mapTxSpends.lower_bound(COutPoint(txid, 0));
return (iter != mapTxSpends.end() && iter->first.hash == txid);
}
void CWallet::Flush(bool shutdown)
{
dbw->Flush(shutdown);
}
void CWallet::SyncMetaData(std::pair<TxSpends::iterator, TxSpends::iterator> range)
{
// We want all the wallet transactions in range to have the same metadata as
// the oldest (smallest nOrderPos).
// So: find smallest nOrderPos:
int nMinOrderPos = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
const CWalletTx* copyFrom = nullptr;
for (TxSpends::iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
{
const uint256& hash = it->second;
int n = mapWallet[hash].nOrderPos;
if (n < nMinOrderPos)
{
nMinOrderPos = n;
copyFrom = &mapWallet[hash];
}
}
assert(copyFrom);
// Now copy data from copyFrom to rest:
for (TxSpends::iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
{
const uint256& hash = it->second;
CWalletTx* copyTo = &mapWallet[hash];
if (copyFrom == copyTo) continue;
assert(copyFrom && "Oldest wallet transaction in range assumed to have been found.");
if (!copyFrom->IsEquivalentTo(*copyTo)) continue;
copyTo->mapValue = copyFrom->mapValue;
copyTo->vOrderForm = copyFrom->vOrderForm;
// fTimeReceivedIsTxTime not copied on purpose
// nTimeReceived not copied on purpose
copyTo->nTimeSmart = copyFrom->nTimeSmart;
copyTo->fFromMe = copyFrom->fFromMe;
copyTo->strFromAccount = copyFrom->strFromAccount;
// nOrderPos not copied on purpose
// cached members not copied on purpose
}
}
/**
* Outpoint is spent if any non-conflicted transaction
* spends it:
*/
bool CWallet::IsSpent(const uint256& hash, unsigned int n) const
{
const COutPoint outpoint(hash, n);
std::pair<TxSpends::const_iterator, TxSpends::const_iterator> range;
range = mapTxSpends.equal_range(outpoint);
for (TxSpends::const_iterator it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it)
{
const uint256& wtxid = it->second;
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mit = mapWallet.find(wtxid);
if (mit != mapWallet.end()) {
int depth = mit->second.GetDepthInMainChain();
if (depth > 0 || (depth == 0 && !mit->second.isAbandoned()))
return true; // Spent
}
}
return false;
}
void CWallet::AddToSpends(const COutPoint& outpoint, const uint256& wtxid)
{
mapTxSpends.insert(std::make_pair(outpoint, wtxid));
std::pair<TxSpends::iterator, TxSpends::iterator> range;
range = mapTxSpends.equal_range(outpoint);
SyncMetaData(range);
}
void CWallet::AddToSpends(const uint256& wtxid)
{
2017-08-13 07:04:57 -07:00
auto it = mapWallet.find(wtxid);
assert(it != mapWallet.end());
CWalletTx& thisTx = it->second;
if (thisTx.IsCoinBase()) // Coinbases don't spend anything!
return;
for (const CTxIn& txin : thisTx.tx->vin)
AddToSpends(txin.prevout, wtxid);
}
bool CWallet::EncryptWallet(const SecureString& strWalletPassphrase)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
if (IsCrypted())
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
2016-11-09 23:00:05 -08:00
CKeyingMaterial _vMasterKey;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
2016-11-09 23:00:05 -08:00
_vMasterKey.resize(WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
GetStrongRandBytes(&_vMasterKey[0], WALLET_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
CMasterKey kMasterKey;
kMasterKey.vchSalt.resize(WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE);
GetStrongRandBytes(&kMasterKey.vchSalt[0], WALLET_CRYPTO_SALT_SIZE);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
CCrypter crypter;
int64_t nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, 25000, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod);
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = static_cast<unsigned int>(2500000 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime)));
nStartTime = GetTimeMillis();
crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod);
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = (kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations + static_cast<unsigned int>(kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations * 100 / ((double)(GetTimeMillis() - nStartTime)))) / 2;
if (kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations < 25000)
kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations = 25000;
LogPrintf("Encrypting Wallet with an nDeriveIterations of %i\n", kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations);
if (!crypter.SetKeyFromPassphrase(strWalletPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations, kMasterKey.nDerivationMethod))
return false;
2016-11-09 23:00:05 -08:00
if (!crypter.Encrypt(_vMasterKey, kMasterKey.vchCryptedKey))
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
mapMasterKeys[++nMasterKeyMaxID] = kMasterKey;
assert(!pwalletdbEncryption);
pwalletdbEncryption = new CWalletDB(*dbw);
if (!pwalletdbEncryption->TxnBegin()) {
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
pwalletdbEncryption = nullptr;
return false;
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
}
pwalletdbEncryption->WriteMasterKey(nMasterKeyMaxID, kMasterKey);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
2016-11-09 23:00:05 -08:00
if (!EncryptKeys(_vMasterKey))
{
pwalletdbEncryption->TxnAbort();
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
// We now probably have half of our keys encrypted in memory, and half not...
2015-04-28 07:48:28 -07:00
// die and let the user reload the unencrypted wallet.
assert(false);
}
2012-02-18 05:55:02 -08:00
// Encryption was introduced in version 0.4.0
SetMinVersion(FEATURE_WALLETCRYPT, pwalletdbEncryption, true);
2012-02-18 05:55:02 -08:00
if (!pwalletdbEncryption->TxnCommit()) {
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
// We now have keys encrypted in memory, but not on disk...
// die to avoid confusion and let the user reload the unencrypted wallet.
assert(false);
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
delete pwalletdbEncryption;
pwalletdbEncryption = nullptr;
Lock();
Unlock(strWalletPassphrase);
// if we are using HD, replace the HD master key (seed) with a new one
if (IsHDEnabled()) {
if (!SetHDMasterKey(GenerateNewHDMasterKey())) {
return false;
}
}
NewKeyPool();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
Lock();
// Need to completely rewrite the wallet file; if we don't, bdb might keep
// bits of the unencrypted private key in slack space in the database file.
dbw->Rewrite();
}
NotifyStatusChanged(this);
2011-11-10 12:29:23 -08:00
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
return true;
}
DBErrors CWallet::ReorderTransactions()
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
// Old wallets didn't have any defined order for transactions
// Probably a bad idea to change the output of this
// First: get all CWalletTx and CAccountingEntry into a sorted-by-time multimap.
typedef std::pair<CWalletTx*, CAccountingEntry*> TxPair;
typedef std::multimap<int64_t, TxPair > TxItems;
TxItems txByTime;
for (auto& entry : mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx* wtx = &entry.second;
txByTime.insert(std::make_pair(wtx->nTimeReceived, TxPair(wtx, nullptr)));
}
std::list<CAccountingEntry> acentries;
walletdb.ListAccountCreditDebit("", acentries);
for (CAccountingEntry& entry : acentries)
{
txByTime.insert(std::make_pair(entry.nTime, TxPair(nullptr, &entry)));
}
nOrderPosNext = 0;
std::vector<int64_t> nOrderPosOffsets;
for (TxItems::iterator it = txByTime.begin(); it != txByTime.end(); ++it)
{
CWalletTx *const pwtx = (*it).second.first;
CAccountingEntry *const pacentry = (*it).second.second;
int64_t& nOrderPos = (pwtx != nullptr) ? pwtx->nOrderPos : pacentry->nOrderPos;
if (nOrderPos == -1)
{
nOrderPos = nOrderPosNext++;
nOrderPosOffsets.push_back(nOrderPos);
if (pwtx)
{
if (!walletdb.WriteTx(*pwtx))
return DB_LOAD_FAIL;
}
else
if (!walletdb.WriteAccountingEntry(pacentry->nEntryNo, *pacentry))
return DB_LOAD_FAIL;
}
else
{
int64_t nOrderPosOff = 0;
for (const int64_t& nOffsetStart : nOrderPosOffsets)
{
if (nOrderPos >= nOffsetStart)
++nOrderPosOff;
}
nOrderPos += nOrderPosOff;
nOrderPosNext = std::max(nOrderPosNext, nOrderPos + 1);
if (!nOrderPosOff)
continue;
// Since we're changing the order, write it back
if (pwtx)
{
if (!walletdb.WriteTx(*pwtx))
return DB_LOAD_FAIL;
}
else
if (!walletdb.WriteAccountingEntry(pacentry->nEntryNo, *pacentry))
return DB_LOAD_FAIL;
}
}
walletdb.WriteOrderPosNext(nOrderPosNext);
return DB_LOAD_OK;
}
int64_t CWallet::IncOrderPosNext(CWalletDB *pwalletdb)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // nOrderPosNext
int64_t nRet = nOrderPosNext++;
if (pwalletdb) {
pwalletdb->WriteOrderPosNext(nOrderPosNext);
} else {
CWalletDB(*dbw).WriteOrderPosNext(nOrderPosNext);
}
return nRet;
}
bool CWallet::AccountMove(std::string strFrom, std::string strTo, CAmount nAmount, std::string strComment)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
if (!walletdb.TxnBegin())
return false;
int64_t nNow = GetAdjustedTime();
// Debit
CAccountingEntry debit;
debit.nOrderPos = IncOrderPosNext(&walletdb);
debit.strAccount = strFrom;
debit.nCreditDebit = -nAmount;
debit.nTime = nNow;
debit.strOtherAccount = strTo;
debit.strComment = strComment;
AddAccountingEntry(debit, &walletdb);
// Credit
CAccountingEntry credit;
credit.nOrderPos = IncOrderPosNext(&walletdb);
credit.strAccount = strTo;
credit.nCreditDebit = nAmount;
credit.nTime = nNow;
credit.strOtherAccount = strFrom;
credit.strComment = strComment;
AddAccountingEntry(credit, &walletdb);
if (!walletdb.TxnCommit())
return false;
return true;
}
bool CWallet::GetAccountPubkey(CPubKey &pubKey, std::string strAccount, bool bForceNew)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
CAccount account;
walletdb.ReadAccount(strAccount, account);
if (!bForceNew) {
if (!account.vchPubKey.IsValid())
bForceNew = true;
else {
// Check if the current key has been used
CScript scriptPubKey = GetScriptForDestination(account.vchPubKey.GetID());
for (std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator it = mapWallet.begin();
it != mapWallet.end() && account.vchPubKey.IsValid();
++it)
for (const CTxOut& txout : (*it).second.tx->vout)
if (txout.scriptPubKey == scriptPubKey) {
bForceNew = true;
break;
}
}
}
// Generate a new key
if (bForceNew) {
if (!GetKeyFromPool(account.vchPubKey, false))
return false;
SetAddressBook(account.vchPubKey.GetID(), strAccount, "receive");
walletdb.WriteAccount(strAccount, account);
}
pubKey = account.vchPubKey;
return true;
}
void CWallet::MarkDirty()
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
for (std::pair<const uint256, CWalletTx>& item : mapWallet)
item.second.MarkDirty();
}
}
bool CWallet::MarkReplaced(const uint256& originalHash, const uint256& newHash)
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
auto mi = mapWallet.find(originalHash);
// There is a bug if MarkReplaced is not called on an existing wallet transaction.
assert(mi != mapWallet.end());
CWalletTx& wtx = (*mi).second;
// Ensure for now that we're not overwriting data
assert(wtx.mapValue.count("replaced_by_txid") == 0);
wtx.mapValue["replaced_by_txid"] = newHash.ToString();
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw, "r+");
bool success = true;
if (!walletdb.WriteTx(wtx)) {
LogPrintf("%s: Updating walletdb tx %s failed", __func__, wtx.GetHash().ToString());
success = false;
}
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, originalHash, CT_UPDATED);
return success;
}
bool CWallet::AddToWallet(const CWalletTx& wtxIn, bool fFlushOnClose)
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw, "r+", fFlushOnClose);
uint256 hash = wtxIn.GetHash();
// Inserts only if not already there, returns tx inserted or tx found
std::pair<std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator, bool> ret = mapWallet.insert(std::make_pair(hash, wtxIn));
CWalletTx& wtx = (*ret.first).second;
wtx.BindWallet(this);
bool fInsertedNew = ret.second;
if (fInsertedNew)
{
wtx.nTimeReceived = GetAdjustedTime();
wtx.nOrderPos = IncOrderPosNext(&walletdb);
wtxOrdered.insert(std::make_pair(wtx.nOrderPos, TxPair(&wtx, nullptr)));
wtx.nTimeSmart = ComputeTimeSmart(wtx);
AddToSpends(hash);
}
bool fUpdated = false;
if (!fInsertedNew)
{
// Merge
if (!wtxIn.hashUnset() && wtxIn.hashBlock != wtx.hashBlock)
{
wtx.hashBlock = wtxIn.hashBlock;
fUpdated = true;
}
// If no longer abandoned, update
if (wtxIn.hashBlock.IsNull() && wtx.isAbandoned())
{
wtx.hashBlock = wtxIn.hashBlock;
fUpdated = true;
}
if (wtxIn.nIndex != -1 && (wtxIn.nIndex != wtx.nIndex))
{
wtx.nIndex = wtxIn.nIndex;
fUpdated = true;
}
if (wtxIn.fFromMe && wtxIn.fFromMe != wtx.fFromMe)
{
wtx.fFromMe = wtxIn.fFromMe;
fUpdated = true;
}
// If we have a witness-stripped version of this transaction, and we
// see a new version with a witness, then we must be upgrading a pre-segwit
// wallet. Store the new version of the transaction with the witness,
// as the stripped-version must be invalid.
// TODO: Store all versions of the transaction, instead of just one.
if (wtxIn.tx->HasWitness() && !wtx.tx->HasWitness()) {
wtx.SetTx(wtxIn.tx);
fUpdated = true;
}
}
//// debug print
LogPrintf("AddToWallet %s %s%s\n", wtxIn.GetHash().ToString(), (fInsertedNew ? "new" : ""), (fUpdated ? "update" : ""));
// Write to disk
if (fInsertedNew || fUpdated)
if (!walletdb.WriteTx(wtx))
return false;
// Break debit/credit balance caches:
wtx.MarkDirty();
// Notify UI of new or updated transaction
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, hash, fInsertedNew ? CT_NEW : CT_UPDATED);
// notify an external script when a wallet transaction comes in or is updated
std::string strCmd = gArgs.GetArg("-walletnotify", "");
if (!strCmd.empty())
{
boost::replace_all(strCmd, "%s", wtxIn.GetHash().GetHex());
boost::thread t(runCommand, strCmd); // thread runs free
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::LoadToWallet(const CWalletTx& wtxIn)
{
uint256 hash = wtxIn.GetHash();
mapWallet[hash] = wtxIn;
CWalletTx& wtx = mapWallet[hash];
wtx.BindWallet(this);
wtxOrdered.insert(std::make_pair(wtx.nOrderPos, TxPair(&wtx, nullptr)));
AddToSpends(hash);
for (const CTxIn& txin : wtx.tx->vin) {
2017-08-13 07:04:57 -07:00
auto it = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (it != mapWallet.end()) {
CWalletTx& prevtx = it->second;
if (prevtx.nIndex == -1 && !prevtx.hashUnset()) {
MarkConflicted(prevtx.hashBlock, wtx.GetHash());
}
}
}
return true;
}
/**
* Add a transaction to the wallet, or update it. pIndex and posInBlock should
* be set when the transaction was known to be included in a block. When
* pIndex == nullptr, then wallet state is not updated in AddToWallet, but
* notifications happen and cached balances are marked dirty.
*
* If fUpdate is true, existing transactions will be updated.
* TODO: One exception to this is that the abandoned state is cleared under the
* assumption that any further notification of a transaction that was considered
* abandoned is an indication that it is not safe to be considered abandoned.
* Abandoned state should probably be more carefully tracked via different
* posInBlock signals or by checking mempool presence when necessary.
*/
bool CWallet::AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(const CTransactionRef& ptx, const CBlockIndex* pIndex, int posInBlock, bool fUpdate)
{
const CTransaction& tx = *ptx;
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
if (pIndex != nullptr) {
for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) {
std::pair<TxSpends::const_iterator, TxSpends::const_iterator> range = mapTxSpends.equal_range(txin.prevout);
while (range.first != range.second) {
if (range.first->second != tx.GetHash()) {
LogPrintf("Transaction %s (in block %s) conflicts with wallet transaction %s (both spend %s:%i)\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pIndex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), range.first->second.ToString(), range.first->first.hash.ToString(), range.first->first.n);
MarkConflicted(pIndex->GetBlockHash(), range.first->second);
}
range.first++;
}
}
}
bool fExisted = mapWallet.count(tx.GetHash()) != 0;
if (fExisted && !fUpdate) return false;
if (fExisted || IsMine(tx) || IsFromMe(tx))
{
/* Check if any keys in the wallet keypool that were supposed to be unused
* have appeared in a new transaction. If so, remove those keys from the keypool.
* This can happen when restoring an old wallet backup that does not contain
* the mostly recently created transactions from newer versions of the wallet.
*/
// loop though all outputs
for (const CTxOut& txout: tx.vout) {
// extract addresses and check if they match with an unused keypool key
std::vector<CKeyID> vAffected;
CAffectedKeysVisitor(*this, vAffected).Process(txout.scriptPubKey);
for (const CKeyID &keyid : vAffected) {
std::map<CKeyID, int64_t>::const_iterator mi = m_pool_key_to_index.find(keyid);
if (mi != m_pool_key_to_index.end()) {
LogPrintf("%s: Detected a used keypool key, mark all keypool key up to this key as used\n", __func__);
MarkReserveKeysAsUsed(mi->second);
if (!TopUpKeyPool()) {
LogPrintf("%s: Topping up keypool failed (locked wallet)\n", __func__);
}
}
}
}
CWalletTx wtx(this, ptx);
// Get merkle branch if transaction was found in a block
if (pIndex != nullptr)
wtx.SetMerkleBranch(pIndex, posInBlock);
return AddToWallet(wtx, false);
}
}
return false;
}
bool CWallet::TransactionCanBeAbandoned(const uint256& hashTx) const
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
const CWalletTx* wtx = GetWalletTx(hashTx);
return wtx && !wtx->isAbandoned() && wtx->GetDepthInMainChain() <= 0 && !wtx->InMempool();
}
bool CWallet::AbandonTransaction(const uint256& hashTx)
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw, "r+");
std::set<uint256> todo;
std::set<uint256> done;
// Can't mark abandoned if confirmed or in mempool
2017-08-13 07:04:57 -07:00
auto it = mapWallet.find(hashTx);
assert(it != mapWallet.end());
CWalletTx& origtx = it->second;
if (origtx.GetDepthInMainChain() > 0 || origtx.InMempool()) {
return false;
}
todo.insert(hashTx);
while (!todo.empty()) {
uint256 now = *todo.begin();
todo.erase(now);
done.insert(now);
2017-08-13 07:04:57 -07:00
auto it = mapWallet.find(now);
assert(it != mapWallet.end());
CWalletTx& wtx = it->second;
int currentconfirm = wtx.GetDepthInMainChain();
// If the orig tx was not in block, none of its spends can be
assert(currentconfirm <= 0);
// if (currentconfirm < 0) {Tx and spends are already conflicted, no need to abandon}
if (currentconfirm == 0 && !wtx.isAbandoned()) {
// If the orig tx was not in block/mempool, none of its spends can be in mempool
assert(!wtx.InMempool());
wtx.nIndex = -1;
wtx.setAbandoned();
wtx.MarkDirty();
walletdb.WriteTx(wtx);
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, wtx.GetHash(), CT_UPDATED);
// Iterate over all its outputs, and mark transactions in the wallet that spend them abandoned too
TxSpends::const_iterator iter = mapTxSpends.lower_bound(COutPoint(hashTx, 0));
while (iter != mapTxSpends.end() && iter->first.hash == now) {
if (!done.count(iter->second)) {
todo.insert(iter->second);
}
iter++;
}
// If a transaction changes 'conflicted' state, that changes the balance
// available of the outputs it spends. So force those to be recomputed
for (const CTxIn& txin : wtx.tx->vin)
{
2017-08-13 07:04:57 -07:00
auto it = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (it != mapWallet.end()) {
it->second.MarkDirty();
}
}
}
}
return true;
}
void CWallet::MarkConflicted(const uint256& hashBlock, const uint256& hashTx)
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
int conflictconfirms = 0;
if (mapBlockIndex.count(hashBlock)) {
CBlockIndex* pindex = mapBlockIndex[hashBlock];
if (chainActive.Contains(pindex)) {
conflictconfirms = -(chainActive.Height() - pindex->nHeight + 1);
}
}
// If number of conflict confirms cannot be determined, this means
// that the block is still unknown or not yet part of the main chain,
// for example when loading the wallet during a reindex. Do nothing in that
// case.
if (conflictconfirms >= 0)
return;
// Do not flush the wallet here for performance reasons
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw, "r+", false);
std::set<uint256> todo;
std::set<uint256> done;
todo.insert(hashTx);
while (!todo.empty()) {
uint256 now = *todo.begin();
todo.erase(now);
done.insert(now);
2017-08-13 07:04:57 -07:00
auto it = mapWallet.find(now);
assert(it != mapWallet.end());
CWalletTx& wtx = it->second;
int currentconfirm = wtx.GetDepthInMainChain();
if (conflictconfirms < currentconfirm) {
// Block is 'more conflicted' than current confirm; update.
// Mark transaction as conflicted with this block.
wtx.nIndex = -1;
wtx.hashBlock = hashBlock;
wtx.MarkDirty();
walletdb.WriteTx(wtx);
// Iterate over all its outputs, and mark transactions in the wallet that spend them conflicted too
TxSpends::const_iterator iter = mapTxSpends.lower_bound(COutPoint(now, 0));
while (iter != mapTxSpends.end() && iter->first.hash == now) {
if (!done.count(iter->second)) {
todo.insert(iter->second);
}
iter++;
}
// If a transaction changes 'conflicted' state, that changes the balance
// available of the outputs it spends. So force those to be recomputed
2017-08-13 07:04:57 -07:00
for (const CTxIn& txin : wtx.tx->vin) {
auto it = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (it != mapWallet.end()) {
it->second.MarkDirty();
}
}
}
}
}
void CWallet::SyncTransaction(const CTransactionRef& ptx, const CBlockIndex *pindex, int posInBlock) {
const CTransaction& tx = *ptx;
if (!AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(ptx, pindex, posInBlock, true))
return; // Not one of ours
// If a transaction changes 'conflicted' state, that changes the balance
// available of the outputs it spends. So force those to be
// recomputed, also:
2017-08-13 07:04:57 -07:00
for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) {
auto it = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (it != mapWallet.end()) {
it->second.MarkDirty();
}
}
}
void CWallet::TransactionAddedToMempool(const CTransactionRef& ptx) {
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
SyncTransaction(ptx);
auto it = mapWallet.find(ptx->GetHash());
if (it != mapWallet.end()) {
it->second.fInMempool = true;
}
}
void CWallet::TransactionRemovedFromMempool(const CTransactionRef &ptx) {
LOCK(cs_wallet);
auto it = mapWallet.find(ptx->GetHash());
if (it != mapWallet.end()) {
it->second.fInMempool = false;
}
}
void CWallet::BlockConnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, const CBlockIndex *pindex, const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& vtxConflicted) {
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
// TODO: Temporarily ensure that mempool removals are notified before
// connected transactions. This shouldn't matter, but the abandoned
// state of transactions in our wallet is currently cleared when we
// receive another notification and there is a race condition where
// notification of a connected conflict might cause an outside process
// to abandon a transaction and then have it inadvertently cleared by
// the notification that the conflicted transaction was evicted.
for (const CTransactionRef& ptx : vtxConflicted) {
SyncTransaction(ptx);
TransactionRemovedFromMempool(ptx);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < pblock->vtx.size(); i++) {
SyncTransaction(pblock->vtx[i], pindex, i);
TransactionRemovedFromMempool(pblock->vtx[i]);
}
m_last_block_processed = pindex;
}
void CWallet::BlockDisconnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock) {
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (const CTransactionRef& ptx : pblock->vtx) {
SyncTransaction(ptx);
}
}
void CWallet::BlockUntilSyncedToCurrentChain() {
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main);
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_wallet);
{
// Skip the queue-draining stuff if we know we're caught up with
// chainActive.Tip()...
// We could also take cs_wallet here, and call m_last_block_processed
// protected by cs_wallet instead of cs_main, but as long as we need
// cs_main here anyway, its easier to just call it cs_main-protected.
LOCK(cs_main);
const CBlockIndex* initialChainTip = chainActive.Tip();
if (m_last_block_processed->GetAncestor(initialChainTip->nHeight) == initialChainTip) {
return;
}
}
// ...otherwise put a callback in the validation interface queue and wait
// for the queue to drain enough to execute it (indicating we are caught up
// at least with the time we entered this function).
SyncWithValidationInterfaceQueue();
}
isminetype CWallet::IsMine(const CTxIn &txin) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx& prev = (*mi).second;
if (txin.prevout.n < prev.tx->vout.size())
return IsMine(prev.tx->vout[txin.prevout.n]);
}
}
2014-07-01 02:00:22 -07:00
return ISMINE_NO;
}
// Note that this function doesn't distinguish between a 0-valued input,
// and a not-"is mine" (according to the filter) input.
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount CWallet::GetDebit(const CTxIn &txin, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (mi != mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx& prev = (*mi).second;
if (txin.prevout.n < prev.tx->vout.size())
if (IsMine(prev.tx->vout[txin.prevout.n]) & filter)
return prev.tx->vout[txin.prevout.n].nValue;
}
}
return 0;
}
isminetype CWallet::IsMine(const CTxOut& txout) const
{
return ::IsMine(*this, txout.scriptPubKey);
}
CAmount CWallet::GetCredit(const CTxOut& txout, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
if (!MoneyRange(txout.nValue))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": value out of range");
return ((IsMine(txout) & filter) ? txout.nValue : 0);
}
bool CWallet::IsChange(const CTxOut& txout) const
{
// TODO: fix handling of 'change' outputs. The assumption is that any
// payment to a script that is ours, but is not in the address book
// is change. That assumption is likely to break when we implement multisignature
// wallets that return change back into a multi-signature-protected address;
// a better way of identifying which outputs are 'the send' and which are
// 'the change' will need to be implemented (maybe extend CWalletTx to remember
// which output, if any, was change).
if (::IsMine(*this, txout.scriptPubKey))
{
CTxDestination address;
if (!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, address))
return true;
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (!mapAddressBook.count(address))
return true;
}
return false;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetChange(const CTxOut& txout) const
{
if (!MoneyRange(txout.nValue))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": value out of range");
return (IsChange(txout) ? txout.nValue : 0);
}
bool CWallet::IsMine(const CTransaction& tx) const
{
for (const CTxOut& txout : tx.vout)
if (IsMine(txout))
return true;
return false;
}
bool CWallet::IsFromMe(const CTransaction& tx) const
{
return (GetDebit(tx, ISMINE_ALL) > 0);
}
CAmount CWallet::GetDebit(const CTransaction& tx, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
CAmount nDebit = 0;
for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin)
{
nDebit += GetDebit(txin, filter);
if (!MoneyRange(nDebit))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": value out of range");
}
return nDebit;
}
bool CWallet::IsAllFromMe(const CTransaction& tx, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin)
{
auto mi = mapWallet.find(txin.prevout.hash);
if (mi == mapWallet.end())
return false; // any unknown inputs can't be from us
const CWalletTx& prev = (*mi).second;
if (txin.prevout.n >= prev.tx->vout.size())
return false; // invalid input!
if (!(IsMine(prev.tx->vout[txin.prevout.n]) & filter))
return false;
}
return true;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetCredit(const CTransaction& tx, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
CAmount nCredit = 0;
for (const CTxOut& txout : tx.vout)
{
nCredit += GetCredit(txout, filter);
if (!MoneyRange(nCredit))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": value out of range");
}
return nCredit;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetChange(const CTransaction& tx) const
{
CAmount nChange = 0;
for (const CTxOut& txout : tx.vout)
{
nChange += GetChange(txout);
if (!MoneyRange(nChange))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": value out of range");
}
return nChange;
}
CPubKey CWallet::GenerateNewHDMasterKey()
{
CKey key;
key.MakeNewKey(true);
int64_t nCreationTime = GetTime();
CKeyMetadata metadata(nCreationTime);
// calculate the pubkey
CPubKey pubkey = key.GetPubKey();
assert(key.VerifyPubKey(pubkey));
// set the hd keypath to "m" -> Master, refers the masterkeyid to itself
metadata.hdKeypath = "m";
metadata.hdMasterKeyID = pubkey.GetID();
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// mem store the metadata
mapKeyMetadata[pubkey.GetID()] = metadata;
// write the key&metadata to the database
if (!AddKeyPubKey(key, pubkey))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": AddKeyPubKey failed");
}
return pubkey;
}
bool CWallet::SetHDMasterKey(const CPubKey& pubkey)
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// store the keyid (hash160) together with
// the child index counter in the database
// as a hdchain object
CHDChain newHdChain;
newHdChain.nVersion = CanSupportFeature(FEATURE_HD_SPLIT) ? CHDChain::VERSION_HD_CHAIN_SPLIT : CHDChain::VERSION_HD_BASE;
newHdChain.masterKeyID = pubkey.GetID();
SetHDChain(newHdChain, false);
return true;
}
bool CWallet::SetHDChain(const CHDChain& chain, bool memonly)
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (!memonly && !CWalletDB(*dbw).WriteHDChain(chain))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": writing chain failed");
hdChain = chain;
return true;
}
bool CWallet::IsHDEnabled() const
{
return !hdChain.masterKeyID.IsNull();
}
int64_t CWalletTx::GetTxTime() const
{
int64_t n = nTimeSmart;
return n ? n : nTimeReceived;
}
int CWalletTx::GetRequestCount() const
{
// Returns -1 if it wasn't being tracked
int nRequests = -1;
{
LOCK(pwallet->cs_wallet);
if (IsCoinBase())
{
// Generated block
if (!hashUnset())
{
std::map<uint256, int>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(hashBlock);
if (mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
nRequests = (*mi).second;
}
}
else
{
// Did anyone request this transaction?
std::map<uint256, int>::const_iterator mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(GetHash());
if (mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
{
nRequests = (*mi).second;
// How about the block it's in?
if (nRequests == 0 && !hashUnset())
{
std::map<uint256, int>::const_iterator _mi = pwallet->mapRequestCount.find(hashBlock);
2016-09-02 09:19:01 -07:00
if (_mi != pwallet->mapRequestCount.end())
nRequests = (*_mi).second;
else
nRequests = 1; // If it's in someone else's block it must have got out
}
}
}
}
return nRequests;
}
void CWalletTx::GetAmounts(std::list<COutputEntry>& listReceived,
std::list<COutputEntry>& listSent, CAmount& nFee, std::string& strSentAccount, const isminefilter& filter) const
{
nFee = 0;
listReceived.clear();
listSent.clear();
strSentAccount = strFromAccount;
// Compute fee:
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount nDebit = GetDebit(filter);
if (nDebit > 0) // debit>0 means we signed/sent this transaction
{
CAmount nValueOut = tx->GetValueOut();
nFee = nDebit - nValueOut;
}
// Sent/received.
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx->vout.size(); ++i)
{
const CTxOut& txout = tx->vout[i];
isminetype fIsMine = pwallet->IsMine(txout);
// Only need to handle txouts if AT LEAST one of these is true:
// 1) they debit from us (sent)
// 2) the output is to us (received)
if (nDebit > 0)
{
// Don't report 'change' txouts
if (pwallet->IsChange(txout))
continue;
}
else if (!(fIsMine & filter))
continue;
// In either case, we need to get the destination address
CTxDestination address;
2015-12-12 10:45:53 -08:00
if (!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, address) && !txout.scriptPubKey.IsUnspendable())
{
LogPrintf("CWalletTx::GetAmounts: Unknown transaction type found, txid %s\n",
this->GetHash().ToString());
address = CNoDestination();
}
COutputEntry output = {address, txout.nValue, (int)i};
2014-05-29 15:54:00 -07:00
// If we are debited by the transaction, add the output as a "sent" entry
if (nDebit > 0)
2014-05-29 15:54:00 -07:00
listSent.push_back(output);
// If we are receiving the output, add it as a "received" entry
if (fIsMine & filter)
2014-05-29 15:54:00 -07:00
listReceived.push_back(output);
}
}
/**
* Scan active chain for relevant transactions after importing keys. This should
* be called whenever new keys are added to the wallet, with the oldest key
* creation time.
*
* @return Earliest timestamp that could be successfully scanned from. Timestamp
* returned will be higher than startTime if relevant blocks could not be read.
*/
int64_t CWallet::RescanFromTime(int64_t startTime, bool update)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
// Find starting block. May be null if nCreateTime is greater than the
// highest blockchain timestamp, in which case there is nothing that needs
// to be scanned.
CBlockIndex* const startBlock = chainActive.FindEarliestAtLeast(startTime - TIMESTAMP_WINDOW);
LogPrintf("%s: Rescanning last %i blocks\n", __func__, startBlock ? chainActive.Height() - startBlock->nHeight + 1 : 0);
if (startBlock) {
const CBlockIndex* const failedBlock = ScanForWalletTransactions(startBlock, nullptr, update);
if (failedBlock) {
return failedBlock->GetBlockTimeMax() + TIMESTAMP_WINDOW + 1;
}
}
return startTime;
}
/**
* Scan the block chain (starting in pindexStart) for transactions
* from or to us. If fUpdate is true, found transactions that already
* exist in the wallet will be updated.
*
* Returns null if scan was successful. Otherwise, if a complete rescan was not
* possible (due to pruning or corruption), returns pointer to the most recent
* block that could not be scanned.
*
* If pindexStop is not a nullptr, the scan will stop at the block-index
* defined by pindexStop
*/
CBlockIndex* CWallet::ScanForWalletTransactions(CBlockIndex* pindexStart, CBlockIndex* pindexStop, bool fUpdate)
{
2014-02-17 16:35:37 -08:00
int64_t nNow = GetTime();
const CChainParams& chainParams = Params();
if (pindexStop) {
assert(pindexStop->nHeight >= pindexStart->nHeight);
}
CBlockIndex* pindex = pindexStart;
CBlockIndex* ret = nullptr;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
fAbortRescan = false;
fScanningWallet = true;
2014-03-18 16:26:14 -07:00
ShowProgress(_("Rescanning..."), 0); // show rescan progress in GUI as dialog or on splashscreen, if -rescan on startup
2017-01-04 13:09:20 -08:00
double dProgressStart = GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.TxData(), pindex);
double dProgressTip = GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.TxData(), chainActive.Tip());
while (pindex && !fAbortRescan)
{
2014-03-18 16:26:14 -07:00
if (pindex->nHeight % 100 == 0 && dProgressTip - dProgressStart > 0.0)
2017-01-04 13:09:20 -08:00
ShowProgress(_("Rescanning..."), std::max(1, std::min(99, (int)((GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.TxData(), pindex) - dProgressStart) / (dProgressTip - dProgressStart) * 100))));
if (GetTime() >= nNow + 60) {
nNow = GetTime();
LogPrintf("Still rescanning. At block %d. Progress=%f\n", pindex->nHeight, GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.TxData(), pindex));
}
CBlock block;
if (ReadBlockFromDisk(block, pindex, Params().GetConsensus())) {
for (size_t posInBlock = 0; posInBlock < block.vtx.size(); ++posInBlock) {
AddToWalletIfInvolvingMe(block.vtx[posInBlock], pindex, posInBlock, fUpdate);
}
} else {
ret = pindex;
}
if (pindex == pindexStop) {
break;
}
pindex = chainActive.Next(pindex);
}
if (pindex && fAbortRescan) {
LogPrintf("Rescan aborted at block %d. Progress=%f\n", pindex->nHeight, GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.TxData(), pindex));
}
2014-03-18 16:26:14 -07:00
ShowProgress(_("Rescanning..."), 100); // hide progress dialog in GUI
fScanningWallet = false;
}
return ret;
}
void CWallet::ReacceptWalletTransactions()
{
2015-04-28 07:48:28 -07:00
// If transactions aren't being broadcasted, don't let them into local mempool either
if (!fBroadcastTransactions)
return;
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
std::map<int64_t, CWalletTx*> mapSorted;
// Sort pending wallet transactions based on their initial wallet insertion order
for (std::pair<const uint256, CWalletTx>& item : mapWallet)
{
const uint256& wtxid = item.first;
CWalletTx& wtx = item.second;
assert(wtx.GetHash() == wtxid);
int nDepth = wtx.GetDepthInMainChain();
if (!wtx.IsCoinBase() && (nDepth == 0 && !wtx.isAbandoned())) {
mapSorted.insert(std::make_pair(wtx.nOrderPos, &wtx));
}
}
// Try to add wallet transactions to memory pool
for (std::pair<const int64_t, CWalletTx*>& item : mapSorted) {
CWalletTx& wtx = *(item.second);
CValidationState state;
wtx.AcceptToMemoryPool(maxTxFee, state);
}
}
bool CWalletTx::RelayWalletTransaction(CConnman* connman)
{
assert(pwallet->GetBroadcastTransactions());
if (!IsCoinBase() && !isAbandoned() && GetDepthInMainChain() == 0)
{
CValidationState state;
/* GetDepthInMainChain already catches known conflicts. */
if (InMempool() || AcceptToMemoryPool(maxTxFee, state)) {
LogPrintf("Relaying wtx %s\n", GetHash().ToString());
if (connman) {
CInv inv(MSG_TX, GetHash());
connman->ForEachNode([&inv](CNode* pnode)
{
pnode->PushInventory(inv);
});
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
std::set<uint256> CWalletTx::GetConflicts() const
{
std::set<uint256> result;
if (pwallet != nullptr)
{
uint256 myHash = GetHash();
result = pwallet->GetConflicts(myHash);
result.erase(myHash);
}
return result;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetDebit(const isminefilter& filter) const
{
if (tx->vin.empty())
return 0;
CAmount debit = 0;
if(filter & ISMINE_SPENDABLE)
{
if (fDebitCached)
debit += nDebitCached;
else
{
nDebitCached = pwallet->GetDebit(*tx, ISMINE_SPENDABLE);
fDebitCached = true;
debit += nDebitCached;
}
}
if(filter & ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY)
{
if(fWatchDebitCached)
debit += nWatchDebitCached;
else
{
nWatchDebitCached = pwallet->GetDebit(*tx, ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY);
fWatchDebitCached = true;
debit += nWatchDebitCached;
}
}
return debit;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetCredit(const isminefilter& filter) const
{
// Must wait until coinbase is safely deep enough in the chain before valuing it
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
return 0;
2016-11-15 06:19:23 -08:00
CAmount credit = 0;
if (filter & ISMINE_SPENDABLE)
{
// GetBalance can assume transactions in mapWallet won't change
if (fCreditCached)
credit += nCreditCached;
else
{
nCreditCached = pwallet->GetCredit(*tx, ISMINE_SPENDABLE);
fCreditCached = true;
credit += nCreditCached;
}
}
if (filter & ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY)
{
if (fWatchCreditCached)
credit += nWatchCreditCached;
else
{
nWatchCreditCached = pwallet->GetCredit(*tx, ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY);
fWatchCreditCached = true;
credit += nWatchCreditCached;
}
}
return credit;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetImmatureCredit(bool fUseCache) const
{
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0 && IsInMainChain())
{
if (fUseCache && fImmatureCreditCached)
return nImmatureCreditCached;
nImmatureCreditCached = pwallet->GetCredit(*tx, ISMINE_SPENDABLE);
fImmatureCreditCached = true;
return nImmatureCreditCached;
}
return 0;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetAvailableCredit(bool fUseCache) const
{
if (pwallet == nullptr)
return 0;
// Must wait until coinbase is safely deep enough in the chain before valuing it
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
return 0;
if (fUseCache && fAvailableCreditCached)
return nAvailableCreditCached;
CAmount nCredit = 0;
uint256 hashTx = GetHash();
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx->vout.size(); i++)
{
if (!pwallet->IsSpent(hashTx, i))
{
const CTxOut &txout = tx->vout[i];
nCredit += pwallet->GetCredit(txout, ISMINE_SPENDABLE);
if (!MoneyRange(nCredit))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + " : value out of range");
}
}
nAvailableCreditCached = nCredit;
fAvailableCreditCached = true;
return nCredit;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetImmatureWatchOnlyCredit(const bool fUseCache) const
{
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0 && IsInMainChain())
{
if (fUseCache && fImmatureWatchCreditCached)
return nImmatureWatchCreditCached;
nImmatureWatchCreditCached = pwallet->GetCredit(*tx, ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY);
fImmatureWatchCreditCached = true;
return nImmatureWatchCreditCached;
}
return 0;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetAvailableWatchOnlyCredit(const bool fUseCache) const
{
if (pwallet == nullptr)
return 0;
// Must wait until coinbase is safely deep enough in the chain before valuing it
if (IsCoinBase() && GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
return 0;
if (fUseCache && fAvailableWatchCreditCached)
return nAvailableWatchCreditCached;
CAmount nCredit = 0;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx->vout.size(); i++)
{
if (!pwallet->IsSpent(GetHash(), i))
{
const CTxOut &txout = tx->vout[i];
nCredit += pwallet->GetCredit(txout, ISMINE_WATCH_ONLY);
if (!MoneyRange(nCredit))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": value out of range");
}
}
nAvailableWatchCreditCached = nCredit;
fAvailableWatchCreditCached = true;
return nCredit;
}
CAmount CWalletTx::GetChange() const
{
if (fChangeCached)
return nChangeCached;
nChangeCached = pwallet->GetChange(*tx);
fChangeCached = true;
return nChangeCached;
}
bool CWalletTx::InMempool() const
{
return fInMempool;
}
bool CWalletTx::IsTrusted() const
{
// Quick answer in most cases
if (!CheckFinalTx(*tx))
return false;
int nDepth = GetDepthInMainChain();
if (nDepth >= 1)
return true;
if (nDepth < 0)
return false;
if (!bSpendZeroConfChange || !IsFromMe(ISMINE_ALL)) // using wtx's cached debit
return false;
// Don't trust unconfirmed transactions from us unless they are in the mempool.
if (!InMempool())
return false;
// Trusted if all inputs are from us and are in the mempool:
for (const CTxIn& txin : tx->vin)
{
// Transactions not sent by us: not trusted
const CWalletTx* parent = pwallet->GetWalletTx(txin.prevout.hash);
if (parent == nullptr)
return false;
const CTxOut& parentOut = parent->tx->vout[txin.prevout.n];
if (pwallet->IsMine(parentOut) != ISMINE_SPENDABLE)
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool CWalletTx::IsEquivalentTo(const CWalletTx& _tx) const
{
CMutableTransaction tx1 = *this->tx;
CMutableTransaction tx2 = *_tx.tx;
for (auto& txin : tx1.vin) txin.scriptSig = CScript();
for (auto& txin : tx2.vin) txin.scriptSig = CScript();
return CTransaction(tx1) == CTransaction(tx2);
}
std::vector<uint256> CWallet::ResendWalletTransactionsBefore(int64_t nTime, CConnman* connman)
{
std::vector<uint256> result;
LOCK(cs_wallet);
// Sort them in chronological order
std::multimap<unsigned int, CWalletTx*> mapSorted;
for (std::pair<const uint256, CWalletTx>& item : mapWallet)
{
CWalletTx& wtx = item.second;
// Don't rebroadcast if newer than nTime:
if (wtx.nTimeReceived > nTime)
continue;
mapSorted.insert(std::make_pair(wtx.nTimeReceived, &wtx));
}
for (std::pair<const unsigned int, CWalletTx*>& item : mapSorted)
{
CWalletTx& wtx = *item.second;
if (wtx.RelayWalletTransaction(connman))
result.push_back(wtx.GetHash());
}
return result;
}
void CWallet::ResendWalletTransactions(int64_t nBestBlockTime, CConnman* connman)
{
// Do this infrequently and randomly to avoid giving away
// that these are our transactions.
if (GetTime() < nNextResend || !fBroadcastTransactions)
return;
bool fFirst = (nNextResend == 0);
nNextResend = GetTime() + GetRand(30 * 60);
if (fFirst)
return;
// Only do it if there's been a new block since last time
if (nBestBlockTime < nLastResend)
return;
nLastResend = GetTime();
// Rebroadcast unconfirmed txes older than 5 minutes before the last
// block was found:
std::vector<uint256> relayed = ResendWalletTransactionsBefore(nBestBlockTime-5*60, connman);
if (!relayed.empty())
LogPrintf("%s: rebroadcast %u unconfirmed transactions\n", __func__, relayed.size());
}
/** @} */ // end of mapWallet
/** @defgroup Actions
*
* @{
*/
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount CWallet::GetBalance() const
{
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (const auto& entry : mapWallet)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &entry.second;
if (pcoin->IsTrusted())
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount CWallet::GetUnconfirmedBalance() const
{
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (const auto& entry : mapWallet)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &entry.second;
if (!pcoin->IsTrusted() && pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain() == 0 && pcoin->InMempool())
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount CWallet::GetImmatureBalance() const
{
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (const auto& entry : mapWallet)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &entry.second;
nTotal += pcoin->GetImmatureCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount CWallet::GetWatchOnlyBalance() const
{
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
2014-07-13 00:33:45 -07:00
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (const auto& entry : mapWallet)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &entry.second;
if (pcoin->IsTrusted())
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableWatchOnlyCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount CWallet::GetUnconfirmedWatchOnlyBalance() const
{
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
2014-07-13 00:33:45 -07:00
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (const auto& entry : mapWallet)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &entry.second;
if (!pcoin->IsTrusted() && pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain() == 0 && pcoin->InMempool())
nTotal += pcoin->GetAvailableWatchOnlyCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount CWallet::GetImmatureWatchOnlyBalance() const
{
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount nTotal = 0;
{
2014-07-13 00:33:45 -07:00
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (const auto& entry : mapWallet)
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &entry.second;
nTotal += pcoin->GetImmatureWatchOnlyCredit();
}
}
return nTotal;
}
// Calculate total balance in a different way from GetBalance. The biggest
// difference is that GetBalance sums up all unspent TxOuts paying to the
// wallet, while this sums up both spent and unspent TxOuts paying to the
// wallet, and then subtracts the values of TxIns spending from the wallet. This
// also has fewer restrictions on which unconfirmed transactions are considered
// trusted.
CAmount CWallet::GetLegacyBalance(const isminefilter& filter, int minDepth, const std::string* account) const
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
CAmount balance = 0;
for (const auto& entry : mapWallet) {
const CWalletTx& wtx = entry.second;
const int depth = wtx.GetDepthInMainChain();
if (depth < 0 || !CheckFinalTx(*wtx.tx) || wtx.GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0) {
continue;
}
// Loop through tx outputs and add incoming payments. For outgoing txs,
// treat change outputs specially, as part of the amount debited.
CAmount debit = wtx.GetDebit(filter);
const bool outgoing = debit > 0;
for (const CTxOut& out : wtx.tx->vout) {
if (outgoing && IsChange(out)) {
debit -= out.nValue;
} else if (IsMine(out) & filter && depth >= minDepth && (!account || *account == GetAccountName(out.scriptPubKey))) {
balance += out.nValue;
}
}
// For outgoing txs, subtract amount debited.
if (outgoing && (!account || *account == wtx.strFromAccount)) {
balance -= debit;
}
}
if (account) {
balance += CWalletDB(*dbw).GetAccountCreditDebit(*account);
}
return balance;
}
CAmount CWallet::GetAvailableBalance(const CCoinControl* coinControl) const
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
CAmount balance = 0;
std::vector<COutput> vCoins;
AvailableCoins(vCoins, true, coinControl);
for (const COutput& out : vCoins) {
if (out.fSpendable) {
balance += out.tx->tx->vout[out.i].nValue;
}
}
return balance;
}
void CWallet::AvailableCoins(std::vector<COutput> &vCoins, bool fOnlySafe, const CCoinControl *coinControl, const CAmount &nMinimumAmount, const CAmount &nMaximumAmount, const CAmount &nMinimumSumAmount, const uint64_t nMaximumCount, const int nMinDepth, const int nMaxDepth) const
{
vCoins.clear();
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
CAmount nTotal = 0;
for (const auto& entry : mapWallet)
{
const uint256& wtxid = entry.first;
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &entry.second;
if (!CheckFinalTx(*pcoin->tx))
continue;
if (pcoin->IsCoinBase() && pcoin->GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
continue;
int nDepth = pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain();
if (nDepth < 0)
continue;
// We should not consider coins which aren't at least in our mempool
// It's possible for these to be conflicted via ancestors which we may never be able to detect
if (nDepth == 0 && !pcoin->InMempool())
continue;
bool safeTx = pcoin->IsTrusted();
// We should not consider coins from transactions that are replacing
// other transactions.
//
// Example: There is a transaction A which is replaced by bumpfee
// transaction B. In this case, we want to prevent creation of
// a transaction B' which spends an output of B.
//
// Reason: If transaction A were initially confirmed, transactions B
// and B' would no longer be valid, so the user would have to create
// a new transaction C to replace B'. However, in the case of a
// one-block reorg, transactions B' and C might BOTH be accepted,
// when the user only wanted one of them. Specifically, there could
// be a 1-block reorg away from the chain where transactions A and C
// were accepted to another chain where B, B', and C were all
// accepted.
if (nDepth == 0 && pcoin->mapValue.count("replaces_txid")) {
safeTx = false;
}
// Similarly, we should not consider coins from transactions that
// have been replaced. In the example above, we would want to prevent
// creation of a transaction A' spending an output of A, because if
// transaction B were initially confirmed, conflicting with A and
// A', we wouldn't want to the user to create a transaction D
// intending to replace A', but potentially resulting in a scenario
// where A, A', and D could all be accepted (instead of just B and
// D, or just A and A' like the user would want).
if (nDepth == 0 && pcoin->mapValue.count("replaced_by_txid")) {
safeTx = false;
}
if (fOnlySafe && !safeTx) {
continue;
}
if (nDepth < nMinDepth || nDepth > nMaxDepth)
continue;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->tx->vout.size(); i++) {
if (pcoin->tx->vout[i].nValue < nMinimumAmount || pcoin->tx->vout[i].nValue > nMaximumAmount)
continue;
if (coinControl && coinControl->HasSelected() && !coinControl->fAllowOtherInputs && !coinControl->IsSelected(COutPoint(entry.first, i)))
continue;
if (IsLockedCoin(entry.first, i))
continue;
if (IsSpent(wtxid, i))
continue;
isminetype mine = IsMine(pcoin->tx->vout[i]);
if (mine == ISMINE_NO) {
continue;
}
bool fSpendableIn = ((mine & ISMINE_SPENDABLE) != ISMINE_NO) || (coinControl && coinControl->fAllowWatchOnly && (mine & ISMINE_WATCH_SOLVABLE) != ISMINE_NO);
bool fSolvableIn = (mine & (ISMINE_SPENDABLE | ISMINE_WATCH_SOLVABLE)) != ISMINE_NO;
vCoins.push_back(COutput(pcoin, i, nDepth, fSpendableIn, fSolvableIn, safeTx));
// Checks the sum amount of all UTXO's.
if (nMinimumSumAmount != MAX_MONEY) {
nTotal += pcoin->tx->vout[i].nValue;
if (nTotal >= nMinimumSumAmount) {
return;
}
}
// Checks the maximum number of UTXO's.
if (nMaximumCount > 0 && vCoins.size() >= nMaximumCount) {
return;
}
}
}
}
}
std::map<CTxDestination, std::vector<COutput>> CWallet::ListCoins() const
{
// TODO: Add AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet) here.
//
// Because the return value from this function contains pointers to
// CWalletTx objects, callers to this function really should acquire the
// cs_wallet lock before calling it. However, the current caller doesn't
// acquire this lock yet. There was an attempt to add the missing lock in
// https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/10340, but that change has been
// postponed until after https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/10244 to
// avoid adding some extra complexity to the Qt code.
std::map<CTxDestination, std::vector<COutput>> result;
std::vector<COutput> availableCoins;
AvailableCoins(availableCoins);
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
for (auto& coin : availableCoins) {
CTxDestination address;
if (coin.fSpendable &&
ExtractDestination(FindNonChangeParentOutput(*coin.tx->tx, coin.i).scriptPubKey, address)) {
result[address].emplace_back(std::move(coin));
}
}
std::vector<COutPoint> lockedCoins;
ListLockedCoins(lockedCoins);
for (const auto& output : lockedCoins) {
auto it = mapWallet.find(output.hash);
if (it != mapWallet.end()) {
int depth = it->second.GetDepthInMainChain();
if (depth >= 0 && output.n < it->second.tx->vout.size() &&
IsMine(it->second.tx->vout[output.n]) == ISMINE_SPENDABLE) {
CTxDestination address;
if (ExtractDestination(FindNonChangeParentOutput(*it->second.tx, output.n).scriptPubKey, address)) {
result[address].emplace_back(
&it->second, output.n, depth, true /* spendable */, true /* solvable */, false /* safe */);
}
}
}
}
return result;
}
const CTxOut& CWallet::FindNonChangeParentOutput(const CTransaction& tx, int output) const
{
const CTransaction* ptx = &tx;
int n = output;
while (IsChange(ptx->vout[n]) && ptx->vin.size() > 0) {
const COutPoint& prevout = ptx->vin[0].prevout;
auto it = mapWallet.find(prevout.hash);
if (it == mapWallet.end() || it->second.tx->vout.size() <= prevout.n ||
!IsMine(it->second.tx->vout[prevout.n])) {
break;
}
ptx = it->second.tx.get();
n = prevout.n;
}
return ptx->vout[n];
}
static void ApproximateBestSubset(const std::vector<CInputCoin>& vValue, const CAmount& nTotalLower, const CAmount& nTargetValue,
std::vector<char>& vfBest, CAmount& nBest, int iterations = 1000)
{
std::vector<char> vfIncluded;
vfBest.assign(vValue.size(), true);
nBest = nTotalLower;
FastRandomContext insecure_rand;
for (int nRep = 0; nRep < iterations && nBest != nTargetValue; nRep++)
{
vfIncluded.assign(vValue.size(), false);
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount nTotal = 0;
bool fReachedTarget = false;
for (int nPass = 0; nPass < 2 && !fReachedTarget; nPass++)
{
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); i++)
{
//The solver here uses a randomized algorithm,
//the randomness serves no real security purpose but is just
//needed to prevent degenerate behavior and it is important
//that the rng is fast. We do not use a constant random sequence,
//because there may be some privacy improvement by making
//the selection random.
if (nPass == 0 ? insecure_rand.randbool() : !vfIncluded[i])
{
nTotal += vValue[i].txout.nValue;
vfIncluded[i] = true;
if (nTotal >= nTargetValue)
{
fReachedTarget = true;
if (nTotal < nBest)
{
nBest = nTotal;
vfBest = vfIncluded;
}
nTotal -= vValue[i].txout.nValue;
vfIncluded[i] = false;
}
}
}
}
}
}
bool CWallet::SelectCoinsMinConf(const CAmount& nTargetValue, const int nConfMine, const int nConfTheirs, const uint64_t nMaxAncestors, std::vector<COutput> vCoins,
std::set<CInputCoin>& setCoinsRet, CAmount& nValueRet) const
{
setCoinsRet.clear();
nValueRet = 0;
// List of values less than target
boost::optional<CInputCoin> coinLowestLarger;
std::vector<CInputCoin> vValue;
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount nTotalLower = 0;
random_shuffle(vCoins.begin(), vCoins.end(), GetRandInt);
for (const COutput &output : vCoins)
{
if (!output.fSpendable)
continue;
const CWalletTx *pcoin = output.tx;
2014-07-01 02:00:22 -07:00
if (output.nDepth < (pcoin->IsFromMe(ISMINE_ALL) ? nConfMine : nConfTheirs))
continue;
if (!mempool.TransactionWithinChainLimit(pcoin->GetHash(), nMaxAncestors))
continue;
int i = output.i;
CInputCoin coin = CInputCoin(pcoin, i);
if (coin.txout.nValue == nTargetValue)
{
setCoinsRet.insert(coin);
nValueRet += coin.txout.nValue;
return true;
}
else if (coin.txout.nValue < nTargetValue + MIN_CHANGE)
{
vValue.push_back(coin);
nTotalLower += coin.txout.nValue;
}
else if (!coinLowestLarger || coin.txout.nValue < coinLowestLarger->txout.nValue)
{
coinLowestLarger = coin;
}
}
if (nTotalLower == nTargetValue)
{
for (const auto& input : vValue)
{
setCoinsRet.insert(input);
nValueRet += input.txout.nValue;
}
return true;
}
if (nTotalLower < nTargetValue)
{
if (!coinLowestLarger)
return false;
setCoinsRet.insert(coinLowestLarger.get());
nValueRet += coinLowestLarger->txout.nValue;
return true;
}
// Solve subset sum by stochastic approximation
std::sort(vValue.begin(), vValue.end(), CompareValueOnly());
std::reverse(vValue.begin(), vValue.end());
std::vector<char> vfBest;
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount nBest;
ApproximateBestSubset(vValue, nTotalLower, nTargetValue, vfBest, nBest);
if (nBest != nTargetValue && nTotalLower >= nTargetValue + MIN_CHANGE)
ApproximateBestSubset(vValue, nTotalLower, nTargetValue + MIN_CHANGE, vfBest, nBest);
// If we have a bigger coin and (either the stochastic approximation didn't find a good solution,
// or the next bigger coin is closer), return the bigger coin
if (coinLowestLarger &&
((nBest != nTargetValue && nBest < nTargetValue + MIN_CHANGE) || coinLowestLarger->txout.nValue <= nBest))
{
setCoinsRet.insert(coinLowestLarger.get());
nValueRet += coinLowestLarger->txout.nValue;
}
else {
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); i++)
if (vfBest[i])
{
setCoinsRet.insert(vValue[i]);
nValueRet += vValue[i].txout.nValue;
}
if (LogAcceptCategory(BCLog::SELECTCOINS)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::SELECTCOINS, "SelectCoins() best subset: ");
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vValue.size(); i++) {
if (vfBest[i]) {
LogPrint(BCLog::SELECTCOINS, "%s ", FormatMoney(vValue[i].txout.nValue));
}
}
LogPrint(BCLog::SELECTCOINS, "total %s\n", FormatMoney(nBest));
}
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::SelectCoins(const std::vector<COutput>& vAvailableCoins, const CAmount& nTargetValue, std::set<CInputCoin>& setCoinsRet, CAmount& nValueRet, const CCoinControl* coinControl) const
{
std::vector<COutput> vCoins(vAvailableCoins);
2013-08-12 08:03:03 -07:00
// coin control -> return all selected outputs (we want all selected to go into the transaction for sure)
if (coinControl && coinControl->HasSelected() && !coinControl->fAllowOtherInputs)
2013-08-12 08:03:03 -07:00
{
for (const COutput& out : vCoins)
2013-08-12 08:03:03 -07:00
{
if (!out.fSpendable)
continue;
nValueRet += out.tx->tx->vout[out.i].nValue;
setCoinsRet.insert(CInputCoin(out.tx, out.i));
2013-08-12 08:03:03 -07:00
}
return (nValueRet >= nTargetValue);
}
// calculate value from preset inputs and store them
std::set<CInputCoin> setPresetCoins;
CAmount nValueFromPresetInputs = 0;
std::vector<COutPoint> vPresetInputs;
if (coinControl)
coinControl->ListSelected(vPresetInputs);
for (const COutPoint& outpoint : vPresetInputs)
{
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator it = mapWallet.find(outpoint.hash);
if (it != mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx* pcoin = &it->second;
// Clearly invalid input, fail
if (pcoin->tx->vout.size() <= outpoint.n)
return false;
nValueFromPresetInputs += pcoin->tx->vout[outpoint.n].nValue;
setPresetCoins.insert(CInputCoin(pcoin, outpoint.n));
} else
return false; // TODO: Allow non-wallet inputs
}
// remove preset inputs from vCoins
for (std::vector<COutput>::iterator it = vCoins.begin(); it != vCoins.end() && coinControl && coinControl->HasSelected();)
{
if (setPresetCoins.count(CInputCoin(it->tx, it->i)))
it = vCoins.erase(it);
else
++it;
}
size_t nMaxChainLength = std::min(gArgs.GetArg("-limitancestorcount", DEFAULT_ANCESTOR_LIMIT), gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantcount", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_LIMIT));
bool fRejectLongChains = gArgs.GetBoolArg("-walletrejectlongchains", DEFAULT_WALLET_REJECT_LONG_CHAINS);
bool res = nTargetValue <= nValueFromPresetInputs ||
SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue - nValueFromPresetInputs, 1, 6, 0, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet) ||
SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue - nValueFromPresetInputs, 1, 1, 0, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet) ||
(bSpendZeroConfChange && SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue - nValueFromPresetInputs, 0, 1, 2, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet)) ||
(bSpendZeroConfChange && SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue - nValueFromPresetInputs, 0, 1, std::min((size_t)4, nMaxChainLength/3), vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet)) ||
(bSpendZeroConfChange && SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue - nValueFromPresetInputs, 0, 1, nMaxChainLength/2, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet)) ||
(bSpendZeroConfChange && SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue - nValueFromPresetInputs, 0, 1, nMaxChainLength, vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet)) ||
(bSpendZeroConfChange && !fRejectLongChains && SelectCoinsMinConf(nTargetValue - nValueFromPresetInputs, 0, 1, std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max(), vCoins, setCoinsRet, nValueRet));
// because SelectCoinsMinConf clears the setCoinsRet, we now add the possible inputs to the coinset
setCoinsRet.insert(setPresetCoins.begin(), setPresetCoins.end());
// add preset inputs to the total value selected
nValueRet += nValueFromPresetInputs;
return res;
}
2017-03-03 07:15:47 -08:00
bool CWallet::SignTransaction(CMutableTransaction &tx)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapWallet
2017-03-03 07:15:47 -08:00
// sign the new tx
CTransaction txNewConst(tx);
int nIn = 0;
for (const auto& input : tx.vin) {
2017-03-03 07:15:47 -08:00
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::const_iterator mi = mapWallet.find(input.prevout.hash);
if(mi == mapWallet.end() || input.prevout.n >= mi->second.tx->vout.size()) {
return false;
}
2017-03-03 07:15:47 -08:00
const CScript& scriptPubKey = mi->second.tx->vout[input.prevout.n].scriptPubKey;
const CAmount& amount = mi->second.tx->vout[input.prevout.n].nValue;
SignatureData sigdata;
if (!ProduceSignature(TransactionSignatureCreator(this, &txNewConst, nIn, amount, SIGHASH_ALL), scriptPubKey, sigdata)) {
return false;
}
UpdateTransaction(tx, nIn, sigdata);
nIn++;
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::FundTransaction(CMutableTransaction& tx, CAmount& nFeeRet, int& nChangePosInOut, std::string& strFailReason, bool lockUnspents, const std::set<int>& setSubtractFeeFromOutputs, CCoinControl coinControl)
{
std::vector<CRecipient> vecSend;
// Turn the txout set into a CRecipient vector.
for (size_t idx = 0; idx < tx.vout.size(); idx++) {
const CTxOut& txOut = tx.vout[idx];
CRecipient recipient = {txOut.scriptPubKey, txOut.nValue, setSubtractFeeFromOutputs.count(idx) == 1};
vecSend.push_back(recipient);
}
coinControl.fAllowOtherInputs = true;
for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) {
coinControl.Select(txin.prevout);
}
// Acquire the locks to prevent races to the new locked unspents between the
// CreateTransaction call and LockCoin calls (when lockUnspents is true).
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
CReserveKey reservekey(this);
CWalletTx wtx;
if (!CreateTransaction(vecSend, wtx, reservekey, nFeeRet, nChangePosInOut, strFailReason, coinControl, false)) {
return false;
}
if (nChangePosInOut != -1) {
tx.vout.insert(tx.vout.begin() + nChangePosInOut, wtx.tx->vout[nChangePosInOut]);
// We don't have the normal Create/Commit cycle, and don't want to risk
// reusing change, so just remove the key from the keypool here.
reservekey.KeepKey();
}
// Copy output sizes from new transaction; they may have had the fee
// subtracted from them.
for (unsigned int idx = 0; idx < tx.vout.size(); idx++) {
tx.vout[idx].nValue = wtx.tx->vout[idx].nValue;
}
// Add new txins while keeping original txin scriptSig/order.
for (const CTxIn& txin : wtx.tx->vin) {
if (!coinControl.IsSelected(txin.prevout)) {
tx.vin.push_back(txin);
if (lockUnspents) {
LockCoin(txin.prevout);
}
}
}
return true;
}
bool CWallet::CreateTransaction(const std::vector<CRecipient>& vecSend, CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey, CAmount& nFeeRet,
int& nChangePosInOut, std::string& strFailReason, const CCoinControl& coin_control, bool sign)
{
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
CAmount nValue = 0;
int nChangePosRequest = nChangePosInOut;
unsigned int nSubtractFeeFromAmount = 0;
for (const auto& recipient : vecSend)
{
if (nValue < 0 || recipient.nAmount < 0)
{
2016-11-22 09:48:01 -08:00
strFailReason = _("Transaction amounts must not be negative");
return false;
}
nValue += recipient.nAmount;
if (recipient.fSubtractFeeFromAmount)
nSubtractFeeFromAmount++;
}
2016-11-22 09:48:01 -08:00
if (vecSend.empty())
{
2016-11-22 09:48:01 -08:00
strFailReason = _("Transaction must have at least one recipient");
return false;
}
wtxNew.fTimeReceivedIsTxTime = true;
2011-06-28 14:45:22 -07:00
wtxNew.BindWallet(this);
CMutableTransaction txNew;
2013-08-25 11:13:25 -07:00
// Discourage fee sniping.
//
// For a large miner the value of the transactions in the best block and
2015-12-02 06:28:24 -08:00
// the mempool can exceed the cost of deliberately attempting to mine two
// blocks to orphan the current best block. By setting nLockTime such that
// only the next block can include the transaction, we discourage this
// practice as the height restricted and limited blocksize gives miners
// considering fee sniping fewer options for pulling off this attack.
//
// A simple way to think about this is from the wallet's point of view we
// always want the blockchain to move forward. By setting nLockTime this
// way we're basically making the statement that we only want this
// transaction to appear in the next block; we don't want to potentially
// encourage reorgs by allowing transactions to appear at lower heights
// than the next block in forks of the best chain.
//
// Of course, the subsidy is high enough, and transaction volume low
// enough, that fee sniping isn't a problem yet, but by implementing a fix
// now we ensure code won't be written that makes assumptions about
// nLockTime that preclude a fix later.
txNew.nLockTime = chainActive.Height();
2013-08-25 11:13:25 -07:00
// Secondly occasionally randomly pick a nLockTime even further back, so
// that transactions that are delayed after signing for whatever reason,
// e.g. high-latency mix networks and some CoinJoin implementations, have
// better privacy.
if (GetRandInt(10) == 0)
txNew.nLockTime = std::max(0, (int)txNew.nLockTime - GetRandInt(100));
assert(txNew.nLockTime <= (unsigned int)chainActive.Height());
assert(txNew.nLockTime < LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD);
FeeCalculation feeCalc;
CAmount nFeeNeeded;
unsigned int nBytes;
{
std::set<CInputCoin> setCoins;
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
{
std::vector<COutput> vAvailableCoins;
AvailableCoins(vAvailableCoins, true, &coin_control);
// Create change script that will be used if we need change
// TODO: pass in scriptChange instead of reservekey so
// change transaction isn't always pay-to-bitcoin-address
CScript scriptChange;
// coin control: send change to custom address
if (!boost::get<CNoDestination>(&coin_control.destChange)) {
scriptChange = GetScriptForDestination(coin_control.destChange);
} else { // no coin control: send change to newly generated address
// Note: We use a new key here to keep it from being obvious which side is the change.
// The drawback is that by not reusing a previous key, the change may be lost if a
// backup is restored, if the backup doesn't have the new private key for the change.
// If we reused the old key, it would be possible to add code to look for and
// rediscover unknown transactions that were written with keys of ours to recover
// post-backup change.
// Reserve a new key pair from key pool
CPubKey vchPubKey;
bool ret;
ret = reservekey.GetReservedKey(vchPubKey, true);
if (!ret)
{
strFailReason = _("Keypool ran out, please call keypoolrefill first");
return false;
}
scriptChange = GetScriptForDestination(vchPubKey.GetID());
}
CTxOut change_prototype_txout(0, scriptChange);
size_t change_prototype_size = GetSerializeSize(change_prototype_txout, SER_DISK, 0);
CFeeRate discard_rate = GetDiscardRate(::feeEstimator);
2014-11-01 16:14:47 -07:00
nFeeRet = 0;
bool pick_new_inputs = true;
CAmount nValueIn = 0;
2015-09-14 05:49:59 -07:00
// Start with no fee and loop until there is enough fee
while (true)
{
nChangePosInOut = nChangePosRequest;
txNew.vin.clear();
txNew.vout.clear();
wtxNew.fFromMe = true;
bool fFirst = true;
CAmount nValueToSelect = nValue;
if (nSubtractFeeFromAmount == 0)
nValueToSelect += nFeeRet;
// vouts to the payees
for (const auto& recipient : vecSend)
{
CTxOut txout(recipient.nAmount, recipient.scriptPubKey);
if (recipient.fSubtractFeeFromAmount)
{
assert(nSubtractFeeFromAmount != 0);
txout.nValue -= nFeeRet / nSubtractFeeFromAmount; // Subtract fee equally from each selected recipient
if (fFirst) // first receiver pays the remainder not divisible by output count
{
fFirst = false;
txout.nValue -= nFeeRet % nSubtractFeeFromAmount;
}
}
if (IsDust(txout, ::dustRelayFee))
{
if (recipient.fSubtractFeeFromAmount && nFeeRet > 0)
{
if (txout.nValue < 0)
strFailReason = _("The transaction amount is too small to pay the fee");
else
strFailReason = _("The transaction amount is too small to send after the fee has been deducted");
}
else
strFailReason = _("Transaction amount too small");
return false;
}
txNew.vout.push_back(txout);
}
// Choose coins to use
if (pick_new_inputs) {
nValueIn = 0;
setCoins.clear();
if (!SelectCoins(vAvailableCoins, nValueToSelect, setCoins, nValueIn, &coin_control))
{
strFailReason = _("Insufficient funds");
return false;
}
}
const CAmount nChange = nValueIn - nValueToSelect;
if (nChange > 0)
{
// Fill a vout to ourself
CTxOut newTxOut(nChange, scriptChange);
// Never create dust outputs; if we would, just
// add the dust to the fee.
if (IsDust(newTxOut, discard_rate))
{
nChangePosInOut = -1;
nFeeRet += nChange;
}
else
{
if (nChangePosInOut == -1)
{
// Insert change txn at random position:
nChangePosInOut = GetRandInt(txNew.vout.size()+1);
}
else if ((unsigned int)nChangePosInOut > txNew.vout.size())
{
strFailReason = _("Change index out of range");
return false;
}
std::vector<CTxOut>::iterator position = txNew.vout.begin()+nChangePosInOut;
txNew.vout.insert(position, newTxOut);
}
} else {
nChangePosInOut = -1;
}
// Fill vin
2013-08-25 11:13:25 -07:00
//
// Note how the sequence number is set to non-maxint so that
// the nLockTime set above actually works.
//
// BIP125 defines opt-in RBF as any nSequence < maxint-1, so
// we use the highest possible value in that range (maxint-2)
// to avoid conflicting with other possible uses of nSequence,
2017-01-18 07:15:37 -08:00
// and in the spirit of "smallest possible change from prior
// behavior."
const uint32_t nSequence = coin_control.signalRbf ? MAX_BIP125_RBF_SEQUENCE : (CTxIn::SEQUENCE_FINAL - 1);
for (const auto& coin : setCoins)
txNew.vin.push_back(CTxIn(coin.outpoint,CScript(),
nSequence));
// Fill in dummy signatures for fee calculation.
if (!DummySignTx(txNew, setCoins)) {
strFailReason = _("Signing transaction failed");
return false;
}
nBytes = GetVirtualTransactionSize(txNew);
// Remove scriptSigs to eliminate the fee calculation dummy signatures
for (auto& vin : txNew.vin) {
vin.scriptSig = CScript();
vin.scriptWitness.SetNull();
}
nFeeNeeded = GetMinimumFee(nBytes, coin_control, ::mempool, ::feeEstimator, &feeCalc);
// If we made it here and we aren't even able to meet the relay fee on the next pass, give up
// because we must be at the maximum allowed fee.
if (nFeeNeeded < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nBytes))
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction too large for fee policy");
return false;
}
if (nFeeRet >= nFeeNeeded) {
// Reduce fee to only the needed amount if possible. This
// prevents potential overpayment in fees if the coins
// selected to meet nFeeNeeded result in a transaction that
// requires less fee than the prior iteration.
// If we have no change and a big enough excess fee, then
// try to construct transaction again only without picking
// new inputs. We now know we only need the smaller fee
// (because of reduced tx size) and so we should add a
// change output. Only try this once.
if (nChangePosInOut == -1 && nSubtractFeeFromAmount == 0 && pick_new_inputs) {
unsigned int tx_size_with_change = nBytes + change_prototype_size + 2; // Add 2 as a buffer in case increasing # of outputs changes compact size
CAmount fee_needed_with_change = GetMinimumFee(tx_size_with_change, coin_control, ::mempool, ::feeEstimator, nullptr);
CAmount minimum_value_for_change = GetDustThreshold(change_prototype_txout, discard_rate);
if (nFeeRet >= fee_needed_with_change + minimum_value_for_change) {
pick_new_inputs = false;
nFeeRet = fee_needed_with_change;
continue;
}
}
// If we have change output already, just increase it
if (nFeeRet > nFeeNeeded && nChangePosInOut != -1 && nSubtractFeeFromAmount == 0) {
CAmount extraFeePaid = nFeeRet - nFeeNeeded;
std::vector<CTxOut>::iterator change_position = txNew.vout.begin()+nChangePosInOut;
change_position->nValue += extraFeePaid;
nFeeRet -= extraFeePaid;
}
break; // Done, enough fee included.
}
else if (!pick_new_inputs) {
// This shouldn't happen, we should have had enough excess
// fee to pay for the new output and still meet nFeeNeeded
// Or we should have just subtracted fee from recipients and
// nFeeNeeded should not have changed
strFailReason = _("Transaction fee and change calculation failed");
return false;
}
// Try to reduce change to include necessary fee
if (nChangePosInOut != -1 && nSubtractFeeFromAmount == 0) {
CAmount additionalFeeNeeded = nFeeNeeded - nFeeRet;
std::vector<CTxOut>::iterator change_position = txNew.vout.begin()+nChangePosInOut;
// Only reduce change if remaining amount is still a large enough output.
if (change_position->nValue >= MIN_FINAL_CHANGE + additionalFeeNeeded) {
change_position->nValue -= additionalFeeNeeded;
nFeeRet += additionalFeeNeeded;
break; // Done, able to increase fee from change
}
}
// If subtracting fee from recipients, we now know what fee we
// need to subtract, we have no reason to reselect inputs
if (nSubtractFeeFromAmount > 0) {
pick_new_inputs = false;
}
// Include more fee and try again.
nFeeRet = nFeeNeeded;
continue;
}
}
if (nChangePosInOut == -1) reservekey.ReturnKey(); // Return any reserved key if we don't have change
if (sign)
{
CTransaction txNewConst(txNew);
int nIn = 0;
for (const auto& coin : setCoins)
{
const CScript& scriptPubKey = coin.txout.scriptPubKey;
SignatureData sigdata;
if (!ProduceSignature(TransactionSignatureCreator(this, &txNewConst, nIn, coin.txout.nValue, SIGHASH_ALL), scriptPubKey, sigdata))
{
strFailReason = _("Signing transaction failed");
return false;
} else {
UpdateTransaction(txNew, nIn, sigdata);
}
nIn++;
}
}
// Embed the constructed transaction data in wtxNew.
wtxNew.SetTx(MakeTransactionRef(std::move(txNew)));
// Limit size
if (GetTransactionWeight(*wtxNew.tx) >= MAX_STANDARD_TX_WEIGHT)
{
strFailReason = _("Transaction too large");
return false;
}
}
if (gArgs.GetBoolArg("-walletrejectlongchains", DEFAULT_WALLET_REJECT_LONG_CHAINS)) {
// Lastly, ensure this tx will pass the mempool's chain limits
LockPoints lp;
CTxMemPoolEntry entry(wtxNew.tx, 0, 0, 0, false, 0, lp);
CTxMemPool::setEntries setAncestors;
size_t nLimitAncestors = gArgs.GetArg("-limitancestorcount", DEFAULT_ANCESTOR_LIMIT);
size_t nLimitAncestorSize = gArgs.GetArg("-limitancestorsize", DEFAULT_ANCESTOR_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000;
size_t nLimitDescendants = gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantcount", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_LIMIT);
size_t nLimitDescendantSize = gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantsize", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000;
std::string errString;
if (!mempool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(entry, setAncestors, nLimitAncestors, nLimitAncestorSize, nLimitDescendants, nLimitDescendantSize, errString)) {
strFailReason = _("Transaction has too long of a mempool chain");
return false;
}
}
LogPrintf("Fee Calculation: Fee:%d Bytes:%u Needed:%d Tgt:%d (requested %d) Reason:\"%s\" Decay %.5f: Estimation: (%g - %g) %.2f%% %.1f/(%.1f %d mem %.1f out) Fail: (%g - %g) %.2f%% %.1f/(%.1f %d mem %.1f out)\n",
nFeeRet, nBytes, nFeeNeeded, feeCalc.returnedTarget, feeCalc.desiredTarget, StringForFeeReason(feeCalc.reason), feeCalc.est.decay,
feeCalc.est.pass.start, feeCalc.est.pass.end,
100 * feeCalc.est.pass.withinTarget / (feeCalc.est.pass.totalConfirmed + feeCalc.est.pass.inMempool + feeCalc.est.pass.leftMempool),
feeCalc.est.pass.withinTarget, feeCalc.est.pass.totalConfirmed, feeCalc.est.pass.inMempool, feeCalc.est.pass.leftMempool,
feeCalc.est.fail.start, feeCalc.est.fail.end,
100 * feeCalc.est.fail.withinTarget / (feeCalc.est.fail.totalConfirmed + feeCalc.est.fail.inMempool + feeCalc.est.fail.leftMempool),
feeCalc.est.fail.withinTarget, feeCalc.est.fail.totalConfirmed, feeCalc.est.fail.inMempool, feeCalc.est.fail.leftMempool);
return true;
}
/**
* Call after CreateTransaction unless you want to abort
*/
bool CWallet::CommitTransaction(CWalletTx& wtxNew, CReserveKey& reservekey, CConnman* connman, CValidationState& state)
{
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
LogPrintf("CommitTransaction:\n%s", wtxNew.tx->ToString());
{
// Take key pair from key pool so it won't be used again
reservekey.KeepKey();
// Add tx to wallet, because if it has change it's also ours,
// otherwise just for transaction history.
AddToWallet(wtxNew);
// Notify that old coins are spent
for (const CTxIn& txin : wtxNew.tx->vin)
{
CWalletTx &coin = mapWallet[txin.prevout.hash];
2011-06-28 14:45:22 -07:00
coin.BindWallet(this);
NotifyTransactionChanged(this, coin.GetHash(), CT_UPDATED);
}
}
// Track how many getdata requests our transaction gets
mapRequestCount[wtxNew.GetHash()] = 0;
// Get the inserted-CWalletTx from mapWallet so that the
// fInMempool flag is cached properly
CWalletTx& wtx = mapWallet[wtxNew.GetHash()];
if (fBroadcastTransactions)
{
// Broadcast
if (!wtx.AcceptToMemoryPool(maxTxFee, state)) {
LogPrintf("CommitTransaction(): Transaction cannot be broadcast immediately, %s\n", state.GetRejectReason());
// TODO: if we expect the failure to be long term or permanent, instead delete wtx from the wallet and return failure.
} else {
wtx.RelayWalletTransaction(connman);
}
}
}
return true;
}
void CWallet::ListAccountCreditDebit(const std::string& strAccount, std::list<CAccountingEntry>& entries) {
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
return walletdb.ListAccountCreditDebit(strAccount, entries);
}
bool CWallet::AddAccountingEntry(const CAccountingEntry& acentry)
{
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
return AddAccountingEntry(acentry, &walletdb);
}
bool CWallet::AddAccountingEntry(const CAccountingEntry& acentry, CWalletDB *pwalletdb)
{
2017-06-05 15:23:20 -07:00
if (!pwalletdb->WriteAccountingEntry(++nAccountingEntryNumber, acentry)) {
return false;
2017-06-05 15:23:20 -07:00
}
laccentries.push_back(acentry);
CAccountingEntry & entry = laccentries.back();
wtxOrdered.insert(std::make_pair(entry.nOrderPos, TxPair(nullptr, &entry)));
return true;
}
DBErrors CWallet::LoadWallet(bool& fFirstRunRet)
{
LOCK2(cs_main, cs_wallet);
fFirstRunRet = false;
DBErrors nLoadWalletRet = CWalletDB(*dbw,"cr+").LoadWallet(this);
if (nLoadWalletRet == DB_NEED_REWRITE)
2011-11-10 12:29:23 -08:00
{
if (dbw->Rewrite("\x04pool"))
{
setInternalKeyPool.clear();
setExternalKeyPool.clear();
m_pool_key_to_index.clear();
// Note: can't top-up keypool here, because wallet is locked.
// User will be prompted to unlock wallet the next operation
// that requires a new key.
}
2011-11-10 12:29:23 -08:00
}
// This wallet is in its first run if all of these are empty
fFirstRunRet = mapKeys.empty() && mapCryptedKeys.empty() && mapWatchKeys.empty() && setWatchOnly.empty() && mapScripts.empty();
2011-07-04 18:06:19 -07:00
if (nLoadWalletRet != DB_LOAD_OK)
return nLoadWalletRet;
2014-03-18 16:26:14 -07:00
uiInterface.LoadWallet(this);
return DB_LOAD_OK;
}
DBErrors CWallet::ZapSelectTx(std::vector<uint256>& vHashIn, std::vector<uint256>& vHashOut)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapWallet
DBErrors nZapSelectTxRet = CWalletDB(*dbw,"cr+").ZapSelectTx(vHashIn, vHashOut);
for (uint256 hash : vHashOut)
mapWallet.erase(hash);
if (nZapSelectTxRet == DB_NEED_REWRITE)
{
if (dbw->Rewrite("\x04pool"))
{
setInternalKeyPool.clear();
setExternalKeyPool.clear();
m_pool_key_to_index.clear();
// Note: can't top-up keypool here, because wallet is locked.
// User will be prompted to unlock wallet the next operation
// that requires a new key.
}
}
if (nZapSelectTxRet != DB_LOAD_OK)
return nZapSelectTxRet;
MarkDirty();
return DB_LOAD_OK;
}
DBErrors CWallet::ZapWalletTx(std::vector<CWalletTx>& vWtx)
{
DBErrors nZapWalletTxRet = CWalletDB(*dbw,"cr+").ZapWalletTx(vWtx);
if (nZapWalletTxRet == DB_NEED_REWRITE)
{
if (dbw->Rewrite("\x04pool"))
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
setInternalKeyPool.clear();
setExternalKeyPool.clear();
m_pool_key_to_index.clear();
// Note: can't top-up keypool here, because wallet is locked.
// User will be prompted to unlock wallet the next operation
// that requires a new key.
}
}
if (nZapWalletTxRet != DB_LOAD_OK)
return nZapWalletTxRet;
return DB_LOAD_OK;
}
bool CWallet::SetAddressBook(const CTxDestination& address, const std::string& strName, const std::string& strPurpose)
{
bool fUpdated = false;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // mapAddressBook
std::map<CTxDestination, CAddressBookData>::iterator mi = mapAddressBook.find(address);
fUpdated = mi != mapAddressBook.end();
mapAddressBook[address].name = strName;
if (!strPurpose.empty()) /* update purpose only if requested */
mapAddressBook[address].purpose = strPurpose;
}
NotifyAddressBookChanged(this, address, strName, ::IsMine(*this, address) != ISMINE_NO,
strPurpose, (fUpdated ? CT_UPDATED : CT_NEW) );
if (!strPurpose.empty() && !CWalletDB(*dbw).WritePurpose(EncodeDestination(address), strPurpose))
return false;
return CWalletDB(*dbw).WriteName(EncodeDestination(address), strName);
}
bool CWallet::DelAddressBook(const CTxDestination& address)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet); // mapAddressBook
// Delete destdata tuples associated with address
std::string strAddress = EncodeDestination(address);
for (const std::pair<std::string, std::string> &item : mapAddressBook[address].destdata)
{
CWalletDB(*dbw).EraseDestData(strAddress, item.first);
}
mapAddressBook.erase(address);
}
NotifyAddressBookChanged(this, address, "", ::IsMine(*this, address) != ISMINE_NO, "", CT_DELETED);
CWalletDB(*dbw).ErasePurpose(EncodeDestination(address));
return CWalletDB(*dbw).EraseName(EncodeDestination(address));
}
const std::string& CWallet::GetAccountName(const CScript& scriptPubKey) const
{
CTxDestination address;
if (ExtractDestination(scriptPubKey, address) && !scriptPubKey.IsUnspendable()) {
auto mi = mapAddressBook.find(address);
if (mi != mapAddressBook.end()) {
return mi->second.name;
}
}
// A scriptPubKey that doesn't have an entry in the address book is
// associated with the default account ("").
const static std::string DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_NAME;
return DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_NAME;
}
/**
* Mark old keypool keys as used,
* and generate all new keys
*/
bool CWallet::NewKeyPool()
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
for (int64_t nIndex : setInternalKeyPool) {
walletdb.ErasePool(nIndex);
}
setInternalKeyPool.clear();
for (int64_t nIndex : setExternalKeyPool) {
walletdb.ErasePool(nIndex);
}
setExternalKeyPool.clear();
m_pool_key_to_index.clear();
if (!TopUpKeyPool()) {
return false;
}
LogPrintf("CWallet::NewKeyPool rewrote keypool\n");
}
return true;
}
size_t CWallet::KeypoolCountExternalKeys()
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setExternalKeyPool
return setExternalKeyPool.size();
}
void CWallet::LoadKeyPool(int64_t nIndex, const CKeyPool &keypool)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
if (keypool.fInternal) {
setInternalKeyPool.insert(nIndex);
} else {
setExternalKeyPool.insert(nIndex);
}
m_max_keypool_index = std::max(m_max_keypool_index, nIndex);
m_pool_key_to_index[keypool.vchPubKey.GetID()] = nIndex;
// If no metadata exists yet, create a default with the pool key's
// creation time. Note that this may be overwritten by actually
// stored metadata for that key later, which is fine.
CKeyID keyid = keypool.vchPubKey.GetID();
if (mapKeyMetadata.count(keyid) == 0)
mapKeyMetadata[keyid] = CKeyMetadata(keypool.nTime);
}
bool CWallet::TopUpKeyPool(unsigned int kpSize)
{
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
if (IsLocked())
return false;
// Top up key pool
unsigned int nTargetSize;
if (kpSize > 0)
nTargetSize = kpSize;
else
nTargetSize = std::max(gArgs.GetArg("-keypool", DEFAULT_KEYPOOL_SIZE), (int64_t) 0);
// count amount of available keys (internal, external)
// make sure the keypool of external and internal keys fits the user selected target (-keypool)
int64_t missingExternal = std::max(std::max((int64_t) nTargetSize, (int64_t) 1) - (int64_t)setExternalKeyPool.size(), (int64_t) 0);
int64_t missingInternal = std::max(std::max((int64_t) nTargetSize, (int64_t) 1) - (int64_t)setInternalKeyPool.size(), (int64_t) 0);
if (!IsHDEnabled() || !CanSupportFeature(FEATURE_HD_SPLIT))
{
// don't create extra internal keys
missingInternal = 0;
}
bool internal = false;
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
for (int64_t i = missingInternal + missingExternal; i--;)
{
if (i < missingInternal) {
internal = true;
}
assert(m_max_keypool_index < std::numeric_limits<int64_t>::max()); // How in the hell did you use so many keys?
int64_t index = ++m_max_keypool_index;
CPubKey pubkey(GenerateNewKey(walletdb, internal));
if (!walletdb.WritePool(index, CKeyPool(pubkey, internal))) {
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": writing generated key failed");
}
if (internal) {
setInternalKeyPool.insert(index);
} else {
setExternalKeyPool.insert(index);
}
m_pool_key_to_index[pubkey.GetID()] = index;
}
if (missingInternal + missingExternal > 0) {
LogPrintf("keypool added %d keys (%d internal), size=%u (%u internal)\n", missingInternal + missingExternal, missingInternal, setInternalKeyPool.size() + setExternalKeyPool.size(), setInternalKeyPool.size());
}
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
}
return true;
}
void CWallet::ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(int64_t& nIndex, CKeyPool& keypool, bool fRequestedInternal)
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
nIndex = -1;
2012-05-14 10:07:52 -07:00
keypool.vchPubKey = CPubKey();
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
if (!IsLocked())
TopUpKeyPool();
bool fReturningInternal = IsHDEnabled() && CanSupportFeature(FEATURE_HD_SPLIT) && fRequestedInternal;
std::set<int64_t>& setKeyPool = fReturningInternal ? setInternalKeyPool : setExternalKeyPool;
// Get the oldest key
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
if(setKeyPool.empty())
return;
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
auto it = setKeyPool.begin();
nIndex = *it;
setKeyPool.erase(it);
if (!walletdb.ReadPool(nIndex, keypool)) {
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": read failed");
}
if (!HaveKey(keypool.vchPubKey.GetID())) {
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": unknown key in key pool");
}
if (keypool.fInternal != fReturningInternal) {
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": keypool entry misclassified");
}
assert(keypool.vchPubKey.IsValid());
m_pool_key_to_index.erase(keypool.vchPubKey.GetID());
LogPrintf("keypool reserve %d\n", nIndex);
}
}
void CWallet::KeepKey(int64_t nIndex)
{
// Remove from key pool
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
walletdb.ErasePool(nIndex);
LogPrintf("keypool keep %d\n", nIndex);
}
void CWallet::ReturnKey(int64_t nIndex, bool fInternal, const CPubKey& pubkey)
{
// Return to key pool
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
if (fInternal) {
setInternalKeyPool.insert(nIndex);
} else {
setExternalKeyPool.insert(nIndex);
}
m_pool_key_to_index[pubkey.GetID()] = nIndex;
}
LogPrintf("keypool return %d\n", nIndex);
}
bool CWallet::GetKeyFromPool(CPubKey& result, bool internal)
{
CKeyPool keypool;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
2017-06-04 13:45:22 -07:00
int64_t nIndex = 0;
ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(nIndex, keypool, internal);
if (nIndex == -1)
{
if (IsLocked()) return false;
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
result = GenerateNewKey(walletdb, internal);
return true;
}
KeepKey(nIndex);
result = keypool.vchPubKey;
}
return true;
}
static int64_t GetOldestKeyTimeInPool(const std::set<int64_t>& setKeyPool, CWalletDB& walletdb) {
if (setKeyPool.empty()) {
Add wallet privkey encryption. This commit adds support for ckeys, or enCrypted private keys, to the wallet. All keys are stored in memory in their encrypted form and thus the passphrase is required from the user to spend coins, or to create new addresses. Keys are encrypted with AES-256-CBC using OpenSSL's EVP library. The key is calculated via EVP_BytesToKey using SHA512 with (by default) 25000 rounds and a random salt. By default, the user's wallet remains unencrypted until they call the RPC command encryptwallet <passphrase> or, from the GUI menu, Options-> Encrypt Wallet. When the user is attempting to call RPC functions which require the password to unlock the wallet, an error will be returned unless they call walletpassphrase <passphrase> <time to keep key in memory> first. A keypoolrefill command has been added which tops up the users keypool (requiring the passphrase via walletpassphrase first). keypoolsize has been added to the output of getinfo to show the user the number of keys left before they need to specify their passphrase (and call keypoolrefill). Note that walletpassphrase will automatically fill keypool in a separate thread which it spawns when the passphrase is set. This could cause some delays in other threads waiting for locks on the wallet passphrase, including one which could cause the passphrase to be stored longer than expected, however it will not allow the passphrase to be used longer than expected as ThreadCleanWalletPassphrase will attempt to get a lock on the key as soon as the specified lock time has arrived. When the keypool runs out (and wallet is locked) GetOrReuseKeyFromPool returns vchDefaultKey, meaning miners may start to generate many blocks to vchDefaultKey instead of a new key each time. A walletpassphrasechange <oldpassphrase> <newpassphrase> has been added to allow the user to change their password via RPC. Whenever keying material (unencrypted private keys, the user's passphrase, the wallet's AES key) is stored unencrypted in memory, any reasonable attempt is made to mlock/VirtualLock that memory before storing the keying material. This is not true in several (commented) cases where mlock/VirtualLocking the memory is not possible. Although encryption of private keys in memory can be very useful on desktop systems (as some small amount of protection against stupid viruses), on an RPC server, the password is entered fairly insecurely. Thus, the only main advantage encryption has for RPC servers is for RPC servers that do not spend coins, except in rare cases, eg. a webserver of a merchant which only receives payment except for cases of manual intervention. Thanks to jgarzik for the original patch and sipa, gmaxwell and many others for all their input. Conflicts: src/wallet.cpp
2011-07-08 06:47:35 -07:00
return GetTime();
}
CKeyPool keypool;
int64_t nIndex = *(setKeyPool.begin());
if (!walletdb.ReadPool(nIndex, keypool)) {
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": read oldest key in keypool failed");
}
assert(keypool.vchPubKey.IsValid());
return keypool.nTime;
}
int64_t CWallet::GetOldestKeyPoolTime()
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
// load oldest key from keypool, get time and return
int64_t oldestKey = GetOldestKeyTimeInPool(setExternalKeyPool, walletdb);
if (IsHDEnabled() && CanSupportFeature(FEATURE_HD_SPLIT)) {
oldestKey = std::max(GetOldestKeyTimeInPool(setInternalKeyPool, walletdb), oldestKey);
}
return oldestKey;
}
2014-04-22 15:46:19 -07:00
std::map<CTxDestination, CAmount> CWallet::GetAddressBalances()
{
std::map<CTxDestination, CAmount> balances;
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
for (const auto& walletEntry : mapWallet)
{
const CWalletTx *pcoin = &walletEntry.second;
if (!pcoin->IsTrusted())
continue;
if (pcoin->IsCoinBase() && pcoin->GetBlocksToMaturity() > 0)
continue;
int nDepth = pcoin->GetDepthInMainChain();
2014-07-01 02:00:22 -07:00
if (nDepth < (pcoin->IsFromMe(ISMINE_ALL) ? 0 : 1))
continue;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < pcoin->tx->vout.size(); i++)
{
CTxDestination addr;
if (!IsMine(pcoin->tx->vout[i]))
continue;
if(!ExtractDestination(pcoin->tx->vout[i].scriptPubKey, addr))
continue;
CAmount n = IsSpent(walletEntry.first, i) ? 0 : pcoin->tx->vout[i].nValue;
if (!balances.count(addr))
balances[addr] = 0;
balances[addr] += n;
}
}
}
return balances;
}
std::set< std::set<CTxDestination> > CWallet::GetAddressGroupings()
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapWallet
std::set< std::set<CTxDestination> > groupings;
std::set<CTxDestination> grouping;
for (const auto& walletEntry : mapWallet)
{
const CWalletTx *pcoin = &walletEntry.second;
if (pcoin->tx->vin.size() > 0)
{
bool any_mine = false;
// group all input addresses with each other
for (CTxIn txin : pcoin->tx->vin)
{
CTxDestination address;
if(!IsMine(txin)) /* If this input isn't mine, ignore it */
continue;
if(!ExtractDestination(mapWallet[txin.prevout.hash].tx->vout[txin.prevout.n].scriptPubKey, address))
continue;
grouping.insert(address);
any_mine = true;
}
// group change with input addresses
if (any_mine)
{
for (CTxOut txout : pcoin->tx->vout)
if (IsChange(txout))
{
CTxDestination txoutAddr;
if(!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, txoutAddr))
continue;
grouping.insert(txoutAddr);
}
}
if (grouping.size() > 0)
{
groupings.insert(grouping);
grouping.clear();
}
}
// group lone addrs by themselves
for (const auto& txout : pcoin->tx->vout)
if (IsMine(txout))
{
CTxDestination address;
if(!ExtractDestination(txout.scriptPubKey, address))
continue;
grouping.insert(address);
groupings.insert(grouping);
grouping.clear();
}
}
std::set< std::set<CTxDestination>* > uniqueGroupings; // a set of pointers to groups of addresses
std::map< CTxDestination, std::set<CTxDestination>* > setmap; // map addresses to the unique group containing it
for (std::set<CTxDestination> _grouping : groupings)
{
// make a set of all the groups hit by this new group
std::set< std::set<CTxDestination>* > hits;
std::map< CTxDestination, std::set<CTxDestination>* >::iterator it;
for (CTxDestination address : _grouping)
if ((it = setmap.find(address)) != setmap.end())
hits.insert((*it).second);
// merge all hit groups into a new single group and delete old groups
std::set<CTxDestination>* merged = new std::set<CTxDestination>(_grouping);
for (std::set<CTxDestination>* hit : hits)
{
merged->insert(hit->begin(), hit->end());
uniqueGroupings.erase(hit);
delete hit;
}
uniqueGroupings.insert(merged);
// update setmap
for (CTxDestination element : *merged)
setmap[element] = merged;
}
std::set< std::set<CTxDestination> > ret;
for (std::set<CTxDestination>* uniqueGrouping : uniqueGroupings)
{
ret.insert(*uniqueGrouping);
delete uniqueGrouping;
}
return ret;
}
2015-05-31 06:36:44 -07:00
std::set<CTxDestination> CWallet::GetAccountAddresses(const std::string& strAccount) const
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
std::set<CTxDestination> result;
for (const std::pair<CTxDestination, CAddressBookData>& item : mapAddressBook)
{
const CTxDestination& address = item.first;
const std::string& strName = item.second.name;
if (strName == strAccount)
result.insert(address);
}
return result;
}
bool CReserveKey::GetReservedKey(CPubKey& pubkey, bool internal)
{
if (nIndex == -1)
{
CKeyPool keypool;
pwallet->ReserveKeyFromKeyPool(nIndex, keypool, internal);
if (nIndex != -1)
vchPubKey = keypool.vchPubKey;
else {
return false;
}
fInternal = keypool.fInternal;
}
2012-05-14 10:07:52 -07:00
assert(vchPubKey.IsValid());
pubkey = vchPubKey;
return true;
}
void CReserveKey::KeepKey()
{
if (nIndex != -1)
pwallet->KeepKey(nIndex);
nIndex = -1;
2012-05-14 10:07:52 -07:00
vchPubKey = CPubKey();
}
void CReserveKey::ReturnKey()
{
if (nIndex != -1) {
pwallet->ReturnKey(nIndex, fInternal, vchPubKey);
}
nIndex = -1;
2012-05-14 10:07:52 -07:00
vchPubKey = CPubKey();
}
void CWallet::MarkReserveKeysAsUsed(int64_t keypool_id)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet);
bool internal = setInternalKeyPool.count(keypool_id);
if (!internal) assert(setExternalKeyPool.count(keypool_id));
std::set<int64_t> *setKeyPool = internal ? &setInternalKeyPool : &setExternalKeyPool;
auto it = setKeyPool->begin();
CWalletDB walletdb(*dbw);
while (it != std::end(*setKeyPool)) {
const int64_t& index = *(it);
if (index > keypool_id) break; // set*KeyPool is ordered
CKeyPool keypool;
if (walletdb.ReadPool(index, keypool)) { //TODO: This should be unnecessary
m_pool_key_to_index.erase(keypool.vchPubKey.GetID());
}
walletdb.ErasePool(index);
LogPrintf("keypool index %d removed\n", index);
it = setKeyPool->erase(it);
}
}
void CWallet::GetScriptForMining(std::shared_ptr<CReserveScript> &script)
2015-04-10 03:49:01 -07:00
{
std::shared_ptr<CReserveKey> rKey = std::make_shared<CReserveKey>(this);
2015-04-10 03:49:01 -07:00
CPubKey pubkey;
if (!rKey->GetReservedKey(pubkey))
2015-04-10 03:49:01 -07:00
return;
script = rKey;
script->reserveScript = CScript() << ToByteVector(pubkey) << OP_CHECKSIG;
2015-04-10 03:49:01 -07:00
}
void CWallet::LockCoin(const COutPoint& output)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
setLockedCoins.insert(output);
}
void CWallet::UnlockCoin(const COutPoint& output)
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
setLockedCoins.erase(output);
}
void CWallet::UnlockAllCoins()
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
setLockedCoins.clear();
}
bool CWallet::IsLockedCoin(uint256 hash, unsigned int n) const
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
COutPoint outpt(hash, n);
return (setLockedCoins.count(outpt) > 0);
}
void CWallet::ListLockedCoins(std::vector<COutPoint>& vOutpts) const
{
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // setLockedCoins
for (std::set<COutPoint>::iterator it = setLockedCoins.begin();
it != setLockedCoins.end(); it++) {
COutPoint outpt = (*it);
vOutpts.push_back(outpt);
}
}
/** @} */ // end of Actions
void CWallet::GetKeyBirthTimes(std::map<CTxDestination, int64_t> &mapKeyBirth) const {
AssertLockHeld(cs_wallet); // mapKeyMetadata
mapKeyBirth.clear();
// get birth times for keys with metadata
for (const auto& entry : mapKeyMetadata) {
if (entry.second.nCreateTime) {
mapKeyBirth[entry.first] = entry.second.nCreateTime;
}
}
// map in which we'll infer heights of other keys
2016-08-13 10:21:13 -07:00
CBlockIndex *pindexMax = chainActive[std::max(0, chainActive.Height() - 144)]; // the tip can be reorganized; use a 144-block safety margin
std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*> mapKeyFirstBlock;
for (const CKeyID &keyid : GetKeys()) {
if (mapKeyBirth.count(keyid) == 0)
mapKeyFirstBlock[keyid] = pindexMax;
}
// if there are no such keys, we're done
if (mapKeyFirstBlock.empty())
return;
// find first block that affects those keys, if there are any left
std::vector<CKeyID> vAffected;
for (const auto& entry : mapWallet) {
// iterate over all wallet transactions...
const CWalletTx &wtx = entry.second;
BlockMap::const_iterator blit = mapBlockIndex.find(wtx.hashBlock);
if (blit != mapBlockIndex.end() && chainActive.Contains(blit->second)) {
// ... which are already in a block
int nHeight = blit->second->nHeight;
for (const CTxOut &txout : wtx.tx->vout) {
// iterate over all their outputs
CAffectedKeysVisitor(*this, vAffected).Process(txout.scriptPubKey);
for (const CKeyID &keyid : vAffected) {
// ... and all their affected keys
std::map<CKeyID, CBlockIndex*>::iterator rit = mapKeyFirstBlock.find(keyid);
if (rit != mapKeyFirstBlock.end() && nHeight < rit->second->nHeight)
rit->second = blit->second;
}
vAffected.clear();
}
}
}
// Extract block timestamps for those keys
for (const auto& entry : mapKeyFirstBlock)
mapKeyBirth[entry.first] = entry.second->GetBlockTime() - TIMESTAMP_WINDOW; // block times can be 2h off
}
/**
* Compute smart timestamp for a transaction being added to the wallet.
*
* Logic:
* - If sending a transaction, assign its timestamp to the current time.
* - If receiving a transaction outside a block, assign its timestamp to the
* current time.
* - If receiving a block with a future timestamp, assign all its (not already
* known) transactions' timestamps to the current time.
* - If receiving a block with a past timestamp, before the most recent known
* transaction (that we care about), assign all its (not already known)
* transactions' timestamps to the same timestamp as that most-recent-known
* transaction.
* - If receiving a block with a past timestamp, but after the most recent known
* transaction, assign all its (not already known) transactions' timestamps to
* the block time.
*
* For more information see CWalletTx::nTimeSmart,
* https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=54527, or
* https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/1393.
*/
unsigned int CWallet::ComputeTimeSmart(const CWalletTx& wtx) const
{
unsigned int nTimeSmart = wtx.nTimeReceived;
if (!wtx.hashUnset()) {
if (mapBlockIndex.count(wtx.hashBlock)) {
int64_t latestNow = wtx.nTimeReceived;
int64_t latestEntry = 0;
// Tolerate times up to the last timestamp in the wallet not more than 5 minutes into the future
int64_t latestTolerated = latestNow + 300;
const TxItems& txOrdered = wtxOrdered;
for (auto it = txOrdered.rbegin(); it != txOrdered.rend(); ++it) {
CWalletTx* const pwtx = it->second.first;
if (pwtx == &wtx) {
continue;
}
CAccountingEntry* const pacentry = it->second.second;
int64_t nSmartTime;
if (pwtx) {
nSmartTime = pwtx->nTimeSmart;
if (!nSmartTime) {
nSmartTime = pwtx->nTimeReceived;
}
} else {
nSmartTime = pacentry->nTime;
}
if (nSmartTime <= latestTolerated) {
latestEntry = nSmartTime;
if (nSmartTime > latestNow) {
latestNow = nSmartTime;
}
break;
}
}
int64_t blocktime = mapBlockIndex[wtx.hashBlock]->GetBlockTime();
nTimeSmart = std::max(latestEntry, std::min(blocktime, latestNow));
} else {
LogPrintf("%s: found %s in block %s not in index\n", __func__, wtx.GetHash().ToString(), wtx.hashBlock.ToString());
}
}
return nTimeSmart;
}
bool CWallet::AddDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key, const std::string &value)
{
if (boost::get<CNoDestination>(&dest))
return false;
mapAddressBook[dest].destdata.insert(std::make_pair(key, value));
return CWalletDB(*dbw).WriteDestData(EncodeDestination(dest), key, value);
}
bool CWallet::EraseDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key)
{
if (!mapAddressBook[dest].destdata.erase(key))
return false;
return CWalletDB(*dbw).EraseDestData(EncodeDestination(dest), key);
}
bool CWallet::LoadDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key, const std::string &value)
{
mapAddressBook[dest].destdata.insert(std::make_pair(key, value));
return true;
}
bool CWallet::GetDestData(const CTxDestination &dest, const std::string &key, std::string *value) const
{
std::map<CTxDestination, CAddressBookData>::const_iterator i = mapAddressBook.find(dest);
if(i != mapAddressBook.end())
{
CAddressBookData::StringMap::const_iterator j = i->second.destdata.find(key);
if(j != i->second.destdata.end())
{
if(value)
*value = j->second;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
std::vector<std::string> CWallet::GetDestValues(const std::string& prefix) const
{
LOCK(cs_wallet);
std::vector<std::string> values;
for (const auto& address : mapAddressBook) {
for (const auto& data : address.second.destdata) {
if (!data.first.compare(0, prefix.size(), prefix)) {
values.emplace_back(data.second);
}
}
}
return values;
}
CWallet* CWallet::CreateWalletFromFile(const std::string walletFile)
{
// needed to restore wallet transaction meta data after -zapwallettxes
std::vector<CWalletTx> vWtx;
if (gArgs.GetBoolArg("-zapwallettxes", false)) {
uiInterface.InitMessage(_("Zapping all transactions from wallet..."));
std::unique_ptr<CWalletDBWrapper> dbw(new CWalletDBWrapper(&bitdb, walletFile));
std::unique_ptr<CWallet> tempWallet = MakeUnique<CWallet>(std::move(dbw));
DBErrors nZapWalletRet = tempWallet->ZapWalletTx(vWtx);
if (nZapWalletRet != DB_LOAD_OK) {
InitError(strprintf(_("Error loading %s: Wallet corrupted"), walletFile));
return nullptr;
}
}
uiInterface.InitMessage(_("Loading wallet..."));
int64_t nStart = GetTimeMillis();
bool fFirstRun = true;
std::unique_ptr<CWalletDBWrapper> dbw(new CWalletDBWrapper(&bitdb, walletFile));
CWallet *walletInstance = new CWallet(std::move(dbw));
DBErrors nLoadWalletRet = walletInstance->LoadWallet(fFirstRun);
if (nLoadWalletRet != DB_LOAD_OK)
{
if (nLoadWalletRet == DB_CORRUPT) {
InitError(strprintf(_("Error loading %s: Wallet corrupted"), walletFile));
return nullptr;
}
else if (nLoadWalletRet == DB_NONCRITICAL_ERROR)
{
InitWarning(strprintf(_("Error reading %s! All keys read correctly, but transaction data"
" or address book entries might be missing or incorrect."),
walletFile));
}
else if (nLoadWalletRet == DB_TOO_NEW) {
InitError(strprintf(_("Error loading %s: Wallet requires newer version of %s"), walletFile, _(PACKAGE_NAME)));
return nullptr;
}
else if (nLoadWalletRet == DB_NEED_REWRITE)
{
InitError(strprintf(_("Wallet needed to be rewritten: restart %s to complete"), _(PACKAGE_NAME)));
return nullptr;
}
else {
InitError(strprintf(_("Error loading %s"), walletFile));
return nullptr;
}
}
if (gArgs.GetBoolArg("-upgradewallet", fFirstRun))
{
int nMaxVersion = gArgs.GetArg("-upgradewallet", 0);
if (nMaxVersion == 0) // the -upgradewallet without argument case
{
LogPrintf("Performing wallet upgrade to %i\n", FEATURE_LATEST);
nMaxVersion = CLIENT_VERSION;
walletInstance->SetMinVersion(FEATURE_LATEST); // permanently upgrade the wallet immediately
}
else
LogPrintf("Allowing wallet upgrade up to %i\n", nMaxVersion);
if (nMaxVersion < walletInstance->GetVersion())
{
InitError(_("Cannot downgrade wallet"));
return nullptr;
}
walletInstance->SetMaxVersion(nMaxVersion);
}
if (fFirstRun)
{
// ensure this wallet.dat can only be opened by clients supporting HD with chain split and expects no default key
if (!gArgs.GetBoolArg("-usehd", true)) {
InitError(strprintf(_("Error creating %s: You can't create non-HD wallets with this version."), walletFile));
return nullptr;
}
walletInstance->SetMinVersion(FEATURE_NO_DEFAULT_KEY);
// generate a new master key
CPubKey masterPubKey = walletInstance->GenerateNewHDMasterKey();
if (!walletInstance->SetHDMasterKey(masterPubKey))
throw std::runtime_error(std::string(__func__) + ": Storing master key failed");
// Top up the keypool
if (!walletInstance->TopUpKeyPool()) {
InitError(_("Unable to generate initial keys") += "\n");
2017-10-09 05:26:53 -07:00
return nullptr;
}
walletInstance->SetBestChain(chainActive.GetLocator());
}
else if (gArgs.IsArgSet("-usehd")) {
bool useHD = gArgs.GetBoolArg("-usehd", true);
if (walletInstance->IsHDEnabled() && !useHD) {
InitError(strprintf(_("Error loading %s: You can't disable HD on an already existing HD wallet"), walletFile));
return nullptr;
}
if (!walletInstance->IsHDEnabled() && useHD) {
InitError(strprintf(_("Error loading %s: You can't enable HD on an already existing non-HD wallet"), walletFile));
return nullptr;
}
}
LogPrintf(" wallet %15dms\n", GetTimeMillis() - nStart);
// Try to top up keypool. No-op if the wallet is locked.
walletInstance->TopUpKeyPool();
CBlockIndex *pindexRescan = chainActive.Genesis();
if (!gArgs.GetBoolArg("-rescan", false))
{
CWalletDB walletdb(*walletInstance->dbw);
CBlockLocator locator;
if (walletdb.ReadBestBlock(locator))
pindexRescan = FindForkInGlobalIndex(chainActive, locator);
}
walletInstance->m_last_block_processed = chainActive.Tip();
RegisterValidationInterface(walletInstance);
if (chainActive.Tip() && chainActive.Tip() != pindexRescan)
{
//We can't rescan beyond non-pruned blocks, stop and throw an error
//this might happen if a user uses an old wallet within a pruned node
// or if he ran -disablewallet for a longer time, then decided to re-enable
if (fPruneMode)
{
CBlockIndex *block = chainActive.Tip();
while (block && block->pprev && (block->pprev->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) && block->pprev->nTx > 0 && pindexRescan != block)
block = block->pprev;
if (pindexRescan != block) {
InitError(_("Prune: last wallet synchronisation goes beyond pruned data. You need to -reindex (download the whole blockchain again in case of pruned node)"));
return nullptr;
}
}
uiInterface.InitMessage(_("Rescanning..."));
LogPrintf("Rescanning last %i blocks (from block %i)...\n", chainActive.Height() - pindexRescan->nHeight, pindexRescan->nHeight);
// No need to read and scan block if block was created before
// our wallet birthday (as adjusted for block time variability)
while (pindexRescan && walletInstance->nTimeFirstKey && (pindexRescan->GetBlockTime() < (walletInstance->nTimeFirstKey - TIMESTAMP_WINDOW))) {
pindexRescan = chainActive.Next(pindexRescan);
}
nStart = GetTimeMillis();
walletInstance->ScanForWalletTransactions(pindexRescan, nullptr, true);
LogPrintf(" rescan %15dms\n", GetTimeMillis() - nStart);
walletInstance->SetBestChain(chainActive.GetLocator());
walletInstance->dbw->IncrementUpdateCounter();
// Restore wallet transaction metadata after -zapwallettxes=1
if (gArgs.GetBoolArg("-zapwallettxes", false) && gArgs.GetArg("-zapwallettxes", "1") != "2")
{
CWalletDB walletdb(*walletInstance->dbw);
for (const CWalletTx& wtxOld : vWtx)
{
uint256 hash = wtxOld.GetHash();
std::map<uint256, CWalletTx>::iterator mi = walletInstance->mapWallet.find(hash);
if (mi != walletInstance->mapWallet.end())
{
const CWalletTx* copyFrom = &wtxOld;
CWalletTx* copyTo = &mi->second;
copyTo->mapValue = copyFrom->mapValue;
copyTo->vOrderForm = copyFrom->vOrderForm;
copyTo->nTimeReceived = copyFrom->nTimeReceived;
copyTo->nTimeSmart = copyFrom->nTimeSmart;
copyTo->fFromMe = copyFrom->fFromMe;
copyTo->strFromAccount = copyFrom->strFromAccount;
copyTo->nOrderPos = copyFrom->nOrderPos;
walletdb.WriteTx(*copyTo);
}
}
}
}
walletInstance->SetBroadcastTransactions(gArgs.GetBoolArg("-walletbroadcast", DEFAULT_WALLETBROADCAST));
{
LOCK(walletInstance->cs_wallet);
LogPrintf("setKeyPool.size() = %u\n", walletInstance->GetKeyPoolSize());
LogPrintf("mapWallet.size() = %u\n", walletInstance->mapWallet.size());
LogPrintf("mapAddressBook.size() = %u\n", walletInstance->mapAddressBook.size());
}
return walletInstance;
}
std::atomic<bool> CWallet::fFlushScheduled(false);
void CWallet::postInitProcess(CScheduler& scheduler)
{
// Add wallet transactions that aren't already in a block to mempool
// Do this here as mempool requires genesis block to be loaded
ReacceptWalletTransactions();
// Run a thread to flush wallet periodically
if (!CWallet::fFlushScheduled.exchange(true)) {
scheduler.scheduleEvery(MaybeCompactWalletDB, 500);
}
}
bool CWallet::BackupWallet(const std::string& strDest)
{
return dbw->Backup(strDest);
}
CKeyPool::CKeyPool()
{
nTime = GetTime();
fInternal = false;
}
CKeyPool::CKeyPool(const CPubKey& vchPubKeyIn, bool internalIn)
{
nTime = GetTime();
vchPubKey = vchPubKeyIn;
fInternal = internalIn;
}
CWalletKey::CWalletKey(int64_t nExpires)
{
nTimeCreated = (nExpires ? GetTime() : 0);
nTimeExpires = nExpires;
}
void CMerkleTx::SetMerkleBranch(const CBlockIndex* pindex, int posInBlock)
{
// Update the tx's hashBlock
hashBlock = pindex->GetBlockHash();
// set the position of the transaction in the block
nIndex = posInBlock;
}
int CMerkleTx::GetDepthInMainChain(const CBlockIndex* &pindexRet) const
{
if (hashUnset())
return 0;
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// Find the block it claims to be in
BlockMap::iterator mi = mapBlockIndex.find(hashBlock);
if (mi == mapBlockIndex.end())
return 0;
CBlockIndex* pindex = (*mi).second;
if (!pindex || !chainActive.Contains(pindex))
return 0;
pindexRet = pindex;
return ((nIndex == -1) ? (-1) : 1) * (chainActive.Height() - pindex->nHeight + 1);
}
int CMerkleTx::GetBlocksToMaturity() const
{
if (!IsCoinBase())
return 0;
return std::max(0, (COINBASE_MATURITY+1) - GetDepthInMainChain());
}
bool CWalletTx::AcceptToMemoryPool(const CAmount& nAbsurdFee, CValidationState& state)
{
// Quick check to avoid re-setting fInMempool to false
if (mempool.exists(tx->GetHash())) {
return false;
}
// We must set fInMempool here - while it will be re-set to true by the
// entered-mempool callback, if we did not there would be a race where a
// user could call sendmoney in a loop and hit spurious out of funds errors
// because we think that the transaction they just generated's change is
// unavailable as we're not yet aware its in mempool.
bool ret = ::AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, state, tx, nullptr /* pfMissingInputs */,
nullptr /* plTxnReplaced */, false /* bypass_limits */, nAbsurdFee);
fInMempool = ret;
return ret;
}