zec
/
zips
mirror of https://github.com/zcash/zips.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity

ZIP 324: use a workaround to make the 0-based list valid. 

Signed-off-by: Daira-Emma Hopwood <daira@jacaranda.org>
This commit is contained in:
Daira-Emma Hopwood 2024-02-24 14:04:20 +00:00
parent 947a4e2ba0
commit 641d21227b
1 changed files with 1 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
zip-0324.rst
View File

@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ In the above description, we explicitly list the notes involved in the payment (
Instead, we can have the nodes be implicitly identified by the spending key (or similar) included in the URI. This can make URI shorter, thus less scary and less likely to run into length limits (consider SMS). The following alternatives are feasible: Instead, we can have the nodes be implicitly identified by the spending key (or similar) included in the URI. This can make URI shorter, thus less scary and less likely to run into length limits (consider SMS). The following alternatives are feasible:
0. Explicitly list the note commitments within the URI. :math:`\hspace{0.9em}`\0. Explicitly list the note commitments within the URI.
1. Include only the spending key(s) in the URI, and have the recipient scan the blockchain using the existing mechanism (trial decryption of the encrypted memo field). This is very slow, and risks denial-of-service attacks. Would be faster in the nominal case if the scanning is done backwards (newest block first), or if told by the sender when the transactions were mined; but scanning the whole chain for nonexistent transactions (perhaps induced by a DoS) would still take very long. 1. Include only the spending key(s) in the URI, and have the recipient scan the blockchain using the existing mechanism (trial decryption of the encrypted memo field). This is very slow, and risks denial-of-service attacks. Would be faster in the nominal case if the scanning is done backwards (newest block first), or if told by the sender when the transactions were mined; but scanning the whole chain for nonexistent transactions (perhaps induced by a DoS) would still take very long.