mirror of https://github.com/zcash/zips.git
Update proposal following community feedback
* Dev Fund will last for 4 years, and terminate at the 2nd halving in 2024, rather than continuing in perpetuity. * Forbid ECC equity holders from serving on Zfnd's Board of Directors. * Zfnd should formally integrate robust means of decentralized community voting into its Board of Director elections by 2021. * Major Grants are no longer limited in duration, and can be ongoing, but have semiannual review points. * Require ECC and Zfnd to publish "grant proposals" and reports that are at least as detailed as other Dev Fund recipients. * Strive for metrics and KPIs in funding decisions. * Clarify that Volatility Reserve investment profits stay in it, and remove the investment constraints. * Discussed profit-sharing provisions in grants. * Another grant priority: supporting ecosystem growth.
This commit is contained in:
parent
3e8e6e9a9e
commit
627487f356
96
zip-XXXX.rst
96
zip-XXXX.rst
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
|||
|
||||
ZIP: Unassigned
|
||||
Title: Dev Fund to ECC + Zfnd + Major Grants
|
||||
Owners: Eran Tromer <eran.tromer.org>
|
||||
Owners: Eran Tromer <eran@tromer.org>
|
||||
Status: Draft
|
||||
Category: Process
|
||||
Created: 2019-11-10
|
||||
|
@ -12,14 +12,17 @@ Abstract
|
|||
========
|
||||
|
||||
This proposal describes a structure for a the Zcash Development Fund, to be
|
||||
enacted in Network Upgrade 4. This Dev Fund would consist of 20% of the block
|
||||
rewards, split into 3 slices: 1/3 for the Electric Coin Company, 1/3 for Zcash
|
||||
Foundation (for internal work and grants), and an 1/3 for additional "Major
|
||||
Grants" administered by the Zcash Foundation (with extra community input and
|
||||
scrutiny). Funding is capped at $700k/month per slice. Governance and
|
||||
accountability are based on existing entities and legal mechanisms, and
|
||||
increasingly decentralized governance is encouraged.
|
||||
enacted in Network Upgrade 4 and last for 4 years. This Dev Fund would consist
|
||||
of 20% of the block rewards, split into 3 slices:
|
||||
|
||||
* 1/3 for the Electric Coin Company
|
||||
* 1/3 for Zcash Foundation (for internal work and grants)
|
||||
* 1/3 for additional "Major Grants" for large-scale long-term projects (decided
|
||||
by the Zcash Foundation, with extra community input and scrutiny)
|
||||
|
||||
Funding is capped at $700k/month per slice. Governance and accountability are
|
||||
based on existing entities and legal mechanisms, and increasingly decentralized
|
||||
governance is encouraged.
|
||||
|
||||
Motivation
|
||||
============
|
||||
|
@ -100,12 +103,6 @@ In particular, it should not cause them to expose their coin holdings, or to
|
|||
maintain access to secret keys for much longer than they would otherwise. (This
|
||||
rules out some form of voting, and of disbursing coins to past/future miners).
|
||||
|
||||
The new Dev Fund system should fulfill the above goals for as long as feasible,
|
||||
without requiring further changes at the consensus-code level. (This is because
|
||||
such changes may become increasingly difficult to agree upon as the community
|
||||
grows; and moreover, to the extent that consensus-code changes are agreed on in
|
||||
the future, they will in any case override the current ZIP.)
|
||||
|
||||
The new Dev Fund system should be simple to understand and realistic to
|
||||
implement. In particular, it should not assume the creation of new mechanisms
|
||||
(e.g., election systems) or entities (for governance or development) for its
|
||||
|
@ -130,15 +127,17 @@ Specification
|
|||
Dev Fund allocation
|
||||
-------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Starting at the first Zcash halving, and in perpetuity, 20% of the block rewards
|
||||
will be allocated to a "Dev Fund" that consists of the following three slices:
|
||||
Starting at the first Zcash halving in 2020, until the second halving in 2024,
|
||||
20% of the block rewards will be allocated to a "Dev Fund" that consists of the
|
||||
following three slices:
|
||||
|
||||
* One third to the Electric Coin Company (denoted **ECC slice**)
|
||||
* One third the Zcash Foundation, for general use (denoted **Zfnd-GU slice**)
|
||||
* One third the Zcash Foundation, for major grants (denoted **Zfnd-MG slice**)
|
||||
|
||||
Details below. The fund flow will be implemented at the consensus-rule layer, by
|
||||
sending the corresponding ZEC to the designated address in each block.
|
||||
sending the corresponding ZEC to the designated address in each block. This Dev
|
||||
Fund will end at the second halving (unless extended/modified by a future ZIP).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
ECC slice (Electric Coin Company)
|
||||
|
@ -173,12 +172,16 @@ including: development, education, support community communication on-line and
|
|||
via events, gathering community sentiment, and external awarding grants for all
|
||||
of the above.
|
||||
|
||||
Zfnd may award grants as profit-sharing contracts, in which case any resulting
|
||||
profits will be added to the Zfnd-GU slice (to fund its ongoing operations and
|
||||
any future grants).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Zfnd-MG slice (Zcash Foundation for major grants)
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
This slice of the Dev Fund is intended to semi-annually fund independent teams
|
||||
entering the Zcash ecosystem, to perform development and other work for the
|
||||
This slice of the Dev Fund is intended to fund independent teams entering the
|
||||
Zcash ecosystem, to perform major ongoing development (or other work) for the
|
||||
public good of Zcash ecosystem, to the extent that such teams are available and
|
||||
effective.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -191,9 +194,8 @@ following additional constraints:
|
|||
operations and direct expenses.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Major Grants should support well-specified work proposed by the grantee, at
|
||||
reasonable market-rate costs, for approximately half a year, and no more than
|
||||
one year; additional funding would require explicit application for a new
|
||||
grant.
|
||||
reasonable market-rate costs. They can be of any duration, or ongoing without a
|
||||
duration limit, but have semiannual review points for continuation of funding.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Major Grants may be issued to ECC only if no other parties are available and
|
||||
capable of performing the specified work with similar effectiveness and cost.
|
||||
|
@ -202,7 +204,9 @@ following additional constraints:
|
|||
4. Priority will be given to Major Grants that bolster new teams with
|
||||
substantial (current or prospective) continual existence, and set them up for
|
||||
long-term success, subject to the usual grant award considerations (impact,
|
||||
ability, risks, team, cost-effectiveness, etc.).
|
||||
ability, risks, team, cost-effectiveness, etc.). Priority will be given Major
|
||||
Grants that support ecosystem growth by mentorship, coaching, technical
|
||||
resources, creating entrepreneurial opportunities, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Major Grants should specifically further the Zcash cryptocurrency and its
|
||||
ecosystem; this is more restrictive than Zfnd's general mission of furthering
|
||||
|
@ -230,8 +234,12 @@ obligations defined below.
|
|||
From grant proposers' side, proposals for such grants will be submitted through
|
||||
Zfnd usual grant process, allowing for public discussion and public funding. It
|
||||
is intended that small one-time grants will be funded by drawing on the Zfnd-GU
|
||||
slice (where they also compete with other Zfnd activities), whereas large and
|
||||
recurring grants will be funded from the dedicated Zfnd-MG slice.
|
||||
slice (where they also compete with other Zfnd activities), whereas large
|
||||
long-duration will be funded from the dedicated Zfnd-MG slice; though this is at
|
||||
Zfnd's discretion.
|
||||
|
||||
Zfnd shall strive to define target metrics and key performance indicators, and
|
||||
utilize these in its funding decisions.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Direct-grant option
|
||||
|
@ -263,7 +271,7 @@ party, in months where the aforementioned monthly ZEC value falls short of the
|
|||
Funding Target, and only to the extent needed to cover that shortfall.
|
||||
|
||||
The Volatility Reserve may be kept as ZEC, or sold and held as fiat currency or
|
||||
low-risk liquid investments.
|
||||
investments (whose profits will remain in the Volatility Reserve).
|
||||
|
||||
The Funding Target may be changed only by unanimous agreement of Zfnd, ECC and
|
||||
the majority vote of a voting mechanism weighted by ZEC coin holding. (This is
|
||||
|
@ -281,7 +289,6 @@ Irrevocable obligations to the above must be made by the recipients (e.g., using
|
|||
their Operating Agreements or by receiving the slice as Restricted Funds).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Transparency and Accountability
|
||||
-------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -316,6 +323,10 @@ ECC, Zfnd and grant recipients must promptly disclose any security of privacy
|
|||
risks that may affect users of Zcash (by responsible disclosure under confidence
|
||||
to the pertinent developers, where applicable).
|
||||
|
||||
ECC's reports, and Zfnd's annual report on its non-grant operations, should be
|
||||
at least as detailed as grant proposals/reports submitted by other funded
|
||||
parties, and satisfy similar levels of public scrutiny.
|
||||
|
||||
All substantial software whose development was funded by the Dev Fund should be
|
||||
released under an Open Source license (as defined by the Open Source
|
||||
Initiative), preferably the MIT license.
|
||||
|
@ -340,18 +351,37 @@ treatment).
|
|||
Future Community Governance
|
||||
===========================
|
||||
|
||||
Decentralized community governance is desirable, yet difficult, and thus lies
|
||||
outside this proposal scope, except for two places mentioned above:
|
||||
Decentralized community governance is used in this proposal in the following places:
|
||||
|
||||
1. As advisory input to the `Zfnd-MG slice (Zcash Foundation for major grants)`_.
|
||||
|
||||
2. For changing the `Funding Target and Volatility Reserve`_ (which is an
|
||||
incentive for ECC and Zfnd to *create* the voting mechanism).
|
||||
|
||||
It is highly desirable to develop robust means to for community voting and
|
||||
governance, and to integrate them into the Dev Fund disbursement process as well as
|
||||
the accountability of the funded parties, before the 2nd Zcash halving in 2024.
|
||||
ECC and Zfnd should place high priority on such development and its deployment.
|
||||
3. In Zfnd's future board composition (see below).
|
||||
|
||||
It is highly desirable to develop robust means of decentralized community voting
|
||||
and governance, and to integrate them into all of the above processes, by the
|
||||
end of 2021. ECC and Zfnd should place high priority on such development and its
|
||||
deployment, in their activities and grant selection.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Zfnd Board Composition
|
||||
======================
|
||||
|
||||
Zfnd should formally integrate robust means of decentralized community voting
|
||||
into its Board of Director elections, in a way that is consistent with Zfnd's
|
||||
mission and values. Zfnd should lead the process for determining and
|
||||
implementing this, legally and technically, by the end of 2021.
|
||||
|
||||
Members of Zfnd's Board of Directors must not hold equity in ECC or have current
|
||||
business or employment relationships with ECC.
|
||||
|
||||
Grace period: members of the board who hold ECC equity (but do not have other
|
||||
current relationships to ECC) may dispose of their equity, or quit the Board, by
|
||||
1 March 2021. (The grace period is to allow for orderly replacement, and also to
|
||||
allow time for ECC corporate reorganization related to Dev Fund receipt, which
|
||||
may affect how disposition of equity would be executed.)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Disclosures
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue