2019-09-27 11:22:09 -07:00
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::
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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ZIP: 1011
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2019-09-27 11:22:09 -07:00
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Title: Decentralize the Dev Fee
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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Owner: Matt Luongo <matt@thesis.co>
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2020-02-27 09:54:18 -08:00
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Status: Obsolete
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2020-11-14 14:06:46 -08:00
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Category: Consensus Process
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2019-09-27 11:22:09 -07:00
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Created: 2019-09-27
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License: MIT
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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Discussions-To: <https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/decentralizing-the-dev-fee/35252>
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2020-09-14 06:16:43 -07:00
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Pull-Request: <https://github.com/zcash/zips/pull/278>
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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2019-09-27 11:22:09 -07:00
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2019-10-20 18:05:17 -07:00
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Abstract
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========
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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This proposal describes a structure for Zcash governance, including funding
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and managing new Zcash development, decentralizing those development efforts,
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and resolving governance hangups between the Zcash Foundation and the Electric
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Coin Company.
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These goals are accomplished via a 20% dev fee, enacted in NU4 and continuing
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for one halving period. This fee will fund a diverse group of development
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teams to ensure Zcash maintains best-in-class research and engineering talent
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while growing a robust ecosystem, funding the Zcash Foundation with 25% of
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the dev fee, and a newly established principal developer role with 35% of the
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dev fee.
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2019-10-20 18:05:17 -07:00
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2019-09-27 11:45:27 -07:00
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Motivation
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==========
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Who am I?
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---------
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My name is Matt Luongo. I'm an entrepreneur who's been full-time in the crypto
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space since 2014, co-founding Fold, a Bitcoin payments company, and more
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2019-10-17 19:28:43 -07:00
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recently Keep, a private computation startup built on Ethereum. At Keep, we've
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done some `work around Zcash <https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pull/2129>`_,
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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and our parent company, `Thesis`_, is considering investing more heavily in
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Zcash development for our latest project.
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2019-09-27 11:45:27 -07:00
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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I'm deeply interested in privacy tech. For me, privacy is about consent
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–consent to share my habits, beliefs, and preferences– and I see privacy as
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2019-10-17 19:28:43 -07:00
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the inevitable next frontier in our pursuit of an economy that respects
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individual choice.
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2019-09-27 11:45:27 -07:00
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My perspective is as the founder of a for-profit company focused on building
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2019-10-17 19:28:43 -07:00
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self-sovereign technology who wants to develop on Zcash. We work in this space
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ideologically, but our work isn't free; attracting and growing talent requires
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funding.
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2019-09-27 11:45:27 -07:00
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If you're interested in more on my background, I've introduced myself more
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`properly on the forum
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<https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/introducing-matt-luongo-from-keep/34947>`_.
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What's this about?
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------------------
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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Since Zcon1, I've been looking to fund work to build an Ethereum / Zcash
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bridge. I've spoken to the ECC, the Zcash Foundation, and a number of early
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Zcash community members on how best to move forward with this project, and in
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the process I've learned a lot about how the community works and dev
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governance has been structured thus far.
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2019-09-27 11:45:27 -07:00
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Inevitably, I've become interested in the community's proposals for a new dev
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fee, and thought about how the right structure might support work like ours.
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I believe the Zcash community has an opportunity to deploy a new incentive
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structure that will attract companies like ours to build and improve Zcash,
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leading to a more resilient network, stronger technology, and wider usage.
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2019-09-27 12:01:38 -07:00
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2019-10-19 18:41:40 -07:00
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The Zcash narrative
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2019-09-27 12:01:38 -07:00
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-------------------
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We're all here to build a robust, private, decentralized currency. But in the
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dev fee proposals I've seen so far, the idea of a Zcash narrative that
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distinguishes it from the competition is absent.
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2019-10-17 19:28:43 -07:00
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Of the slew of ZIPs addressing Zcash's future, there's only been one strong
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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narrative case — the idea that Zcash exists purely as a hedge against Bitcoin's
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2019-09-27 12:01:38 -07:00
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long-term privacy failure. Put simply, Zcash is "Bitcoin, but private".
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2019-10-17 19:28:43 -07:00
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Zcash should aim higher. Bitcoin is the only coin that has successfully made a
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2019-09-27 12:01:38 -07:00
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store of value argument, which I like to call "worse is better". Don't upgrade
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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the network –the argument goes– stability is more important than solving
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today's problems. Bitcoin is chasing the `Lindy effect
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<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lindy_effect>`_, where worse is better, and the
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network becomes stronger every day it survives. That's great for Bitcoin.
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2019-10-17 19:28:43 -07:00
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For the rest of us, though, better is better. Zcash *should be better*.
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2019-09-27 12:01:38 -07:00
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Zcash is known for having the best tech in the space, built by one of the best
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teams in the space. We should lean in to that reputation, nurturing the best
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research and engineering talent to take Zcash to the next level, and
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leveraging a Zcash dev fee as a differentiator to build the world's best
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private medium of exchange.
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2019-10-06 13:44:57 -07:00
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Principles of cryptocurrency governance
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---------------------------------------
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2019-10-19 18:41:40 -07:00
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To understand Zcash governance, it's worth reviewing "default" cryptocurrency
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governance. Most proof-of-work chains today have three major governing roles:
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2019-10-06 13:44:57 -07:00
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1. Miners validate and secure the chain. They do some work to earn a reward.
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Miners are the first owners of newly minted coins, and are an integral part
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of network upgrades.
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2. Users buy, hold, and spend the currency. In networks like Bitcoin, they
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also run full nodes, strengthening network resilience by decentralizing
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validation.
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3. Developers maintain clients to power and interact with the network. They
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typically propose network upgrades.
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On a chain like Bitcoin, any of these roles can veto a network upgrade.
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1. Miners can veto activating a new fork by refusing to build off blocks using
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new network rules, orphaning a minority effort. They can also attack any
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fork attempt that doesn't change
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2. Users can veto a fork by refusing to update their full nodes, rejecting
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blocks as invalid — as demonstrated in the UASF movement successfully
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2019-11-14 21:30:33 -08:00
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countering the SegWit2x attempt to force a Bitcoin hardfork. Users can also
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vote with their dollars, acting as a fork resolution of last resort via
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market pressure.
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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3. Developers can refuse to update client codebases to follow a fork. While
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this might not seem like a strong veto, in practice that means any fork
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will need at least one additional development team, or the agreement of
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existing client software developers.
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2019-10-06 13:44:57 -07:00
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These roles together form a balance of power that makes contentious forks
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difficult — any change that a large swath of users disapproves of could split
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the chain.
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The state of play
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-----------------
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2019-10-17 19:28:43 -07:00
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In Zcash, the addition of the Electric Coin Company (ECC) and the Zcash
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Foundation skew this balance.
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Both organizations are comprised of Zcash founders, developers, researchers,
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and privacy proponents who have driven this ecosystem forward and represent
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its values. Nevertheless, their mode of operation today skews a healthy
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balance of power in Zcash governance.
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2019-11-14 21:36:10 -08:00
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The mechanisms of that skew are the Zcash trademark, held jointly by the
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Foundation and the ECC, and primary client software development, now split
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between the ECC and the Foundation.
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In a disagreement between miners, users, and developers, the Foundation and
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ECC have the option of enforcing the Zcash trademark, effectively allowing
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them to choose a winning fork against the will of users, miners, and other
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developers.
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In addition, the Foundation's sole maintenance of the ``zebrad`` client
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allows them to "soft veto" a network upgrade.
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2019-11-14 21:36:10 -08:00
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Unfortunately, the Foundation and the ECC aren't organized as arms-length
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entities today.
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This situation poses a number of problems for new and existing Zcash users,
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as well as both entities.
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2019-10-12 03:38:44 -07:00
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* The threat of two entangled entities overriding (or being forced to
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override) the will of users undermines self-sovereignty.
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* The ECC and Foundation are both put at legal risk. As entangled entities,
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they're remarkably similar to a single entity when trying to minimize
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regulatory risk.
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2019-10-06 14:02:29 -07:00
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The "crowding out" problem
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--------------------------
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The Zcash ecosystem, as it exists today, leaves little incentive for outside
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2019-10-06 14:02:29 -07:00
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developers to participate.
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Zcash development has a high learning curve.
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* The reference client is a fork of the Bitcoin reference implementation,
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building on a decade of poorly written legacy code.
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* What Zcash brings to the table involves a greater understanding of applied
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cryptography than most projects. SNARKs are often still referred to as
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"moon math", after all.
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* As the recent network-level attack demonstrates, full-stack privacy is hard.
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Most outside developers need to see a clear path to longer-term funding before
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they can commit to the cost of that curve.
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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Even those developers who already have the expertise to work on this system
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are frustrated by the lack of longer-term funding. For evidence, look at
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Parity's exit from Zcash after ``zebrad`` development, or Summa's struggles
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to work on Zcash.
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2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
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2019-10-17 19:28:43 -07:00
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Sustainably attracting talent to Zcash is critical to maintain innovation and
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build resilience.
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Requirements
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============
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The first requirement is a balanced governance structure. Developers should be
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rewarded, without rewarding governance capture. What's best for the chain and
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ZEC holders should always come before commercial interests.
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The second, and secondary, requirement is funding Zcash development. While the
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chain shouldn't be run by a commercial entity, it will need to be supported by
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them.
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The third requirement is the support of a more resilient ecosystem by:
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1. Ending the "crowding out" problem by paying development teams to work on
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and for Zcash.
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2. Building a dev fee management structure that's resilient to the loss,
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capture, or compromise of the Zcash Foundation.
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3. Ensuring the ecosystem can survive the loss, capture, or compromise of the
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ECC by encouraging developer diversity and strategic input.
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Finally, avoid introducing unnecessary additional entities into the governance
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process.
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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2019-10-19 18:41:40 -07:00
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Non-requirements
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================
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General on-chain governance is outside the scope of this proposal. On-chain
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governance is an exciting idea -- what if we had an impartial arbiter funding
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development? My experience with on-chain governance to date, however, leads
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me to believe it's still a risky direction. Zcash should focus on what it's
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good at –privacy– and leave proving on-chain governance models to other
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projects.
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While this proposal attempts to outline a long-term structure for Zcash
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funding and governance, specifying the structure beyond the next 4 years is
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out of scope. Much will have changed in 4 years. Perhaps this structure will
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be sufficient; perhaps we'll be battling the Third Crypto War, and need to go
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back to the drawing table.
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2019-10-19 18:41:40 -07:00
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Specification
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=============
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2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
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The below proposal is an effort to cleanly resolve the problems with Zcash's
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current governance, while
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2019-10-12 03:38:44 -07:00
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* maintaining a balance of power between stakeholders;
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* removing single points of failure / control;
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* growing development and usage of Zcash;
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* and supporting the best interests of miners, users, and developers *today*.
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Decentralizing development
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--------------------------
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A few proposals have suggested the introduction of a mysterious "third entity"
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to resolve disagreements between the Foundation and the ECC.
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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I prefer a different approach, refocusing the role of the Foundation and
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making room for the ECC to work with a robust developer ecosystem.
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In this proposal, the Foundation shall support community development through
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running the forum and events, gathering community sentiment, managing
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short-term development grants, research and development, and conducting the
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diligence behind the assignment and disbursement of a development fee. This
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development fee shall be funded by 20% of the block reward, with as much as
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half of the fee burned in case of extraordinary growth in the price of ZEC.
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The Foundation shall receive 25% of the dev fee. If the volume-weighted
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average price of ZEC over the month means the foundation would receive greater
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than $500k that month, the Foundation shall set aside enough ZEC such that
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their max monthly budget is
|
2019-10-20 13:13:15 -07:00
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2020-03-10 09:40:32 -07:00
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.. math::
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\mathsf{MaxBenefit}(\mathsf{RewardDollarAmount}) = \mathsf{min}\left(500000, 500000 * \sqrt{\frac{\mathsf{RewardDollarAmount}}{500000}}\right)
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2019-10-20 13:13:15 -07:00
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2019-11-14 21:05:26 -08:00
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The excess ZEC should be purpose-restricted to the Foundation grants program,
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ensuring the funds are earmarked to grow outside community talent and
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involvement.
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Capping the monthly expenses of the Foundation will limit growth, while
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2019-10-20 13:13:15 -07:00
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encouraging fiscal discipline.
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2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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The remaining 75% of the dev fee shall be distributed between development
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teams working to maintain clients.
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2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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* Up to 35% of the total fee shall be reserved for the role of the "principal
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developer", a developer with assured long-term alignment with the project.
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* The remaining 40% of the fee, called the "outside development fee", shall
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be distributed between at least two development teams, chosen semi-annually
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by the Foundation, coinciding with network upgrades.
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2019-10-19 18:52:39 -07:00
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Prior to each network upgrade, the Foundation shall recommend a list of
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addresses and a total number of ZEC per block each address is meant to receive
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from the dev fee. The recommendation will be "ratified" by the miners as the
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network upgrade activates.
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2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
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The role of dev fee recipients
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------------------------------
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Dev fee recipients are distinguished from grant recipients in the scope and
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timelines of their work, as well as the specificity of direction. The intent
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2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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is to allow teams to focus on a core competency, while encouraging research
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and adjacent work.
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2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
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Dev fee recipients are chosen semi-annually by the Foundation based on their
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ability to move Zcash forward. Recipients will typically be development teams,
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though "full stack" teams that can communicate well with the community, expand
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Zcash usage, and widely share their work should be advantaged.
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2019-10-15 16:51:37 -07:00
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Recipients shall submit quarterly plans to the community for their efforts, as
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well as monthly progress updates.
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2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
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|
2019-10-15 16:51:37 -07:00
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All work funded by the dev fee will be open source, under licenses compatible
|
2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
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with the existing Zcash clients.
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|
2019-10-15 16:51:37 -07:00
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Though the Foundation shall periodically judge the efficacy of dev fee
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|
recipients, deciding on and driving roadmaps for Zcash is the role of dev fee
|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
|
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|
recipients, in partnership with the community. This role is neatly balanced
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by users running full nodes and miners, either of which can veto a network
|
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|
upgrade.
|
2019-10-15 16:51:37 -07:00
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While dev fee recipients are not required to work exclusively on Zcash,
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considering the nature of their work, recipients must guarantee they aren't
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obliged to the interests of competing projects.
|
2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
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The role of the principal developer
|
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|
-----------------------------------
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|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
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The role of the principal developer is as a "first among equals" amongst the
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dev fee recipients.
|
2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
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The principal developer shall make a number of guarantees.
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1. Zcash shall be their exclusive focus, submitting financials periodically to
|
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the Foundation as assurance.
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2. They shall maintain a well-run board and employ a qualified CFO.
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3. In addition to the existing open-source requirements, they shall agree to
|
2019-11-14 21:36:10 -08:00
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|
assign any patents relevant to Zcash to the Foundation.
|
2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
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|
2019-11-14 21:20:26 -08:00
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In exchange, the principal developer is granted an indefinite minimum dev fee
|
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|
allocation of 20%, with a maximum allocation of 35% of the total fee, as
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|
recommended annually by the Foundation.
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The principal developer will have a wide remit to pursue longer-term research
|
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|
|
relevant to Zcash, though it will submit the same plans required of other
|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
|
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|
recipients. The principal developer will only be recommended for removal by
|
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|
|
the Foundation in extraordinary circumstances, including reneging on the above
|
2019-11-14 21:20:26 -08:00
|
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|
|
guarantees or extreme negligence.
|
2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
|
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|
|
Minimum viable Foundation
|
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|
|
-------------------------
|
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|
To manage the dev fee and fulfill its community and diligence duties, the
|
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|
|
Foundation shall maintain a board of 5 independent members. Rather than the
|
2019-10-15 16:51:37 -07:00
|
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|
|
structure in the current bylaws, the board will consist of
|
2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
|
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|
2019-11-14 21:27:10 -08:00
|
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|
* 1 seat voted on periodically by ZEC holders directly.
|
2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
|
|
|
|
* 1 seat representing a newly created research advisory board, whose primary
|
2019-10-15 17:00:35 -07:00
|
|
|
|
role will be technical diligence of potential recipients of the dev fee.
|
2019-11-14 21:27:10 -08:00
|
|
|
|
* 1 seat for a member of the investment community.
|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
|
|
|
|
* 2 seats elected by the board, as the board is currently selected according
|
|
|
|
|
to the bylaws. The board's discretion here means these could be selected via
|
|
|
|
|
a community election, or via the remaining 3 seats' direct vote.
|
2019-10-12 03:48:52 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Foundation requires a professional board. Board member selection should
|
|
|
|
|
heavily favor candidates with existing formal public or private sector board
|
2019-10-25 11:54:00 -07:00
|
|
|
|
experience.
|
2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
|
|
|
|
Board seats should rotate periodically, while maintaining long enough terms
|
|
|
|
|
and overlap for consistent governance.
|
2019-11-14 21:27:10 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
2019-10-12 03:48:52 -07:00
|
|
|
|
Each board member should bring a unique network and set of skills to bear to
|
|
|
|
|
increase the impact of the Foundation.
|
2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
|
|
|
|
No board members shall have an ongoing commercial interest in any recipients
|
|
|
|
|
of the dev fee.
|
2019-11-14 21:27:10 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Considering their expertise, the Foundation shall deliver a transition plan,
|
|
|
|
|
including a board election schedule and report on the feasibility of a future
|
|
|
|
|
coin vote process to determine a board seat.
|
2019-10-06 16:03:53 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The ECC as the principal developer
|
|
|
|
|
----------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I propose that the ECC be considered as the initial principal developer,
|
|
|
|
|
receiving an indefinite dev fee allocation in exchange for their exclusive
|
|
|
|
|
focus on Zcash research and development, and assigning all patents and marks
|
|
|
|
|
relevant to Zcash to the Foundation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I believe this arrangement is best for the Zcash ecosystem, and with proper
|
|
|
|
|
management of funds, should satisfy the ongoing needs of the ECC.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The dev call
|
|
|
|
|
------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Foundation shall organize a bi-weekly call for all dev fee recipients and
|
|
|
|
|
other third party developers. The call will be live-streamed for community
|
|
|
|
|
participation, though the speaking participants will be invite only. At a
|
|
|
|
|
minimum, a single representative from each dev fee recipient should attend.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Foundation shall also maintain a simple chat solution for development of
|
|
|
|
|
the protocol. While the chat logs should be publicly viewable, it need not be
|
|
|
|
|
open to public participation.
|
2019-10-20 19:54:05 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Moving forward
|
|
|
|
|
--------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
|
|
|
|
I believe this proposal can form the basis for a new way forward for Zcash —
|
|
|
|
|
a robust, decentralized ecosystem with fair governance. I also hope it can
|
|
|
|
|
bring together the stakeholders in this discussion, and allow us to get back
|
|
|
|
|
to why we're all here — to protect the world's financial privacy.
|
2019-10-20 19:54:05 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I look forward to feedback on GitHub and the Zcash forum.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
2019-10-20 19:54:05 -07:00
|
|
|
|
Disclosures
|
|
|
|
|
===========
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In the interest of transparency, I'd like to make a few professional
|
|
|
|
|
disclosures.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I'm the largest shareholder of Thesis_, the parent company and studio behind
|
|
|
|
|
Fold_ and Keep_. Thesis is a for-profit company that might benefit from this
|
|
|
|
|
proposal as a dev fee recipient. While today I maintain exclusive control of
|
|
|
|
|
Thesis, the company has taken outside investment in the past.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
|
|
|
|
As far as my financial interest in Zcash, I've held a small amount of ZEC
|
|
|
|
|
since shortly after launch. I'm in the process of building my personal ZEC
|
|
|
|
|
position, as well as a position at Thesis.
|
2019-10-20 19:54:05 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Thesis: https://thesis.co
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Fold: https://foldapp.com
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Keep: https://keep.network
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
|
|
|
|
|
2019-10-20 19:54:05 -07:00
|
|
|
|
Acknowledgements
|
|
|
|
|
================
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Thanks to my friends and colleagues Carolyn_, Laura_, Josh_, James_, Corbin_,
|
|
|
|
|
and Antonio_ for early review of the text this proposal.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Carolyn: https://twitter.com/CReckhow
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Laura: https://twitter.com/LauraWallendal
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Josh: https://twitter.com/JoshSRosenblatt
|
|
|
|
|
.. _James: https://twitter.com/_prestwich
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Corbin: https://twitter.com/CorbinPon
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Antonio: https://github.com/shadowfiend
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Thanks to my fellow dev fund ZIP authors, `Avichal Garg`_ at Electric Capital,
|
|
|
|
|
`Antoinette Marie`_, `Josh Cincinnati, ED`_ at the Zcash Foundation,
|
|
|
|
|
`Jacob Phillips`_ at Autonomous Partners, `Andrew Miller`_, `Chris Burniske`_,
|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
|
|
|
|
`Eran Tromer`_, and the fellows at `Blocktown`_, each of whose ideas
|
|
|
|
|
influenced this proposal. And of course, thanks to `Sonya Mann`_ and the
|
|
|
|
|
Foundation for coordinating discussions around these different proposals.
|
2019-10-20 19:54:05 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Avichal Garg: https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/dev-fund-proposal-5-entity-strategic-council-approach/34801
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Antoinette Marie: https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/zcash-dev-fund-results-based-financing-equity-proposal-amendment/35052/31
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Josh Cincinnati, ED: https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/a-grand-compromise-synthesis-zip-proposal/34812
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Jacob Phillips: https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/asp-founders-reward-positioning-support-for-avichal-garg-s-proposal-with-amendments/35184
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Andrew Miller: https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/dev-fund-proposal-miner-directed-dev-fund-was-20-to-any-combination-of-ecc-zfnd-parity-or-burn/33864
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Blocktown: https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/blocktown-development-fund-proposal-10-to-a-2-of-3-multisig-with-community-involved-third-entity/34782
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Chris Burniske: https://twitter.com/cburniske
|
2019-11-14 21:38:41 -08:00
|
|
|
|
.. _Eran Tromer: https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/dev-fund-proposal-dev-fund-to-ecc-zfnd-major-grants/35364/15
|
2019-10-20 19:54:05 -07:00
|
|
|
|
.. _Sonya Mann: https://github.com/sonyamann
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-25 19:55:17 -08:00
|
|
|
|
Outside ongoing discussions in the forum and with other ZIP authors, I've
|
|
|
|
|
spoken with a number of prominent community members while developing this
|
|
|
|
|
proposal, though none were provided early access to the text of the proposal.
|
|
|
|
|
I appreciated the thoughtful discussions with `Josh Cincinnati`_,
|
|
|
|
|
`Zooko Wilcox`_, `Josh Swihart`_, `Ian Miers`_, and others.
|
2019-10-20 19:54:05 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Josh Cincinnati: https://twitter.com/acityinohio
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Zooko Wilcox: https://twitter.com/zooko
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Josh Swihart: https://twitter.com/jswihart
|
|
|
|
|
.. _Ian Miers: https://twitter.com/secparam
|