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ValarDragon 2021-02-22 14:38:08 -06:00
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docs/architecture/adr-039-epoched-staking.md
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@ -48,8 +48,6 @@ Applying it immediately can be viewed as offering greater consensus layer securi
- For fairness of deterministic leader election, applying a slash or jailing within an epoch would break the guarantee we were seeking to provide. This then re-introduces a new (but significantly simpler) problem for trying to provide fairness guarantees. Namely, that validators can adversarially elect to remove themself from the set of proposers. From a security perspective, this could potentially be handled by two different mechanisms (or prove to still be too difficult to achieve). One is making a security statement acknowledging the ability for an adversary to force an ahead-of-time fixed threshold of users to drop out of the proposer set within an epoch. The second method would be to parameterize such that the cost of a slash within the epoch far outweights benefits due to being a proposer. However, this latter criterion is quite dubious, since being a proposer can have many advantageous side-effects in chains with complex state machines. (Namely, DeFi games such as Fomo3D) - For fairness of deterministic leader election, applying a slash or jailing within an epoch would break the guarantee we were seeking to provide. This then re-introduces a new (but significantly simpler) problem for trying to provide fairness guarantees. Namely, that validators can adversarially elect to remove themself from the set of proposers. From a security perspective, this could potentially be handled by two different mechanisms (or prove to still be too difficult to achieve). One is making a security statement acknowledging the ability for an adversary to force an ahead-of-time fixed threshold of users to drop out of the proposer set within an epoch. The second method would be to parameterize such that the cost of a slash within the epoch far outweights benefits due to being a proposer. However, this latter criterion is quite dubious, since being a proposer can have many advantageous side-effects in chains with complex state machines. (Namely, DeFi games such as Fomo3D)
- For staking derivative design, this will not cause problems with the suggested design there, nor does it increase the stateful of staking. (As whether a slash has occured is fully queryable given the validator address) - For staking derivative design, this will not cause problems with the suggested design there, nor does it increase the stateful of staking. (As whether a slash has occured is fully queryable given the validator address)
However, for achieving consensus layer security, it suffices to apply the validator jailing immediately, but still delay the actual slash changes to waiting until the end of the epoch. This largely mitigates the concern for fairness of deterministic leader election as well, since the validator is removed the set of potential proposers immediately.
### Token lockup ### Token lockup
When someone makes a transaction to delegate, even though they are not immediately staked, their tokens should be moved into a pool managed by the staking module which will then be used at the end of an epoch. This prevents concerns where they stake, and then spend those tokens not realizing they were already allocated for staking, and thus having their staking tx fail. When someone makes a transaction to delegate, even though they are not immediately staked, their tokens should be moved into a pool managed by the staking module which will then be used at the end of an epoch. This prevents concerns where they stake, and then spend those tokens not realizing they were already allocated for staking, and thus having their staking tx fail.