Merge pull request #5406

5fdbe67 Add 0.10 release notes on improvement to signing security. (Gregory Maxwell)
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Wladimir J. van der Laan 2014-12-03 10:00:39 +01:00
commit 1863deae5f
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@ -95,3 +95,32 @@ are done, it always returns an immediate error with code -28 to all calls.
This new behaviour can be useful for clients to know that a server is already
started and will be available soon (for instance, so that they do not
have to start it themselves).
Improved signing security
=========================
For 0.10 the security of signing against unusual attacks has been
improved by making the signatures constant time and deterministic.
This change is a result of switching signing to use libsecp256k1
instead of OpenSSL. Libsecp256k1 is a cryptographic library
optimized for the curve Bitcoin uses which was created by Bitcoin
Core developer Pieter Wuille.
There exist attacks[1] against most ECC implementations where an
attacker on shared virtual machine hardware could extract a private
key if they could cause a target to sign using the same key hundreds
of times. While using shared hosts and reusing keys are inadvisable
for other reasons, it's a better practice to avoid the exposure.
OpenSSL has code in their source repository for derandomization
and reduction in timing leaks, and we've eagerly wanted to use
it for a long time but this functionality has still not made its
way into a released version of OpenSSL. Libsecp256k1 achieves
significantly stronger protection: As far as we're aware this is
the only deployed implementation of constant time signing for
the curve Bitcoin uses and we have reason to believe that
libsecp256k1 is better tested and more thoroughly reviewed
than the implementation in OpenSSL.
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/161.pdf