Update to reflect the ECC/ZF trademark agreement

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Matt Luongo 2019-11-15 00:36:10 -05:00 committed by Daira Hopwood
parent 5db9d91870
commit 2d38080008
1 changed files with 13 additions and 17 deletions

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@ -135,32 +135,28 @@ privacy proponents who have driven this ecosystem forward and represent its
values. Nevertheless, their mode of operation today skews a healthy balance of values. Nevertheless, their mode of operation today skews a healthy balance of
power in Zcash governance. power in Zcash governance.
The mechanisms of that skew are the Zcash trademark, held by the ECC, and The mechanisms of that skew are the Zcash trademark, held jointly by the
primary client software development, now split between the ECC and the Foundation and the ECC, and primary client software development, now split
Foundation. between the ECC and the Foundation.
In a disagreement between miners, users, and developers, the ECC has the In a disagreement between miners, users, and developers, the Foundation and ECC
unilateral option of enforcing the Zcash trademark, effectively allowing them have the option of enforcing the Zcash trademark, effectively allowing them to
to choose a winning fork against the will of users, miners, and other choose a winning fork against the will of users, miners, and other developers.
developers.
While the Foundation's maintenance of the `zebrad` client would normally allow In addition, the Foundation's sole maintenance of the `zebrad` client allows
them to "soft veto" a network upgrade, they don't have a similar veto on the them to "soft veto" a network upgrade.
Zcash trademark enforcement.
Compounding these issues, the Foundation and the ECC aren't arms-length entities Unfortunately, the Foundation and the ECC aren't organized as arms-length
as they're organized today. entities today.
This situation poses a number of problems for new and existing Zcash users, as This situation poses a number of problems for new and existing Zcash users, as
well as both entities. well as both entities.
* The threat of a central entity overriding (or being forced to override) the * The threat of two entangled entities overriding (or being forced to override)
will of users undermines self-sovereignty. the will of users undermines self-sovereignty.
* The ECC and Foundation are both put at legal risk. As entangled entities, * The ECC and Foundation are both put at legal risk. As entangled entities,
they're remarkably similar to a single entity when trying to minimize they're remarkably similar to a single entity when trying to minimize
regulatory risk. regulatory risk.
* Power between the two entites *hasn't* been decentralized. The ECC remains
a unilateral power, as well as a single point of failure.
The "crowding out" problem The "crowding out" problem
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@ -324,7 +320,7 @@ The principal developer shall make a number of guarantees.
the Foundation as assurance. the Foundation as assurance.
2. They shall maintain a well-run board and employ a qualified CFO. 2. They shall maintain a well-run board and employ a qualified CFO.
3. In addition to the existing open-source requirements, they shall agree to 3. In addition to the existing open-source requirements, they shall agree to
assign any trademarks or patents relevant to Zcash to the Foundation. assign any patents relevant to Zcash to the Foundation.
In exchange, the principal developer is granted an indefinite minimum dev fee In exchange, the principal developer is granted an indefinite minimum dev fee
allocation of 20%, with a maximum allocation of 35% of the total fee, as allocation of 20%, with a maximum allocation of 35% of the total fee, as