Fix cluster economics figures and spelling in docs (#8502)

docs/src/implemented-proposals/ed_overview/README.md

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ These protocol-based rewards, to be distributed to participating validation and
 
 Transaction fees are market-based participant-to-participant transfers, attached to network interactions as a necessary motivation and compensation for the inclusion and execution of a proposed transaction \(be it a state execution or proof-of-replication verification\). A mechanism for long-term economic stability and forking protection through partial burning of each transaction fee is also discussed below.
 
-A high-level schematic of Solana’s crypto-economic design is shown below in **Figure 1**. The specifics of validation-client economics are described in sections: [Validation-client Economics](ed_validation_client_economics/), [State-validation Protocol-based Rewards](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md), [State-validation Transaction Fees](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_state_validation_transaction_fees.md) and [Replication-validation Transaction Fees](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md). Also, the section titled [Validation Stake Delegation](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_validation_stake_delegation.md) closes with a discussion of validator delegation opportunties and marketplace. Additionally, in [Storage Rent Economics](ed_storage_rent_economics.md), we describe an implementation of storage rent to account for the externality costs of maintaining the active state of the ledger. [Replication-client Economics](ed_replication_client_economics/) will review the Solana network design for global ledger storage/redundancy and archiver-client economics \([Storage-replication rewards](ed_replication_client_economics/ed_rce_storage_replication_rewards.md)\) along with an archiver-to-validator delegation mechanism designed to aide participant on-boarding into the Solana economy discussed in [Replication-client Reward Auto-delegation](ed_replication_client_economics/ed_rce_replication_client_reward_auto_delegation.md). An outline of features for an MVP economic design is discussed in the [Economic Design MVP](ed_mvp.md) section. Finally, in [Attack Vectors](ed_attack_vectors.md), various attack vectors will be described and potential vulnerabilities explored and parameterized.
+A high-level schematic of Solana’s crypto-economic design is shown below in **Figure 1**. The specifics of validation-client economics are described in sections: [Validation-client Economics](ed_validation_client_economics/), [State-validation Protocol-based Rewards](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md), [State-validation Transaction Fees](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_state_validation_transaction_fees.md) and [Replication-validation Transaction Fees](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md). Also, the section titled [Validation Stake Delegation](ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_validation_stake_delegation.md) closes with a discussion of validator delegation opportunities and marketplace. Additionally, in [Storage Rent Economics](ed_storage_rent_economics.md), we describe an implementation of storage rent to account for the externality costs of maintaining the active state of the ledger. [Replication-client Economics](ed_replication_client_economics/) will review the Solana network design for global ledger storage/redundancy and archiver-client economics \([Storage-replication rewards](ed_replication_client_economics/ed_rce_storage_replication_rewards.md)\) along with an archiver-to-validator delegation mechanism designed to aide participant on-boarding into the Solana economy discussed in [Replication-client Reward Auto-delegation](ed_replication_client_economics/ed_rce_replication_client_reward_auto_delegation.md). An outline of features for an MVP economic design is discussed in the [Economic Design MVP](ed_mvp.md) section. Finally, in [Attack Vectors](ed_attack_vectors.md), various attack vectors will be described and potential vulnerabilities explored and parameterized.
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/economic_design_infl_230719.png)
 
 **Figure 1**: Schematic overview of Solana economic incentive design.

docs/src/implemented-proposals/ed_overview/ed_economic_sustainability.md

@@ -2,13 +2,15 @@
 
 **Subject to change.**
 
-Long term economic sustainability is one of the guiding principles of Solana’s economic design. While it is impossible to predict how decentralized economies will develop over time, especially economies with flexible decentralized governances, we can arrange economic components such that, under certain conditions, a sustainable economy may take shape in the long term. In the case of Solana’s network, these components take the form of token issuance \(via inflation\) and token burning’.
+Long term economic sustainability is one of the guiding principles of Solana’s economic design. While it is impossible to predict how decentralized economies will develop over time, especially economies with flexible decentralized governances, we can arrange economic components such that, under certain conditions, a sustainable economy may take shape in the long term. In the case of Solana’s network, these components take the form of token issuance \(via inflation\) and token burning.
 
 The dominant remittances from the Solana mining pool are validator and archiver rewards. The disinflationary mechanism is a flat, protocol-specified and adjusted, % of each transaction fee.
 
-The Archiver rewards are to be delivered to archivers as a portion of the network inflation after successful PoRep validation. The per-PoRep reward amount is determined as a function of the total network storage redundancy at the time of the PoRep validation and the network goal redundancy. This function is likely to take the form of a discount from a base reward to be delivered when the network has achieved and maintained its goal redundancy. An example of such a reward function is shown in **Figure 3**
+The Archiver rewards are to be delivered to archivers as a portion of the network inflation after successful PoRep validation. The per-PoRep reward amount is determined as a function of the total network storage redundancy at the time of the PoRep validation and the network goal redundancy. This function is likely to take the form of a discount from a base reward to be delivered when the network has achieved and maintained its goal redundancy. An example of such a reward function is shown in **Figure 1**
 
-**Figure 3**: Example PoRep reward design as a function of global network storage redundancy.
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/porep_reward.png)
 
-In the example shown in Figure 1, multiple per PoRep base rewards are explored \(as a % of Tx Fee\) to be delivered when the global ledger replication redundancy meets 10X. When the global ledger replication redundancy is less than 10X, the base reward is discounted as a function of the square of the ratio of the actual ledger replication redundancy to the goal redundancy \(i.e. 10X\).
+**Figure 1**: Example PoRep reward design as a function of global network storage redundancy.
+
+In the example shown in **Figure 1**, multiple per PoRep base rewards are explored \(as a % of Tx Fee\) to be delivered when the global ledger replication redundancy meets 10X. When the global ledger replication redundancy is less than 10X, the base reward is discounted as a function of the square of the ratio of the actual ledger replication redundancy to the goal redundancy \(i.e. 10X\).
 

docs/src/implemented-proposals/ed_overview/ed_mvp.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 **Subject to change.**
 
-The preceeding sections, outlined in the [Economic Design Overview](./), describe a long-term vision of a sustainable Solana economy. Of course, we don't expect the final implementation to perfectly match what has been described above. We intend to fully engage with network stakeholders throughout the implementation phases \(i.e. pre-testnet, testnet, mainnet\) to ensure the system supports, and is representative of, the various network participants' interests. The first step toward this goal, however, is outlining a some desired MVP economic features to be available for early pre-testnet and testnet participants. Below is a rough sketch outlining basic economic functionality from which a more complete and functional system can be developed.
+The preceding sections, outlined in the [Economic Design Overview](./), describe a long-term vision of a sustainable Solana economy. Of course, we don't expect the final implementation to perfectly match what has been described above. We intend to fully engage with network stakeholders throughout the implementation phases \(i.e. pre-testnet, testnet, mainnet\) to ensure the system supports, and is representative of, the various network participants' interests. The first step toward this goal, however, is outlining a some desired MVP economic features to be available for early pre-testnet and testnet participants. Below is a rough sketch outlining basic economic functionality from which a more complete and functional system can be developed.
 
 ## MVP Economic Features
 

docs/src/implemented-proposals/ed_overview/ed_storage_rent_economics.md

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 ## Storage Rent Economics
 
-Each transaction that is submitted to the Solana ledger imposes costs. Transaction fees paid by the submitter, and collected by a validator, in theory, account for the acute, transacitonal, costs of validating and adding that data to the ledger. At the same time, our compensation design for archivers (see [Replication-client Economics](ed_replication_client_economics.md)), in theory, accounts for the long term storage of the historical ledger. Unaccounted in this process is the mid-term storage of active ledger state, necessarily maintined by the rotating validator set. This type of storage imposes costs not only to validators but also to the broader network as active state grows so does data transmission and validation overhead. To account for these costs, we describe here our preliminary design and implementation of storage rent. 
+Each transaction that is submitted to the Solana ledger imposes costs. Transaction fees paid by the submitter, and collected by a validator, in theory, account for the acute, transactional, costs of validating and adding that data to the ledger. At the same time, our compensation design for archivers (see [Replication-client Economics](ed_replication_client_economics.md)), in theory, accounts for the long term storage of the historical ledger. Unaccounted in this process is the mid-term storage of active ledger state, necessarily maintained by the rotating validator set. This type of storage imposes costs not only to validators but also to the broader network as active state grows so does data transmission and validation overhead. To account for these costs, we describe here our preliminary design and implementation of storage rent.
 
 Storage rent can be paid via one of two methods:
 
 Method 1: Set it and forget it
 
-With this approach, accounts with two-years worth of rent deposits secured are exempt from network rent charges. By maintaining this minimum-balance, the broader network benefits from reduced liquitity and the account holder can trust that their `Account::data` will be retained for continual access/usage. 
+With this approach, accounts with two-years worth of rent deposits secured are exempt from network rent charges. By maintaining this minimum-balance, the broader network benefits from reduced liquidity and the account holder can trust that their `Account::data` will be retained for continual access/usage.
 
 Method 2: Pay per byte
 

docs/src/implemented-proposals/ed_overview/ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_replication_validation_transaction_fees.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 As previously mentioned, validator-clients will also be responsible for validating PoReps submitted into the PoH stream by archiver-clients. In this case, validators are providing compute \(CPU/GPU\) and light storage resources to confirm that these replication proofs could only be generated by a client that is storing the referenced PoH leger block.
 
-While replication-clients are incentivized and rewarded through protocol-based rewards schedule \(see [Replication-client Economics](../ed_replication_client_economics/README.md)\), validator-clients will be incentivized to include and validate PoReps in PoH through collection of transaction fees associated with the submitted PoReps and distribution of protocol rewards proportional to the validated PoReps. As will be described in detail in the Section 3.1, replication-client rewards are protocol-based and designed to reward based on a global data redundancy factor. I.e. the protocol will incentivize replication-client participation through rewards based on a target ledger redundancy \(e.g. 10x data redundancy\).
+While replication-clients are incentivize and rewarded through protocol-based rewards schedule \(see [Replication-client Economics](../ed_replication_client_economics/README.md)\), validator-clients will be incentivized to include and validate PoReps in PoH through collection of transaction fees associated with the submitted PoReps and distribution of protocol rewards proportional to the validated PoReps. As will be described in detail in the Section 3.1, replication-client rewards are protocol-based and designed to reward based on a global data redundancy factor. I.e. the protocol will incentivize replication-client participation through rewards based on a target ledger redundancy \(e.g. 10x data redundancy\).
 
 The validation of PoReps by validation-clients is computationally more expensive than state-validation \(detailed in the [Economic Sustainability](../ed_economic_sustainability.md) section\), thus the transaction fees are expected to be proportionally higher.
 

docs/src/implemented-proposals/ed_overview/ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_state_validation_protocol_based_rewards.md

@@ -15,16 +15,20 @@ The effective protocol-based annual interest rate \(%\) per epoch received by va
 * the fraction of staked SOLs out of the current total circulating supply,
 * the up-time/participation \[% of available slots that validator had opportunity to vote on\] of a given validator over the previous epoch.
 
-The first factor is a function of protocol parameters only \(i.e. independent of validator behavior in a given epoch\) and results in a global validation reward schedule designed to incentivize early participation, provide clear montetary stability and provide optimal security in the network.
+The first factor is a function of protocol parameters only \(i.e. independent of validator behavior in a given epoch\) and results in a global validation reward schedule designed to incentivize early participation, provide clear monetary stability and provide optimal security in the network.
 
-At any given point in time, a specific validator's interest rate can be determined based on the porportion of circulating supply that is staked by the network and the validator's uptime/activity in the previous epoch. For example, consider a hypothetical instance of the network with an initial circulating token supply of 250MM tokens with an additional 250MM vesting over 3 years. Additionally an inflation rate is specified at network launch of 7.5%, and a disinflationary schedule of 20% decrease in inflation rate per year \(the actual rates to be implemented are to be worked out during the testnet experimentation phase of mainnet launch\). With these broad assumptions, the 10-year inflation rate \(adjusted daily for this example\) is shown in **Figure 2**, while the total circulating token supply is illustrated in **Figure 3**. Neglected in this toy-model is the inflation supression due to the portion of each transaction fee that is to be destroyed.
+At any given point in time, a specific validator's interest rate can be determined based on the proportion of circulating supply that is staked by the network and the validator's uptime/activity in the previous epoch. For example, consider a hypothetical instance of the network with an initial circulating token supply of 250MM tokens with an additional 250MM vesting over 3 years. Additionally an inflation rate is specified at network launch of 7.5%, and a disinflationary schedule of 20% decrease in inflation rate per year \(the actual rates to be implemented are to be worked out during the testnet experimentation phase of mainnet launch\). With these broad assumptions, the 10-year inflation rate \(adjusted daily for this example\) is shown in **Figure 1**, while the total circulating token supply is illustrated in **Figure 2**. Neglected in this toy-model is the inflation suppression due to the portion of each transaction fee that is to be destroyed.
 
-![drawing](../../../.gitbook/assets/p_ex_schedule.png) \*\*Figure 2:\*\* In this example schedule, the annual inflation rate \[%\] reduces at around 20% per year, until it reaches the long-term, fixed, 1.5% rate.
+![](../../../.gitbook/assets/p_ex_schedule.png)
 
-![drawing](../../../.gitbook/assets/p_ex_supply.png) \*\*Figure 3:\*\* The total token supply over a 10-year period, based on an initial 250MM tokens with the disinflationary inflation schedule as shown in \*\*Figure 2\*\* Over time, the interest rate, at a fixed network staked percentage, will reduce concordant with network inflation. Validation-client interest rates are designed to be higher in the early days of the network to incentivize participation and jumpstart the network economy. As previously mentioned, the inflation rate is expected to stabalize near 1-2% which also results in a fixed, long-term, interest rate to be provided to validator-clients. This value does not represent the total interest available to validator-clients as transaction fees for state-validation and ledger storage replication \(PoReps\) are not accounted for here. Given these example parameters, annualized validator-specific interest rates can be determined based on the global fraction of tokens bonded as stake, as well as their uptime/activity in the previous epoch. For the purpose of this example, we assume 100% uptime for all validators and a split in interest-based rewards between validators and archiver nodes of 80%/20%. Additionally, the fraction of staked circulating supply is assummed to be constant. Based on these assumptions, an annualized validation-client interest rate schedule as a function of % circulating token supply that is staked is shown in\*\* Figure 4\*\*.
+**Figure 1:** In this example schedule, the annual inflation rate \[%\] reduces at around 20% per year, until it reaches the long-term, fixed, 1.5% rate.
 
-![drawing](../../../.gitbook/assets/p_ex_interest.png)
+![](../../../.gitbook/assets/p_ex_supply.png)
 
-**Figure 4:** Shown here are example validator interest rates over time, neglecting transaction fees, segmented by fraction of total circulating supply bonded as stake.
+**Figure 2:** The total token supply over a 10-year period, based on an initial 250MM tokens with the disinflationary inflation schedule as shown in **Figure 1**. Over time, the interest rate, at a fixed network staked percentage, will reduce concordant with network inflation. Validation-client interest rates are designed to be higher in the early days of the network to incentivize participation and jumpstart the network economy. As previously mentioned, the inflation rate is expected to stabilize near 1-2% which also results in a fixed, long-term, interest rate to be provided to validator-clients. This value does not represent the total interest available to validator-clients as transaction fees for state-validation and ledger storage replication \(PoReps\) are not accounted for here. Given these example parameters, annualized validator-specific interest rates can be determined based on the global fraction of tokens bonded as stake, as well as their uptime/activity in the previous epoch. For the purpose of this example, we assume 100% uptime for all validators and a split in interest-based rewards between validators and archiver nodes of 80%/20%. Additionally, the fraction of staked circulating supply is assumed to be constant. Based on these assumptions, an annualized validation-client interest rate schedule as a function of % circulating token supply that is staked is shown in **Figure 3**.
+
+![](../../../.gitbook/assets/p_ex_interest.png)
+
+**Figure 3:** Shown here are example validator interest rates over time, neglecting transaction fees, segmented by fraction of total circulating supply bonded as stake.
 
 This epoch-specific protocol-defined interest rate sets an upper limit of _protocol-generated_ annual interest rate \(not absolute total interest rate\) possible to be delivered to any validator-client per epoch. The distributed interest rate per epoch is then discounted from this value based on the participation of the validator-client during the previous epoch.

docs/src/implemented-proposals/ed_overview/ed_validation_client_economics/ed_vce_state_validation_transaction_fees.md

@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ Each transaction sent through the network, to be processed by the current leader
 
 Many current blockchain economies \(e.g. Bitcoin, Ethereum\), rely on protocol-based rewards to support the economy in the short term, with the assumption that the revenue generated through transaction fees will support the economy in the long term, when the protocol derived rewards expire. In an attempt to create a sustainable economy through protocol-based rewards and transaction fees, a fixed portion of each transaction fee is destroyed, with the remaining fee going to the current leader processing the transaction. A scheduled global inflation rate provides a source for rewards distributed to validation-clients, through the process described above, and replication-clients, as discussed below.
 
-Transaction fees are set by the network cluster based on recent historical throughput, see [Congestion Driven Fees](../../transaction-fees.md#congestion-driven-fees). This minimum portion of each transaction fee can be dynamically adjusted depending on historical gas usage. In this way, the protocol can use the minimum fee to target a desired hardware utilisation. By monitoring a protocol specified gas usage with respect to a desired, target usage amount, the minimum fee can be raised/lowered which should, in turn, lower/raise the actual gas usage per block until it reaches the target amount. This adjustment process can be thought of as similar to the difficulty adjustment algorithm in the Bitcoin protocol, however in this case it is adjusting the minimum transaction fee to guide the transaction processing hardware usage to a desired level.
+Transaction fees are set by the network cluster based on recent historical throughput, see [Congestion Driven Fees](../../transaction-fees.md#congestion-driven-fees). This minimum portion of each transaction fee can be dynamically adjusted depending on historical gas usage. In this way, the protocol can use the minimum fee to target a desired hardware utilization. By monitoring a protocol specified gas usage with respect to a desired, target usage amount, the minimum fee can be raised/lowered which should, in turn, lower/raise the actual gas usage per block until it reaches the target amount. This adjustment process can be thought of as similar to the difficulty adjustment algorithm in the Bitcoin protocol, however in this case it is adjusting the minimum transaction fee to guide the transaction processing hardware usage to a desired level.
 
-As mentioned, a fixed-proportion of each transaction fee is to be destroyed. The intent of this design is to retain leader incentive to include as many transactions as possible within the leader-slot time, while providing an inflation limiting mechansim that protects against "tax evasion" attacks \(i.e. side-channel fee payments\)[1](../ed_references.md).
+As mentioned, a fixed-proportion of each transaction fee is to be destroyed. The intent of this design is to retain leader incentive to include as many transactions as possible within the leader-slot time, while providing an inflation limiting mechanism that protects against "tax evasion" attacks \(i.e. side-channel fee payments\)[1](../ed_references.md).
 
 Additionally, the burnt fees can be a consideration in fork selection. In the case of a PoH fork with a malicious, censoring leader, we would expect the total fees destroyed to be less than a comparable honest fork, due to the fees lost from censoring. If the censoring leader is to compensate for these lost protocol fees, they would have to replace the burnt fees on their fork themselves, thus potentially reducing the incentive to censor in the first place.