mirror of https://github.com/zcash/zips.git
Update proposal following community feedback
* Dev Fund will last for 4 years, and terminate at the 2nd halving in 2024, rather than continuing in perpetuity. * Forbid ECC equity holders from serving on Zfnd's Board of Directors. * Zfnd should formally integrate robust means of decentralized community voting into its Board of Director elections by 2021. * Major Grants are no longer limited in duration, and can be ongoing, but have semiannual review points. * Require ECC and Zfnd to publish "grant proposals" and reports that are at least as detailed as other Dev Fund recipients. * Strive for metrics and KPIs in funding decisions. * Clarify that Volatility Reserve investment profits stay in it, and remove the investment constraints. * Discussed profit-sharing provisions in grants. * Another grant priority: supporting ecosystem growth.
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zip-XXXX.rst
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zip-XXXX.rst
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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ZIP: Unassigned
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ZIP: Unassigned
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Title: Dev Fund to ECC + Zfnd + Major Grants
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Title: Dev Fund to ECC + Zfnd + Major Grants
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Owners: Eran Tromer <eran.tromer.org>
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Owners: Eran Tromer <eran@tromer.org>
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Status: Draft
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Status: Draft
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Category: Process
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Category: Process
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Created: 2019-11-10
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Created: 2019-11-10
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@ -12,14 +12,17 @@ Abstract
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========
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========
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This proposal describes a structure for a the Zcash Development Fund, to be
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This proposal describes a structure for a the Zcash Development Fund, to be
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enacted in Network Upgrade 4. This Dev Fund would consist of 20% of the block
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enacted in Network Upgrade 4 and last for 4 years. This Dev Fund would consist
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rewards, split into 3 slices: 1/3 for the Electric Coin Company, 1/3 for Zcash
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of 20% of the block rewards, split into 3 slices:
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Foundation (for internal work and grants), and an 1/3 for additional "Major
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Grants" administered by the Zcash Foundation (with extra community input and
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scrutiny). Funding is capped at $700k/month per slice. Governance and
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accountability are based on existing entities and legal mechanisms, and
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increasingly decentralized governance is encouraged.
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* 1/3 for the Electric Coin Company
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* 1/3 for Zcash Foundation (for internal work and grants)
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* 1/3 for additional "Major Grants" for large-scale long-term projects (decided
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by the Zcash Foundation, with extra community input and scrutiny)
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Funding is capped at $700k/month per slice. Governance and accountability are
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based on existing entities and legal mechanisms, and increasingly decentralized
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governance is encouraged.
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Motivation
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Motivation
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============
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============
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@ -100,12 +103,6 @@ In particular, it should not cause them to expose their coin holdings, or to
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maintain access to secret keys for much longer than they would otherwise. (This
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maintain access to secret keys for much longer than they would otherwise. (This
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rules out some form of voting, and of disbursing coins to past/future miners).
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rules out some form of voting, and of disbursing coins to past/future miners).
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The new Dev Fund system should fulfill the above goals for as long as feasible,
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without requiring further changes at the consensus-code level. (This is because
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such changes may become increasingly difficult to agree upon as the community
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grows; and moreover, to the extent that consensus-code changes are agreed on in
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the future, they will in any case override the current ZIP.)
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The new Dev Fund system should be simple to understand and realistic to
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The new Dev Fund system should be simple to understand and realistic to
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implement. In particular, it should not assume the creation of new mechanisms
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implement. In particular, it should not assume the creation of new mechanisms
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(e.g., election systems) or entities (for governance or development) for its
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(e.g., election systems) or entities (for governance or development) for its
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@ -130,15 +127,17 @@ Specification
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Dev Fund allocation
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Dev Fund allocation
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-------------------
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-------------------
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Starting at the first Zcash halving, and in perpetuity, 20% of the block rewards
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Starting at the first Zcash halving in 2020, until the second halving in 2024,
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will be allocated to a "Dev Fund" that consists of the following three slices:
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20% of the block rewards will be allocated to a "Dev Fund" that consists of the
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following three slices:
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* One third to the Electric Coin Company (denoted **ECC slice**)
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* One third to the Electric Coin Company (denoted **ECC slice**)
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* One third the Zcash Foundation, for general use (denoted **Zfnd-GU slice**)
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* One third the Zcash Foundation, for general use (denoted **Zfnd-GU slice**)
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* One third the Zcash Foundation, for major grants (denoted **Zfnd-MG slice**)
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* One third the Zcash Foundation, for major grants (denoted **Zfnd-MG slice**)
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Details below. The fund flow will be implemented at the consensus-rule layer, by
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Details below. The fund flow will be implemented at the consensus-rule layer, by
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sending the corresponding ZEC to the designated address in each block.
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sending the corresponding ZEC to the designated address in each block. This Dev
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Fund will end at the second halving (unless extended/modified by a future ZIP).
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ECC slice (Electric Coin Company)
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ECC slice (Electric Coin Company)
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@ -173,12 +172,16 @@ including: development, education, support community communication on-line and
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via events, gathering community sentiment, and external awarding grants for all
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via events, gathering community sentiment, and external awarding grants for all
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of the above.
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of the above.
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Zfnd may award grants as profit-sharing contracts, in which case any resulting
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profits will be added to the Zfnd-GU slice (to fund its ongoing operations and
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any future grants).
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Zfnd-MG slice (Zcash Foundation for major grants)
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Zfnd-MG slice (Zcash Foundation for major grants)
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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This slice of the Dev Fund is intended to semi-annually fund independent teams
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This slice of the Dev Fund is intended to fund independent teams entering the
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entering the Zcash ecosystem, to perform development and other work for the
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Zcash ecosystem, to perform major ongoing development (or other work) for the
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public good of Zcash ecosystem, to the extent that such teams are available and
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public good of Zcash ecosystem, to the extent that such teams are available and
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effective.
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effective.
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@ -191,9 +194,8 @@ following additional constraints:
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operations and direct expenses.
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operations and direct expenses.
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2. Major Grants should support well-specified work proposed by the grantee, at
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2. Major Grants should support well-specified work proposed by the grantee, at
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reasonable market-rate costs, for approximately half a year, and no more than
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reasonable market-rate costs. They can be of any duration, or ongoing without a
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one year; additional funding would require explicit application for a new
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duration limit, but have semiannual review points for continuation of funding.
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grant.
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3. Major Grants may be issued to ECC only if no other parties are available and
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3. Major Grants may be issued to ECC only if no other parties are available and
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capable of performing the specified work with similar effectiveness and cost.
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capable of performing the specified work with similar effectiveness and cost.
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@ -202,7 +204,9 @@ following additional constraints:
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4. Priority will be given to Major Grants that bolster new teams with
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4. Priority will be given to Major Grants that bolster new teams with
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substantial (current or prospective) continual existence, and set them up for
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substantial (current or prospective) continual existence, and set them up for
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long-term success, subject to the usual grant award considerations (impact,
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long-term success, subject to the usual grant award considerations (impact,
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ability, risks, team, cost-effectiveness, etc.).
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ability, risks, team, cost-effectiveness, etc.). Priority will be given Major
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Grants that support ecosystem growth by mentorship, coaching, technical
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resources, creating entrepreneurial opportunities, etc.
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5. Major Grants should specifically further the Zcash cryptocurrency and its
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5. Major Grants should specifically further the Zcash cryptocurrency and its
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ecosystem; this is more restrictive than Zfnd's general mission of furthering
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ecosystem; this is more restrictive than Zfnd's general mission of furthering
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@ -230,8 +234,12 @@ obligations defined below.
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From grant proposers' side, proposals for such grants will be submitted through
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From grant proposers' side, proposals for such grants will be submitted through
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Zfnd usual grant process, allowing for public discussion and public funding. It
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Zfnd usual grant process, allowing for public discussion and public funding. It
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is intended that small one-time grants will be funded by drawing on the Zfnd-GU
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is intended that small one-time grants will be funded by drawing on the Zfnd-GU
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slice (where they also compete with other Zfnd activities), whereas large and
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slice (where they also compete with other Zfnd activities), whereas large
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recurring grants will be funded from the dedicated Zfnd-MG slice.
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long-duration will be funded from the dedicated Zfnd-MG slice; though this is at
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Zfnd's discretion.
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Zfnd shall strive to define target metrics and key performance indicators, and
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utilize these in its funding decisions.
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Direct-grant option
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Direct-grant option
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@ -263,7 +271,7 @@ party, in months where the aforementioned monthly ZEC value falls short of the
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Funding Target, and only to the extent needed to cover that shortfall.
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Funding Target, and only to the extent needed to cover that shortfall.
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The Volatility Reserve may be kept as ZEC, or sold and held as fiat currency or
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The Volatility Reserve may be kept as ZEC, or sold and held as fiat currency or
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low-risk liquid investments.
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investments (whose profits will remain in the Volatility Reserve).
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The Funding Target may be changed only by unanimous agreement of Zfnd, ECC and
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The Funding Target may be changed only by unanimous agreement of Zfnd, ECC and
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the majority vote of a voting mechanism weighted by ZEC coin holding. (This is
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the majority vote of a voting mechanism weighted by ZEC coin holding. (This is
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@ -281,7 +289,6 @@ Irrevocable obligations to the above must be made by the recipients (e.g., using
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their Operating Agreements or by receiving the slice as Restricted Funds).
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their Operating Agreements or by receiving the slice as Restricted Funds).
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Transparency and Accountability
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Transparency and Accountability
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-------------------------------
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-------------------------------
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@ -316,6 +323,10 @@ ECC, Zfnd and grant recipients must promptly disclose any security of privacy
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risks that may affect users of Zcash (by responsible disclosure under confidence
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risks that may affect users of Zcash (by responsible disclosure under confidence
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to the pertinent developers, where applicable).
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to the pertinent developers, where applicable).
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ECC's reports, and Zfnd's annual report on its non-grant operations, should be
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at least as detailed as grant proposals/reports submitted by other funded
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parties, and satisfy similar levels of public scrutiny.
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All substantial software whose development was funded by the Dev Fund should be
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All substantial software whose development was funded by the Dev Fund should be
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released under an Open Source license (as defined by the Open Source
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released under an Open Source license (as defined by the Open Source
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Initiative), preferably the MIT license.
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Initiative), preferably the MIT license.
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@ -340,18 +351,37 @@ treatment).
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Future Community Governance
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Future Community Governance
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===========================
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===========================
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Decentralized community governance is desirable, yet difficult, and thus lies
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Decentralized community governance is used in this proposal in the following places:
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outside this proposal scope, except for two places mentioned above:
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1. As advisory input to the `Zfnd-MG slice (Zcash Foundation for major grants)`_.
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1. As advisory input to the `Zfnd-MG slice (Zcash Foundation for major grants)`_.
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2. For changing the `Funding Target and Volatility Reserve`_ (which is an
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2. For changing the `Funding Target and Volatility Reserve`_ (which is an
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incentive for ECC and Zfnd to *create* the voting mechanism).
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incentive for ECC and Zfnd to *create* the voting mechanism).
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It is highly desirable to develop robust means to for community voting and
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3. In Zfnd's future board composition (see below).
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governance, and to integrate them into the Dev Fund disbursement process as well as
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the accountability of the funded parties, before the 2nd Zcash halving in 2024.
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It is highly desirable to develop robust means of decentralized community voting
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ECC and Zfnd should place high priority on such development and its deployment.
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and governance, and to integrate them into all of the above processes, by the
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end of 2021. ECC and Zfnd should place high priority on such development and its
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deployment, in their activities and grant selection.
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Zfnd Board Composition
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======================
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Zfnd should formally integrate robust means of decentralized community voting
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into its Board of Director elections, in a way that is consistent with Zfnd's
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mission and values. Zfnd should lead the process for determining and
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implementing this, legally and technically, by the end of 2021.
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Members of Zfnd's Board of Directors must not hold equity in ECC or have current
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business or employment relationships with ECC.
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Grace period: members of the board who hold ECC equity (but do not have other
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current relationships to ECC) may dispose of their equity, or quit the Board, by
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1 March 2021. (The grace period is to allow for orderly replacement, and also to
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allow time for ECC corporate reorganization related to Dev Fund receipt, which
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may affect how disposition of equity would be executed.)
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Disclosures
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Disclosures
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