mirror of https://github.com/zcash/zips.git
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177 lines
8.0 KiB
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ZIP: 213
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Title: Shielded Coinbase
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Owners: Jack Grigg <jack@z.cash>
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Status: Draft
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Category: Consensus
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Created: 2019-03-30
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License: MIT
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Terminology
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===========
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The key words "MUST" and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
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RFC 2119. [#RFC2119]_
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The term "network upgrade" in this document is to be interpreted as described in ZIP 200
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[#zip-0200]_.
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The term "Sapling" in this document is to be interpreted as described in ZIP 205
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[#zip-0205]_.
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The terms "Founders' Reward", "funding stream", and "active funding stream" in this
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document are to be interpreted as described in ZIP 207 [#zip-0207]_.
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Abstract
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========
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This proposal defines modifications to the Zcash consensus rules that enable coinbase
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funds to be mined to Sapling addresses. It does not disable the use of transparent
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addresses in coinbase transactions.
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Motivation
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==========
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Zcash inherited the concept of "coinbase transactions" from Bitcoin: special transactions
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inside each block that are allowed to have no inputs. These transactions are created by
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miners during block creation, and collect the block reward and transaction fees into new
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transparent outputs that can then be spent. They are also leveraged in Zcash for the
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Founders' Reward (and potentially for funding streams [#zip-0207]_).
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On the path to deprecating and removing Bitcoin-inherited transparent addresses within the
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Zcash network, a required step is to be able to create coinbase transactions that have no
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transparent outputs. However, Zcash was launched with a consensus rule preventing coinbase
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transactions from containing shielded outputs, instead enforcing that coinbase funds could
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not be spent in transactions with transparent outputs. This was partly in order to reduce
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the complexity of the original Zcash modifications to the Bitcoin Core codebase, but also
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because at the time, shielded transactions required significant memory and CPU resources
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to create.
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The Sapling network upgrade [#zip-0205]_ deployed architectural changes and performance
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improvements that make shielding funds directly in the coinbase transaction feasible. In
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order to reduce the complexity of the Sapling network upgrade, the existing consensus
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rules preventing coinbase transactions from containing shielded outputs were extended to
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cover Sapling outputs. Therefore, it is now necessary to modify the consensus rules in
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order to enable miners to start using Sapling addresses.
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Specification
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=============
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Prior to activation of the TODO network upgrade, the existing consensus rule requiring
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coinbase transactions to have zero Sapling outputs is enforced.
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Once the TODO network upgrade activates:
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- The above existing consensus rule is no longer active, and coinbase transactions MAY
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contain Sapling outputs.
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- The consensus rules applied to ``valueBalance``, ``vShieldedOutput``, and ``bindingSig``
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in non-coinbase transactions MUST also be applied to coinbase transactions.
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- The existing consensus rule requiring transactions that spend coinbase outputs to have
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an empty ``vout``, is amended to only apply to transactions that spend transparent
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coinbase outputs.
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- The existing consensus rule requiring coinbase outputs to have 100 confirmations before
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they may be spent (coinbase maturity), is amended to only apply to transparent coinbase
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outputs.
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- All Sapling outputs in coinbase transactions MUST have valid note commitments when
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recovered using a 32-byte array of zeroes as the outgoing viewing key.
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Interaction with funding streams
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--------------------------------
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If ZIP 207 [#zip-0207]_ is accepted and deployed prior to (or in the same network upgrade
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as) this ZIP, the following additional consensus rules are enforced once the TODO network
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upgrade activates:
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- Funding streams MAY target Sapling addresses in addition to transparent P2SH addresses.
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- The existing consensus rule from ZIP 207 [#zip-0207]_ requiring coinbase transactions
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for block height ``height`` to pay active funding streams with a standard P2SH script,
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is amended to only apply to active funding streams that target a transparent address at
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``height``.
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- In the coinbase transaction for block height ``height``, for every active funding stream
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that targets a Sapling address at ``height``, the transaction MUST include at least one
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Sapling output that pays exactly the funding stream's value to the target Sapling
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address.
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Interaction with the Founders' Reward
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-------------------------------------
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This ZIP does not alter the existing Founders' Reward addresses.
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Rationale
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=========
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The ZIP does not require that all coinbase must be shielded immediately from activation of
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the network upgrade, so that miners and mining pools may gradually migrate from their
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existing transparent addresses to Sapling addresses. This also simplifies the consensus
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rules, because the Founders' Reward targets transparent addresses, and thus it remains
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necessary for the time being to support them. A future ZIP could require all coinbase to
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be shielded immediately.
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Enforcing coinbase maturity at the consensus level for Sapling outputs would incur
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significant complexity in the consensus rules, because it would require special-casing
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coinbase note commitments in the Sapling commitment tree. The standard recommendation when
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spending a note is to select an anchor 10 blocks back from the current chain tip, which
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acts as a de-facto 10-block maturity on all notes, coinbase included. This might be
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proposed as a consensus rule in future.
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There is another reason for shielded coinbase maturity being unnecessary: when a rollback
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occurs that would cause a shielded coinbase output to disappear, it will also invalidate
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every shielded transaction that uses an anchor descending from the tree that the shielded
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coinbase output had been appended to. That is, all economic activity would be rolled back
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in addition to the shielded coinbase output disappearing, so there is no reason to make
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shielded coinbase a special case when the same behaviour occurs in regular shielded notes
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already. In the transparent coinbase case, only direct child transactions of the
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transparent coinbase would become invalid, and thus it would be possible to end up in a
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situation where a logical child transaction (for example, a mining pool paying out miners)
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persists in the block chain after its logical parent (the mining pool receiving a block)
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disappears.
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Requiring that note commitments are valid when recovering using a fixed outgoing viewing
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key implies that target addresses and values for all Sapling outputs within the coinbase
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are revealed. This would be necessary to correctly enforce shielded Founders' Reward or
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funding stream outputs, and it is simpler to enforce this on all outputs. Additionally,
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this maintains the ability for network observers to track miners and mining pools.
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Meanwhile, the miners and mining pools could put useful or identifying text in the memo
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fields of the outputs, instead of storing it ad-hoc elsewhere in the coinbase transaction.
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Security and Privacy Considerations
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===================================
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Sapling outputs in coinbase transactions are by design publicly viewable, in contrast to
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Sapling outputs in normal transactions. This does not introduce any privacy regressions,
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because coinbase output values and recipient addresses have always been public
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information.
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Revealing the coinbase output notes does not enable anyone else to detect when the note is
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spent, which removes the need for a separate shielding step like is enforced for
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transparent coinbase outputs.
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Reference Implementation
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========================
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TBD
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References
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==========
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.. [#RFC2119] `Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119>`_
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.. [#zip-0200] `ZIP 200: Network Upgrade Activation Mechanism <https://github.com/zcash/zips/blob/master/zip-0200.rst>`_
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.. [#zip-0205] `ZIP 205: Deployment of the Sapling Network Upgrade <https://github.com/zcash/zips/blob/master/zip-0205.rst>`_
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.. [#zip-0207] `ZIP 207: Split Founders' Reward <https://github.com/zcash/zips/blob/master/zip-0207.rst>`_
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