update economics section to provide detail on expected inflation parameters (#5615)

book/src/ed_economic_sustainability.md

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ## Economic Sustainability
 
-Long term economic sustainability is one of the guiding principles of Solana’s economic design. While it is impossible to predict how decentralized economies will develop over time, especially economies with flexible decentralized governances, we can arrange economic components such that, under certain conditions, a sustainable economy may take shape in the long term. In the case of Solana’s network, these components take the form of the remittances and deposits into and out of the reserve ‘mining pool’.
+Long term economic sustainability is one of the guiding principles of Solana’s economic design. While it is impossible to predict how decentralized economies will develop over time, especially economies with flexible decentralized governances, we can arrange economic components such that, under certain conditions, a sustainable economy may take shape in the long term. In the case of Solana’s network, these components take the form of token issuance (via inflation) and token burning’.
 
-The dominant remittances from the Solana mining pool are validator and replicator rewards. The deposit mechanism is a flat, protocol-specified and adjusted, % of each transaction fee.
+The dominant remittances from the Solana mining pool are validator and replicator rewards. The disinflationary mechanism is a flat, protocol-specified and adjusted, % of each transaction fee.
 
-The Replicator rewards are to be delivered to replicators from the mining pool after successful PoRep validation. The per-PoRep reward amount is determined as a function of the total network storage redundancy at the time of the PoRep validation and the network goal redundancy. This function is likely to take the form of a discount from a base reward to be delivered when the network has achieved and maintained its goal redundancy. An example of such a reward function is shown in **Figure 3**
+The Replicator rewards are to be delivered to replicators as a portion of the network inflation after successful PoRep validation. The per-PoRep reward amount is determined as a function of the total network storage redundancy at the time of the PoRep validation and the network goal redundancy. This function is likely to take the form of a discount from a base reward to be delivered when the network has achieved and maintained its goal redundancy. An example of such a reward function is shown in **Figure 3**
 
 <!-- ![image alt text](porep_reward.png) -->
 <p style="text-align:center;"><img src="img/porep_reward.png" alt="==PoRep Reward Curve ==" width="800"/></p>
@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ The Replicator rewards are to be delivered to replicators from the mining pool a
 
 In the example shown in Figure 1, multiple per PoRep base rewards are explored (as a % of Tx Fee) to be delivered when the global ledger replication redundancy meets 10X. When the global ledger replication redundancy is less than 10X, the base reward is discounted as a function of the square of the ratio of the actual ledger replication redundancy to the goal redundancy (i.e. 10X).
 
-The other protocol-based remittance goes to validation-clients as a reward distributed in proportion to stake-weight for voting to validate the ledger state. The functional issuance of this reward is described in [State-validation Protocol-based Rewards](ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md) and is designed to reduce over time until validators are incentivized solely through collection of transaction fees. Therefore, in the long-run, protocol-based rewards to replication-nodes will be the only remittances from the mining pool, and will have to be countered by the portion of each non-PoRep transaction fee that is directed back into the mining pool. I.e. for a long-term self-sustaining economy, replicator-client rewards must be subsidized through a minimum fee on each non-PoRep transaction pre-allocated to the mining pool.  Through this constraint, we can write the following inequality:
-
-**== WIP [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1HBDasdkjS4Ja9wC_tIUsZPVcxGAWTuYOq9zf6xoQNps/edit?usp=sharing) ==**
+<!-- The other protocol-based remittance goes to validation-clients as a reward distributed in proportion to stake-weight for voting to validate the ledger state. The functional issuance of this reward is described in [State-validation Protocol-based Rewards](ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md) and is designed to reduce over time until validators are incentivized solely through collection of transaction fees. Therefore, in the long-run, protocol-based rewards to replication-nodes will be the only remittances from the mining pool, and will have to be countered by the portion of each non-PoRep transaction fee that is directed back into the mining pool. I.e. for a long-term self-sustaining economy, replicator-client rewards must be subsidized through a minimum fee on each non-PoRep transaction pre-allocated to the mining pool.  Through this constraint, we can write the following inequality:
+--> 
+<!-- **== WIP [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1HBDasdkjS4Ja9wC_tIUsZPVcxGAWTuYOq9zf6xoQNps/edit?usp=sharing) ==** -->

book/src/ed_mvp.md

@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@ The preceeding sections, outlined in the [Economic Design Overview](ed_overview.
 ### MVP Economic Features
 
 * Faucet to deliver testnet SOLs to validators for staking and dapp development.
-* Mechanism by which validators are rewarded in proportion to their stake. Interest rate mechansism (i.e. to be determined by total % staked) to come later.
-* Ability to delegate tokens to validator nodes.
+* Mechanism by which validators are rewarded via network inflation.
+* Ability to delegate tokens to validator nodes
+* Validator set commission fees on interest from delegated tokens.
 * Replicators to receive fixed, arbitrary reward for submitting validated PoReps. Reward size mechanism (i.e. PoRep reward as a function of total ledger redundancy) to come later.
 * Pooling of replicator PoRep transaction fees and weighted distribution to validators based on PoRep verification (see [Replication-validation Transaction Fees](ed_vce_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md). It will be useful to test this protection against attacks on testnet.
 * Nice-to-have: auto-delegation of replicator rewards to validator.

book/src/ed_overview.md

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 ## Economic Design Overview
 
-Solana’s crypto-economic system is designed to promote a healthy, long term self-sustaining economy with participant incentives aligned to the security and decentralization of the network. The main participants in this economy are validation-clients and replication-clients. Their contributions to the network, state validation and data storage respectively, and their requisite remittance mechanisms are discussed below.
+Solana’s crypto-economic system is designed to promote a healthy, long term self-sustaining economy with participant incentives aligned to the security and decentralization of the network. The main participants in this economy are validation-clients and replication-clients. Their contributions to the network, state validation and data storage respectively, and their requisite incentive mechanisms are discussed below.
 
-The main channels of participant remittances are referred to as protocol-based rewards and transaction fees. Protocol-based rewards are protocol-derived issuances from a protocol-defined, global inflation rate. These rewards will constitute the total reward delivered to replication clients and a portion of the total rewards for validation clients, the remaining sourced from transaction fees. In the early days of the network, it is likely that protocol-based rewards, deployed based on predefined issuance schedule, will drive the majority of participant incentives to join the network.
+The main channels of participant remittances are referred to as protocol-based rewards and transaction fees. Protocol-based rewards are issuances from a global, protocol-defined, inflation rate. These rewards will constitute the total reward delivered to replication and validation clients, the remaining sourced from transaction fees. In the early days of the network, it is likely that protocol-based rewards, deployed based on predefined issuance schedule, will drive the majority of participant incentives to participate in the network.
 
 These protocol-based rewards, to be distributed to participating validation and replication clients, are to be a result of a global supply inflation rate, calculated per Solana epoch and distributed amongst the active validator set. As discussed further below, the per annum inflation rate is based on a pre-determined disinflationary schedule. This provides the network with monetary supply predictability which supports long term economic stability and security. 
 
-Transaction fees are market-based participant-to-participant transfers, attached to network interactions as a necessary motivation and compensation for the inclusion and execution of a proposed transaction (be it a state execution or proof-of-replication verification). A mechanism for continuous and long-term economic stability through partial burning of each transaction fee is also discussed below.
+Transaction fees are market-based participant-to-participant transfers, attached to network interactions as a necessary motivation and compensation for the inclusion and execution of a proposed transaction (be it a state execution or proof-of-replication verification). A mechanism for long-term economic stability and forking protection through partial burning of each transaction fee is also discussed below.
 
-A high-level schematic of Solana’s crypto-economic design is shown below in **Figure 1**. The specifics of validation-client economics are described in sections: [Validation-client Economics](ed_validation_client_economics.md), [State-validation Protocol-based Rewards](ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md), [State-validation Transaction Fees](ed_vce_state_validation_transaction_fees.md) and [Replication-validation Transaction Fees](ed_vce_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md). Also, the chapter titled [Validation Stake Delegation](ed_vce_validation_stake_delegation.md) closes with a discussion of validator delegation opportunties and marketplace. Additionally, in [Storage Rent Economics](ed_storage_rend_economics.md), we describe an implementation of storage rent to account for the externality costs of maintaining the active state of the ledger. The [Replication-client Economics](ed_replication_client_economics.md) chapter will review the Solana network design for global ledger storage/redundancy and replicator-client economics ([Storage-replication rewards](ed_rce_storage_replication_rewards.md)) along with a replicator-to-validator delegation mechanism designed to aide participant on-boarding into the Solana economy discussed in [Replication-client Reward Auto-delegation](ed_rce_replication_client_reward_auto_delegation.md). The [Economic Sustainability](ed_economic_sustainability.md) section dives deeper into Solana’s design for long-term economic sustainability and outlines the constraints and conditions for a self-sustaining economy. An outline of features for an MVP economic design is discussed in the [Economic Design MVP](ed_mvp.md) section. Finally, in chapter [Attack Vectors](ed_attack_vectors.md), various attack vectors will be described and potential vulnerabilities explored and parameterized.
+A high-level schematic of Solana’s crypto-economic design is shown below in **Figure 1**. The specifics of validation-client economics are described in sections: [Validation-client Economics](ed_validation_client_economics.md), [State-validation Protocol-based Rewards](ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md), [State-validation Transaction Fees](ed_vce_state_validation_transaction_fees.md) and [Replication-validation Transaction Fees](ed_vce_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md). Also, the chapter titled [Validation Stake Delegation](ed_vce_validation_stake_delegation.md) closes with a discussion of validator delegation opportunties and marketplace.<!-- Additionally, in [Storage Rent Economics](ed_storage_rend_economics.md), we describe an implementation of storage rent to account for the externality costs of maintaining the active state of the ledger.--> The [Replication-client Economics](ed_replication_client_economics.md) chapter will review the Solana network design for global ledger storage/redundancy and replicator-client economics ([Storage-replication rewards](ed_rce_storage_replication_rewards.md)) along with a replicator-to-validator delegation mechanism designed to aide participant on-boarding into the Solana economy discussed in [Replication-client Reward Auto-delegation](ed_rce_replication_client_reward_auto_delegation.md). <!-- The [Economic Sustainability](ed_economic_sustainability.md) section dives deeper into Solana’s design for long-term economic sustainability and outlines the constraints and conditions for a self-sustaining economy.--> An outline of features for an MVP economic design is discussed in the [Economic Design MVP](ed_mvp.md) section. Finally, in chapter [Attack Vectors](ed_attack_vectors.md), various attack vectors will be described and potential vulnerabilities explored and parameterized.
 
 <!-- ![img alt text](solana_economic_design.png) -->
 <p style="text-align:center;"><img src="img/economic_design_infl_230719.png" alt="== Solana Economic Design Diagram ==" width="800"/></p>

book/src/ed_rce_replication_client_reward_auto_delegation.md

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ### Replication-client Reward Auto-delegation
 
-The ability for Solana network participant’s to earn rewards by providing storage service is a unique on-boarding path that requires little hardware overhead and minimal upfront capital. It offers an avenue for individuals with extra-storage space on their home laptops or PCs to contribute to the security of the network and become integrated into the Solana economy.
+The ability for Solana network participants to earn rewards by providing storage service is a unique on-boarding path that requires little hardware overhead and minimal upfront capital. It offers an avenue for individuals with extra-storage space on their home laptops or PCs to contribute to the security of the network and become integrated into the Solana economy.
 
-To enhance this on-boarding ramp and facilitate further participation and investment in the Solana economy, replication-clients have the opportunity to auto-delegate their rewards to validation-clients of their choice. Much like the automatic reinvestment of stock dividends, in this scenario, a replicator-client can earn Solana tokens by providing some storage capacity to the network (i.e. via submitting valid PoReps), have the protocol-based rewards automatically assigned as delegation to a staked validator node and therefore earning interest in the validation-client reward pool.
+To enhance this on-boarding ramp and facilitate further participation and investment in the Solana economy, replication-clients have the opportunity to auto-delegate their rewards to validation-clients of their choice. Much like the automatic reinvestment of stock dividends, in this scenario, a replicator-client can earn Solana tokens by providing some storage capacity to the network (i.e. via submitting valid PoReps), have the protocol-based rewards automatically assigned as delegation to a staked validator node of the replicator's choice and earn interest, less a fee, from the validation-client's network participation.

book/src/ed_replication_client_economics.md

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 ## Replication-client economics
 
-Replication-clients should be rewarded for providing the network with storage space. Incentivization of the set of replicators provides data security through redundancy of the historical ledger. Replication nodes are rewarded in proportion to the amount of ledger data storage provided. These rewards are captured by generating and entering Proofs of Replication (PoReps) into the PoH stream which can be validated by Validation nodes as described above in the [Replication-validation Transaction Fees](ed_vce_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md) chapter.
+Replication-clients should be rewarded for providing the network with storage space. Incentivization of the set of replicators provides data security through redundancy of the historical ledger. Replication nodes are rewarded in proportion to the amount of ledger data storage provided, as proved by successfully submitting Proofs-of-Replication to the cluster.. These rewards are captured by generating and entering Proofs of Replication (PoReps) into the PoH stream which can be validated by Validation nodes as described above in the [Replication-validation Transaction Fees](ed_vce_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md) chapter.

book/src/ed_validation_client_economics.md

@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
 ## Validation-client Economics
 
-Validator-clients are eligible to receive protocol-based (i.e. via inflation) rewards issued via stake-based annual interest rates (calculated per epoch) by providing compute (CPU+GPU) resources to validate and vote on a given PoH state. These protocol-based rewards are determined through an algorithmic disinflationary schedule as a function of total amount of circulating tokens. Additionally, these clients may earn revenue through fees via state-validation transactions and Proof-of-Replication (PoRep) transactions. For clarity, we separately describe the design and motivation of these revenue distriubutions for validation-clients below: state-validation protocol-based rewards, state-validation transaction fees and rent,  and PoRep-validation transaction fees.
+Validator-clients are eligible to receive protocol-based (i.e. inflation-based) rewards issued via stake-based annual interest rates (calculated per epoch) by providing compute (CPU+GPU) resources to validate and vote on a given PoH state. These protocol-based rewards are determined through an algorithmic disinflationary schedule as a function of total amount of circulating tokens. 
+The network is expected to launch with an annual inflation rate around 15%, set to decrease by 15% per year until a long-term stable rate of 1-2% is reached. These issuances are to be split and distributed to participating validators and replicators, with around 90% of the issued tokens allocated for validator rewards. Because the network will be distributing a fixed amount of inflation rewards across the stake-weighted valdiator set, any individual validator's interest rate will be a function of the amount of staked SOL in relation to the circulating SOL. 
+
+Additionally, validator clients may earn revenue through fees via state-validation transactions and Proof-of-Replication (PoRep) transactions. For clarity, we separately describe the design and motivation of these revenue distriubutions for validation-clients below: state-validation protocol-based rewards, state-validation transaction fees and rent,  and PoRep-validation transaction fees.

book/src/ed_vce_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 ### Replication-validation Transaction Fees
 
-As previously mentioned, validator-clients will also be responsible for validating PoReps submitted into the PoH stream by replicator-clients. In this case, validators are providing compute (CPU/GPU) and light storage resources to confirm that these replication proofs could only be generated by a client that is storing the referenced PoH leger block.2
+As previously mentioned, validator-clients will also be responsible for validating PoReps submitted into the PoH stream by replicator-clients. In this case, validators are providing compute (CPU/GPU) and light storage resources to confirm that these replication proofs could only be generated by a client that is storing the referenced PoH leger block.
 
 While replication-clients are incentivized and rewarded through protocol-based rewards schedule (see [Replication-client Economics](ed_replication_client_economics.md)), validator-clients will be incentivized to include and validate PoReps in PoH through collection of transaction fees associated with the submitted PoReps and distribution of protocol rewards proportional to the validated PoReps. As will be described in detail in the Section 3.1, replication-client rewards are protocol-based and designed to reward based on a global data redundancy factor. I.e. the protocol will incentivize replication-client participation through rewards based on a target ledger redundancy (e.g. 10x data redundancy). 
 
 The validation of PoReps by validation-clients is computationally more expensive than state-validation (detail in the [Economic Sustainability](ed_economic_sustainability.md) chapter), thus the transaction fees are expected to be proportionally higher. 
 
-There are various attack vectors available for colluding validation and replication clients, as described in detail below in [Economic Sustainability](ed_economic_sustainability). To protect against various collusion attack vectors, for a given epoch, validator rewards are distributed across participating validation-clients in proportion to the number of validated PoReps in the epoch less the number of PoReps that mismatch the replicators challenge. The PoRep challenge game is described in [Ledger Replication](https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/blob/master/book/src/ledger-replication.md#the-porep-game). This design rewards validators proportional to the number of PoReps they process and validate, while providing negative pressure for validation-clients to submit lazy or malicious invalid votes on submitted PoReps (note that it is computationally prohibitive to determine whether a validator-client has marked a valid PoRep as invalid).
+There are various attack vectors available for colluding validation and replication clients, also described in detail below in [Economic Sustainability](ed_economic_sustainability). To protect against various collusion attack vectors, for a given epoch, validator rewards are distributed across participating validation-clients in proportion to the number of validated PoReps in the epoch less the number of PoReps that mismatch the replicators challenge. The PoRep challenge game is described in [Ledger Replication](https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/blob/master/book/src/ledger-replication.md#the-porep-game). This design rewards validators proportional to the number of PoReps they process and validate, while providing negative pressure for validation-clients to submit lazy or malicious invalid votes on submitted PoReps (note that it is computationally prohibitive to determine whether a validator-client has marked a valid PoRep as invalid).

book/src/ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md

@@ -6,12 +6,12 @@ Validator-clients have two functional roles in the Solana network:
 
 * Be elected as ‘leader’ on a stake-weighted round-robin schedule during which time they are responsible for collecting outstanding transactions and Proofs-of-Replication and incorporating them into the PoH, thus updating the global state of the network and providing chain continuity.
 
-Validator-client rewards for these services are to be distributed at the end of each Solana epoch. Compensation for validator-clients is provided via a protocol-based annual inflation rate dispersed in proportion to the stake-weight of each validator (see below) along with leader-claimed transaction fees available during each leader rotation. I.e. during the time a given validator-client is elected as leader, it has the opportunity to keep a portion of each transaction fee, less a protocol-specified amount that is destroyed (see [Validation-client State Transaction Fees](ed_vce_state_validation_transaction_fees.md)). PoRep transaction fees are also collected by the leader client and validator PoRep rewards are distributed in proportion to the number of validated PoReps less the number of PoReps that mismatch a replicator's challenge. (see [Replication-client Transaction Fees](ed_vce_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md))
+Validator-client rewards for these services are to be distributed at the end of each Solana epoch. As previously discussed, compensation for validator-clients is provided via a protocol-based annual inflation rate dispersed in proportion to the stake-weight of each validator (see below) along with leader-claimed transaction fees available during each leader rotation. I.e. during the time a given validator-client is elected as leader, it has the opportunity to keep a portion of each transaction fee, less a protocol-specified amount that is destroyed (see [Validation-client State Transaction Fees](ed_vce_state_validation_transaction_fees.md)). PoRep transaction fees are also collected by the leader client and validator PoRep rewards are distributed in proportion to the number of validated PoReps less the number of PoReps that mismatch a replicator's challenge. (see [Replication-client Transaction Fees](ed_vce_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md))
 
 
-The effective protocol-based annual interest rate (%) per epoch to be distributed to validation-clients is to be a function of:
+The effective protocol-based annual interest rate (%) per epoch received by validation-clients is to be a function of:
 
-* the current global inflation rate, derived from the pre-determined dis-inflationary issuance schedule
+* the current global inflation rate, derived from the pre-determined dis-inflationary issuance schedule (see [Validation-client Economics](ed_validartion_client_economics.md))
 
 * the fraction of staked SOLs out of the current total circulating supply,
 
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The effective protocol-based annual interest rate (%) per epoch to be distribute
 
 The first factor is a function of protocol parameters only (i.e. independent of validator behavior in a given epoch) and results in a global validation reward schedule designed to incentivize early participation, provide clear montetary stability and provide optimal security in the network. 
 
-At any given point in time, a specific validator's interest rate can be determined based on the porportion of circulating supply that is staked by the network and the validator's uptime/activity in the previous epoch. For an illustrative example, consider a hypothetical instance of the network with an initial circulating token supply of 250MM tokens with an additional 250MM vesting over 3 years. Additionally an inflation rate is specified at network launch of 7.5%, and a disinflationary schedule of 20% decrease in inflation rate per year (the actual rates to be implemented are to be worked out during the testnet experimentation phase of mainnet launch). With these broad assumptions, the 10-year inflation rate (adjusted daily for this example) is shown in **Figure 2**, while the total circulating token supply is illustrated in **Figure 3**. Neglected in this toy-model is the inflation supression due to the portion of each transaction fee that is to be destroyed.
+At any given point in time, a specific validator's interest rate can be determined based on the porportion of circulating supply that is staked by the network and the validator's uptime/activity in the previous epoch. For example, consider a hypothetical instance of the network with an initial circulating token supply of 250MM tokens with an additional 250MM vesting over 3 years. Additionally an inflation rate is specified at network launch of 7.5%, and a disinflationary schedule of 20% decrease in inflation rate per year (the actual rates to be implemented are to be worked out during the testnet experimentation phase of mainnet launch). With these broad assumptions, the 10-year inflation rate (adjusted daily for this example) is shown in **Figure 2**, while the total circulating token supply is illustrated in **Figure 3**. Neglected in this toy-model is the inflation supression due to the portion of each transaction fee that is to be destroyed.
 
 <p style="text-align:center;"><img src="img/p_ex_schedule.png" alt="drawing" width="800"/></p>
 **Figure 2:** In this example schedule, the annual inflation rate [%] reduces at around 20% per year, until it reaches the long-term, fixed, 1.5% rate.
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ At any given point in time, a specific validator's interest rate can be determin
 <p style="text-align:center;"><img src="img/p_ex_supply.png" alt="drawing" width="800"/></p>
 **Figure 3:** The total token supply over a 10-year period, based on an initial 250MM tokens with the disinflationary inflation schedule as shown in **Figure 2**
 
-Over time, the interest rate, at a fixed network staked percentage, will reduce concordant with network inflation. Validation-client interest rates are designed to be higher in the early days of the network to incentivize participation and jumpstart the network economy. As previously mentioned, the inflation rate is expected to stabalize near 1-2% which also results in a fixed, long-term, interest rate to be provided to validator-clients. This value does not represent the total interest available to validator-clients as transaction fees for both state-validation and ledger storage replication (PoReps) are not accounted for here. 
+Over time, the interest rate, at a fixed network staked percentage, will reduce concordant with network inflation. Validation-client interest rates are designed to be higher in the early days of the network to incentivize participation and jumpstart the network economy. As previously mentioned, the inflation rate is expected to stabalize near 1-2% which also results in a fixed, long-term, interest rate to be provided to validator-clients. This value does not represent the total interest available to validator-clients as transaction fees for state-validation and ledger storage replication (PoReps) are not accounted for here. 
 
 Given these example parameters, annualized validator-specific interest rates can be determined based on the global fraction of tokens bonded as stake, as well as their uptime/activity in the previous epoch. For the purpose of this example, we assume 100% uptime for all validators and a split in interest-based rewards between validators and replicator nodes of 80%/20%. Additionally, the fraction of staked circulating supply is assummed to be constant. Based on these assumptions, an annualized validation-client interest rate schedule as a function of % circulating token supply that is staked is shown in** Figure 4**.
 

book/src/ed_vce_validation_stake_delegation.md

@@ -26,4 +26,4 @@ Despite the low-barrier to entry as a validation-client, from a capital investme
 
     a. This participant has the additional option to directly delegate their earned storage rewards ([Replication-client Reward Auto-delegation](ed_rce_replication_client_reward_auto_delegation.md))
 
-Delegation of tokens to validation-clients, via option 1, provides a way for passive Solana token holders to become part of the active Solana economy and earn interest rates proportional to the interest rate generated by the delegated validation-client. Additionally, this feature creates a healthy validation-client market, with potential validation-client nodes competing to build reliable, transparent and profitable delegation services.
+Delegation of tokens to validation-clients, via option 1, provides a way for passive Solana token holders to become part of the active Solana economy and earn interest rates proportional to the interest rate generated by the delegated validation-client. Additionally, this feature intends to create a healthy validation-client market, with potential validation-client nodes competing to build reliable, transparent and profitable delegation services.

book/src/introduction.md

@@ -109,8 +109,7 @@ organization that launched it.
 
 A sol is the name of Solana's native token, which can be passed to nodes in a
 Solana cluster in exchange for running an on-chain program or validating its
-output. The Solana protocol defines that only 1 billion sols will ever exist,
-but that the system may perform micropayments of fractional sols, and that a sol
+output. The system may perform micropayments of fractional sols and a sol
 may be split as many as 34 times. The fractional sol is called a *lamport*. It
 is named in honor of Solana's biggest technical influence, [Leslie
 Lamport](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leslie_Lamport). A lamport has a value