- New permissionless instruction to regularly charge collateral fees
- Bank and group configuration to set rate and interval
- Keeper addition to call the instruction
The liqor liquidation fee and platform liquidation fee for the asset and
liab token are both payed by the liqee.
The platform liquidation fee is added to the Bank's
collected_fees_native and tracked in collected_liquidation_fees.
(cherry picked from commit 8383109f0d)
The liqor liquidation fee and platform liquidation fee for the asset and
liab token are both payed by the liqee.
The platform liquidation fee is added to the Bank's
collected_fees_native and tracked in collected_liquidation_fees.
- limit deposits (via deposit, flash loan, tcs)
- limit potential deposits via openbook settle
by restricting placable orders via potential_serum_tokens
- introduce Serum3PlaceOrderV2 for this purpose
- account for new limits in liquidator, max_swap
- token_edit can set it up to gradually scale to new target values
- security admin can abort an ongoing change via token_edit
- all health computations are now time dependent and get the weight
based on it
- when the change is done, the keeper "cleans up" and moves the new
values into the default fields
Which applies to the in token amount of swaps only.
Charging a deposit fee on flash loans was a bad idea:
- It incentivizes flash loan users to make the deposit a separate
instruction, defeating the purpose.
- For swaps, it makes traders pay a loan origination fee in in-token and
a deposit fee in out-token, leading to more complex bookkeeping and ui
display.
Instead, charge a fee on the in-token for all flash loans explicitly
marked as swaps only.
- Rename the new "swap fee" to "deposit fee" and let it apply to all
deposits, not just for Swap-type flash loans.
- But don't apply it to withdrawals (effectively giving rebates!)
Result of audit feedback
* support name edit for token and program
Signed-off-by: microwavedcola1 <microwavedcola@gmail.com>
* undo
Signed-off-by: microwavedcola1 <microwavedcola@gmail.com>
* Fixes from review
Signed-off-by: microwavedcola1 <microwavedcola@gmail.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: microwavedcola1 <microwavedcola@gmail.com>
This allows the security council to say "users can't create new borrows
against this token/perp anymore". In some emergency situations this can
help reduce risk exposure.
For example, if the price of a wrapped asset permanently depegs from
its underlying or there is a successful long-term attack on an oracle,
this (and reduce-only) would significantly reduce exploitability until
the DAO's decision for how to resolve the issue goes through.
To do that, split up the Accounts objects and the instruction
implementations.
GPL code is only used when the "enable-gpl" feature is enabled. That
means compiling the program or running tests need explicit feature
activation now.
It is tracked in the StablePriceModel and updated on
TokenUpdateIndexAndRate and PerpUpdateFunding instructions.
The stable price is used in health computations.
Since Bank can't expand the existing OracleConfig, add a new one to Bank
and (temporarily!) copy over the old value to the new one in
TokenUpdateIndexAndRate.
Add some reserved space to OracleConfig to make this easier in the
future.
Breaks the PerpMarket and PerpPosition layouts
* Perp instruction logging
* Onchain funding calculation
* perp_spot_transfers field on perp positions
* Logging on register token, perp market
* Additional fields on update token index logging
* maker and taker volume fields on perp position
* AccountExpand: cleanups from audit
* Group instructions: cleanups from audit
* AccountClose: cleanups from audit
* TokenAddBank: Audit fixes, including significant bugs
Must not take collected_fees and bump from the existing bank.
* Instruction comment updates
* GroupEdit: Add version/testing flag changes
Ported from mc/vanity
microwavedcola1
Christian Kamm
Lou-Kamades
Lou-Kamades
microwavedcola1
Nicholas Clarke