Cosmetics.

Signed-off-by: Daira Hopwood <daira@jacaranda.org>
This commit is contained in:
Daira Hopwood 2018-10-01 10:16:32 +01:00
parent dc81e21c2b
commit 691922ebd1
1 changed files with 9 additions and 9 deletions

View File

@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ electronic commerce and payment, financial privacy, proof of work, zero knowledg
\newcommand{\TransmitCiphertext}[1]{\Ctext^\enc_{#1}} \newcommand{\TransmitCiphertext}[1]{\Ctext^\enc_{#1}}
\newcommand{\TransmitKey}[1]{\Key^\enc_{#1}} \newcommand{\TransmitKey}[1]{\Key^\enc_{#1}}
\newcommand{\OutCiphertext}{\Ctext^\mathsf{out}} \newcommand{\OutCiphertext}{\Ctext^\mathsf{out}}
\newcommand{\Extractor}[1]{\mathcal{E}_{#1}} \newcommand{\Extractor}[1]{\mathcal{E}_{\kern-0.05em{#1}}}
\newcommand{\Adversary}{\mathcal{A}} \newcommand{\Adversary}{\mathcal{A}}
\newcommand{\Oracle}{\mathsf{O}} \newcommand{\Oracle}{\mathsf{O}}
\newcommand{\CryptoBoxSeal}{\mathsf{crypto\_box\_seal}} \newcommand{\CryptoBoxSeal}{\mathsf{crypto\_box\_seal}}
@ -6724,7 +6724,7 @@ Define $\RedDSAVerify{} \typecolon (\vk \typecolon \RedDSAPublic) \times (M \typ
let $\RedDSAReprS{}$ be the remaining $\ceiling{\bitlength(\ParamG{r})/8}$ bytes. let $\RedDSAReprS{}$ be the remaining $\ceiling{\bitlength(\ParamG{r})/8}$ bytes.
\item Let $\RedDSASigR{} = \abstG{}\big(\LEOStoBSP{\ellG{}}(\RedDSAReprR{})\kern-0.15em\big)$, and \item Let $\RedDSASigR{} = \abstG{}\big(\LEOStoBSP{\ellG{}}(\RedDSAReprR{})\kern-0.15em\big)$, and
let $\RedDSASigS{} = \LEOStoIP{8 \mult \length(\RedDSAReprS{})}(\RedDSAReprS{})$. let $\RedDSASigS{} = \LEOStoIP{8 \mult \length(\RedDSAReprS{})}(\RedDSAReprS{})$.
\item Let $\vkBytes{} = \LEBStoOSPOf{\ellG{}}{\reprG{}\Of{\vk}}$. \item Let $\vkBytes{} = \LEBStoOSPOf{\ellG{}}{\reprG{}\Of{\vk}\kern 0.03em}$.
\vspace{-0.5ex} \vspace{-0.5ex}
\item Let $\RedDSASigc{} = \RedDSAHashToScalar(\RedDSAReprR{} \bconcat \vkBytes{} \bconcat M)$. \item Let $\RedDSASigc{} = \RedDSAHashToScalar(\RedDSAReprR{} \bconcat \vkBytes{} \bconcat M)$.
\vspace{0.5ex} \vspace{0.5ex}
@ -9779,9 +9779,9 @@ Peter Newell's illustration of the Jubjub bird, from \cite{Carroll1902}.
\item Correct some uses of $\ParamJ{r}$ that should have been $\ParamS{r}$ or $q$. \item Correct some uses of $\ParamJ{r}$ that should have been $\ParamS{r}$ or $q$.
\item Correct uses of $\LEOStoIP{\ell}$ in $\RedDSAVerify{}$ and $\RedDSABatchVerify{}$ \item Correct uses of $\LEOStoIP{\ell}$ in $\RedDSAVerify{}$ and $\RedDSABatchVerify{}$
to ensure that $\ell$ is a multiple of $8$ as required. to ensure that $\ell$ is a multiple of $8$ as required.
\item Minor changes to avoid clashing notation, affecting extractors \item Minor changes to avoid clashing notation for
$\Extractor{\Adversary}$, Edwards curves $\Edwards{a,d}$, and Montgomery curves Edwards curves $\Edwards{a,d}$, Montgomery curves $\Montgomery{A,B}$, and
$\Montgomery{A,B}$. extractors $\Extractor{\Adversary}$.
} %sapling } %sapling
\end{itemize} \end{itemize}
@ -9793,7 +9793,7 @@ Peter Newell's illustration of the Jubjub bird, from \cite{Carroll1902}.
\item No changes to \Sprout. \item No changes to \Sprout.
\sapling{ \sapling{
\item Give an informal security argument for Unlinkability of \diversifiedPaymentAddresses \item Give an informal security argument for Unlinkability of \diversifiedPaymentAddresses
based on to reduction to \keyPrivacy of ElGamal encryption, for which a security proof based on reduction to \keyPrivacy of ElGamal encryption, for which a security proof
is given in \cite{BBDP2001}. (This argument has gaps which will be addressed in a future is given in \cite{BBDP2001}. (This argument has gaps which will be addressed in a future
version.) version.)
\item Add a reference to \cite{BGM2018} for the \Sapling \zkSNARK parameters. \item Add a reference to \cite{BGM2018} for the \Sapling \zkSNARK parameters.
@ -11316,7 +11316,7 @@ implement the affine-Montgomery addition $P_1 + P_2 = (x_3, y_3)$ for all such $
\begin{proof} \begin{proof}
The given constraints are equivalent to the Montgomery addition formulae The given constraints are equivalent to the Montgomery addition formulae
under the side condition $x_1 \neq x_2$. (Note that neither $P_i$ can be under the side condition that $x_1 \neq x_2$. (Note that neither $P_i$ can be
the zero point since $k_\barerange{1}{2} \neq 0 \pmod s$.) the zero point since $k_\barerange{1}{2} \neq 0 \pmod s$.)
Assume for a contradiction that $x_1 = x_2$. For any Assume for a contradiction that $x_1 = x_2$. For any
$P_1 = \scalarmult{k_1}{Q}$, there can be only one other point $-P_1$ with $P_1 = \scalarmult{k_1}{Q}$, there can be only one other point $-P_1$ with
@ -11993,7 +11993,7 @@ Check & Implements & \heading{Cost} & Reference \\
& \textbf{Diversified address integrity} & 392 & \shortcrossref{ccteddecompressvalidate} \\ \hline & \textbf{Diversified address integrity} & 392 & \shortcrossref{ccteddecompressvalidate} \\ \hline
$\AuthProvePublicRepr = \reprJ(\AuthProvePublic)$ $\AuthProvePublicRepr = \reprJ(\AuthProvePublic)$
& \textbf{Nullifier integrity} & 392 & \shortcrossref{ccteddecompressvalidate} \\ \hline & \textbf{Nullifier integrity} & 392 & \shortcrossref{ccteddecompressvalidate} \\ \hline
$\InViewingKeyRepr = \ItoLEBSP{251}\big(\CRHivk(\AuthSignPublic, \AuthProvePublic)\big)\;\dagger$ $\InViewingKeyRepr = \ItoLEBSP{251}\big(\CRHivk(\AuthSignPublic, \AuthProvePublic)\kern-0.08em\big)\;\dagger$
& \textbf{Diversified address integrity} & 21262 & \shortcrossref{cctblake2s} \\ \hline & \textbf{Diversified address integrity} & 21262 & \shortcrossref{cctblake2s} \\ \hline
$\DiversifiedTransmitBase$ is on the curve $\DiversifiedTransmitBase$ is on the curve
& $\DiversifiedTransmitBase \typecolon \GroupJ$ & 4 & \shortcrossref{cctedvalidate} \\ \hline & $\DiversifiedTransmitBase \typecolon \GroupJ$ & 4 & \shortcrossref{cctedvalidate} \\ \hline
@ -12014,7 +12014,7 @@ Check & Implements & \heading{Cost} & Reference \\
& \textbf{Note commitment integrity} & ? & \shortcrossref{cctwindowedcommit} ($\ell = 576$) \\ \hline & \textbf{Note commitment integrity} & ? & \shortcrossref{cctwindowedcommit} ($\ell = 576$) \\ \hline
$\cmURepr = \ExtractJ(\cm)$ $\cmURepr = \ExtractJ(\cm)$
& \textbf{Merkle path validity} & 0 & \\ \cline{1-1}\cline{3-4} & \textbf{Merkle path validity} & 0 & \\ \cline{1-1}\cline{3-4}
$\rt'$ is the root of a Merkle tree with leaf $\cmU$ and authentication path $(\TreePath{}, \NotePositionRepr)$ \raggedright $\rt'$ is the root of a Merkle tree with leaf $\cmU$, and authentication path $(\TreePath{}, \NotePositionRepr)$
& & 32 \mult 1369 & \shortcrossref{cctmerklepath} \\ \cline{1-1}\cline{3-4} & & 32 \mult 1369 & \shortcrossref{cctmerklepath} \\ \cline{1-1}\cline{3-4}
$\NotePositionRepr = \ItoLEBSPOf{\MerkleDepthSapling}{\NotePosition}$ $\NotePositionRepr = \ItoLEBSPOf{\MerkleDepthSapling}{\NotePosition}$
& & 1 & \shortcrossref{cctmodpack} \\ \cline{1-1}\cline{3-4} & & 1 & \shortcrossref{cctmodpack} \\ \cline{1-1}\cline{3-4}