tendermint/docs/specification/new-spec/p2p/peer.md

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# Tendermint Peers
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This document explains how Tendermint Peers are identified and how they connect to one another.
For details on peer discovery, see the [peer exchange (PEX) reactor doc](pex.md).
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## Peer Identity
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Tendermint peers are expected to maintain long-term persistent identities in the form of a public key.
Each peer has an ID defined as `peer.ID == peer.PubKey.Address()`, where `Address` uses the scheme defined in go-crypto.
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A single peer ID can have multiple IP addresses associated with it.
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TODO: define how to deal with this.
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When attempting to connect to a peer, we use the PeerURL: `<ID>@<IP>:<PORT>`.
We will attempt to connect to the peer at IP:PORT, and verify,
via authenticated encryption, that it is in possession of the private key
corresponding to `<ID>`. This prevents man-in-the-middle attacks on the peer layer.
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Peers can also be connected to without specifying an ID, ie. just `<IP>:<PORT>`.
In this case, the peer must be authenticated out-of-band of Tendermint,
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for instance via VPN.
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## Connections
All p2p connections use TCP.
Upon establishing a successful TCP connection with a peer,
two handhsakes are performed: one for authenticated encryption, and one for Tendermint versioning.
Both handshakes have configurable timeouts (they should complete quickly).
### Authenticated Encryption Handshake
Tendermint implements the Station-to-Station protocol
using ED25519 keys for Diffie-Helman key-exchange and NACL SecretBox for encryption.
It goes as follows:
- generate an emphemeral ED25519 keypair
- send the ephemeral public key to the peer
- wait to receive the peer's ephemeral public key
- compute the Diffie-Hellman shared secret using the peers ephemeral public key and our ephemeral private key
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- generate two nonces to use for encryption (sending and receiving) as follows:
- sort the ephemeral public keys in ascending order and concatenate them
- RIPEMD160 the result
- append 4 empty bytes (extending the hash to 24-bytes)
- the result is nonce1
- flip the last bit of nonce1 to get nonce2
- if we had the smaller ephemeral pubkey, use nonce1 for receiving, nonce2 for sending;
else the opposite
- all communications from now on are encrypted using the shared secret and the nonces, where each nonce
increments by 2 every time it is used
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- we now have an encrypted channel, but still need to authenticate
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- generate a common challenge to sign:
- SHA256 of the sorted (lowest first) and concatenated ephemeral pub keys
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- sign the common challenge with our persistent private key
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- send the go-wire encoded persistent pubkey and signature to the peer
- wait to receive the persistent public key and signature from the peer
- verify the signature on the challenge using the peer's persistent public key
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If this is an outgoing connection (we dialed the peer) and we used a peer ID,
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then finally verify that the peer's persistent public key corresponds to the peer ID we dialed,
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ie. `peer.PubKey.Address() == <ID>`.
The connection has now been authenticated. All traffic is encrypted.
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Note: only the dialer can authenticate the identity of the peer,
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but this is what we care about since when we join the network we wish to
ensure we have reached the intended peer (and are not being MITMd).
### Peer Filter
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Before continuing, we check if the new peer has the same ID as ourselves or
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an existing peer. If so, we disconnect.
We also check the peer's address and public key against
an optional whitelist which can be managed through the ABCI app -
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if the whitelist is enabled and the peer does not qualify, the connection is
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terminated.
### Tendermint Version Handshake
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The Tendermint Version Handshake allows the peers to exchange their NodeInfo:
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```golang
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type NodeInfo struct {
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PubKey crypto.PubKey
Moniker string
Network string
RemoteAddr string
ListenAddr string
Version string
Channels []int8
Other []string
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}
```
The connection is disconnected if:
- `peer.NodeInfo.PubKey != peer.PubKey`
- `peer.NodeInfo.Version` is not formatted as `X.X.X` where X are integers known as Major, Minor, and Revision
- `peer.NodeInfo.Version` Major is not the same as ours
- `peer.NodeInfo.Version` Minor is not the same as ours
- `peer.NodeInfo.Network` is not the same as ours
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- `peer.Channels` does not intersect with our known Channels.
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At this point, if we have not disconnected, the peer is valid.
It is added to the switch and hence all reactors via the `AddPeer` method.
Note that each reactor may handle multiple channels.
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## Connection Activity
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Once a peer is added, incoming messages for a given reactor are handled through
that reactor's `Receive` method, and output messages are sent directly by the Reactors
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on each peer. A typical reactor maintains per-peer go-routine(s) that handle this.