mirror of https://github.com/zcash/zips.git
137 lines
4.8 KiB
ReStructuredText
137 lines
4.8 KiB
ReStructuredText
::
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ZIP: 1013
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Title: Keep It Simple, Zcashers: 10% to ECC, 10% to ZF
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Owners: Gordon Mohr (@gojomo on relevant forums)
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Status: Obsolete
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Category: Consensus Process
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Created: 2019-11-14
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License: Public Domain
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Discussions-To: <https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/zip-keep-it-simple-zcashers-kisz-10-to-ecc-10-to-zfnd/35425>
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Pull-Request: <https://github.com/zcash/zips/pull/293>
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Terminology
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===========
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The key words "MUST" and "SHOULD" in this document are to be interpreted as
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described in RFC 2119. [#RFC2119]_
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The terms below are to be interpreted as follows:
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ECC
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Electric Coin Company, a US-based limited-liability corporation.
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ZF
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Zcash Foundation, a US-based non-profit corporation.
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Halvening
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a regularly-scheduled discontinuity where the rate of ZEC issuance halves,
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expected first in roughly October 2020 then next in roughly October 2024.
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Abstract
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========
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This ZIP proposes:
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After the 1st Zcash Halvening, when the "Founders’ Reward" system-
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bootstrapping protocol-based development funding expires, continue to
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direct 20% of new ZEC issuance to development-related activities for ongoing
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research, development, innovation, and maintenance of Zcash.
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Assign half of such funds to the ECC, and half to the ZF. Continue this
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allocation until the 2nd Halvening.
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Motivation
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==========
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There have been many proposals for potential allocations of Zcash block
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rewards (ZEC inflation) after the 1st Halvening. Many cluster around similar
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broad parameters:
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* 20% of block rewards for continuing development efforts;
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* provided to some combination of the Electric Coin Company (ECC),
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Zcash Foundation (ZF), and other named or to-be-determined entities;
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* conditioned on certain new allocation formulas or management practices,
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often involving novel entities, personnel, and feedback/deliberation
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processes.
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However, no existing ZIPs explicitly propose the most simple variation
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on this theme - one that maintains maximal continuity with prior practice.
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This 'Keep It Simple, Zcashers' ZIP aims to fill that gap.
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Requirements
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============
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This proposal intends to be easy to describe, understand, and implement.
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Non-requirements
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================
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This proposal does not seek to propose any particular course of action
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past the 2nd Halvening.
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Specification
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=============
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To implement this ZIP, the Zcash protocol and compatible software MUST:
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* maintain a 20% allotment of new ZEC issuance to development activities
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through to the 2nd Halvening event (expected around October 2024);
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* formalize a 50-50 relative allocation between the ECC and ZF;
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* deliver these ZEC to addresses provided by the recipients, in a manner
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analogous to the original "Founders’ Reward" consensus-encoded block
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rewards, or any other technically- and/or legally- preferred method
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agreed to by the ECC & ZF.
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This proposal specifically refrains from adding any new conditions or
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procedural formalities, technical or legal, on the delivery of development
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funds.
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There is only the expectation that these recipients SHOULD continue the
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stated missions, practices of transparency, and responsiveness to community
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input that they have demonstrated thus far.
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Discussion
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==========
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This proposal primarily differs from similar proposals in two ways: (1) it
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places no new comditions/processes on the disbursement of ZEC development
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funds; (2) it specifies a fixed, 50-50 division-of-funds between the ECC and
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ZF.
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These differences are motivated by a desire for simplicity and continuity.
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This allocation can be implemented technically without novel institutions,
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processes, or legal agreements.
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Rather than relying on lists-of-conditions with underspecified enforcement or
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dispute-resolution mechanisms, the adequate performance of fund recipients is
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expected due to:
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* aligned incentives, especially the fact that the value of all funds received
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over 4 years depends completely on the continued health & growth of the Zcash
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ecosystem;
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* proven records of dedication to the Zcash project, and effective efforts on
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related projects, by receipient entities & personnel – even in the absence
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of formalized funding conditions.
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From original "Founders’ Reward"-era development-funds, roughly 15% has been
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directed to the ZF. (Or, about 3 points of the full 20 points of bootstrap-
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funds.) However, from its later start, the ZF has recently grown its
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technical, grantmaking, and organizational capabilities, and wide sentiment in
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the Zcash community, ECC, and ZF desires the ZF grow to a role of equivalent
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or greater importance as the ECC for long-term Zcash evolution. Thus this
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proposal specifies a 50:50 split of future development funds, rather than
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continuing any prior proportions.
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References
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==========
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.. [#RFC2119] `RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119.html>`_
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