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Ancestor verification for vote signing (#1919)

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Pankaj Garg 2018-11-26 19:26:54 -08:00 committed by GitHub
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@ -31,6 +31,19 @@ Secure Enclaves (such as SGX) provide a layer of memory and computation protecti
* The sign request contains the entry ID for the new vote
* Enclave verifies that new vote's entry ID is on the correct branch (following the rules #1 and #2 above)
## Ancestor Verification
This is alternate, albeit, less certain approach to verifying voting branch.
1. The validator maintains an active set of nodes in the network
2. It observes the votes from the active set in the last voting period
3. It stores the ancestor/last_tick at which each node voted
4. It sends new vote request to vote-signing service
* It includes previous votes from nodes in the active set, and their corresponding ancestors
5. The signer checks if the previous votes contains a vote from the validator, and the vote ancestor matches with majority of the nodes
* It signs the new vote if the check is successful
* It asserts (raises an alarm of some sort) if the check is unsuccessful
The premise is that the validator can be spoofed at most once to vote on incorrect data. If someone hijacks the validator and submits a vote request for bogus data, that vote will not be included in the PoH (as it'll be rejected by the network). The next time the validator sends a request to sign the vote, the signing service will detect that validator's last vote is missing (as part of #5 above).
## Branch determination