diff --git a/zip-XXXX.rst b/zip-XXXX.rst index a3970a3d..8685eb0b 100644 --- a/zip-XXXX.rst +++ b/zip-XXXX.rst @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ My name is Matt Luongo. I'm an entrepreneur who's been full-time in the crypto space since 2014, co-founding Fold, a Bitcoin payments company, and more recently Keep, a private computation startup built on Ethereum. At Keep, we've done some `work around Zcash `_, -and our parent company, `Thesis `, is considering investing +and our parent company, `Thesis `_, is considering investing more heavily in Zcash development for our latest project. I'm deeply interested in privacy tech. For me, privacy is about consent -- @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ I believe the Zcash community has an opportunity to deploy a new incentive structure that will attract companies like ours to build and improve Zcash, leading to a more resilient network, stronger technology, and wider usage. -The Zcash Narrative +The Zcash narrative ------------------- We're all here to build a robust, private, decentralized currency. But in the @@ -76,13 +76,11 @@ research and engineering talent to take Zcash to the next level, and leveraging a Zcash dev fee as a differentiator to build the world's best private medium of exchange. -Evolving Zcash Governance -========================= - Principles of cryptocurrency governance --------------------------------------- -Most proof-of-work chains today have three major governing roles: +To understand Zcash governance, it's worth reviewing "default" cryptocurrency +governance. Most proof-of-work chains today have three major governing roles: 1. Miners validate and secure the chain. They do some work to earn a reward. Miners are the first owners of newly minted coins, and are an integral part @@ -175,8 +173,46 @@ Zcash. Sustainably attracting talent to Zcash is critical to maintain innovation and build resilience. -Moving Forward -============== +Requirements +============ + +The first requirement is a balanced governance structure. Developers should be +rewarded, without rewarding governance capture. What's best for the chain and +ZEC holders should always come before commercial interests. + +The second, and secondary, requirement is funding Zcash development. While the +chain shouldn't be run by a commercial entity, it will need to be supported by +them. + +The third requirement is the support of a more resilient ecosystem by: + +1. Ending the "crowding out" problem by paying development teams to work on and + for Zcash. +2. Building a dev fee management structure that's resilient to the loss, + capture, or compromise of the Zcash Foundation. +3. Ensuring the ecosystem can survive the loss, capture, or compromise of the + ECC by encouraging developer diversity and strategic input. + +Finally, avoid introducing unnecessary additional entities into the governance +process. + +Non-requirements +================ + +General on-chain governance is outside the scope of this proposal. On-chain +governance is an exciting idea -- what if we had an impartial arbiter funding +development? My experience with on-chain governance to date, however, leads me +to believe it's still a risky direction. Zcash should focus on what it's good at +-- privacy -- and leave proving on-chain governance models to other projects. + +While this proposal attempts to outline a long-term structure for Zcash funding +and governance, specifying the structure beyond the next 4 years is out of +scope. Much will have changed in 4 years. Perhaps this structure will be +sufficient; perhaps we'll be battling the Third Crypto War, and need to go back +to the drawing table. + +Specification +============= The below proposal is an effort to cleanly resolve the problems with Zcash's current governance, while