diff --git a/protocol/protocol.tex b/protocol/protocol.tex
index 317d9a8b..253b2281 100644
--- a/protocol/protocol.tex
+++ b/protocol/protocol.tex
@@ -1491,7 +1491,6 @@ electronic commerce and payment, financial privacy, proof of work, zero knowledg
 \newcommand{\DiversifierKeyLength}{\mathsf{\ell_{\DiversifierKey}}}
 \newcommand{\DiversifierKeyType}{\byteseq{\DiversifierKeyLength/8}}
 \newcommand{\DiversifierIndex}{\mathsf{index}}
-\newcommand{\CommitIvkRandom}{\mathsf{rivk}}
 \newcommand{\FVK}{\mathsf{FVK}}
 \newcommand{\DiversifiedTransmitBase}{\mathsf{g_d}}
 \newcommand{\DiversifiedTransmitBaseRepr}{\mathsf{g\Repr_d}}
@@ -5107,7 +5106,7 @@ The \diversifiedPaymentAddress with \diversifierIndex $0$ is called the \definin
         usage in the context of hierarchical deterministic wallets.
   \item Address generators \MAY encode information in the \diversifierIndex
         that can be recovered by the recipient of a payment, given the \diversifierKey.
-  \item $\CommitIvkRandom$ is used both as a randomizer for $\CommitIvk{}$, and as a
+  \item $\CommitIvkRand$ is used both as a randomizer for $\CommitIvk{}$, and as a
         key for $\PRFexpand{}$ to derive $\DiversifierKey$ and $\OutViewingKey$.
         If $\DiversifierKey$ and $\OutViewingKey$ are known to an adversary, then
         this reuse prevents proving that the use of $\CommitIvk{}$ in this context is
@@ -7129,7 +7128,7 @@ $\AuthSignRandomizedPublic = \SpendAuthSigRandomizePublic{Orchard}(\AuthSignRand
 
 \snarkcondition{Diversified address integrity}{actionaddressintegrity}
 $\InViewingKey = \bot$ or $\DiversifiedTransmitPublicOld = \scalarmult{\InViewingKey}{\DiversifiedTransmitBaseOld}$ where
-$\InViewingKey = \CommitIvk{\CommitIvkRandom}\big(\ExtractP(\AuthSignPublicPoint), \NullifierKey\big)$.
+$\InViewingKey = \CommitIvk{\CommitIvkRand}\big(\ExtractP(\AuthSignPublicPoint), \NullifierKey\big)$.
 
 \snarkcondition{New note commitment integrity}{actionnewnotecommitmentintegrity}
 $\ExtractPbot\big(\NoteCommit{Orchard}{\NoteCommitRandNew{}}(\reprP(\DiversifiedTransmitBaseNew),
@@ -7191,7 +7190,7 @@ For details of the form and encoding of \actionStatement proofs, see \crossref{h
         where the statement only requires to prove knowledge of the scalar, without using it
         elsewhere --- i.e.\ the multiplications by $\NoteCommitRandOld{}$ or $\NoteCommitRandNew{}$
         in $\NoteCommitAlg{Orchard}$, by $\ValueCommitRand$ in $\ValueCommitAlg{Orchard}$, by
-        $\CommitIvkRandom$ in $\CommitIvkAlg$, and by $\AuthSignRandomizer$ in
+        $\CommitIvkRand$ in $\CommitIvkAlg$, and by $\AuthSignRandomizer$ in
         $\SpendAuthSigRandomizePublic{Orchard}$. In particular, the representation of
         $(\PRFnf{Orchard}{\NullifierKey}(\NoteUniqueRand) + \NoteNullifierRand) \bmod \ParamP{q}$
         that is used for the scalar multiplication in $\DeriveNullifierAlg$ \MUST be checked to be
@@ -12062,12 +12061,12 @@ Let $\KA{Orchard}$ be as defined in \crossref{concreteorchardkeyagreement}.
 Let $\ExtractP$ be as defined in \crossref{concreteextractorpallas}.
 
 An \Orchard{} \defining{\fullViewingKey} consists of $\AuthSignPublic \typecolon \AuthSignPublicTypeOrchard$,
-$\NullifierKey \typecolon \NullifierKeyTypeOrchard$, and $\CommitIvkRandom \typecolon \GF{\ParamP{r}}$.
+$\NullifierKey \typecolon \NullifierKeyTypeOrchard$, and $\CommitIvkRand \typecolon \GF{\ParamP{r}}$.
 
 $\AuthSignPublic$ is the \authValidatingKey, a result of applying $\ExtractP$ to a
 point on the \pallasCurve (see \crossref{pallasandvesta}). $\NullifierKey$ is the
 \nullifierDerivingKey, a field element in $\NullifierKeyTypeOrchard$.
-$\CommitIvkRandom$ is the \commitIvkRandomness, a field element in $\GF{\ParamP{r}}$.
+$\CommitIvkRand$ is the \commitIvkRandomness, a field element in $\CommitIvkRandType$.
 They are derived as described in \crossref{orchardkeycomponents}.
 
 Let $\ItoLEOSP{}$ be as defined in \crossref{endian}.
@@ -12080,7 +12079,7 @@ The \rawEncoding of an \Orchard \fullViewingKey consists of:
 \begin{bytefield}[bitwidth=0.05em]{512}
     \sbitbox{256}{$\ItoLEOSPOf{256}{\AuthSignPublic}$}
     \sbitbox{256}{$\ItoLEOSPOf{256}{\NullifierKey}$}
-    \sbitbox{256}{$\ItoLEOSPOf{256}{\CommitIvkRandom}$}
+    \sbitbox{256}{$\ItoLEOSPOf{256}{\CommitIvkRand}$}
 \end{bytefield}
 \end{equation*}
 
@@ -12088,13 +12087,13 @@ The \rawEncoding of an \Orchard \fullViewingKey consists of:
 \begin{itemize}
   \item $32$ bytes (little-endian) specifying $\AuthSignPublic$.
   \item $32$ bytes (little-endian) specifying $\NullifierKey$.
-  \item $32$ bytes (little-endian) specifying $\CommitIvkRandom$.
+  \item $32$ bytes (little-endian) specifying $\CommitIvkRand$.
 \end{itemize}
 
 \introlist
 \vspace{-1ex}
 When decoding this representation, the key \MUST be considered invalid if $\AuthSignPublic$,
-$\NullifierKey$, or $\CommitIvkRandom$ are not canonically encoded elements of their respective
+$\NullifierKey$, or $\CommitIvkRand$ are not canonically encoded elements of their respective
 fields, or if $\AuthSignPublic$ is not a valid \Pallas $x$-coordinate.
 
 There is no \BechOptm encoding defined for an individual \Orchard \fullViewingKey;
@@ -15108,7 +15107,7 @@ Peter Newell's illustration of the Jubjub bird, from \cite{Carroll1902}.
     \item Correct and clarify \theoremref{thmsinsemillacr} and \theoremref{thmsinsemillaex}.
     \item Clarify that a \dummyNote should be created if no real \Orchard \note is being
           spent in an \actionTransfer.
-    \item Add a caveat in \crossref{orchardkeycomponents} about reuse of $\CommitIvkRandom$
+    \item Add a caveat in \crossref{orchardkeycomponents} about reuse of $\CommitIvkRand$
           between $\PRFexpand{}$ and $\CommitIvk{}$.
     \item Expand the set of ZIPs associated with \NUFive in \crossref{networkupgrades}, and
           reference \cite{Zcash-Orchard} and \cite{Zcash-halo2} there.