Include requirements and non-requirements

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Matt Luongo 2019-10-19 21:41:40 -04:00
parent 66eb89c7f3
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ My name is Matt Luongo. I'm an entrepreneur who's been full-time in the crypto
space since 2014, co-founding Fold, a Bitcoin payments company, and more
recently Keep, a private computation startup built on Ethereum. At Keep, we've
done some `work around Zcash <https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pull/2129>`_,
and our parent company, `Thesis <https://thesis.co>`, is considering investing
and our parent company, `Thesis <https://thesis.co>`_, is considering investing
more heavily in Zcash development for our latest project.
I'm deeply interested in privacy tech. For me, privacy is about consent --
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ I believe the Zcash community has an opportunity to deploy a new incentive
structure that will attract companies like ours to build and improve Zcash,
leading to a more resilient network, stronger technology, and wider usage.
The Zcash Narrative
The Zcash narrative
-------------------
We're all here to build a robust, private, decentralized currency. But in the
@ -76,13 +76,11 @@ research and engineering talent to take Zcash to the next level, and leveraging
a Zcash dev fee as a differentiator to build the world's best private medium of
exchange.
Evolving Zcash Governance
=========================
Principles of cryptocurrency governance
---------------------------------------
Most proof-of-work chains today have three major governing roles:
To understand Zcash governance, it's worth reviewing "default" cryptocurrency
governance. Most proof-of-work chains today have three major governing roles:
1. Miners validate and secure the chain. They do some work to earn a reward.
Miners are the first owners of newly minted coins, and are an integral part
@ -175,8 +173,46 @@ Zcash.
Sustainably attracting talent to Zcash is critical to maintain innovation and
build resilience.
Moving Forward
==============
Requirements
============
The first requirement is a balanced governance structure. Developers should be
rewarded, without rewarding governance capture. What's best for the chain and
ZEC holders should always come before commercial interests.
The second, and secondary, requirement is funding Zcash development. While the
chain shouldn't be run by a commercial entity, it will need to be supported by
them.
The third requirement is the support of a more resilient ecosystem by:
1. Ending the "crowding out" problem by paying development teams to work on and
for Zcash.
2. Building a dev fee management structure that's resilient to the loss,
capture, or compromise of the Zcash Foundation.
3. Ensuring the ecosystem can survive the loss, capture, or compromise of the
ECC by encouraging developer diversity and strategic input.
Finally, avoid introducing unnecessary additional entities into the governance
process.
Non-requirements
================
General on-chain governance is outside the scope of this proposal. On-chain
governance is an exciting idea -- what if we had an impartial arbiter funding
development? My experience with on-chain governance to date, however, leads me
to believe it's still a risky direction. Zcash should focus on what it's good at
-- privacy -- and leave proving on-chain governance models to other projects.
While this proposal attempts to outline a long-term structure for Zcash funding
and governance, specifying the structure beyond the next 4 years is out of
scope. Much will have changed in 4 years. Perhaps this structure will be
sufficient; perhaps we'll be battling the Third Crypto War, and need to go back
to the drawing table.
Specification
=============
The below proposal is an effort to cleanly resolve the problems with Zcash's
current governance, while