From d1bcc3292e7b9969ea5cc83b04f513c5fe1d5626 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: teor <teor@riseup.net>
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 22:14:21 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] Resolve a few doc warnings about unquoted HTML tags (#5477)

---
 zebra-chain/src/orchard/shielded_data.rs           |  2 +-
 zebra-chain/src/serialization/zcash_deserialize.rs | 12 ++++++------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/zebra-chain/src/orchard/shielded_data.rs b/zebra-chain/src/orchard/shielded_data.rs
index e9a02eab1..6b3d8a255 100644
--- a/zebra-chain/src/orchard/shielded_data.rs
+++ b/zebra-chain/src/orchard/shielded_data.rs
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ impl AuthorizedAction {
 /// [ps]: <https://zips.z.cash/protocol/nu5.pdf#actionencodingandconsensus>
 pub const ACTION_SIZE: u64 = 5 * 32 + 580 + 80;
 
-/// The size of a single Signature<SpendAuth>
+/// The size of a single `Signature<SpendAuth>`.
 ///
 /// Each Signature is 64 bytes.
 /// [7.1 Transaction Encoding and Consensus][ps]
diff --git a/zebra-chain/src/serialization/zcash_deserialize.rs b/zebra-chain/src/serialization/zcash_deserialize.rs
index 45b4df061..3f8444567 100644
--- a/zebra-chain/src/serialization/zcash_deserialize.rs
+++ b/zebra-chain/src/serialization/zcash_deserialize.rs
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ impl<T: ZcashDeserialize + TrustedPreallocate> ZcashDeserialize for AtLeastOne<T
     }
 }
 
-/// Implement ZcashDeserialize for Vec<u8> directly instead of using the blanket Vec implementation
+/// Implement ZcashDeserialize for `Vec<u8>` directly instead of using the blanket Vec implementation
 ///
 /// This allows us to optimize the inner loop into a single call to `read_exact()`
 /// Note that we don't implement TrustedPreallocate for u8.
@@ -158,14 +158,14 @@ impl<R: io::Read> ZcashDeserializeInto for R {
     }
 }
 
-/// Blind preallocation of a Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate> is based on a bounded length. This is in contrast
-/// to blind preallocation of a generic Vec<T>, which is a DOS vector.
+/// Blind preallocation of a `Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate>` is based on a bounded length. This is in contrast
+/// to blind preallocation of a generic `Vec<T>`, which is a DOS vector.
 ///
-/// The max_allocation() function provides a loose upper bound on the size of the Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate>
+/// The max_allocation() function provides a loose upper bound on the size of the `Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate>`
 /// which can possibly be received from an honest peer. If this limit is too low, Zebra may reject valid messages.
 /// In the worst case, setting the lower bound too low could cause Zebra to fall out of consensus by rejecting all messages containing a valid block.
 pub trait TrustedPreallocate {
-    /// Provides a ***loose upper bound*** on the size of the Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate>
+    /// Provides a ***loose upper bound*** on the size of the `Vec<T: TrustedPreallocate>`
     /// which can possibly be received from an honest peer.
     fn max_allocation() -> u64;
 }
@@ -182,6 +182,6 @@ where
 /// The length of the longest valid `Vec<u8>` that can be received over the network
 ///
 /// It takes 5 bytes to encode a CompactSize representing any number netween 2^16 and (2^32 - 1)
-/// MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN is ~2^21, so the largest Vec<u8> that can be received from an honest peer is
+/// MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN is ~2^21, so the largest `Vec<u8>` that can be received from an honest peer is
 /// (MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN - 5);
 pub(crate) const MAX_U8_ALLOCATION: usize = MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN - 5;