mirror of https://github.com/zcash/zips.git
Clarify a note about SU-CMA security for signatures.
Signed-off-by: Daira Hopwood <daira@jacaranda.org>
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@ -1298,10 +1298,10 @@ pair without access to the signing key.
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In fact the instantiation of $\JoinSplitSig$ uses a scheme designed
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for security under adaptive attack even when multiple signatures are
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signed under the same key.
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\item SU-CMA security requires it to be infeasible for the adversary to
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forge a distinct signature on a previously seen message. That is,
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\joinSplitSignatures are intended to be nonmalleable in the sense of
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\cite{BIP-62}.
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\item SU-CMA security requires it to be infeasible for the adversary, not
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knowing the private key, to forge a distinct signature on a previously
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seen message. That is, \joinSplitSignatures are intended to be
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nonmalleable in the sense of \cite{BIP-62}.
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\end{pnotes}
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@ -3558,6 +3558,7 @@ The errors in the proof of Ledger Indistinguishability mentioned in
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\item Update the section on encoding of \transparent addresses.
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(The precise prefixes are not decided yet.)
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\item Clarify why $\Blake{\ell}$ is different from truncated $\Blake{512}$.
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\item Clarify a note about SU-CMA security for signatures.
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\item Add a paragraph about key length in \crossref{inbandrationale}.
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\item Add acknowledgements for John Tromp, Paige Peterson, Maureen Walsh,
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Jay Graber, and Jack Gavigan.
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