solana/runtime/src/runtime.rs

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use crate::native_loader;
use solana_sdk::account::{create_keyed_accounts, Account, KeyedAccount};
use solana_sdk::native_program::ProgramError;
use solana_sdk::pubkey::Pubkey;
use solana_sdk::system_program;
use solana_sdk::transaction::Transaction;
/// Reasons the runtime might have rejected a transaction.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
pub enum RuntimeError {
/// Executing the instruction at the given index produced an error.
ProgramError(u8, ProgramError),
}
/// Process an instruction
/// This method calls the instruction's program entrypoint method
fn process_instruction(
tx: &Transaction,
instruction_index: usize,
executable_accounts: &mut [(Pubkey, Account)],
program_accounts: &mut [&mut Account],
tick_height: u64,
) -> Result<(), ProgramError> {
let program_id = tx.program_id(instruction_index);
let mut keyed_accounts = create_keyed_accounts(executable_accounts);
let mut keyed_accounts2: Vec<_> = tx.instructions[instruction_index]
.accounts
.iter()
.map(|&index| {
let index = index as usize;
let key = &tx.account_keys[index];
(key, index < tx.signatures.len())
})
.zip(program_accounts.iter_mut())
.map(|((key, is_signer), account)| KeyedAccount::new(key, is_signer, account))
.collect();
keyed_accounts.append(&mut keyed_accounts2);
if system_program::check_id(&program_id) {
solana_system_program::entrypoint(
&program_id,
&mut keyed_accounts[1..],
&tx.instructions[instruction_index].userdata,
tick_height,
)
} else {
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native_loader::entrypoint(
&program_id,
&mut keyed_accounts,
&tx.instructions[instruction_index].userdata,
tick_height,
)
}
}
fn verify_instruction(
program_id: &Pubkey,
pre_program_id: &Pubkey,
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pre_lamports: u64,
pre_userdata: &[u8],
account: &Account,
) -> Result<(), ProgramError> {
// Verify the transaction
// Make sure that program_id is still the same or this was just assigned by the system program
if *pre_program_id != account.owner && !system_program::check_id(&program_id) {
return Err(ProgramError::ModifiedProgramId);
}
// For accounts unassigned to the program, the individual balance of each accounts cannot decrease.
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if *program_id != account.owner && pre_lamports > account.lamports {
return Err(ProgramError::ExternalAccountLamportSpend);
}
// For accounts unassigned to the program, the userdata may not change.
if *program_id != account.owner
&& !system_program::check_id(&program_id)
&& pre_userdata != &account.userdata[..]
{
return Err(ProgramError::ExternalAccountUserdataModified);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Execute an instruction
/// This method calls the instruction's program entrypoint method and verifies that the result of
/// the call does not violate the bank's accounting rules.
/// The accounts are committed back to the bank only if this function returns Ok(_).
fn execute_instruction(
tx: &Transaction,
instruction_index: usize,
executable_accounts: &mut [(Pubkey, Account)],
program_accounts: &mut [&mut Account],
tick_height: u64,
) -> Result<(), ProgramError> {
let program_id = tx.program_id(instruction_index);
// TODO: the runtime should be checking read/write access to memory
// we are trusting the hard-coded programs not to clobber or allocate
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let pre_total: u64 = program_accounts.iter().map(|a| a.lamports).sum();
let pre_data: Vec<_> = program_accounts
.iter_mut()
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.map(|a| (a.owner, a.lamports, a.userdata.clone()))
.collect();
process_instruction(
tx,
instruction_index,
executable_accounts,
program_accounts,
tick_height,
)?;
// Verify the instruction
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for ((pre_program_id, pre_lamports, pre_userdata), post_account) in
pre_data.iter().zip(program_accounts.iter())
{
verify_instruction(
&program_id,
pre_program_id,
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*pre_lamports,
pre_userdata,
post_account,
)?;
}
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// The total sum of all the lamports in all the accounts cannot change.
let post_total: u64 = program_accounts.iter().map(|a| a.lamports).sum();
if pre_total != post_total {
return Err(ProgramError::UnbalancedInstruction);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Return true if the slice has any duplicate elements
pub fn has_duplicates<T: PartialEq>(xs: &[T]) -> bool {
// Note: This is an O(n^2) algorithm, but requires no heap allocations. The benchmark
// `bench_has_duplicates` in benches/runtime.rs shows that this implementation is
// ~50 times faster than using HashSet for very short slices.
for i in 1..xs.len() {
if xs[i..].contains(&xs[i - 1]) {
return true;
}
}
false
}
/// Get mut references to a subset of elements.
pub fn get_subset_unchecked_mut<'a, T>(xs: &'a mut [T], indexes: &[u8]) -> Vec<&'a mut T> {
// Since the compiler doesn't know the indexes are unique, dereferencing
// multiple mut elements is assumed to be unsafe. If, however, all
// indexes are unique, it's perfectly safe. The returned elements will share
// the liftime of the input slice.
// Make certain there are no duplicate indexes. If there are, panic because we
// can't return multiple mut references to the same element.
if has_duplicates(indexes) {
panic!("duplicate indexes");
}
indexes
.iter()
.map(|i| {
let ptr = &mut xs[*i as usize] as *mut T;
unsafe { &mut *ptr }
})
.collect()
}
/// Execute a transaction.
/// This method calls each instruction in the transaction over the set of loaded Accounts
/// The accounts are committed back to the bank only if every instruction succeeds
pub fn execute_transaction(
tx: &Transaction,
loaders: &mut [Vec<(Pubkey, Account)>],
tx_accounts: &mut [Account],
tick_height: u64,
) -> Result<(), RuntimeError> {
for (instruction_index, instruction) in tx.instructions.iter().enumerate() {
let executable_accounts = &mut (&mut loaders[instruction.program_ids_index as usize]);
let mut program_accounts = get_subset_unchecked_mut(tx_accounts, &instruction.accounts);
execute_instruction(
tx,
instruction_index,
executable_accounts,
&mut program_accounts,
tick_height,
)
.map_err(|err| RuntimeError::ProgramError(instruction_index as u8, err))?;
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
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use solana_sdk::signature::{Keypair, KeypairUtil};
#[test]
fn test_has_duplicates() {
assert!(!has_duplicates(&[1, 2]));
assert!(has_duplicates(&[1, 2, 1]));
}
#[test]
fn test_get_subset_unchecked_mut() {
assert_eq!(get_subset_unchecked_mut(&mut [7, 8], &[0]), vec![&mut 7]);
assert_eq!(
get_subset_unchecked_mut(&mut [7, 8], &[0, 1]),
vec![&mut 7, &mut 8]
);
}
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn test_get_subset_unchecked_mut_duplicate_index() {
// This panics, because it assumes duplicate detection is done elsewhere.
get_subset_unchecked_mut(&mut [7, 8], &[0, 0]);
}
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn test_get_subset_unchecked_mut_out_of_bounds() {
// This panics, because it assumes bounds validation is done elsewhere.
get_subset_unchecked_mut(&mut [7, 8], &[2]);
}
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#[test]
fn test_verify_instruction_change_program_id() {
fn change_program_id(ix: Pubkey, pre: Pubkey, post: Pubkey) -> Result<(), ProgramError> {
verify_instruction(&ix, &pre, 0, &[], &Account::new(0, 0, post))
}
let system_program_id = system_program::id();
let alice_program_id = Keypair::new().pubkey();
let mallory_program_id = Keypair::new().pubkey();
assert_eq!(
change_program_id(system_program_id, system_program_id, alice_program_id),
Ok(()),
"system program should be able to change the account owner"
);
assert_eq!(
change_program_id(mallory_program_id, system_program_id, alice_program_id),
Err(ProgramError::ModifiedProgramId),
"malicious Mallory should not be able to change the account owner"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_verify_instruction_change_userdata() {
fn change_userdata(program_id: Pubkey) -> Result<(), ProgramError> {
let alice_program_id = Keypair::new().pubkey();
let account = Account::new(0, 0, alice_program_id);
verify_instruction(&program_id, &alice_program_id, 0, &[42], &account)
}
let system_program_id = system_program::id();
let mallory_program_id = Keypair::new().pubkey();
assert_eq!(
change_userdata(system_program_id),
Ok(()),
"system program should be able to change the userdata"
);
assert_eq!(
change_userdata(mallory_program_id),
Err(ProgramError::ExternalAccountUserdataModified),
"malicious Mallory should not be able to change the account userdata"
);
}
}