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# Governance documentation
*Disclaimer: This is work in progress. Mechanisms are susceptible to change.*
This document describes the high-level architecture of the governance module.
The governance module allows bonded Atom holders to vote on proposals on a 1
bonded Atom 1 vote basis.
## Design overview
The governance process is divided in a few steps that are outlined below:
* **Proposal submission:** Proposal is submitted to the blockchain with a
deposit.
* **Vote:** Once deposit reaches a certain value (`MinDeposit`), proposal is
confirmed and vote opens. Bonded Atom holders can then send `TxGovVote`
transactions to vote on the proposal.
* If the proposal involves a software upgrade:
* **Signal:** Validators start signaling that they are ready to switch to the
new version.
* **Switch:** Once more than 75% of validators have signaled that they are
ready to switch, their software automatically flips to the new version.
## Proposal submission
### Right to submit a proposal
Any Atom holder, whether bonded or unbonded, can submit proposals by sending a
`TxGovProposal` transaction. Once a proposal is submitted, it is identified by
its unique `proposalID`.
### Proposal filter (minimum deposit)
To prevent spam, proposals must be submitted with a deposit in Atoms. Voting
period will not start as long as the proposal's deposit is smaller than the
minimum deposit `MinDeposit`.
When a proposal is submitted, it has to be accompanied by a deposit that must
be strictly positive but can be inferior to `MinDeposit`. Indeed, the submitter
need not pay for the entire deposit on its own. If a proposal's deposit is
strictly inferior to `MinDeposit`, other Atom holders can increase the
proposal's deposit by sending a `TxGovDeposit` transaction. Once the proposal's
deposit reaches `MinDeposit`, it enters voting period.
### Deposit refund
There are two instances where Atom holders that deposited can claim back their
deposit:
* If the proposal is accepted.
* If the proposal's deposit does not reach `MinDeposit` for a period longer
than `MaxDepositPeriod` (initial value: 2 months). Then the proposal is
considered closed and nobody can deposit on it anymore.
In such instances, Atom holders that deposited can send a `TxGovClaimDeposit`
transaction to retrieve their share of the deposit.
### Proposal types
In the initial version of the governance module, there are two types of
proposal:
* `PlainTextProposal` All the proposals that do not involve a modification of
the source code go under this type. For example, an opinion poll would use a
proposal of type `PlainTextProposal`.
* `SoftwareUpgradeProposal`. If accepted, validators are expected to update
their software in accordance with the proposal. They must do so by following
a 2-steps process described in the [Software Upgrade](#software-upgrade)
section below. Software upgrade roadmap may be discussed and agreed on via
`PlainTextProposals`, but actual software upgrades must be performed via
`SoftwareUpgradeProposals`.
### Proposal categories
There are two categories of proposal:
* `Regular`
* `Urgent`
These two categories are strictly identical except that `Urgent` proposals can
be accepted faster if a certain condition is met. For more information, see
[Threshold](#threshold) section.
## Vote
### Participants
*Participants* are users that have the right to vote on proposals. On the
Cosmos Hub, participants are bonded Atom holders. Unbonded Atom holders and
other users do not get the right to participate in governance. However, they
can submit and deposit on proposals.
Note that some *participants* can be forbidden to vote on a proposal under a
certain validator if:
* *participant* bonded or unbonded Atoms to said validator after proposal
entered voting period.
* *participant* became validator after proposal entered voting period.
This does not prevent *participant* to vote with Atoms bonded to other
validators. For example, if a *participant* bonded some Atoms to validator A
before a proposal entered voting period and other Atoms to validator B after
proposal entered voting period, only the vote under validator B will be
forbidden.
### Voting period
Once a proposal reaches `MinDeposit`, it immediately enters `Voting period`. We
define `Voting period` as the interval between the moment the vote opens and
the moment the vote closes. `Voting period` should always be shorter than
`Unbonding period` to prevent double voting. The initial value of
`Voting period` is 2 weeks.
### Option set
The option set of a proposal refers to the set of choices a participant can
choose from when casting its vote.
The initial option set includes the following options:
- `Yes`
- `No`
- `NoWithVeto`
- `Abstain`
`NoWithVeto` counts as `No` but also adds a `Veto` vote. `Abstain` option
allows voters to signal that they do not intend to vote in favor or against the
proposal but accept the result of the vote.
*Note: from the UI, for urgent proposals we should maybe add a ‘Not Urgent’
option that casts a `NoWithVeto` vote.*
### Quorum
Quorum is defined as the minimum percentage of voting power that needs to be
casted on a proposal for the result to be valid.
In the initial version of the governance module, there will be no quorum
enforced by the protocol. Participation is ensured via the combination of
inheritance and validator's punishment for non-voting.
### Threshold
Threshold is defined as the minimum proportion of `Yes` votes (excluding
`Abstain` votes) for the proposal to be accepted.
Initially, the threshold is set at 50% with a possibility to veto if more than
1/3rd of votes (excluding `Abstain` votes) are `NoWithVeto` votes. This means
that proposals are accepted if the proportion of `Yes` votes (excluding
`Abstain` votes) at the end of the voting period is superior to 50% and if the
proportion of `NoWithVeto` votes is inferior to 1/3 (excluding `Abstain`
votes).
`Urgent` proposals also work with the aforementioned threshold, except there is
another condition that can accelerate the acceptance of the proposal. Namely,
if the ratio of `Yes` votes to `InitTotalVotingPower` exceeds 2:3,
`UrgentProposal` will be immediately accepted, even if the `Voting period` is
not finished. `InitTotalVotingPower` is the total voting power of all bonded
Atom holders at the moment when the vote opens.
### Inheritance
If a delegator does not vote, it will inherit its validator vote.
* If the delegator votes before its validator, it will not inherit from the
validator's vote.
* If the delegator votes after its validator, it will override its validator
vote with its own. If the proposal is a `Urgent` proposal, it is possible
that the vote will close before delegators have a chance to react and
override their validator's vote. This is not a problem, as `Urgent` proposals
require more than 2/3rd of the total voting power to pass before the end of
the voting period. If more than 2/3rd of validators collude, they can censor
the votes of delegators anyway.
### Validator’s punishment for non-voting
Validators are required to vote on all proposals to ensure that results have
legitimacy. Voting is part of validators' directives and failure to do it will
result in a penalty.
If a validator’s address is not in the list of addresses that voted on a
proposal and the vote is closed (i.e. `MinDeposit` was reached and `Voting
period` is over), then the validator will automatically be partially slashed by
`GovernancePenalty`.
*Note: Need to define values for `GovernancePenalty`*
**Exception:** If a proposal is an `Urgent` proposal and is accepted via the
special condition of having a ratio of `Yes` votes to `InitTotalVotingPower`
that exceeds 2:3, validators cannot be punished for not having voted on it.
That is because the proposal will close as soon as the ratio exceeds 2:3,
making it mechanically impossible for some validators to vote on it.
### Governance key and governance address
Validators can make use of a slot where they can designate a
`Governance PubKey`. By default, a validator's `Governance PubKey` will be the
same as its main PubKey. Validators can change this `Governance PubKey` by
sending a `Change Governance PubKey` transaction signed by their main
`Consensus PrivKey`. From there, they will be able to sign votes using the
`Governance PrivKey` associated with their `Governance PubKey`. The
`Governance PubKey` can be changed at any moment.
## Software Upgrade
If proposals are of type `SoftwareUpgradeProposal`, then nodes need to upgrade
their software to the new version that was voted. This process is divided in
two steps.
### Signal
After a `SoftwareUpgradeProposal` is accepted, validators are expected to
download and install the new version of the software while continuing to run
the previous version. Once a validator has downloaded and installed the
upgrade, it will start signaling to the network that it is ready to switch by
including the proposal's `proposalID` in its *precommits*.(*Note: Confirmation
that we want it in the precommit?*)
Note: There is only one signal slot per *precommit*. If several
`SoftwareUpgradeProposals` are accepted in a short timeframe, a pipeline will
form and they will be implemented one after the other in the order that they
were accepted.
### Switch
Once a block contains more than 2/3rd *precommits* where a common
`SoftwareUpgradeProposal` is signaled, all the nodes (including validator
nodes, non-validating full nodes and light-nodes) are expected to switch to the
new version of the software.
*Note: Not clear how the flip is handled programatically*
## Implementation
*Disclaimer: This is a suggestion. Only structs and pseudocode. Actual logic
and implementation might widely differ*
### State
#### Procedures
`Procedures` define the rule according to which votes are run. There can only
be one active procedure at any given time. If governance wants to change a
procedure, either to modify a value or add/remove a parameter, a new procedure
has to be created and the previous one rendered inactive.
```go
type Procedure struct {
VotingPeriod int64 // Length of the voting period. Initial value: 2 weeks
MinDeposit int64 // Minimum deposit for a proposal to enter voting period.
OptionSet []string // Options available to voters. {Yes, No, NoWithVeto, Abstain}
ProposalTypes []string // Types available to submitters. {PlainTextProposal, SoftwareUpgradeProposal}
Threshold rational.Rational // Minimum propotion of Yes votes for proposal to pass. Initial value: 0.5
Veto rational.Rational // Minimum value of Veto votes to Total votes ratio for proposal to be vetoed. Initial value: 1/3
MaxDepositPeriod int64 // Maximum period for Atom holders to deposit on a proposal. Initial value: 2 months
GovernancePenalty int64 // Penalty if validator does not vote
IsActive bool // If true, procedure is active. Only one procedure can have isActive true.
}
```
**Store**:
* `Procedures`: a mapping `map[int16]Procedure` of procedures indexed by their
`ProcedureNumber`
* `ActiveProcedureNumber`: returns current procedure number
#### Proposals
`Proposals` are item to be voted on.
```go
type Proposal struct {
Title string // Title of the proposal
Description string // Description of the proposal
Type string // Type of proposal. Initial set {PlainTextProposal, SoftwareUpgradeProposal}
Category bool // false=regular, true=urgent
Deposit int64 // Current deposit on this proposal. Initial value is set at InitialDeposit
SubmitBlock int64 // Height of the block where TxGovSubmitProposal was included
VotingStartBlock int64 // Height of the block where MinDeposit was reached. -1 if MinDeposit is not reached
InitTotalVotingPower int64 // Total voting power when proposal enters voting period (default 0)
InitProcedureNumber int16 // Procedure number of the active procedure when proposal enters voting period (default -1)
Votes map[string]int64 // Votes for each option (Yes, No, NoWithVeto, Abstain)
}
```
We also introduce a type `ValidatorGovInfo`
```go
type ValidatorGovInfo struct {
InitVotingPower int64 // Voting power of validator when proposal enters voting period
Minus int64 // Minus of validator, used to compute validator's voting power
}
```
**Store:**
* `Proposals`: A mapping `map[int64]Proposal` of proposals indexed by their
`proposalID`
* `Deposits`: A mapping `map[[]byte]int64` of deposits indexed by
`<proposalID>:<depositorPubKey>` as `[]byte`. Given a `proposalID` and a
`PubKey`, returns deposit (`nil` if `PubKey` has not deposited on the
proposal)
* `Options`: A mapping `map[[]byte]string` of options indexed by
`<proposalID>:<voterPubKey>:<validatorPubKey>` as `[]byte`. Given a
`proposalID`, a `PubKey` and a validator's `PubKey`, returns option chosen by
this `PubKey` for this validator (`nil` if `PubKey` has not voted under this
validator)
* `ValidatorGovInfos`: A mapping `map[[]byte]ValidatorGovInfo` of validator's
governance infos indexed by `<proposalID>:<validatorGovPubKey>`. Returns
`nil` if proposal has not entered voting period or if `PubKey` was not the
governance public key of a validator when proposal entered voting period.
#### Proposal Processing Queue
**Store:**
* `ProposalProcessingQueue`: A queue `queue[proposalID]` containing all the
`ProposalIDs` of proposals that reached `MinDeposit`. Each round, the oldest
element of `ProposalProcessingQueue` is checked during `BeginBlock` to see if
`CurrentBlock == VotingStartBlock + InitProcedure.VotingPeriod`. If it is,
then the application checks if validators in `InitVotingPowerList` have voted
and, if not, applies `GovernancePenalty`. After that proposal is ejected from
`ProposalProcessingQueue` and the next element of the queue is evaluated.
Note that if a proposal is urgent and accepted under the special condition,
its `ProposalID` must be ejected from `ProposalProcessingQueue`.
And the pseudocode for the `ProposalProcessingQueue`:
```go
in BeginBlock do
checkProposal() // First call of the recursive function
// Recursive function. First call in BeginBlock
func checkProposal()
if (ProposalProcessingQueue.Peek() == nil)
return
else
proposalID = ProposalProcessingQueue.Peek()
proposal = load(store, Proposals, proposalID)
initProcedure = load(store, Procedures, proposal.InitProcedureNumber)
if (proposal.Category AND proposal.Votes['Yes']/proposal.InitTotalVotingPower >= 2/3)
// proposal was urgent and accepted under the special condition
// no punishment
ProposalProcessingQueue.pop()
checkProposal()
else if (CurrentBlock == proposal.VotingStartBlock + initProcedure.VotingPeriod)
activeProcedure = load(store, Procedures, ActiveProcedureNumber)
for each validator in CurrentBondedValidators
validatorGovInfo = load(store, ValidatorGovInfos, validator.GovPubKey)
if (validatorGovInfo.InitVotingPower != nil)
// validator was bonded when vote started
validatorOption = load(store, Options, validator.GovPubKey)
if (validatorOption == nil)
// validator did not vote
slash validator by activeProcedure.GovernancePenalty
ProposalProcessingQueue.pop()
checkProposal()
```
### Transactions
#### Proposal Submission
Proposals can be submitted by any Atom holder via a `TxGovSubmitProposal`
transaction.
```go
type TxGovSubmitProposal struct {
Title string // Title of the proposal
Description string // Description of the proposal
Type string // Type of proposal. Initial set {PlainTextProposal, SoftwareUpgradeProposal}
Category bool // false=regular, true=urgent
InitialDeposit int64 // Initial deposit paid by sender. Must be strictly positive.
}
```
**State modifications:**
* Generate new `proposalID`
* Create new `Proposal`
* Initialise `Proposals` attributes
* Store sender's deposit in `Deposits`
* Decrease balance of sender by `InitialDeposit`
* If `MinDeposit` is reached:
* Push `proposalID` in `ProposalProcessingQueueEnd`
* Store each validator's voting power in `ValidatorGovInfos`
A `TxGovSubmitProposal` transaction can be handled according to the following
pseudocode.
```go
// PSEUDOCODE //
// Check if TxGovSubmitProposal is valid. If it is, create proposal //
upon receiving txGovSubmitProposal from sender do
if !correctlyFormatted(txGovSubmitProposal) then
// check if proposal is correctly formatted. Includes fee payment.
throw
else
if (txGovSubmitProposal.InitialDeposit <= 0) OR (sender.AtomBalance < InitialDeposit) then
// InitialDeposit is negative or null OR sender has insufficient funds
throw
else
sender.AtomBalance -= txGovSubmitProposal.InitialDeposit
proposalID = generate new proposalID
proposal = NewProposal()
proposal.Title = txGovSubmitProposal.Title
proposal.Description = txGovSubmitProposal.Description
proposal.Type = txGovSubmitProposal.Type
proposal.Category = txGovSubmitProposal.Category
proposal.Deposit = txGovSubmitProposal.InitialDeposit
proposal.SubmitBlock = CurrentBlock
store(Deposits, <proposalID>:<sender>, txGovSubmitProposal.InitialDeposit)
activeProcedure = load(store, Procedures, ActiveProcedureNumber)
if (txGovSubmitProposal.InitialDeposit < activeProcedure.MinDeposit) then
// MinDeposit is not reached
proposal.VotingStartBlock = -1
proposal.InitTotalVotingPower = 0
proposal.InitProcedureNumber = -1
else
// MinDeposit is reached
proposal.VotingStartBlock = CurrentBlock
proposal.InitTotalVotingPower = TotalVotingPower
proposal.InitProcedureNumber = ActiveProcedureNumber
for each validator in CurrentBondedValidators
// Store voting power of each bonded validator
validatorGovInfo = NewValidatorGovInfo()
validatorGovInfo.InitVotingPower = validator.VotingPower
validatorGovInfo.Minus = 0
store(ValidatorGovInfos, <proposalID>:<validator.GovPubKey>, validatorGovInfo)
ProposalProcessingQueue.push(proposalID)
store(Proposals, proposalID, proposal) // Store proposal in Proposals mapping
return proposalID
```
#### Deposit
Once a proposal is submitted, if
`Proposal.Deposit < ActiveProcedure.MinDeposit`, Atom holders can send
`TxGovDeposit` transactions to increase the proposal's deposit.
```go
type TxGovDeposit struct {
ProposalID int64 // ID of the proposal
Deposit int64 // Number of Atoms to add to the proposal's deposit
}
```
**State modifications:**
* Decrease balance of sender by `deposit`
* Initialize or increase `deposit` of sender in `Deposits`
* Increase `proposal.Deposit` by sender's `deposit`
* If `MinDeposit` is reached:
* Push `proposalID` in `ProposalProcessingQueueEnd`
* Store each validator's voting power in `ValidatorGovInfos`
A `TxGovDeposit` transaction has to go through a number of checks to be valid.
These checks are outlined in the following pseudocode.
```go
// PSEUDOCODE //
// Check if TxGovDeposit is valid. If it is, increase deposit and check if MinDeposit is reached
upon receiving txGovDeposit from sender do
// check if proposal is correctly formatted. Includes fee payment.
if !correctlyFormatted(txGovDeposit) then
throw
else
proposal = load(store, Proposals, txGovDeposit.ProposalID)
if (proposal == nil) then
// There is no proposal for this proposalID
throw
else
if (txGovDeposit.Deposit <= 0) OR (sender.AtomBalance < txGovDeposit.Deposit)
// deposit is negative or null OR sender has insufficient funds
throw
else
activeProcedure = load(store, Procedures, ActiveProcedureNumber)
if (proposal.Deposit >= activeProcedure.MinDeposit) then
// MinDeposit was reached
throw
else
if (CurrentBlock >= proposal.SubmitBlock + activeProcedure.MaxDepositPeriod) then
// Maximum deposit period reached
throw
else
// sender can deposit
sender.AtomBalance -= txGovDeposit.Deposit
deposit = load(store, Deposits, <txGovDeposit.ProposalID>:<sender>)
if (deposit == nil)
// sender has never deposited on this proposal
store(Deposits, <txGovDeposit.ProposalID>:<sender>, deposit)
else
// sender has already deposited on this proposal
newDeposit = deposit + txGovDeposit.Deposit
store(Deposits, <txGovDeposit.ProposalID>:<sender>, newDeposit)
proposal.Deposit += txGovDeposit.Deposit
if (proposal.Deposit >= activeProcedure.MinDeposit) then
// MinDeposit is reached, vote opens
proposal.VotingStartBlock = CurrentBlock
proposal.InitTotalVotingPower = TotalVotingPower
proposal.InitProcedureNumber = ActiveProcedureNumber
for each validator in CurrentBondedValidators
// Store voting power of each bonded validator
validatorGovInfo = NewValidatorGovInfo()
validatorGovInfo.InitVotingPower = validator.VotingPower
validatorGovInfo.Minus = 0
store(ValidatorGovInfos, <proposalID>:<validator.GovPubKey>, validatorGovInfo)
ProposalProcessingQueue.push(txGovDeposit.ProposalID)
```
#### Claim deposit
Finally, if the proposal is accepted or `MinDeposit` was not reached before the
end of the `MaximumDepositPeriod`, then Atom holders can send
`TxGovClaimDeposit` transaction to claim their deposits.
```go
type TxGovClaimDeposit struct {
ProposalID int64
}
```
**State modifications:**
If conditions are met, reimburse the deposit, i.e.
* Increase `AtomBalance` of sender by `deposit`
* Set `deposit` of sender in `DepositorsList` to 0
And the associated pseudocode.
```go
// PSEUDOCODE //
/* Check if TxGovClaimDeposit is valid. If vote never started and MaxDepositPeriod is reached or if vote started and proposal was accepted, return deposit */
upon receiving txGovClaimDeposit from sender do
// check if proposal is correctly formatted. Includes fee payment.
if !correctlyFormatted(txGovClaimDeposit) then
throw
else
proposal = load(store, Proposals, txGovDeposit.ProposalID)
if (proposal == nil) then
// There is no proposal for this proposalID
throw
else
deposit = load(store, Deposits, <txGovClaimDeposit.ProposalID>:<sender>)
if (deposit == nil)
// sender has not deposited on this proposal
throw
else
if (deposit <= 0)
// deposit has already been claimed
throw
else
if (proposal.VotingStartBlock <= 0)
// Vote never started
activeProcedure = load(store, Procedures, ActiveProcedureNumber)
if (CurrentBlock <= proposal.SubmitBlock + activeProcedure.MaxDepositPeriod)
// MaxDepositPeriod is not reached
throw
else
// MaxDepositPeriod is reached
// Set sender's deposit to 0 and refund
store(Deposits, <txGovClaimDeposit.ProposalID>:<sender>, 0)
sender.AtomBalance += deposit
else
// Vote started
initProcedure = load(store, Procedures, proposal.InitProcedureNumber)
if (proposal.Category AND proposal.Votes['Yes']/proposal.InitTotalVotingPower >= 2/3) OR ((CurrentBlock > proposal.VotingStartBlock + initProcedure.VotingPeriod) AND (proposal.Votes['NoWithVeto']/(proposal.Votes['Yes']+proposal.Votes['No']+proposal.Votes['NoWithVeto']) < 1/3) AND (proposal.Votes['Yes']/(proposal.Votes['Yes']+proposal.Votes['No']+proposal.Votes['NoWithVeto']) > 1/2)) then
// Proposal was accepted either because
// Proposal was urgent and special condition was met
// Voting period ended and vote satisfies threshold
store(Deposits, <txGovClaimDeposit.ProposalID>:<sender>, 0)
sender.AtomBalance += deposit
```
#### Vote
Once `ActiveProcedure.MinDeposit` is reached, voting period starts. From there,
bonded Atom holders are able to send `TxGovVote` transactions to cast their
vote on the proposal.
```go
type TxGovVote struct {
ProposalID int64 // proposalID of the proposal
Option string // option from OptionSet chosen by the voter
ValidatorPubKey crypto.PubKey // PubKey of the validator voter wants to tie its vote to
}
```
**State modifications:**
* If sender is not a validator and validator has not voted, initialize or
increase minus of validator by sender's `voting power`
* If sender is not a validator and validator has voted, decrease
`proposal.Votes['validatorOption']` by sender's `voting power`
* If sender is not a validator, increase `[proposal.Votes['txGovVote.Option']`
by sender's `voting power`
* If sender is a validator, increase `proposal.Votes['txGovVote.Option']` by
validator's `InitialVotingPower - minus` (`minus` can be equal to 0)
Votes need to be tied to a validator in order to compute validator's voting
power. If a delegator is bonded to multiple validators, it will have to send
one transaction per validator (the UI should facilitate this so that multiple
transactions can be sent in one "vote flow"). If the sender is the validator
itself, then it will input its own GovernancePubKey as `ValidatorPubKey`
Next is a pseudocode proposal of the way `TxGovVote` transactions can be
handled:
```go
// PSEUDOCODE //
// Check if TxGovVote is valid. If it is, count vote//
upon receiving txGovVote from sender do
// check if proposal is correctly formatted. Includes fee payment.
if !correctlyFormatted(txGovDeposit) then
throw
else
proposal = load(store, Proposals, txGovDeposit.ProposalID)
if (proposal == nil) then
// There is no proposal for this proposalID
throw
else
initProcedure = load(store, Procedures, proposal.InitProcedureNumber) // get procedure that was active when vote opened
validator = load(store, Validators, txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey)
if !initProcedure.OptionSet.includes(txGovVote.Option) OR
(validator == nil) then
// Throws if
// Option is not in Option Set of procedure that was active when vote opened OR if
// ValidatorPubKey is not the GovPubKey of a current validator
throw
else
option = load(store, Options, <txGovVote.ProposalID>:<sender>:<txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey>)
if (option != nil)
// sender has already voted with the Atoms bonded to ValidatorPubKey
throw
else
if (proposal.VotingStartBlock < 0) OR
(CurrentBlock > proposal.VotingStartBlock + initProcedure.VotingPeriod) OR
(proposal.VotingStartBlock < lastBondingBlock(sender, txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey) OR
(proposal.VotingStartBlock < lastUnbondingBlock(sender, txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey) OR
(proposal.Category AND proposal.Votes['Yes']/proposal.InitTotalVotingPower >= 2/3) then
// Throws if
// Vote has not started OR if
// Vote had ended OR if
// sender bonded Atoms to ValidatorPubKey after start of vote OR if
// sender unbonded Atoms from ValidatorPubKey after start of vote OR if
// proposal is urgent and special condition is met, i.e. proposal is accepted and closed
throw
else
validatorGovInfo = load(store, ValidatorGovInfos, <txGovVote.ProposalID>:<validator.ValidatorGovPubKey>)
if (validatorGovInfo == nil)
// validator became validator after proposal entered voting period
throw
else
// sender can vote, check if sender == validator and store sender's option in Options
store(Options, <txGovVote.ProposalID>:<sender>:<txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey>, txGovVote.Option)
if (sender != validator.GovPubKey)
// Here, sender is not the Governance PubKey of the validator whose PubKey is txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey
if sender does not have bonded Atoms to txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey then
// check in Staking module
throw
else
validatorOption = load(store, Options, <txGovVote.ProposalID>:<sender>:<txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey)
if (validatorOption == nil)
// Validator has not voted already
validatorGovInfo.Minus += sender.bondedAmounTo(txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey)
store(ValidatorGovInfos, <txGovVote.ProposalID>:<validator.ValidatorGovPubKey>, validatorGovInfo)
else
// Validator has already voted
// Reduce votes of option chosen by validator by sender's bonded Amount
proposal.Votes['validatorOption'] -= sender.bondedAmountTo(txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey)
// increase votes of option chosen by sender by bonded Amount
proposal.Votes['txGovVote.Option'] += sender.bondedAmountTo(txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey)
else
// sender is the Governance PubKey of the validator whose main PubKey is txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey
// i.e. sender == validator
proposal.Votes['txGovVote.Option'] += (validatorGovInfo.InitVotingPower - validatorGovInfo.Minus)
```
## Future improvements (not in scope for MVP)
The current documentation only describes the minimum viable product for the
governance module. Future improvements may include:
* **`BountyProposals`:** If accepted, a `BountyProposal` creates an open
bounty. The `BountyProposal` specifies how many Atoms will be given upon
completion. These Atoms will be taken from the `reserve pool`. After a
`BountyProposal` is accepted by governance, anybody can submit a
`SoftwareUpgradeProposal` with the code to claim the bounty. Note that once a
`BountyProposal` is accepted, the corresponding funds in the `reserve pool`
are locked so that payment can always be honored. In order to link a
`SoftwareUpgradeProposal` to an open bounty, the submitter of the
`SoftwareUpgradeProposal` will use the `Proposal.LinkedProposal` attribute.
If a `SoftwareUpgradeProposal` linked to an open bounty is accepted by
governance, the funds that were reserved are automatically transferred to the
submitter.
* **Complex delegation:** Delegators could choose other representatives than
their validators. Ultimately, the chain of representatives would always end
up to a validator, but delegators could inherit the vote of their chosen
representative before they inherit the vote of their validator. In other
words, they would only inherit the vote of their validator if their other
appointed representative did not vote.
* **`ParameterProposals` and `WhitelistProposals`:** These proposals would
automatically change pre-defined parameters and whitelists. Upon acceptance,
these proposals would not require validators to do the signal and switch
process.
* **Better process for proposal review:** There would be two parts to
`proposal.Deposit`, one for anti-spam (same as in MVP) and an other one to
reward third party auditors.