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ZIP for "Allow Recipient to Derive Sapling Ephemeral Secret from Note Plaintext"

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@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ Index of ZIPs
<tr> <td>209</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0209.rst">Prohibit Negative Shielded Value Pool</a></td> <td>Final</td>
<tr> <td>210</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0210.rst">Sapling Anchor Deduplication within Transactions</a></td> <td>Draft</td>
<tr> <td>211</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0211.rst">Disabling Addition of New Value to the Sprout Value Pool</a></td> <td>Proposed</td>
<tr> <td>212</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0212.rst">Allow Recipient to Derive Sapling Ephemeral Secret from Note Plaintext</a></td> <td>Proposed</td>
<tr> <td>213</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0213.rst">Shielded Coinbase</a></td> <td>Implemented (zcashd)</td>
<tr> <td>214</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0214.rst">Consensus rules for a Zcash Development Fund</a></td> <td>Proposed</td>
<tr> <td>221</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0221.rst">FlyClient - Consensus-Layer Changes</a></td> <td>Implemented (zcashd)</td>

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<tr> <td>209</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0209">Prohibit Negative Shielded Value Pool</a></td> <td>Final</td>
<tr> <td>210</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0210">Sapling Anchor Deduplication within Transactions</a></td> <td>Draft</td>
<tr> <td>211</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0211">Disabling Addition of New Value to the Sprout Value Pool</a></td> <td>Proposed</td>
<tr> <td>212</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0212">Allow Recipient to Derive Sapling Ephemeral Secret from Note Plaintext</a></td> <td>Proposed</td>
<tr> <td>213</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0213">Shielded Coinbase</a></td> <td>Implemented (zcashd)</td>
<tr> <td>214</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0214">Consensus rules for a Zcash Development Fund</a></td> <td>Proposed</td>
<tr> <td>221</td> <td class="left"><a href="zip-0221">FlyClient - Consensus-Layer Changes</a></td> <td>Implemented (zcashd)</td>

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<title>ZIP 212: Allow Recipient to Derive Sapling Ephemeral Secret from Note Plaintext</title>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
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<section>
<pre>ZIP: 212
Title: Allow Recipient to Derive Sapling Ephemeral Secret from Note Plaintext
Owners: Sean Bowe &lt;sean@electriccoin.co&gt;
Status: Proposed
Category: Consensus
Created: 2019-03-31
License: MIT</pre>
<section id="terminology"><h2><span class="section-heading">Terminology</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#terminology"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h2>
<p>The key words "MUST" and "MUST NOT" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.</p>
<p>The function <code>ToScalar</code> is defined as in Section 4.4.2 of the Zcash Protocol Specification. <a id="id1" class="footnote_reference" href="#protocol">1</a></p>
</section>
<section id="abstract"><h2><span class="section-heading">Abstract</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#abstract"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h2>
<p>This ZIP proposes a new note plaintext format for Sapling Outputs in transactions. The new format allows recipients to check the well-formedness of the emphemeral Diffie-Hellman key in the Output to avoid an assumption on zk-SNARK soundness for preventing diversified address linkability.</p>
</section>
<section id="motivation"><h2><span class="section-heading">Motivation</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#motivation"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h2>
<p>The Sapling payment protocol contains a feature called "diversified addresses" which allows a single incoming viewing key to receive payments on an enormous number of distinct and unlinkable payment addresses. This feature allows users to maintain many payment addresses without paying additional overhead during blockchain scanning.</p>
<p>The feature works by allowing payment addresses to become a tuple (<code>pk_d</code>, <code>d</code>) of a public key <code>pk_d</code> and 88-bit diversifier <code>d</code> such that <code>pk_d =
[ivk] GH(d)</code> for some incoming viewing key <code>ivk</code>. The hash function <code>GH(d)</code> maps from a diversifier to prime order elements of the Jubjub elliptic curve. It is possible for a user to choose many <code>d</code> to create several distinct and unlinkable payment addresses of this form.</p>
<p>In order to make a payment to a Sapling address, an ephemeral secret <code>esk</code> is sampled by the sender and an ephemeral public key <code>epk = [esk] GH(d)</code> is included in the Output description. Then, a shared Diffie-Hellman secret is computed by the sender as <code>[esk] [8] pk_d</code>. The recipient can recover this shared secret without knowledge of the particular <code>d</code> by computing <code>[ivk] [8]
epk</code>. This shared secret is then used as part of Note decryption.</p>
<p>Naively, the recipient cannot know which <code>(pk_d, d)</code> was used to compute the shared secret, but the sender is asked to include the <code>d</code> within the note plaintext to reconstruct the Note. However, if the recipient has more than one known addresses, an attacker could use a different payment address to perform secret exchange and, by observing the behavior of the recipient, link the two diversified addresses together. (This attacker strategy was discovered by Brian Warner earlier in the design of the Sapling protocol.)</p>
<p>In order to prevent this attack, the protocol currently forces the sender to prove knowledge of the discrete logarithm of <code>epk</code> with respect to the <code>g_d =
GH(d)</code> included within the Note commitment. This <code>g_d</code> is determined by <code>d</code> and recomputed during Note decryption, and so the recipient will either be unable to decrypt the note or the sender will be unable to perform the attack.</p>
<p>However, this check occurs as part of the zero-knowledge proof statement and so relies on the soundness of the underlying zk-SNARK in Sapling, and therefore it relies on relatively strong cryptographic assumptions and a trusted setup. It would be preferable to force the sender to transfer <code>esk</code> within the Note plaintext so that, during note decryption, the recipient can check that <code>epk =
[esk] g_d</code> (for the expected <code>g_d</code>) and ignore the payment as invalid otherwise. This forms a line of defense in the case that soundness of the zk-SNARK does not hold.</p>
<p>Merely sending <code>esk</code> to the recipient in the Note plaintext would require us to enlarge the note plaintext, but also would compromise the proof of IND-CCA2 security for in-band secret distribution. We avoid both of these concerns by using a key derivation to obtain both <code>esk</code> and <code>rcm</code>.</p>
</section>
<section id="specification"><h2><span class="section-heading">Specification</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#specification"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h2>
<p>Pseudo random functions (PRFs) are defined in section 4.2.1 of the Zcash Protocol Specification. <a id="id2" class="footnote_reference" href="#abstractprfs">3</a> We will be adapting <code>PRF^expand</code> for the purposes of this ZIP. This function is keyed by a 256-bit key <code>sk</code> and takes an arbitrary length byte sequence as input, returning a 64-byte sequence as output.</p>
<section id="changes-to-sapling-note-plaintexts"><h3><span class="section-heading">Changes to Sapling Note plaintexts</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#changes-to-sapling-note-plaintexts"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h3>
<p>Note plaintext encodings are specified in section 5.5 of the Zcash Protocol Specification. <a id="id3" class="footnote_reference" href="#notept">4</a> Currently, the encoding of a Sapling note plaintext requires that the first byte take the form <code>0x01</code>, indicating the version of the note plaintext. In addition, a 256-bit <code>rcm</code> field exists within the note plaintext and encoding.</p>
<p>Following the activation of this ZIP, the first byte of the encoding MUST take the form <code>0x02</code> (representing the new note plaintext version) and the field <code>rcm</code> of the encoding will be renamed to <code>rseed</code>. This field <code>rseed</code> of the Sapling note plaintext will no longer take the type of <cite>NoteCommit^Sapling.Trapdoor</cite> but will instead be a 32-byte sequence. The requirement that <code>rseed</code> (previously, <code>rcm</code>) be a scalar of the Jubjub elliptic curve, when interpreted as a little endian integer, is removed from the decryption of note plaintexts as described in sections 4.17.2 and 4.17.3 of the Zcash Protocol Specification. <a id="id4" class="footnote_reference" href="#saplingdecryptivk">5</a> <a id="id5" class="footnote_reference" href="#saplingdecryptovk">6</a></p>
</section>
<section id="changes-to-the-process-of-sending-sapling-notes"><h3><span class="section-heading">Changes to the process of sending Sapling notes</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#changes-to-the-process-of-sending-sapling-notes"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h3>
<p>The process of sending notes in Sapling is described in section 4.6.2 of the Zcash Protocol Specification. <a id="id6" class="footnote_reference" href="#saplingsend">7</a> During this process, the sender samples <code>rcm^new</code> uniformly at random. In addition, the process of encrypting a note is described in section 4.17.1 of the Zcash Protocol Specification. <a id="id7" class="footnote_reference" href="#saplingencrypt">2</a> During this process, the sender also samples the ephemeral private key <code>esk</code> uniformly at random.</p>
<p>After the activation of this ZIP, the sender will sample a uniformly random 32-byte sequence <code>rseed</code>. The note plaintext will take <code>rseed</code> in place of <code>rcm^new</code>.</p>
<p><code>rcm^new</code> is then computed by the sender as the output of <code>ToScalar(PRF^expand_rseed([4]))</code>.</p>
<p><code>esk</code> is also computed by the sender as the output of <code>ToScalar(PRF^expand_rseed([5]))</code>.</p>
</section>
<section id="changes-to-the-process-of-receiving-sapling-notes"><h3><span class="section-heading">Changes to the process of receiving Sapling notes</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#changes-to-the-process-of-receiving-sapling-notes"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h3>
<p>The process of receiving notes in Sapling is described in sections 4.17.2 and 4.17.3 of the Zcash Protocol Specification. <a id="id8" class="footnote_reference" href="#saplingdecryptivk">5</a> <a id="id9" class="footnote_reference" href="#saplingdecryptovk">6</a></p>
<p>After the activation of this ZIP, the note plaintext contains a field <code>rseed</code> that is a 32-byte sequence rather than a scalar value <code>rcm</code>. The recipient, during decryption and in any later contexts, will interpret the value <code>rcm</code> as the output of <code>ToScalar(PRF^expand_rseed([4]))</code>. Further, the recipient MUST compute <code>esk</code> as <code>ToScalar(PRF^expand_rseed([5]))</code> and check that <code>epk =
[esk] g_d</code> and fail decryption if this check is not satisfied.</p>
</section>
</section>
<section id="rationale"><h2><span class="section-heading">Rationale</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#rationale"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h2>
<p>The attack that this prevents is an interactive attack that requires an adversary to be able to break critical soundness properties of the zk-SNARKs underlying Sapling. It is potentially valid to assume that this cannot occur, due to other damaging effects on the system such as undetectable counterfeiting. However, we have attempted to avoid any instance in the protocol where privacy (even against interactive attacks) depended on strong cryptographic assumptions. Acting differently here would be confusing for users that have previously been told that "privacy does not depend on zk-SNARK soundness" or similar claims.</p>
<p>It is possible for us to infringe on the length of the <code>memo</code> field and ask the sender to provide <code>esk</code> within the existing note plaintext without modifying the transaction format, but this would harm users that have come to expect a 512-byte memo field to be available to them. Changes to the memo field length should be considered in a broader context than changes made for cryptographic purposes.</p>
<p>It is possible to transmit a signature of knowledge of a correct <code>esk</code> rather than <code>esk</code> itself, but this appears to be an unnecessary complication and is likely slower than just supplying <code>esk</code>.</p>
</section>
<section id="security-and-privacy-considerations"><h2><span class="section-heading">Security and Privacy Considerations</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#security-and-privacy-considerations"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h2>
<p>The changes made in this proposal prevent an interactive attack that could link together diversified addresses by only breaking the knowledge soundness assumption of the zk-SNARK. It is already assumed that the adversary cannot defeat the EC-DDH assumption of the Jubjub elliptic curve, for it could perform a linkability attack trivially in that case.</p>
<p>In the naive case where the protocol is modified so that <code>esk</code> is supplied directly to the recipient (rather than derived through <code>rseed</code>) this would lead to an instance of key-dependent encryption, which is difficult or perhaps impossible to prove secure using existing security notions. Our approach of using a key derivation, which ultimately queries an oracle, allows a proof for IND-CCA2 security to be written by reprogramming the oracle to return bogus keys when necessary.</p>
</section>
<section id="reference-implementation"><h2><span class="section-heading">Reference Implementation</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#reference-implementation"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h2>
<p>TBD</p>
</section>
<section id="acknowledgements"><h2><span class="section-heading">Acknowledgements</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#acknowledgements"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h2>
<p>The discovery that diversified address unlinkability depended on the zk-SNARK knowledge assumption was made by Sean Bowe and Zooko Wilcox.</p>
</section>
<section id="references"><h2><span class="section-heading">References</span><span class="section-anchor"> <a href="#references"><img width="24" height="24" src="assets/images/section-anchor.png" alt=""></a></span></h2>
<table id="protocol" class="footnote">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<td><a href="https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf">Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table id="saplingencrypt" class="footnote">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>2</th>
<td><a href="https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#saplingencrypt">Section 4.17.1: Encryption (Sapling). Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table id="abstractprfs" class="footnote">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>3</th>
<td><a href="https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#abstractprfs">Section 4.1.2: Pseudo Random Functions. Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table id="notept" class="footnote">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>4</th>
<td><a href="https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#notept">Section 5.5: Encodings of Note Plaintexts and Memo Fields. Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table id="saplingdecryptivk" class="footnote">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>5</th>
<td><a href="https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#saplingdecryptivk">Section 4.17.2: Decryption using an Incoming Viewing Key (Sapling). Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table id="saplingdecryptovk" class="footnote">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>6</th>
<td><a href="https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#saplingdecryptovk">Section 4.17.3: Decryption using a Full Viewing Key (Sapling). Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table id="saplingsend" class="footnote">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>7</th>
<td><a href="https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#saplingsend">Section 4.6.2: Sending Notes (Sapling). Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</section>
</section>
</body>
</html>

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::
ZIP: 212
Title: Allow Recipient to Derive Sapling Ephemeral Secret from Note Plaintext
Owners: Sean Bowe <sean@electriccoin.co>
Status: Proposed
Category: Consensus
Created: 2019-03-31
License: MIT
Terminology
===========
The key words "MUST" and "MUST NOT" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
The function ``ToScalar`` is defined as in Section 4.4.2 of the Zcash Protocol Specification. [#protocol]_
Abstract
========
This ZIP proposes a new note plaintext format for Sapling Outputs in
transactions. The new format allows recipients to check the well-formedness of
the emphemeral Diffie-Hellman key in the Output to avoid an assumption on
zk-SNARK soundness for preventing diversified address linkability.
Motivation
==========
The Sapling payment protocol contains a feature called "diversified addresses"
which allows a single incoming viewing key to receive payments on an enormous
number of distinct and unlinkable payment addresses. This feature allows users
to maintain many payment addresses without paying additional overhead during
blockchain scanning.
The feature works by allowing payment addresses to become a tuple (``pk_d``,
``d``) of a public key ``pk_d`` and 88-bit diversifier ``d`` such that ``pk_d =
[ivk] GH(d)`` for some incoming viewing key ``ivk``. The hash function ``GH(d)``
maps from a diversifier to prime order elements of the Jubjub elliptic curve. It
is possible for a user to choose many ``d`` to create several distinct and
unlinkable payment addresses of this form.
In order to make a payment to a Sapling address, an ephemeral secret ``esk`` is
sampled by the sender and an ephemeral public key ``epk = [esk] GH(d)`` is
included in the Output description. Then, a shared Diffie-Hellman secret is
computed by the sender as ``[esk] [8] pk_d``. The recipient can recover this
shared secret without knowledge of the particular ``d`` by computing ``[ivk] [8]
epk``. This shared secret is then used as part of Note decryption.
Naively, the recipient cannot know which ``(pk_d, d)`` was used to compute the
shared secret, but the sender is asked to include the ``d`` within the note
plaintext to reconstruct the Note. However, if the recipient has more than one
known addresses, an attacker could use a different payment address to perform
secret exchange and, by observing the behavior of the recipient, link the two
diversified addresses together. (This attacker strategy was discovered by Brian
Warner earlier in the design of the Sapling protocol.)
In order to prevent this attack, the protocol currently forces the sender to
prove knowledge of the discrete logarithm of ``epk`` with respect to the ``g_d =
GH(d)`` included within the Note commitment. This ``g_d`` is determined by ``d``
and recomputed during Note decryption, and so the recipient will either be
unable to decrypt the note or the sender will be unable to perform the attack.
However, this check occurs as part of the zero-knowledge proof statement and so
relies on the soundness of the underlying zk-SNARK in Sapling, and therefore it
relies on relatively strong cryptographic assumptions and a trusted setup. It
would be preferable to force the sender to transfer ``esk`` within the Note
plaintext so that, during note decryption, the recipient can check that ``epk =
[esk] g_d`` (for the expected ``g_d``) and ignore the payment as invalid
otherwise. This forms a line of defense in the case that soundness of the
zk-SNARK does not hold.
Merely sending ``esk`` to the recipient in the Note plaintext would require us
to enlarge the note plaintext, but also would compromise the proof of IND-CCA2
security for in-band secret distribution. We avoid both of these concerns by
using a key derivation to obtain both ``esk`` and ``rcm``.
Specification
=============
Pseudo random functions (PRFs) are defined in section 4.2.1 of the Zcash
Protocol Specification. [#abstractprfs]_ We will be adapting ``PRF^expand`` for
the purposes of this ZIP. This function is keyed by a 256-bit key ``sk`` and
takes an arbitrary length byte sequence as input, returning a 64-byte sequence
as output.
Changes to Sapling Note plaintexts
----------------------------------
Note plaintext encodings are specified in section 5.5 of the Zcash Protocol
Specification. [#notept]_ Currently, the encoding of a Sapling note plaintext
requires that the first byte take the form ``0x01``, indicating the version of
the note plaintext. In addition, a 256-bit ``rcm`` field exists within the note
plaintext and encoding.
Following the activation of this ZIP, the first byte of the encoding MUST take
the form ``0x02`` (representing the new note plaintext version) and the field
``rcm`` of the encoding will be renamed to ``rseed``. This field ``rseed`` of
the Sapling note plaintext will no longer take the type of
`NoteCommit^Sapling.Trapdoor` but will instead be a 32-byte sequence. The
requirement that ``rseed`` (previously, ``rcm``) be a scalar of the Jubjub
elliptic curve, when interpreted as a little endian integer, is removed from the
decryption of note plaintexts as described in sections 4.17.2 and 4.17.3 of the
Zcash Protocol Specification. [#saplingdecryptivk]_ [#saplingdecryptovk]_
Changes to the process of sending Sapling notes
-----------------------------------------------
The process of sending notes in Sapling is described in section 4.6.2 of the
Zcash Protocol Specification. [#saplingsend]_ During this process, the sender
samples ``rcm^new`` uniformly at random. In addition, the process of encrypting
a note is described in section 4.17.1 of the Zcash Protocol Specification.
[#saplingencrypt]_ During this process, the sender also samples the ephemeral
private key ``esk`` uniformly at random.
After the activation of this ZIP, the sender will sample a uniformly random
32-byte sequence ``rseed``. The note plaintext will take ``rseed`` in place of
``rcm^new``.
``rcm^new`` is then computed by the sender as the output of
``ToScalar(PRF^expand_rseed([4]))``.
``esk`` is also computed by the sender as the output of
``ToScalar(PRF^expand_rseed([5]))``.
Changes to the process of receiving Sapling notes
-------------------------------------------------
The process of receiving notes in Sapling is described in sections 4.17.2 and
4.17.3 of the Zcash Protocol Specification. [#saplingdecryptivk]_
[#saplingdecryptovk]_
After the activation of this ZIP, the note plaintext contains a field ``rseed``
that is a 32-byte sequence rather than a scalar value ``rcm``. The recipient,
during decryption and in any later contexts, will interpret the value ``rcm`` as
the output of ``ToScalar(PRF^expand_rseed([4]))``. Further, the recipient MUST
compute ``esk`` as ``ToScalar(PRF^expand_rseed([5]))`` and check that ``epk =
[esk] g_d`` and fail decryption if this check is not satisfied.
Rationale
=========
The attack that this prevents is an interactive attack that requires an
adversary to be able to break critical soundness properties of the zk-SNARKs
underlying Sapling. It is potentially valid to assume that this cannot occur,
due to other damaging effects on the system such as undetectable counterfeiting.
However, we have attempted to avoid any instance in the protocol where privacy
(even against interactive attacks) depended on strong cryptographic assumptions.
Acting differently here would be confusing for users that have previously been
told that "privacy does not depend on zk-SNARK soundness" or similar claims.
It is possible for us to infringe on the length of the ``memo`` field and ask
the sender to provide ``esk`` within the existing note plaintext without
modifying the transaction format, but this would harm users that have come to
expect a 512-byte memo field to be available to them. Changes to the memo field
length should be considered in a broader context than changes made for
cryptographic purposes.
It is possible to transmit a signature of knowledge of a correct ``esk`` rather
than ``esk`` itself, but this appears to be an unnecessary complication and is
likely slower than just supplying ``esk``.
Security and Privacy Considerations
===================================
The changes made in this proposal prevent an interactive attack that could link
together diversified addresses by only breaking the knowledge soundness
assumption of the zk-SNARK. It is already assumed that the adversary cannot
defeat the EC-DDH assumption of the Jubjub elliptic curve, for it could perform
a linkability attack trivially in that case.
In the naive case where the protocol is modified so that ``esk`` is supplied
directly to the recipient (rather than derived through ``rseed``) this would
lead to an instance of key-dependent encryption, which is difficult or perhaps
impossible to prove secure using existing security notions. Our approach of
using a key derivation, which ultimately queries an oracle, allows a proof for
IND-CCA2 security to be written by reprogramming the oracle to return bogus keys
when necessary.
Reference Implementation
========================
TBD
Acknowledgements
================
The discovery that diversified address unlinkability depended on the zk-SNARK
knowledge assumption was made by Sean Bowe and Zooko Wilcox.
References
==========
.. [#protocol] `Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later <https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf>`_
.. [#saplingencrypt] `Section 4.17.1: Encryption (Sapling). Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later <https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#saplingencrypt>`_
.. [#abstractprfs] `Section 4.1.2: Pseudo Random Functions. Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later <https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#abstractprfs>`_
.. [#notept] `Section 5.5: Encodings of Note Plaintexts and Memo Fields. Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later <https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#notept>`_
.. [#saplingdecryptivk] `Section 4.17.2: Decryption using an Incoming Viewing Key (Sapling). Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later <https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#saplingdecryptivk>`_
.. [#saplingdecryptovk] `Section 4.17.3: Decryption using a Full Viewing Key (Sapling). Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later <https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#saplingdecryptovk>`_
.. [#saplingsend] `Section 4.6.2: Sending Notes (Sapling). Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2020.1.4 [Overwinter+Sapling+Blossom+Heartwood] or later <https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#saplingsend>`_