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Include the bulk of the dev fee proposal
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zip-XXXX.rst
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zip-XXXX.rst
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@ -168,3 +168,132 @@ Even those developers who already have the expertise to work on this system are
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frustrated by the lack of longer-term funding. For evidence, look at Parity's
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frustrated by the lack of longer-term funding. For evidence, look at Parity's
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exit from Zcash after `zebrad` development, or Summa's struggles to work on
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exit from Zcash after `zebrad` development, or Summa's struggles to work on
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Zcash.
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Zcash.
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Sustainably attracting talent to Zcash can increase innovation *and* ecosystem
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resilience.
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Moving Forward
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==============
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The below proposal is an effort to cleanly resolve the problems with Zcash's
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current governance, while
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* maintaining a balance of power between stakeholders
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* removing single points of failure / control
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* growing development and usage of Zcash
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* and supporting the best interests of miners, users, and developers *today*.
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Decentralizing development
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--------------------------
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A few proposals have suggested the introduction of a mysterious "third entity"
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to resolve disagreements between the Foundation and the ECC.
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I prefer a different approach, refocusing the role of the Foundation and making
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room for the ECC to innovate alongside outside developers.
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In this proposal, the Foundation shall support community development through
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running the forum and events, gathering community sentiment, managing short-term
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development grants, and conducting the diligence behind the assignment and
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disbursement of a development fee. This development fee shall be funded by 20%
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of the block reward, with as much as half of the fee burned each month based on
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market conditions.
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The Foundation shall receive 25% of the dev fee. If the volume-weighted average
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price of ZEC over the month means the foundation would receive greater than
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$500k that month, the foundation shall burn the remaining ZEC such that their
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max benefit is $500k that month.
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The remaining 75% of the dev fee shall be distributed between development teams
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working to maintain clients.
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* One third of the remaining fee (25% of the total) shall be reserved for the
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role of the "principal developer", a developer with additional voice in Zcash
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governance. The principal developer allocation shall be capped similarly to
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the Foundation's at $500k per month based on a volume-weighted average price.
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* The remaining two thirds of the fee (50% of the total), called the "outside
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development fee", shall be distributed between at least two developers,
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chosen semi-annually by the Foundation. Unlike those of the Foundation and
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principal developer, these allocations aren't limited by market conditions,
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and don't carry a burn requirement.
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The role of dev fee recipients
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------------------------------
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Dev fee recipients are distinguished from grant recipients in the scope and
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timelines of their work, as well as the specificity of direction. The intent
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is to allow teams to focus on a core competency, while encouraging research and
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adjacent work.
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Dev fee recipients are chosen semi-annually by the Foundation based on their
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ability to move Zcash forward. Recipients will typically be development teams,
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though "full stack" teams that can communicate well with the community, expand
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Zcash usage, and widely share their work should be advantaged.
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Recipients shall submit quarterly plans to the Foundation and community for
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their efforts, as well as monthly progress updates.
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All work by funded by the dev fee will be open source, under licenses compatible
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with the existing Zcash clients.
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While dev fee recipients are not required to work exclusively on Zcash, they
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must guarantee they aren't obliged to the interests of competing projects.
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The role of the principal developer
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-----------------------------------
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The role of the principal developer is as a "first among equals" amongst the dev
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fee recipients.
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The principal developer shall make a number of guarantees.
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1. Zcash shall be their exclusive focus, submitting financials periodically to
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the Foundation as assurance.
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2. They shall maintain a well-run board and employ a qualified CFO.
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3. In addition to the existing open-source requirements, they shall agree to
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assign any trademarks or patents relevant to Zcash to the Foundation.
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In exchange, the principal developer is granted an indefinite dev fee allocation
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and a wide remit to pursue longer-term research relevant to Zcash.
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Minimum viable Foundation
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-------------------------
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To manage the dev fee and fulfill its community and diligence duties, the
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Foundation shall maintain a board of 5 independent members. Rather than the
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current structure in the current bylaws, the board will consist of
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* 3 seats voted on by the ZEC holders
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* 1 seat representing a newly created research advisory board, whose primary
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role will be technical diligence of potential recipients of the dev fee
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* 1 seat for the "principal developer", a privileged recipient of the Zcash
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dev fee acting as "first among equals" amongst a variety of dev fee recipients
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building on Zcash
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Each board member shall be paid reasonably by the Foundation.
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Outside the seat for the principal developer, no board members shall have an
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ongoing commercial interest in any recipients of the dev fee.
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The ECC as the principal developer
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----------------------------------
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I propose that the ECC be considered as the initial principal developer,
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receiving an indefinite dev fee allocation in exchange for their exclusive
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focus on Zcash research and development, and assigning all patents and marks
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relevant to Zcash to the Foundation.
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I believe this arrangement is best for the Zcash ecosystem, and with proper
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management of funds, should satisfy the ongoing needs of the ECC.
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The dev call
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------------
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The Foundation shall organize a bi-weekly call for all dev fee recipients and
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other third party developers. The call will be live-streamed for community
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participation, though the speaking participants will be invite only. At a
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minimum, a single representative from each dev fee recipient should attend.
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The Foundation shall also maintain a simple chat solution for development of
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the protocol. While the chat logs should be publicly viewable, it need not be
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open to public participation.
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