* change `poll_ready()` and `call()` of `ChainVerifier`
* add bound, move max_checkpoint_height
* add buffers to the checkpoint and block verifiers
And rename the chain verifier fields so `block` means `Arc<Block>`, and
`block_verifier` means `Buffer<BlockVerifier, ...>`.
* Fix the error types
* Use `ServiceExt::oneshot` in `ChainVerifier::call`
And:
* make the code look like the `main` branch as much as possible
* document the `poll_ready`/`call` invariant
* Use `ServiceExt::oneshot` in `chain::init`
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
This PR is the first step in getting a groth16 proving system fully
integrated with the rest of zebra. This PR implements the initial async
API, but none of the actual batching logic necessary for our eventual
verifier design.
Once the batch verification API from bellman has been implemented we
will need to swap out the "Batch" type defined in this crate with the
new `batch::Verifier` defined in bellman.
* Bump versions where appropriate
Tested with cargo install --locked --path etc
* Remove fixed panics from 'Known Issues'
* Change to alpha release series in the README
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
The clippy unknown lints attribute was deprecated in
nightly in rust-lang/rust#80524. The old lint name now produces a
warning.
Since we're using `allow(unknown_lints)` to suppress warnings, we need to
add the canonical name, so we can continue to build without warnings on
nightly.
But we also need to keep the old name, so we can continue to build
without warnings on stable.
And therefore, we also need to disable the "removed lints" warning,
otherwise we'll get warnings about the old name on nightly.
We'll need to keep this transitional clippy config until rustc 1.51 is
stable.
## Motivation
This PR is motivated by the regression identified in https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/issues/1349. That PR notes that the metrics stopped working for most of the crates other than `zebrad`.
## Solution
This PR resolves the regression by deduplicating the `metrics` crate dependency. During a recent change we upgraded the metrics version in `zebrad` and a couple other of our crates, but we never updated the dependencies in `zebra-state`, `zebra-consensus`, or `zebra-network`. This caused the metrics macros to attempt to retrieve the current metrics exporter through the wrong function. We would install the metrics exporter in `0.13`, but then attempt to look it up through the `0.12` crate, which contains a different instance of the metrics exporter static variable which is unset. Doing this causes the metrics macros to return `None` for the current exporter after which they just silently give up.
## Related Issues
closes https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/issues/1349
## Follow Up Work
I noticed we have quite a few duplicate dependencies in our tree. We might be able to save some compilation time by auditing those and deduplicating them as much as possible.
- https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/issues/1582
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
* export new precompute api in zebra-script
* remove old API in favor of precompute API
* add multi use test cases and bump version
* update implementation to actually match henry's design
* Add safety comment for zebra-script
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
* create readme for utils and checkpoints
* add link to checkpoint usage to book
Co-authored-by: Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustulum@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: teor <teor@riseup.net>
Previously we set the crate versions to 3.x, so that the major version was
aligned with the NU version. But we want to be able to make API changes
independently of the NU schedule.
Change the Merkle root validation logic to also check that a block does not
contain duplicate transactions. This check is redundant with later
double-spend checks, but is a useful defense-in-depth.
As a side effect of computing Merkle roots, we build a list of
transaction hashes. Instead of discarding these, add them to
PreparedBlock and FinalizedBlock so that they can be reused rather than
recomputed.
This commit adds Merkle root validation to:
1. the block verifier;
2. the checkpoint verifier.
In the first case, Bitcoin Merkle tree malleability has no effect,
because only a single Merkle tree in each malleablity set is valid (the
others have duplicate transactions).
In the second case, we need to check that the Merkle tree does not contain any
duplicate transactions.
Closes#1385Closes#906
UTXO requests during transaction input verification can time out because:
1. The block that creates the UTXO is queued for download or verify, but
it hasn't been committed yet. The creating block might spend UTXOs
that come from other recent blocks, so UTXO verification can depend on
a (non-contiguous) sequence of block verifications.
In this case, Zebra should wait for additional block download and
verify tasks to complete.
2. The block that creates the UTXO isn't queued for download. This can
happen because the block is gossiped block that's much higher than the
current tip, or because a peer sent the syncer a bad list of block
hashes.
In this case, Zebra should discard the timed out block, and restart
the sync.
We need to choose a timeout that balances these two cases, so we time
out after 180 seconds.
Assuming Zebra can download at least 1 MB per second, 180 seconds is
enough time to download a few hundred blocks. So Zebra should be able to
download and verify the next block before the UTXOs that it creates time
out. (Since Zebra has already verified all the blocks before the next
block, its UTXO requests should return immediately.)
Even if some peers time out downloads, a block can only be pending
download for 80 seconds (4 retries * 20 second timeout) before the
download fails. So the UTXO timeout doesn't need to be much larger than
this overall download timeout - because the download timeout will happen
first on slow networks.
Alternately, if the download for the creating block was never queued,
Zebra should timeout as soon as possible - so it can restart the sync
and download the creating block.
As a side-effect, a lower UTXO timeout also makes it slightly easier to
debug UTXO issues, because unsatisfiable queries fail faster.
The state service API says explicitly that AwaitUTXO requests should be coupled
with a timeout layer. I didn't add this when I was testing and fixing the UTXO
lookup code (#1348, #1358) because causing zebrad to hang on a failed
dependency was useful for identifying cases where the code wasn't useful (and
then inspecting execution traces).
As a side effect, this ticket resolves most of the hangs in #1389, because
far-future gossiped blocks will have their UTXO lookups time out, though we
may wish to do other work as part of debugging the combined sync+gossip logic.
This commit changes the state system and database format to track the
provenance of UTXOs, in addition to the outputs themselves.
Specifically, it tracks the following additional metadata:
- the height at which the UTXO was created;
- whether or not the UTXO was created from a coinbase transaction or
not.
This metadata will allow us to:
- check the coinbase maturity consensus rule;
- check the coinbase inputs => no transparent outputs rule;
- implement lookup of transactions by utxo (using the height to find the
block and then scanning the block) for a future RPC mechanism.
Closes#1342
dependabot[bot]
teor
Deirdre Connolly
Alfredo Garcia
Jane Lusby
Jane Lusby
Henry de Valence