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more grammar fixes 

Co-Authored-By: John Light <john-light@users.noreply.github.com>
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Josh Cincinnati 2019-11-13 11:01:12 -05:00 committed by Daira Hopwood
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@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ With all due respect to the proposers behind some variant of a "2-of-3 multisig"
> As for why 2-of-2 is still strictly better than 1-of-1: in the case of cryptocurrency governance, I believe that inaction in the case of disagreement is a better outcome than one party unilaterally exercising power.
More to the point, I worry that the "third party" in question is being idolized into some Platonic ideal, and in reality either the ECC or the Zcash Foundation would spend a great deal of their time currying favor in either the process or selection of the party in question in the limited time between now and that party's selection. Given that the Zcash Foundation is charged with representing community interests, I'm not sure why another community-focused representative would really make sense from the ECC's perspective — they'd be constantly outvoted if interests clashed, so from a balance of power perspective I'm not sure why the ECC finds would find that tenable. And I'm not sure the community would want the "third party" to be another profit-generating enterprise, like a VC or another startup, which would tip power another way.
More to the point, I worry that the "third party" in question is being idolized into some Platonic ideal, and in reality either the ECC or the Zcash Foundation would spend a great deal of their time currying favor in either the process or selection of the party in question in the limited time between now and that party's selection. Given that the Zcash Foundation is charged with representing community interests, I'm not sure why another community-focused representative would really make sense from the ECC's perspective — they'd be constantly outvoted if interests clashed, so from a balance of power perspective I'm not sure why the ECC would find that tenable. And I'm not sure the community would want the "third party" to be another profit-generating enterprise, like a VC or another startup, which would tip power another way.
The crux of this proposal still centers around the idea that the Zcash Foundation and ECC share responsibility for protocol development, and assumes an eventual 2-of-2 agreement on the trademark and that both continue developing consensus-compatible node software that interacts with the Zcash network. But it mandates accountability for disbursement of funds to the ECC/Zcash Foundation, and expands outside stakeholder input on funds that _wouldn't_ be earmarked for the ECC/Zcash Foundation (similar to Placeholder's earlier version of their proposal), while it doesn’t preclude the possibility of migrating to broader “2-of-3” later on.