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udpate staking section

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Eric 2019-02-14 12:28:30 +01:00 committed by Greg Fitzgerald
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book/src/staking-rewards.md
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@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ specific attributes to be modified as is allowed by Solana's Proof of History
### General Overview
Solana's ledger validation design is based on a rotating, stake-weighted
randomly selected leader broadcasting transactions in a PoH data
Solana's ledger validation design is based on a rotating, stake-weighted selected leader broadcasting transactions in a PoH data
structure to validating nodes. These nodes, upon receiving the leader's
broadcast, have the opportunity to vote on the current state and PoH height by
signing a transaction into the PoH stream.
@ -50,43 +49,12 @@ specific parameters will be necessary:
Solana's trustless sense of time and ordering provided by its PoH data
structure, along with its
[avalanche](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qt_gDRXHrHQ&t=1s) data broadcast
and transmission design, should provide subsecond confirmation times that scale
and transmission design, should provide sub-second transaction confirmation times that scale
with the log of the number of nodes in the cluster. This means we shouldn't
have to restrict the number of validating nodes with a prohibitive 'minimum
deposits' and expect nodes to be able to become validators with nominal amounts
of SOL staked. This should also render validation pools, a proposed solution
for economic censorship imposed by minimum staking amounts currently described
in Casper, unnecessary and remove the concern for needing to put slashable
stake at risk while relying on others to play by the rules.
of SOL staked. At the same time, Solana's focus on high-throughput should create incentive for validation clients to provide high-performant and reliable hardware. Combined with potential a minimum network speed threshold to join as a validation-client, we expect a healthy validation delegation market to emerge. To this end, Solana's testnet will lead into a "Tour de SOL" validation-client competition, focusing on throughput and uptime to rank and reward testnet validators.
### Stake-weighted Rewards
Rewards are expected to be paid out to active validators as a function of
validator activity and as a proportion of the percentage of SOL they have at
stake out of the entirety of the staking pool.
We expect to define a baseline annual validator payout/inflation rate based on
the total SOL deposited. E.g. 10% annual interest on SOL deposited with X total
SOL deposited as slashable on the cluster. This is the same design as currently
proposed in Casper FFG which has additionally specifies how inflation rates
adjust as a function of total ETH deposited. Specifically, Casper validator
returns are proportional to the inverse square root of the total deposits and
initial annual rates are estimated as:
| Deposit Size | Annual Validator Interest |
|-------------:|--------------------------:|
| 2.5M ETH | 10.12% |
| 10M ETH | 5.00% |
| 20M ETH | 3.52% |
| 40M ETH | 2.48% |
This has the nice property of potentially incentivizing participation around a
target deposit size. Incentivisation of specific participation rates more
directly (rather than deposit size) may something also worth exploring.
The specifics of the Solana validator reward scheme are to be worked out in
parallel with a design for transaction fee assignment as well as our storage
mining reward scheme.
### Slashing rules
@ -149,8 +117,8 @@ This is an area currently under exploration
### Penalties
As previously discussed, annual validator reward rates are to be specified as a
function of total amount staked. The cluster rewards validators who are online
As discussed in the [Economic Design](ed_overview.md) section, annual validator interest rates are to be specified as a
function of total percentage of circulating supply that has been staked. The cluster rewards validators who are online
and actively participating in the validation process throughout the entirety of
their *validation period*. For validators that go offline/fail to validate
transactions during this period, their annual reward is effectively reduced.