Update assumptions.md

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Leo 2020-11-27 19:43:57 +01:00
parent 8c0c902b42
commit ee0904adf9
1 changed files with 5 additions and 5 deletions

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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ request retransmission of their lockup, resulting in re-observation by nodes and
chain replay, nodes will re-process events from connected chains up from a given block height, check whether a VAA has
already been submitted to Solana, and initiate a round of consensus for missed lockups.
This carries no risk and can be be done any number of times. VAAs are fully deterministic and idempotent - any given
This carries no risk and can be done any number of times. VAAs are fully deterministic and idempotent - any given
lockup will always result in the same VAA body hash. All connected chains keep a permanent record of whether a given VAA
body - identified by its hash - has already been executed, therefore, VAAs can safely undergo multiple rounds of
consensus until they are executed on all chains.
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ operator consensus in the same way.
A non-exhaustive list of external chain properties Wormhole relies on:
- It can be assumed that at some point, transactions are final and cannot be rolled back.
- A given transaction is only included/executed once in a single block, resulting in a determistic VAA body.
- A given transaction is only included/executed once in a single block, resulting in a deterministic VAA body.
- Account data and state is permanent, by default or through a mechanism like Solana's rent exemptions.
- No equivocation - there is only one valid block at a given height.
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ and that Wormhole's processing capacity is greater than the sum of the capacity
Solana has ridiculous processing capacity and can process transactions at a greater rate than what its websocket
subscription interface, the agent, or the Wormhole itself could handle. This is partially mitigated by the fee that the
Wormhole contracts charge in excess of the (very cheap) transaction fee, but a sufficiently incentived attacker could
Wormhole contracts charge in excess of the (very cheap) transaction fee, but a sufficiently incentivized attacker could
still execute a sustained attack by simply paying said fee.
A possible future improvement would be dynamic fees on the Solana side, but this is currently blocked by runtime
@ -79,9 +79,9 @@ We assume that at the present time, such incentive alignment is easy to bootstra
which requires carefully-designed token economy and slashing criteria. In particular, it attracts operators who care
about the ecosystem beyond short-term validation rewards, resulting in a high-quality, resilient guardian set.
As the project grows, there's a number of potential improvements to consider other to a staking token, including
As the project grows, there's a number of potential improvements to consider other than a staking token, including
the [Balsa](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1sCgxHIOrVHAqrt4NWkUJXxQvpSxq6DyZrkf4IR-R-YM/edit) insurance pool
proposal and a DAO that offsets operational costs and rewards operators.
proposal, and a DAO that offsets operational costs and rewards operators.
## Uncompromised hosts