diff --git a/README.rst b/README.rst index 11c2f9ec..49ebd30e 100644 --- a/README.rst +++ b/README.rst @@ -162,5 +162,6 @@ be deleted. - + +
Title
Lockbox for Decentralized Grants Allocation
Allocation of Block Rewards for Decentralized Development Funding
Lockbox Funding Streams
diff --git a/draft-nuttycom-funding-allocation.html b/draft-nuttycom-funding-allocation.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2df96188 --- /dev/null +++ b/draft-nuttycom-funding-allocation.html @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ + + + + Draft nuttycom-funding-allocation: Allocation of Block Rewards for Decentralized Development Funding + + + +
+
ZIP: Unassigned
+Title: Allocation of Block Rewards for Decentralized Development Funding
+Owners: Kris Nuttycombe <kris@nutty.land>
+        Jason McGee <aquietinvestor@gmail.com>
+Original-Authors: Skylar Saveland <skylar@free2z.com>
+Credits: Daira-Emma Hopwood
+         Jack Grigg
+Status: Draft
+Category: Consensus
+Created: 2024-07-03
+License: MIT
+Pull-Request: <https://github.com/zcash/zips/pull/866>
+

Terminology

+

The key words "MUST", "REQUIRED", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 1 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals.

+ + + + + + + + + + +
+

Abstract

+

This ZIP proposes several options for the allocation of a percentage of the Zcash block subsidy, post-November 2024 halving, to an in-protocol "lockbox." Currently, 80% of the block subsidy goes to miners, while 20% is distributed among the Major Grants Fund (ZCG), Electric Coin Company (ECC), and the Zcash Foundation (ZF). If no changes are made, this 20% dev fund will expire, resulting in the entire block subsidy going to miners, leaving no block-subsidy funds for essential protocol development, security, marketing, or legal expenses.

+

The proposed lockbox addresses significant issues observed with 2, such as regulatory risks, inefficiencies in funding organizations instead of projects, and centralization. While the exact disbursement mechanism for the lockbox funds is yet to be determined and will be addressed in a future ZIP, the goal is to employ a decentralized mechanism that ensures community involvement and efficient, project-specific funding. This approach is intended to potentially improve regulatory compliance, reduce inefficiencies, and enhance the decentralization of Zcash's funding structure.

+
+

Motivation

+

Starting at Zcash's second halving in November 2024, by default 100% of the block subsidies will be allocated to miners, and no further funds will be automatically allocated to any other entities. Consequently, no substantial new funding may be available to existing teams dedicated to furthering charitable, educational, or scientific purposes, such as research, development, and outreach.

+

It is important to balance the incentives for securing the consensus protocol through mining with funding crucial charitable, educational, and scientific activities like research, development, and outreach. Additionally, there is a need to continue to promote decentralization and the growth of independent development teams.

+

For these reasons, the Zcash Community wishes to establish a new Zcash Development Fund after the second halving in November 2024, with the intent to put in place a more decentralized mechanism for allocation of development funds. The alternatives presented here are intended to address the following:

+
    +
  1. Regulatory Risks: The current model involves direct funding of US-based organizations, which can potentially attract regulatory scrutiny from entities such as the SEC, posing legal risks to the Zcash ecosystem.
  2. +
  3. Funding Inefficiencies: The current model directly funds organizations rather than specific projects, leading to a potential mismatch between those organizations' development priorities and the priorities of the community. Furthermore, if organizations are guaranteed funds regardless of performance, there is little incentive to achieve key performance indicators (KPIs) or align with community sentiment. A future system that allocates resources directly to projects rather than organizations may help reduce inefficiencies and better align development efforts with community priorities.
  4. +
  5. Centralization Concerns: The current model centralizes decision-making power within a few organizations, contradicting the decentralized ethos of blockchain technology. Traditional organizational structures with boards and executives introduce a single point of failure and limit community involvement in funding decisions.
  6. +
  7. Community Involvement: The current system provides minimal formal input from the community regarding what projects should be funded, leading to a misalignment between funded projects and community priorities.
  8. +
  9. Moving Towards a Non-Direct Funding Model: There is strong community support for a non-direct Dev Fund funding model. Allocating funds to a Deferred Dev Fund Lockbox incentivizes the development of a decentralized mechanism for the disbursement of the locked funds.
  10. +
+

By addressing these issues, this proposal aims to ensure sustainable, efficient, and decentralized funding for essential activities within the Zcash ecosystem.

+
+

Requirements

+
    +
  1. In-Protocol Lockbox: The alternatives presented in this ZIP depend upon the Lockbox Funding Streams proposal 3.
  2. +
  3. Regulatory Considerations: The allocation of funds should minimize regulatory risks by avoiding direct funding of specific organizations. The design should ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations to support the long-term sustainability of the funding model.
  4. +
+
+

Non-requirements

+

The following consideratiosn are explicitly deferred to future ZIPs and are not covered by this proposal:

+
    +
  1. Disbursement Mechanism: The exact method for disbursing the accumulated funds from the lockbox is not defined in this ZIP. The design, implementation, and governance of the disbursement mechanism will be addressed in a future ZIP. This includes specifics on how funds will be allocated, the voting or decision-making process, and the structure of the decentralized mechanism (such as a DAO).
  2. +
  3. Regulatory Compliance Details: The proposal outlines the potential to reduce regulatory risks by avoiding direct funding of US-based organizations, but it does not detail specific regulatory compliance strategies. Future ZIPs will need to address how the disbursement mechanism complies with applicable laws and regulations.
  4. +
  5. Impact Assessment: The long-term impact of reallocating a portion of the block subsidy to the lockbox on the Zcash ecosystem, including its effect on miners, developers, and the broader community, is not analyzed in this ZIP. Subsequent proposals will need to evaluate the outcomes and make necessary adjustments based on real-world feedback and data.
  6. +
+
+

Specification

+

The following alternatives all depend upon the Lockbox Funding Streams proposal 3 for storage of funds into a deferred value pool.

+

Some of the alternatives described below do not specify a termination height for the funding streams they propose. In these cases, the termination height is set to u32::MAX_VALUE. A future network upgrade is required in order for these streams to be terminated.

+
+

Alternatives

+

Alternative 1

+

Proposed by Skylar Saveland

+
    +
  • 50% of the block subsidy is to be distributed to the lockbox.
  • +
+

As of block height 2726400, and continuing until modified by a future ZIP, the complete set of funding streams will be:

+
================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+      Stream       Numerator   Denominator   Start height   End height
+================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+``FS_DEFERRED``       50           100          2726400     u32::MAX
+================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+

Motivations for Alternative 1

+

This alternative proposes a substantially larger slice of the block subsidy than is currently allocated for development funding, in order to provide a long-term source of funding for protocol improvements. It is intended that a future mechanism put in place for the disbursement of these funds to only release funds from the pool in relatively small increments and with a bounded upper value, to ensure that funding remains available for years to come.

+
+
+

Alternative 2

+

Proposed by Jason McGee

+
    +
  • 12% of the block subsidy is to be distributed to the lockbox.
  • +
  • 8% of the block subsidy is to be distributed to the Financial Privacy Foundation (FPF), for the express use of the Zcash Community Grants Committee (ZCG) to fund independent teams in the Zcash ecosystem.
  • +
+

As of block height 2726400, and continuing for one year, the complete set of funding streams will be:

+
================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+      Stream       Numerator   Denominator   Start height   End height
+================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+``FS_DEFERRED``       12           100          2726400      3146400
+``FS_FPF_ZCG``         8           100          2726400      3146400
+================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+

Motivations for Alternative 2

+
    +
  • Limited Runway: ZCG does not have the financial runway that ECC/BP and ZF have. As such, allocating ongoing funding to ZCG will help ensure the Zcash ecosystem has an active grants program.
  • +
  • Promoting Decentralization: Allocating a portion of the Dev Fund to Zcash Community Grants ensures small teams continue to receive funding to contribute to Zcash. Allowing the Dev Fund to expire, or putting 100% into a lockbox, would disproportionally impact grant recipients. This hybrid approach promotes decentralization and the growth of independent development teams.
  • +
  • Mitigating Regulatory Risks: By minimizing direct funding of US-based organizations, the lockbox helps to reduce potential regulatory scrutiny and legal risks.
  • +
+
+
+

Alternative 3

+

Proposed by Kris Nuttycombe

+
    +
  • 20% of the block subsidy is to be distributed to the lockbox.
  • +
+

As of block height 2726400, and continuing for two years, the complete set of funding streams will be:

+
================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+      Stream       Numerator   Denominator   Start height   End height
+================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+``FS_DEFERRED``       20           100          2726400      3566400
+================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+

Motivations for Alternative 3

+

This alternative is presented as the simplest allocation of block rewards to a lockbox for future disbursement that is consistent with results of community polling.

+
+
+

Alternative 4

+

Proposed by NoamChom (Zcash forum)

+
    +
  • 17% of the block subsidy is to be distributed to the lockbox.
  • +
  • 8% of the block subsidy is to be distributed to the Financial Privacy Foundation (FPF), for the express use of the Zcash Community Grants Committee (ZCG) to fund independent teams in the Zcash ecosystem.
  • +
+

As of block height 2726400, and continuing for four years, the complete set of funding streams will be:

+
================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+      Stream       Numerator   Denominator   Start height   End height
+================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+``FS_DEFERRED``       17           100          2726400      4406400
+``FS_FPF_ZCG``         8           100          2726400      4406400
+================= =========== ============= ============== ============
+

Motivations for Alternative 4

+

This alternative proposes a slightly larger slice of the block subsidy than is currently allocated for development funding, in order to better provide for the needs of the Zcash community.

+
+
+
+ +

References

+ + + + + + + +
1Information on BCP 14 — "RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" and "RFC 8174: Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"
+ + + + + + + +
2ZIP 1014: Dev Fund Proposal and Governance
+ + + + + + + +
3Lockbox Funding Streams
+
+
+ + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/draft-nuttycom-lockbox-streams.html b/draft-nuttycom-lockbox-streams.html index 78e8210b..f49dedae 100644 --- a/draft-nuttycom-lockbox-streams.html +++ b/draft-nuttycom-lockbox-streams.html @@ -1,16 +1,15 @@ - Draft nuttycom-lockbox-streams: Lockbox for Decentralized Grants Allocation + Draft nuttycom-lockbox-streams: Lockbox Funding Streams
ZIP: Unassigned
-Title: Lockbox for Decentralized Grants Allocation
+Title: Lockbox Funding Streams
 Owners: Kris Nuttycombe <kris@nutty.land>
-Original-Authors: Skylar Saveland <skylar@free2z.com>
 Credits: Daira-Emma Hopwood <daira-emma@electriccoin.co>
          Jack Grigg <jack@electriccoin.co>
 Status: Draft
diff --git a/index.html b/index.html
index de0e8776..714137ea 100644
--- a/index.html
+++ b/index.html
@@ -128,7 +128,8 @@
             

These are works-in-progress, and may never be assigned ZIP numbers if their ideas become obsoleted or abandoned. Do not assume that these drafts will exist in perpetuity; instead assume that they will either move to a numbered ZIP, or be deleted.

- + +
Title
Lockbox for Decentralized Grants Allocation
Allocation of Block Rewards for Decentralized Development Funding
Lockbox Funding Streams