[zapps-wg] Cut-off date for Powers of Tau Contributions
Gabor Losonci
gabor.losonci at gmail.com
Sat Mar 10 02:20:27 EST 2018
If there is a free slot on March 12 —13 Emea timezone I am happy to do a
contribution with an alternate implementation (I took part earlier) Gabor
On Mar 9, 2018 11:23 PM, "Devrandom via zapps-wg"
<zapps-wg at lists.z.cash.foundation> wrote:
> That's a good idea. Also, please let me know if I can have my turn on
> Sunday.
>
> On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 12:06 PM Andrew Miller <soc1024 at illinois.edu>
> wrote:
>
>> What if we just reach out to everyone currently in queue and ask them to
>> use the golang version (and save the binaries)
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 2:57 PM, Devrandom <c1.devrandom at niftybox.net>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I can take care of the first bullet point (hopefully on ARM64), but
>>> would be nice if we had more than one additional round with golang.
>>>
>> On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 11:22 AM Andrew Miller <soc1024 at illinois.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>> It sounds like an efficient way to dispense with the suggestions
>>>> Devrandom raised are to:
>>>> 1. Do a round with the deterministic Go build, explicitly saving the
>>>> binary for posthoc analysis, and ideally running it on a non x86
>>>> architecture if anyone has one...
>>>> 2. Do a round with mrustc
>>>> What would it take to get a concrete plan to include those?
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 2:17 PM, Sean Bowe <sean at z.cash> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> As far as security goes, we've successfully guarded against all but
>>>>> the most elaborate and unrealistic attack scenarios. The remaining
>>>>> threats require some combinatorial explosion of individually
>>>>> sophisticated attacks or breakthroughs, like stealthy backdoors in the
>>>>> Rust compiler and still for many participants to be colluding in
>>>>> secret, somehow without leaving evidence behind.
>>>>>
>>>>> We don't need an absolutely perfect ceremony to get strong privacy
>>>>> guarantees, we get that already even with a totally compromised
>>>>> ceremony. We *could* continue to invest time and resources for many
>>>>> more months or years in order to make us marginally more resistant to
>>>>> these absurd attack scenarios, but by the time we'd be finished with
>>>>> the ceremony we'll probably have better proving systems available
>>>>> anyway. It's silly to let privacy languish in the meantime.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think we did the best with the time we had, but if you disagree,
>>>>> remember that all of this can be extended and improved by anyone, even
>>>>> after this ceremony is done!
>>>>>
>>>>> Sean
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 11:06 AM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>> > On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 04:49:37PM +0000, Devrandom wrote:
>>>>> >> Hi all,
>>>>> >>
>>>>> >> I have some concerns about the lack of diversity of contributions:
>>>>> >>
>>>>> >> - most (all?) of the contributions used a distributed Rust
>>>>> toolchain, which
>>>>> >> suffers from the "trusting-trust" issue since they are
>>>>> self-compiled. I
>>>>> >> don't think I've seen any contributions using the mrustc build path.
>>>>> >> - there were very few contributions (two?) using the golang
>>>>> implementation
>>>>> >> - no attempt has been made to replicate the deterministic golang
>>>>> build
>>>>> >> - people did not capture the binary they used, so we can't do
>>>>> forensics in
>>>>> >> case of future questions
>>>>> >> - there were no contributions using alternative processor
>>>>> architectures
>>>>> >> (e.g. ARM64). I believe this is possible using the golang
>>>>> implementation.
>>>>> >> - there was a lot of focus on destroying toxic waste and not enough
>>>>> on the
>>>>> >> trustworthiness of the tools
>>>>> >
>>>>> > I agree with all these points, particularly the latter: we should be
>>>>> focused on
>>>>> > genuine security, not flashy marketing stunts. (indeed, I regret the
>>>>> way my own
>>>>> > participation was marketted the last time around)
>>>>> >
>>>>> > --
>>>>> > https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Andrew Miller
>>>> University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Andrew Miller
>> University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
>>
>
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