* Fix fragile tests in prep of stake rewrite pr
* Restore BOOTSTRAP_VALIDATOR_LAMPORTS where appropriate
* Further clean up
* Further clean up
* Aligh with other call site change
* Remove false warn!
* fix ci!
Validator logs show that prune messages are dropped because they exceed
packet data size:
https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/blob/f25c969ad/perf/src/packet.rs#L90-L92
This can exacerbate gossip traffic by redundantly increasing push
messages across network. The workaround is to break prunes into smaller
chunks and send over in multiple messages.
* Add TestValidator::new_with_fees constructor, and warning for low bootstrap_validator_lamports
* Add logging to solana-tokens integration test to help catch low bootstrap_validator_lamports in the future
* Reasonable TestValidator mint_lamports
split_gossip_messages:
https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/blob/a97c04b40/core/src/cluster_info.rs#L1536-L1574
splits crds-values into chunks to fit into a gossip packet. However it is
using a global upper-bound for the header-size across all protocols:
https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/blob/a97c04b40/core/src/cluster_info.rs#L90-L93
This can be wasteful as the specific gossip protocol can have smaller
header than this upper-bound (e.g. Protocol::PushMessage is 170 bytes
smaller). Adding more crds-values in one gossip packet can avoid the
overheads of separate packets and reduce total number of bytes sent over
the wire.
This commit updates the splitting function to take a max-chunk-size
argument. At call-site, this value is set to the size of the protocol
which the values are sent over.
In several places in gossip code, the entire crds table is scanned only
to filter out nodes' contact infos. Currently on mainnet, crds table is
of size ~70k, while there are only ~470 nodes. So the full table scan is
inefficient. Instead we may maintain an index of only nodes' contact
infos.
The --rpc-pubsub-enable-vote-subscription flag may be used to enable it.
The current vote subscription is problematic because it emits a
notification for *every* vote, so hundreds a second in a real cluster.
Critically it's also missing information about *who* is voting,
rendering all those notifications practically useless.
Until these two issues can be resolved, the vote subscription is not
much more than a potential DoS vector.
* Discard pre hard fork persisted tower if hard-forking
* Relax config.require_tower
* Add cluster test
* nits
* Remove unnecessary check
Co-authored-by: Ryo Onodera <ryoqun@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Carl Lin <carl@solana.com>
* Fix slow/stuck unstaking due to toggling in epoch
* nits
* nits
* Add stake_program_v2 feature status check to cli
Co-authored-by: Tyera Eulberg <tyera@solana.com>
Packet::from_data is ignoring serialization errors:
https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/blob/d08c3232e/sdk/src/packet.rs#L42-L48
This is likely never useful as the packet will be sent over the wire
taking bandwidth but at the receiving end will either fail to
deserialize or it will be invalid.
This commit will propagate the errors out of the function to the
call-site, allowing the call-site to handle the error.
* Fix tower/blockstore unsync due to external causes
* Add and clean up long comments
* Clean up test
* Comment about warped_slot_history
* Run test_future_tower with master-only/master-slave
* Update comments about false leader condition
https://hackerone.com/reports/991106
> It’s possible to use UDP gossip protocol to amplify DDoS attacks. An attacker
> can spoof IP address in UDP packet when sending PullRequest to the node.
> There's no any validation if provided source IP address is not spoofed and
> the node can send much larger PullResponse to victim's IP. As I checked,
> PullRequest is about 290 bytes, while PullResponse is about 10 kB. It means
> that amplification is about 34x. This way an attacker can easily perform DDoS
> attack both on Solana node and third-party server.
>
> To prevent it, need for example to implement ping-pong mechanism similar as
> in Ethereum: Before accepting requests from remote client needs to validate
> his IP. Local node sends Ping packet to the remote node and it needs to reply
> with Pong packet that contains hash of matching Ping packet. Content of Ping
> packet is unpredictable. If hash from Pong packet matches, local node can
> remember IP where Ping packet was sent as correct and allow further
> communication.
>
> More info:
> https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv4.md#endpoint-proof
> https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv4.md#wire-protocol
The commit adds a PingCache, which maintains records of remote nodes
which have returned a valid response to a ping message, and on-the-fly
ping messages pending a pong response from the remote node.
When handling pull-requests, those from addresses which have not passed
the ping-pong check are filtered out, and additionally ping packets are
added for addresses which need to be (re)verified.
mark_pull_request_creation time requires an exclusive lock on gossip:
https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/blob/16944e218/core/src/cluster_info.rs#L1547-L1548
Current code is redundantly marking each peer once for each request.
There are at most only 2 unique peers, whereas there are hundreds of
requests per each. So the lock is acquired hundreds of time longer than
necessary.
ClusterInfo::process_packets handles incoming packets in a thread_pool:
https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/blob/87311cce7/core/src/cluster_info.rs#L2118-L2134
However, profiling runtime shows that threads are not well utilized and
a lot of the processing is done sequentially.
This commit redistributes the work done in parallel. Testing on a gce
cluster shows 20%+ improvement in processing gossip packets with much
smaller variations.
* Follow up to persistent tower
* Ignore for now...
* Hard-code validator identities for easy reasoning
* Add a test for opt. conf violation without tower
* Fix compile with rust < 1.47
* Remove unused method
* More move of assert tweak to the asser pr
* Add comments
* Clean up
* Clean the test addressing various review comments
* Clean up a bit
* introduce store program logs in blockstore / bigtable
* fix test, transaction logs created for successful transactions
* fix test for legacy bincode implementation around log_messages
* only api nodes should record logs
* truncate transaction logs to 100KB
* refactor log truncate for improved coverage
* Include post balance information for rewards
* Add post-balance to stored Reward struct
* Handle extended Reward in bigtable
Co-authored-by: Michael Vines <mvines@gmail.com>
Based on run-time profiles, the majority time of new_pull_requests is
spent building bloom filters, in hashing and bit-vec ops.
This commit builds crds filters in parallel using rayon constructs. The
added benchmark shows ~5x speedup (4-core machine, 8 threads).
Current code only returns values which are expired based on the default
timeout. Example from the added unit test:
- value inserted at time 0
- pubkey specific timeout = 1
- default timeout = 3
Then at now = 2, the value is expired, but the function fails to return
the value because it compares with the default timeout.
* Add service to track the most recent optimistically confirmed bank
* Plumb service into ClusterInfoVoteListener and ReplayStage
* Clean up test
* Use OptimisticallyConfirmedBank in RPC
* Remove superfluous notifications from RpcSubscriptions
* Use crossbeam to avoid mpsc recv_timeout panic
* Review comments
* Remove superfluous last_checked_slots, but pass in OptimisticallyConfirmedBank for complete correctness
sakridge
Ryo Onodera
behzad nouri
Trent Nelson
Tyera Eulberg
Michael Vines
carllin
Justin Starry
Tyera Eulberg
Jack May
Josh
Dan Albert
