mirror of https://github.com/zcash/zips.git
ZIP 1012: Editing to regularize all of the dev fund ZIPs.
Signed-off-by: Daira Hopwood <daira@jacaranda.org>
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zip-XXXX.rst
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zip-XXXX.rst
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@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
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::
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::
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ZIP: Unassigned
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ZIP: 1012
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Title: Dev Fund to ECC + Zfnd + Major Grants
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Title: Dev Fund to ECC + ZF + Major Grants
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Owners: Eran Tromer <eran@tromer.org>
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Owner: Eran Tromer <eran@tromer.org>
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Status: Draft
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Status: Draft
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Category: Process
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Category: Consensus / Process
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Created: 2019-11-10
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Created: 2019-11-10
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License: MIT
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License: MIT
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Abstract
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Abstract
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========
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========
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@ -24,15 +25,16 @@ Funding is capped at $700k/month per slice. Governance and accountability are
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based on existing entities and legal mechanisms, and increasingly decentralized
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based on existing entities and legal mechanisms, and increasingly decentralized
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governance is encouraged.
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governance is encouraged.
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Motivation
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Motivation
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============
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==========
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Starting at Zcash's first halving in October 2020, by default 100% of the block
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Starting at Zcash's first halving in October 2020, by default 100% of the block
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rewards will be allocated to miners, and no further funds will be automatically
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rewards will be allocated to miners, and no further funds will be automatically
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allocated to research, development and outreach. Consequently, no substantial
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allocated to research, development and outreach. Consequently, no substantial
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new funding may be available to existing teams dedicated to Zcash: the Electric
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new funding may be available to existing teams dedicated to Zcash: the Electric
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Coin Company (ECC), the Zcash Foundation (Zfnd), and the many entities funded by
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Coin Company (ECC), the Zcash Foundation (ZF), and the many entities funded by
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the Zfnd grant program.
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the ZF grant program.
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There is a need to strike a balance between incentivizing the security of the
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There is a need to strike a balance between incentivizing the security of the
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consensus protocol (i.e., mining) versus other crucial aspects of the Zcash
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consensus protocol (i.e., mining) versus other crucial aspects of the Zcash
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@ -48,27 +50,28 @@ Difference from Matt Luongo's proposal
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This proposal is based on Matt Luongo's `Decentralizing the Dev Fee`_ proposal,
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This proposal is based on Matt Luongo's `Decentralizing the Dev Fee`_ proposal,
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which has similar motivations. The major changes are as follows:
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which has similar motivations. The major changes are as follows:
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* The Dev Fund slice intended for external recipients (beyond ECC, Zfnd and
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* The Dev Fund slice intended for external recipients (beyond ECC, ZF and
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existing Zfnd grants) may be used to fund ECC if no competitive alternatives
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existing ZF grants) may be used to fund ECC if no competitive alternatives
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present themselves, to mitigate unwarranted loss of existing capabilities.
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present themselves, to mitigate unwarranted loss of existing capabilities.
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* For simplicity, the above slice is combined with the Foundation's existing
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* For simplicity, the above slice is combined with the Foundation's existing
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grant system; but is accompanied by explicit requirements to achieve its goals,
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grant system; but is accompanied by explicit requirements to achieve its
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independent advisory input, and a Restricted Funds mechanism to enforce these
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goals, independent advisory input, and a Restricted Funds mechanism to
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requirements.
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enforce these requirements.
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* The "easing function" coin value cap is removed, in favor of capping each slice
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* The "easing function" coin value cap is removed, in favor of capping each
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at $700k/month funding target. Any excess is kept in a reserve, from which it
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slice at $700k/month funding target. Any excess is kept in a reserve, from
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can be withdrawn only to maintain the funding target in the future.
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which it can be withdrawn only to maintain the funding target in the future.
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* Strengthened the transparency and accountability requirements, and harmonized
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* Strengthened the transparency and accountability requirements, and
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them across ECC, Zfnd and major grantees.
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harmonized them across ECC, ZF and major grantees.
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* Removed Zfnd's supervisory role in determining the "principal developer",
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* Removed ZF's supervisory role in determining the "principal developer",
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fixing it to be ECC (changing this would be sufficiently dramatic to merit a
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fixing it to be ECC (changing this would be sufficiently dramatic to merit a
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fork).
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fork).
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* Small differences in prescribed changes to the Zfnd board.
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* Small differences in prescribed changes to the ZF board.
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* Call for, and incentivize, development of decentralized voting and governance.
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* Call for, and incentivize, development of decentralized voting and governance.
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* Clarity and brevity.
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* Clarity and brevity.
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.. _Decentralizing the Dev Fee: https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/decentralizing-the-dev-fee/35252
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.. _Decentralizing the Dev Fee: https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/decentralizing-the-dev-fee/35252
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Requirements
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Requirements
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============
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============
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@ -105,6 +108,7 @@ execution; but it should strive to support and use these once they are built.
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Comply with legal, regulatory and taxation constraints in pertinent
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Comply with legal, regulatory and taxation constraints in pertinent
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jurisdictions.
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jurisdictions.
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Non-requirements
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Non-requirements
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================
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================
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@ -122,16 +126,17 @@ Dev Fund allocation
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-------------------
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-------------------
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Starting at the first Zcash halving in 2020, until the second halving in 2024,
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Starting at the first Zcash halving in 2020, until the second halving in 2024,
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20% of the block rewards will be allocated to a "Dev Fund" that consists of the
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20% of the block rewards will be allocated to a "Dev Fund" that consists of
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following three slices:
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the following three slices:
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* One third to the Electric Coin Company (denoted **ECC slice**)
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* One third to the Electric Coin Company (denoted **ECC slice**)
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* One third the Zcash Foundation, for general use (denoted **Zfnd-GU slice**)
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* One third the Zcash Foundation, for general use (denoted **ZF-GU slice**)
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* One third the Zcash Foundation, for major grants (denoted **Zfnd-MG slice**)
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* One third the Zcash Foundation, for major grants (denoted **ZF-MG slice**)
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Details below. The fund flow will be implemented at the consensus-rule layer, by
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Details below. The fund flow will be implemented at the consensus-rule layer,
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sending the corresponding ZEC to the designated address in each block. This Dev
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by sending the corresponding ZEC to the designated address in each block. This
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Fund will end at the second halving (unless extended/modified by a future ZIP).
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Dev Fund will end at the second halving (unless extended/modified by a future
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ZIP).
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ECC slice (Electric Coin Company)
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ECC slice (Electric Coin Company)
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@ -156,130 +161,132 @@ This obligation must be made irrevocable, e.g., within ECC's corporate
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governance structure (i.e., its Operating Agreement) or contractual obligations.
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governance structure (i.e., its Operating Agreement) or contractual obligations.
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Zfnd-GU slice (Zcash Foundation, for general use)
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ZF-GU slice (Zcash Foundation, for general use)
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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This slice of the Dev Fund will flow to Zfnd, to be used at its discretion for
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This slice of the Dev Fund will flow to ZF, to be used at its discretion for
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any purpose within its mandate to support Zcash and financial privacy,
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any purpose within its mandate to support Zcash and financial privacy,
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including: development, education, support community communication on-line and
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including: development, education, support community communication on-line
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via events, gathering community sentiment, and external awarding grants for all
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and via events, gathering community sentiment, and external awarding grants
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of the above.
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for all of the above.
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Zfnd may award grants as profit-sharing contracts, in which case any resulting
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ZF may award grants as profit-sharing contracts, in which case any resulting
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profits will be added to the Zfnd-GU slice (to fund its ongoing operations and
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profits will be added to the ZF-GU slice (to fund its ongoing operations and
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any future grants).
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any future grants).
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Zfnd-MG slice (Zcash Foundation, for major grants)
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ZF-MG slice (Zcash Foundation, for major grants)
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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This slice of the Dev Fund is intended to fund independent teams entering the
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This slice of the Dev Fund is intended to fund independent teams entering the
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Zcash ecosystem, to perform major ongoing development (or other work) for the
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Zcash ecosystem, to perform major ongoing development (or other work) for the
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public good of Zcash ecosystem, to the extent that such teams are available and
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public good of Zcash ecosystem, to the extent that such teams are available
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effective.
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and effective.
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The funds will be received and administered by Zfnd. Zfnd will disburse them as
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The funds will be received and administered by ZF. ZF will disburse them as
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"Major Grants", within the framework of Zfnd's grant program but subject to the
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"Major Grants", within the framework of ZF's grant program but subject to the
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following additional constraints:
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following additional constraints:
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1. These funds may be only be used to issue Major Grants to external parties
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1. These funds may be only be used to issue Major Grants to external parties
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that are independent of Zfnd. They may not be used by Zfnd for its internal
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that are independent of ZF. They may not be used by ZF for its internal
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operations and direct expenses.
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operations and direct expenses.
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2. Major Grants should support well-specified work proposed by the grantee, at
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2. Major Grants should support well-specified work proposed by the grantee,
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reasonable market-rate costs. They can be of any duration, or ongoing without a
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at reasonable market-rate costs. They can be of any duration, or ongoing
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duration limit, but have semiannual review points for continuation of funding.
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without a duration limit, but have semiannual review points for
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continuation of funding.
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3. Major Grants may be issued to ECC only if no other parties are available and
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3. Major Grants may be issued to ECC only if no other parties are available
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capable of performing the specified work with similar effectiveness and cost.
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and capable of performing the specified work with similar effectiveness and
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(The intent is that eventually ECC will not receive Major Grants.)
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cost. (The intent is that eventually ECC will not receive Major Grants.)
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4. Priority will be given to Major Grants that bolster new teams with
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4. Priority will be given to Major Grants that bolster new teams with
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substantial (current or prospective) continual existence, and set them up for
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substantial (current or prospective) continual existence, and set them up
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long-term success, subject to the usual grant award considerations (impact,
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for long-term success, subject to the usual grant award considerations
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ability, risks, team, cost-effectiveness, etc.). Priority will be given Major
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(impact, ability, risks, team, cost-effectiveness, etc.). Priority will be
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Grants that support ecosystem growth by mentorship, coaching, technical
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given Major Grants that support ecosystem growth by mentorship, coaching,
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resources, creating entrepreneurial opportunities, etc.
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technical resources, creating entrepreneurial opportunities, etc.
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5. Major Grants should specifically further the Zcash cryptocurrency and its
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5. Major Grants should specifically further the Zcash cryptocurrency and its
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ecosystem; this is more restrictive than Zfnd's general mission of furthering
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ecosystem; this is more restrictive than ZF's general mission of furthering
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financial privacy.
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financial privacy.
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6. Major Grants awarding is subject to individual approval by Zfnd's Board of
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6. Major Grants awarding is subject to individual approval by ZF's Board of
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Directors, by a majority excluding any members with a conflict of interest.
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Directors, by a majority excluding any members with a conflict of interest.
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7. Zfnd shall seek advisory input on its choice of Major Grant awards, by all
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7. ZF shall seek advisory input on its choice of Major Grant awards, by all
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effective and reasonable means (e.g., on-line discussion forums, the community
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effective and reasonable means (e.g., on-line discussion forums, the
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Advisory Board, on-chain voting by holders and miners, and proactive
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community Advisory Board, on-chain voting by holders and miners, and
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consultation with experts). The Zfnd Board of Directors shall strive to follow
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proactive consultation with experts). The ZF Board of Directors shall
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this advisory input (within the confines of the Foundation's charter and
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strive to follow this advisory input (within the confines of the
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duties).
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Foundation's charter and duties).
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8. Zfnd shall strive to create an independent grant committee to evaluate and
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8. ZF shall strive to create an independent grant committee to evaluate and
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publicly recommend Major Grant proposals, based on the committee's expertise and
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publicly recommend Major Grant proposals, based on the committee's
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the above inputs.
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expertise and the above inputs.
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Zfnd shall recognize the Zfnd-MG slice of the Dev Fund as a Restricted Fund
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ZF shall recognize the ZF-MG slice of the Dev Fund as a Restricted Fund
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donation under the above constraints (suitably formalized), and keep separate
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donation under the above constraints (suitably formalized), and keep separate
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accounting of its balance and usage under its Transparency and Accountability
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accounting of its balance and usage under its Transparency and Accountability
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obligations defined below.
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obligations defined below.
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From grant proposers' side, proposals for such grants will be submitted through
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From grant proposers' side, proposals for such grants will be submitted
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Zfnd usual grant process, allowing for public discussion and public funding. It
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through ZF usual grant process, allowing for public discussion and public
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is intended that small one-time grants will be funded by drawing on the Zfnd-GU
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funding. It is intended that small one-time grants will be funded by drawing
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slice (where they also compete with other Zfnd activities), whereas large
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on the ZF-GU slice (where they also compete with other ZF activities), whereas
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long-duration will be funded from the dedicated Zfnd-MG slice; though this is at
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large long-duration will be funded from the dedicated ZF-MG slice; though this
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Zfnd's discretion.
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is at ZF's discretion.
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Zfnd shall strive to define target metrics and key performance indicators, and
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ZF shall strive to define target metrics and key performance indicators, and
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utilize these in its funding decisions.
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utilize these in its funding decisions.
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Direct-grant option
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Direct-grant option
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'''''''''''''''''''
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'''''''''''''''''''
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It may be deemed better, operationally or legally, if the Major Grant funds are
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It may be deemed better, operationally or legally, if the Major Grant funds
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not accepted and disbursed by Zfnd, but rather directly assigned to the
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are not accepted and disbursed by ZF, but rather directly assigned to the
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grantees. Thus, the following mechanism may be used in perpetuity, if agreed
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grantees. Thus, the following mechanism may be used in perpetuity, if agreed
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upon by both ECC and Zfnd before NU4 activation:
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upon by both ECC and ZF before NU4 activation:
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Prior to each Network Upgrade, the Foundation shall publish a list of grantees'
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Prior to each Network Upgrade, the Foundation shall publish a list of
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addresses and the total number of Dev Fund ZEC per block they should receive.
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grantees' addresses and the total number of Dev Fund ZEC per block they
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ECC and Zfnd shall implement this list in any implementations of the Zcash
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should receive. ECC and ZF shall implement this list in any implementations
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consensus rules they maintain. This decision will then be, effectively, ratified
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of the Zcash consensus rules they maintain. This decision will then be,
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by the miners as the network upgrade activates.
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effectively, ratified by the miners as the network upgrade activates.
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Funding Target and Volatility Reserve
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Funding Target and Volatility Reserve
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Each Dev Fund slice has a Funding Target, initially US $700,000 for each slice.
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Each Dev Fund slice has a Funding Target, initially US $700,000 for each
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At the end of each calendar month, the fair market value of the Dev Fund ZEC
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slice. At the end of each calendar month, the fair market value of the Dev
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received during that month will be computed, and the excess over the Funding
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Fund ZEC received during that month will be computed, and the excess over
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Target will be put into a dedicated Volatility Reserve account by the funds'
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the Funding Target will be put into a dedicated Volatility Reserve account
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recipient.
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by the funds' recipient.
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Funds may be withdrawn from the Volatility Reserve account only by that same
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Funds may be withdrawn from the Volatility Reserve account only by that same
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party, in months where the aforementioned monthly ZEC value falls short of the
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party, in months where the aforementioned monthly ZEC value falls short of
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Funding Target, and only to the extent needed to cover that shortfall.
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the Funding Target, and only to the extent needed to cover that shortfall.
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The Volatility Reserve may be kept as ZEC, or sold and held as fiat currency or
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The Volatility Reserve may be kept as ZEC, or sold and held as fiat currency
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investments (whose profits will remain in the Volatility Reserve).
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or investments (whose profits will remain in the Volatility Reserve).
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The Funding Target may be changed only by unanimous agreement of Zfnd, ECC and
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The Funding Target may be changed only by unanimous agreement of ZF, ECC and
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the majority vote of a voting mechanism weighted by ZEC coin holding. (This is
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the majority vote of a voting mechanism weighted by ZEC coin holding. (This is
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meant to encourage the creation of such a voting mechanism. Moreover, in case
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meant to encourage the creation of such a voting mechanism. Moreover, in case
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of excessive accumulation of reserves, the community can condition an increase
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of excessive accumulation of reserves, the community can condition an increase
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of the Funding Target on the redirection of some of the reserves to a
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of the Funding Target on the redirection of some of the reserves to a
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different entity, miners or an airdrop).
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different entity, miners or an airdrop).
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Dev Fund ZEC that has been received, not placed in the Volatility Reserve, and
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Dev Fund ZEC that has been received, not placed in the Volatility Reserve,
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has not yet been used or disbursed, will be kept by the corresponding party (as
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and has not yet been used or disbursed, will be kept by the corresponding
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ZEC, or sold and invested) for later use under the terms of the corresponding
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party (as ZEC, or sold and invested) for later use under the terms of the
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slice.
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corresponding slice.
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Irrevocable obligations to the above must be made by the recipients (e.g., using
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Irrevocable obligations to the above must be made by the recipients (e.g.,
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their Operating Agreements or by receiving the slice as Restricted Funds).
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using their Operating Agreements or by receiving the slice as Restricted
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Funds).
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Transparency and Accountability
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Transparency and Accountability
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@ -288,7 +295,7 @@ Transparency and Accountability
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Obligations
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Obligations
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~~~~~~~~~~~
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~~~~~~~~~~~
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ECC, Zfnd and Major Grant recipients (during and leading to their award period)
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ECC, ZF and Major Grant recipients (during and leading to their award period)
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shall all accept the following obligations:
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shall all accept the following obligations:
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Ongoing public reporting requirements:
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Ongoing public reporting requirements:
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@ -304,77 +311,78 @@ Ongoing public reporting requirements:
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These reports may be either organization-wide, or restricted to the income,
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These reports may be either organization-wide, or restricted to the income,
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expenses and work associated with the receipt of Dev Fund.
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expenses and work associated with the receipt of Dev Fund.
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It is expected that ECC, Zfnd and Major Grant recipient will be focused
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It is expected that ECC, ZF and Major Grant recipient will be focused
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primarily (in their attention and resources) on Zcash. Thus, they must promptly
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primarily (in their attention and resources) on Zcash. Thus, they must
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disclose:
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promptly disclose:
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* Any major activity they perform (even if not supported by the Dev Fund) that
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* Any major activity they perform (even if not supported by the Dev Fund) that
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is not in the interest of the general Zcash ecosystem.
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is not in the interest of the general Zcash ecosystem.
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* Any conflict of interest with the general success of the Zcash ecosystem
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* Any conflict of interest with the general success of the Zcash ecosystem
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ECC, Zfnd and grant recipients must promptly disclose any security of privacy
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ECC, ZF and grant recipients must promptly disclose any security of privacy
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risks that may affect users of Zcash (by responsible disclosure under confidence
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risks that may affect users of Zcash (by responsible disclosure under
|
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to the pertinent developers, where applicable).
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confidence to the pertinent developers, where applicable).
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ECC's reports, and Zfnd's annual report on its non-grant operations, should be
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ECC's reports, and ZF's annual report on its non-grant operations, should be
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at least as detailed as grant proposals/reports submitted by other funded
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at least as detailed as grant proposals/reports submitted by other funded
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parties, and satisfy similar levels of public scrutiny.
|
parties, and satisfy similar levels of public scrutiny.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
All substantial software whose development was funded by the Dev Fund should be
|
All substantial software whose development was funded by the Dev Fund should
|
||||||
released under an Open Source license (as defined by the Open Source
|
be released under an Open Source license (as defined by the Open Source
|
||||||
Initiative), preferably the MIT license.
|
Initiative), preferably the MIT license.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Enforcement
|
Enforcement
|
||||||
~~~~~~~~~~~
|
~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
For grant recipients, these conditions should be included in their contract with
|
For grant recipients, these conditions should be included in their contract
|
||||||
Zfnd, such that substantial violation, not promptly remedied, will cause
|
with ZF, such that substantial violation, not promptly remedied, will cause
|
||||||
forfeiture of their grant funds and their return to Zfnd.
|
forfeiture of their grant funds and their return to ZF.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
ECC and Zfnd will contractually commit to each other to fulfill these
|
ECC and ZF will contractually commit to each other to fulfill these
|
||||||
conditions, and the prescribed use of funds, such that substantial violation,
|
conditions, and the prescribed use of funds, such that substantial violation,
|
||||||
not promptly remedied, will permit the other party to issue a modified version
|
not promptly remedied, will permit the other party to issue a modified version
|
||||||
of Zcash node software that removes the violating party's Dev Fund slice, and
|
of Zcash node software that removes the violating party's Dev Fund slice, and
|
||||||
use the Zcash trademark for this modified version. The slice's funds will be
|
use the Zcash trademark for this modified version. The slice's funds will be
|
||||||
reassigned to Zfnd-MG (whose integrity is legally protected by the Restricted Fund
|
reassigned to ZF-MG (whose integrity is legally protected by the Restricted
|
||||||
treatment).
|
Fund treatment).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Future Community Governance
|
Future Community Governance
|
||||||
===========================
|
===========================
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Decentralized community governance is used in this proposal in the following places:
|
Decentralized community governance is used in this proposal in the following
|
||||||
|
places:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
1. As advisory input to the `Zfnd-MG slice (Zcash Foundation, for major grants)`_.
|
1. As advisory input to the `ZF-MG slice (Zcash Foundation, for major grants)`_.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
2. For changing the `Funding Target and Volatility Reserve`_ (which is an
|
2. For changing the `Funding Target and Volatility Reserve`_ (which is an
|
||||||
incentive for ECC and Zfnd to *create* the voting mechanism).
|
incentive for ECC and ZF to *create* the voting mechanism).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
3. In Zfnd's future board composition (see below).
|
3. In ZF's future board composition (see below).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
It is highly desirable to develop robust means of decentralized community voting
|
It is highly desirable to develop robust means of decentralized community
|
||||||
and governance, and to integrate them into all of the above processes, by the
|
voting and governance, and to integrate them into all of the above processes,
|
||||||
end of 2021. ECC and Zfnd should place high priority on such development and its
|
by the end of 2021. ECC and ZF should place high priority on such development
|
||||||
deployment, in their activities and grant selection.
|
and its deployment, in their activities and grant selection.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Zfnd Board Composition
|
ZF Board Composition
|
||||||
======================
|
======================
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Zfnd should formally integrate robust means of decentralized community voting
|
ZF should formally integrate robust means of decentralized community voting
|
||||||
into its Board of Director elections, in a way that is consistent with Zfnd's
|
into its Board of Director elections, in a way that is consistent with ZF's
|
||||||
mission and values. Zfnd should lead the process for determining and
|
mission and values. ZF should lead the process for determining and
|
||||||
implementing this, legally and technically, by the end of 2021.
|
implementing this, legally and technically, by the end of 2021.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Members of Zfnd's Board of Directors must not hold equity in ECC or have current
|
Members of ZF's Board of Directors must not hold equity in ECC or have current
|
||||||
business or employment relationships with ECC.
|
business or employment relationships with ECC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Grace period: members of the board who hold ECC equity (but do not have other
|
Grace period: members of the board who hold ECC equity (but do not have other
|
||||||
current relationships to ECC) may dispose of their equity, or quit the Board, by
|
current relationships to ECC) may dispose of their equity, or quit the Board,
|
||||||
1 March 2021. (The grace period is to allow for orderly replacement, and also to
|
by 1 March 2021. (The grace period is to allow for orderly replacement, and
|
||||||
allow time for ECC corporate reorganization related to Dev Fund receipt, which
|
also to allow time for ECC corporate reorganization related to Dev Fund
|
||||||
may affect how disposition of equity would be executed.)
|
receipt, which may affect how disposition of equity would be executed.)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Disclosures
|
Disclosures
|
||||||
|
@ -382,16 +390,17 @@ Disclosures
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The author is
|
The author is
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* a coauthor of the Zerocash_ academic paper underlying Zcash
|
* a coauthor of the Zerocash_ academic paper underlying Zcash;
|
||||||
* a technical adviser to the Zcash Foundation
|
* a technical adviser to the Zcash Foundation;
|
||||||
* a founding scientist, a shareholder, and formerly a technical adviser to the
|
* a founding scientist, a shareholder, and formerly a technical adviser to the
|
||||||
Electric Coin Company
|
Electric Coin Company;
|
||||||
* an academic researcher and adviser to various other organizations
|
* an academic researcher and adviser to various other organizations.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This proposal is his private opinion and does not represent any of the above.
|
This proposal is his private opinion and does not represent any of the above.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
.. _Zerocash: https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/349
|
.. _Zerocash: https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/349
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Acknowledgements
|
Acknowledgements
|
||||||
================
|
================
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue