591 lines
30 KiB
Markdown
591 lines
30 KiB
Markdown
# Governance documentation
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*Disclaimer: This is work in progress. Mechanisms are susceptible to change.*
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This document describes the high-level architecture of the governance module. The governance module allows bonded Atom holders to vote on proposals on a 1 bonded Atom 1 vote basis.
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## Design overview
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The governance process is divided in a few steps that are outlined below:
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- **Proposal submission:** Proposal is submitted to the blockchain with a deposit
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- **Vote:** Once deposit reaches a certain value (`MinDeposit`), proposal is confirmed and vote opens. Bonded Atom holders can then send `TxGovVote` transactions to vote on the proposal
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- If the proposal involves a software upgrade
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- **Signal:** Validator start signaling that they are ready to switch to the new version
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- **Switch:** Once more than 2/3rd validators have signaled their readiness to switch, their software automatically flips to the new version
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## Proposal submission
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### Right to submit a proposal
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Any Atom holder, whether bonded or unbonded, can submit proposals by sending a `TxProposal` transaction. Once a proposal is submitted, it is identified by its unique `proposalID`.
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### Proposal filter (minimum deposit)
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To prevent spam, proposals must be submitted with a `deposit` in Atoms such that `0 < deposit < MinDeposit`.
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Other Atom holders can increase the proposal's deposit by sending a `TxGovDeposit` transaction.
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Once the proposals's deposit reaches `MinDeposit`, it enters voting period.
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### Deposit refund
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There are two instances where Atom holders that deposited can claim back their deposit:
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- If the proposal is accepted
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- If the proposal's deposit does not reach `MinDeposit` for a period longer than `mMxDepositPeriod` (initial value: 2 months). Then the proposal is considered closed and nobody can deposit on it anymore.
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In such instances, Atom holders that deposited can send a `TxGovClaimDeposit` transaction to retrieve their share of the deposit.
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### Proposal types
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In the initial version of the governance module, there are two types of proposal:
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- `PlainTextProposal`. All the proposals that do not involve a modification of the source code go under this type. For example, an opinion poll would use a proposal of type `PlainTextProposal`
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- `SoftwareUpgradeProposal`. If accepted, validators are expected to update their software in accordance with the proposal. They must do so by following a 2-steps process described in the [Software Upgrade](#software-upgrade) section below. Software upgrade roadmap may be discussed and agreed on via `PlainTextProposals`, but actual software upgrades must be performed via `SoftwareUpgradeProposals`.
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### Proposal categories
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There are two categories of proposal:
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- `Regular`
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- `Urgent`
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These two categories are strictly identical except that `Urgent` proposals can be accepted faster if a certain condition is met. For more information, see [Threshold](#threshold) section.
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## Vote
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### Participants
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*Participants* are users that have the right to vote. On the Cosmos Hub, participants are bonded Atom holders. Unbonded Atom holders and other users do not get the right to participate in governance. However, they can submit and deposit on proposals.
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### Voting period
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Once a proposal reaches `MinDeposit`, it immediately enters `Voting period`. We define `Voting period` as the interval between the moment the vote opens and the moment the vote closes. `Voting period` should always be shorter than `Unbonding period` to prevent double voting. The initial value of `Voting period` is 2 weeks.
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### Option set
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The option set of a proposal refers to the set of choices a participant can choose from when casting its vote.
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The initial option set includes the following options:
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- `Yes`
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- `No`
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- `NoWithVeto`
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- `Abstain`
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`NoWithVeto` counts as `No` but also adds a `Veto` vote. `Abstain` allows voters to signal that they do not intend to vote in favor or against the proposal but accept the result of the vote.
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*Note: from the UI, for urgent proposals we should maybe add a ‘Not Urgent’ option that casts a `NoWithVeto` vote.*
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### Quorum
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Quorum is defined as the minimum percentage of voting power that needs to be casted on a proposal for the result to be valid.
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In the initial version of the governance module, there will be no quorum enforced by the protocol. Participation is ensured via the combination of inheritance and validator's punishment for non-voting.
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### Threshold
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Threshold is defined as the minimum ratio of `Yes` votes to `No` votes for the proposal to be accepted.
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Initially, the threshold is set at 50% with a possibility to veto if more than 1/3rd of votes (excluding `Abstain` votes) are `NoWithVeto` votes. This means that proposals are accepted is the ratio of `Yes` votes to `No` votes at the end of the voting period is superior to 50% and if the number of `NoWithVeto` votes is inferior to 1/3rd of total votes (excluding `Abstain`).
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`Urgent` proposals also work with the aforementioned threshold, except there is another condition that can accelerate the acceptance of the proposal. Namely, if the ratio of `Yes` votes to `InitTotalVotingPower` exceeds 2/3, `UrgentProposal` will be immediately accepted, even if the `Voting period` is not finished. `InitTotalVotingPower` is the total voting power of all bonded Atom holders at the moment when the vote opens.
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### Inheritance
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If a delegator does not vote, it will inherit its validator vote.
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- If the delegator votes before its validator, it will not inherit from the validator's vote.
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- If the delegator votes after its validaotor, it will override its validator vote with its own vote. If the proposal is a `Urgent` proposal, it is possible that the vote will close before delegators have a chance to react and override their validator's vote. This is not a problem, as `Urgent` proposals require more than 2/3rd of the total voting power to pass before the end of the voting period. If more than 2/3rd of validators collude, they can censor the votes of delegators anyway.
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### Validator’s punishment for non-voting
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Validators are required to vote on all proposals to ensure that results have legitimacy. Voting is part of validators' directives and failure to do it will result in a penalty.
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If a validator’s address is not in the list of addresses that voted on a proposal and if the vote is closed (i.e. `MinDeposit` was reached and `Voting period` is over), then this validator will automatically be partially slashed of `GovernancePenalty`.
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*Note: Need to define values for `GovernancePenalty`*
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**Exception:** If a proposal is a `Urgent` proposal and is accepted via the special condition of having a ratio of `Yes` votes to `InitTotalVotingPower` that exceeds 2/3, validators cannot be punished for not having voted on it. That is because the proposal will close as soon as the ratio exceeds 2/3, making it mechanically impossible for some validators to vote on it.
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### Governance key and governance address
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Validators can make use of an additional slot where they can designate a `Governance PubKey`. By default, a validator's `Governance PubKey` will be the same as its main PubKey. Validators can change this `Governance PubKey` by sending a `Change Governance PubKey` transaction signed by their main `Consensus PubKey`. From there, they will be able to sign vote using the `Governance PrivKey` associated with their `Governance PubKey`. The `Governance PubKey` can be changed at any moment.
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## Software Upgrade
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If proposals are of type `SoftwareUpgradeProposal`, then nodes need to upgrade their software to the new version that was voted. This process is divided in two steps.
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### Signal
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After a `SoftwareUpgradeProposal` is accepted, validators are expected to download and install the new version of the software while continuing to run the previous version. Once a validator has downloaded and installed the upgrade, it will start signaling to the network that it is ready to switch by including the proposal's `proposalID` in its *precommits*.(*Note: Confirmation that we want it in the precommit?*)
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Note: There is only one signal slot per *precommit*. If several `SoftwareUpgradeProposals` are accepted in a short timeframe, a pipeline will form and they will be implemented one after the other in the order that they were accepted.
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### Switch
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Once a block contains more than 2/3rd *precommits* where a common `SoftwareUpgradeProposal` is signaled, all the nodes (including validator nodes, non-validating full nodes and light-nodes) are expected to switch to the new version of the software.
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*Note: Not clear how the flip is handled programatically*
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## Implementation
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*Disclaimer: This is a suggestion. Only structs and pseudocode. Actual logic and implementation might widely differ*
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### Procedures
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`Procedures` define the rule according to which votes are run. There can only be one active procedure at any given time. If governance wants to change a procedure, either to modify a value or add/remove a parameter, a new procedure has to be created and the previous one rendered inactive.
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```Go
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type Procedure struct {
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VotingPeriod int64 // Length of the voting period. Initial value: 2 weeks
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MinDeposit int64 // Minimum deposit for a proposal to enter voting period.
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OptionSet []string // Options available to voters. {Yes, No, NoWithVeto, Abstain}
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ProposalTypes []string // Types available to submitters. {PlainTextProposal, SoftwareUpgradeProposal}
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Threshold int64 // Minimum value of Yes votes to No votes ratio for proposal to pass. Initial value: 0.5
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Veto rational.Rational // Minimum value of Veto votes to Total votes ratio for proposal to be vetoed. Initial value: 1/3
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MaxDepositPeriod int64 // Maximum period for Atom holders to deposit on a proposal. Initial value: 2 months
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GovernancePenalty int64 // Penalty if validator does not vote
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ProcedureNumber int16 // Incremented each time a new procedure is created
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IsActive bool // If true, procedure is active. Only one procedure can have isActive true.
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}
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```
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### Proposals
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`Proposals` are item to be voted on. They can be submitted by any Atom holder via a `TxGovSubmitProposal` transaction.
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```Go
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type TxGovSubmitProposal struct {
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Title string // Title of the proposal
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Description string // Description of the proposal
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Type string // Type of proposal. Initial set {PlainTextProposal, SoftwareUpgradeProposal}
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Category bool // false=regular, true=urgent
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InitialDeposit int64 // Initial deposit paid by sender. Must be strictly positive.
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}
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type Proposal struct {
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Title string // Title of the proposal
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Description string // Description of the proposal
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Type string // Type of proposal. Initial set {PlainTextProposal, SoftwareUpgradeProposal}
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Category bool // false=regular, true=urgent
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Deposit int64 // Current deposit on this proposal. Initial value is set at InitialDeposit
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SubmitBlock int64 // Height of the block where TxGovSubmitProposal was included
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VotingStartBlock int64 // Height of the block where MinDeposit was reached. -1 if MinDeposit is not reached.
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Votes map[string]int64 // Votes for each option (Yes, No, NoWithVeto, Abstain)
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}
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```
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Each `Proposal` is identified by its unique `proposalID`.
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Additionaly, four lists will be linked to each proposal:
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- `DepositorList`: List of addresses that deposited on the proposal with their associated deposit
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- `VotersList`: List of addresses that voted **under each validator** with their associated option
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- `InitVotingPowerList`: Snapshot of validators' voting power **when proposal enters voting period** (only saves validators whose voting power is >0).
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- `MinusesList`: List of minuses for each validator. Used to compute validators' voting power when they cast a vote.
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Two final parameters, `InitTotalVotingPower` and `InitProcedureNumber` associated with `proposalID` will be saved when proposal enters voting period.
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We also introduce `ProposalProcessingQueue` which lists all the `ProposalIDs` of proposals that reached `MinDeposit` from oldest to newest. Each round, the oldest element of `ProposalProcessingQueue` is checked during `BeginBlock` to see if `CurrentBlock == VotingStartBlock + InitProcedure.VotingPeriod`. If it is, then the application checks if validators in `InitVotingPowerList` have voted and, if not, applies `GovernancePenalty`. After that proposal is ejected from `ProposalProcessingQueue` and the new first element of the queue is evaluated. Note that if a proposal is urgent and accepted under the special condition, its `ProposalID` must be ejected from `ProposalProcessingQueue`.
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A `TxGovSubmitProposal` transaction can be handled according to the following pseudocode
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```
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// PSEUDOCODE //
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// Check if TxGovSubmitProposal is valid. If it is, create proposal //
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upon receiving txGovSubmitProposal from sender do
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// check if proposal is correctly formatted. Includes fee payment.
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if !correctlyFormatted(txGovSubmitProposal) then
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throw
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else
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if (txGovSubmitProposal.InitialDeposit <= 0) OR (sender.AtomBalance < InitialDeposit) then
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// InitialDeposit is negative or null OR sender has insufficient funds
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throw
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else
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sender.AtomBalance -= InitialDeposit
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proposalID = generate new proposalID
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proposal = create new Proposal from proposalID
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proposal.Title = txGovSubmitProposal.Title
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proposal.Description = txGovSubmitProposal.Description
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proposal.Type = txGovSubmitProposal.Type
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proposal.Category = txGovSubmitProposal.Category
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proposal.Deposit = txGovSubmitProposal.InitialDeposit
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proposal.SubmitBlock = CurrentBlock
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create depositorsList from proposalID
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initiate deposit of sender in depositorsList at txGovSubmitProposal.InitialDeposit
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if (txGovSubmitProposal.InitialDeposit < ActiveProcedure.MinDeposit) then
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// MinDeposit is not reached
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proposal.VotingStartBlock = -1
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else
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// MinDeposit is reached
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proposal.VotingStartBlock = CurrentBlock
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create votersList,
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initVotingPowerList,
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minusesList,
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initProcedureNumber,
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initTotalVotingPower from proposalID
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snapshot(ActiveProcedure.ProcedureNumber) // Save current procedure number in initProcedureNumber
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snapshot(TotalVotingPower) // Save total voting power in initTotalVotingPower
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snapshot(ValidatorVotingPower) // Save validators' voting power in initVotingPowerList
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ProposalProcessingQueueEnd++
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ProposalProcessingQueue[ProposalProcessingQueueEnd] = proposalID
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return proposalID
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```
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And the pseudocode for the `ProposalProcessingQueue`:
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```
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in BeginBlock do
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checkProposal()
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func checkProposal()
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if (ProposalProcessingQueueBeginning == ProposalProcessingQueueEnd)
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return
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else
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retrieve proposalID from ProposalProcessingQueue[ProposalProcessingQueueBeginning]
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retrieve proposal from proposalID
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retrieve initProcedureNumber from proposalID
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retrieve initProcedure from initProcedureNumber
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if (CurrentBlock == proposal.VotingStartBlock + initProcedure.VotingPeriod)
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retrieve initVotingPowerList from proposalID
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retrieve votersList from proposalID
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retrieve validators from initVotingPowerList
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for each validator in validators
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if validator is not in votersList
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slash validator by ActiveProcedure.GovernancePenalty
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ProposalProcessingQueueBeginning++ // ProposalProcessingQueue will have a new element
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checkProposal()
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else
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return
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```
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Once a proposal is submitted, if `Proposal.Deposit < ActiveProcedure.MinDeposit`, Atom holders can send `TxGovDeposit` transactions to increase the proposal's deposit.
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```Go
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type TxGovDeposit struct {
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ProposalID int64 // ID of the proposal
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Deposit int64 // Number of Atoms to add to the proposal's deposit
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}
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```
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A `TxGovDeposit` transaction has to go through a number of checks to be valid. These checks are outlined in the following pseudocode.
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```
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// PSEUDOCODE //
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// Check if TxGovDeposit is valid. If it is, increase deposit and check if MinDeposit is reached
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upon receiving txGovDeposit from sender do
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// check if proposal is correctly formatted. Includes fee payment.
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if !correctlyFormatted(txGovDeposit) then
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throw
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else
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if !exist(txGovDeposit.proposalID) then
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// There is no proposal for this proposalID
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throw
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else
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if (txGovDeposit.Deposit <= 0 OR sender.AtomBalance < txGovDeposit.Deposit)
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// deposit is negative or null OR sender has insufficient funds
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throw
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else
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retrieve proposal from txGovDeposit.ProposalID // retrieve throws if it fails
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if (proposal.Deposit >= ActiveProcedure.MinDeposit) then
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// MinDeposit was reached
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throw
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else
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if (CurrentBlock >= proposal.SubmitBlock + ActiveProcedure.MaxDepositPeriod) then
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// Maximum deposit period reached
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throw
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else
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// sender can deposit
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retrieve depositorsList from txGovDeposit.ProposalID
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sender.AtomBalance -= txGovDeposit.Deposit
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if sender is in depositorsList
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increase deposit of sender in depositorsList by txGovDeposit.Deposit
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else
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initialise deposit of sender in depositorsList at txGovDeposit.Deposit
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proposal.Deposit += txGovDeposit.Deposit
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if (proposal.Deposit >= ActiveProcedure.MinDeposit) then
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// MinDeposit is reached, vote opens
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proposal.VotingStartBlock = CurrentBlock
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create votersList,
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initVotingPowerList,
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minusesList,
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initProcedureNumber,
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initTotalVotingPower from proposalID
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snapshot(ActiveProcedure.ProcedureNumber) // Save current procedure number in InitProcedureNumber
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snapshot(TotalVotingPower) // Save total voting power in InitTotalVotingPower
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snapshot(ValidatorVotingPower) // Save validators' voting power in InitVotingPowerList
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ProposalProcessingQueueEnd++ // ProposalProcessingQueue will have a new element
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ProposalProcessingQueue[ProposalProcessingQueueEnd] = txGovDeposit.ProposalID
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```
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Finally, if the proposal is accepted or `MinDeposit` was not reached before the end of the `MaximumDepositPeriod`, then Atom holders can send `TxGovClaimDeposit` transaction to claim their deposits.
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```Go
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type TxGovClaimDeposit struct {
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ProposalID int64
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}
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```
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And the associated pseudocode
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```
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// PSEUDOCODE //
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/* Check if TxGovClaimDeposit is valid. If vote never started and MaxDepositPeriod is reached or if vote started and proposal was accepted, return deposit */
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upon receiving txGovClaimDeposit from sender do
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// check if proposal is correctly formatted. Includes fee payment.
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if !correctlyFormatted(txGovClaimDeposit) then
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throw
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else
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if !exists(txGovClaimDeposit.ProposalID) then
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// There is no proposal for this proposalID
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throw
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else
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retrieve depositorsList from txGovClaimDeposit.ProposalID
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if sender is not in depositorsList then
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throw
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else
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retrieve deposit from sender in depositorsList
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if deposit <= 0
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// deposit has already been claimed
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throw
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else
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retrieve proposal from txGovClaimDeposit.ProposalID
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if proposal.VotingStartBlock <= 0
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// Vote never started
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if (CurrentBlock <= proposal.SubmitBlock + ActiveProcedure.MaxDepositPeriod)
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// MaxDepositPeriod is not reached
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throw
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else
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// MaxDepositPeriod is reached
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set deposit of sender in depositorsList to 0
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sender.AtomBalance += deposit
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else
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// Vote started
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retrieve initTotalVotingPower from txGovClaimDeposit.ProposalID
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retrieve initProcedureNumber from txGovClaimDeposit.ProposalID
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retrieve initProcedure from initProcedureNumber // get procedure that was active when vote opened
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if (proposal.Category AND proposal.Votes['Yes']/initTotalVotingPower >= 2/3) OR
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((CurrentBlock > proposal.VotingStartBlock + initProcedure.VotingPeriod) AND (proposal.Votes['NoWithVeto']/(proposal.Votes['Yes']+proposal.Votes['No']+proposal.Votes['NoWithVeto']) < 1/3) AND (proposal.Votes['Yes']/(proposal.Votes['Yes']+proposal.Votes['No']+proposal.Votes['NoWithVeto']) > 1/2)) then
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// Proposal was accepted either because
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// Proposal was urgent and special condition was met
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// Voting period ended and vote satisfies threshold
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set deposit of sender in depositorsList to 0
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sender.AtomBalance += deposit
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else
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throw
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```
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### Vote
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Once `ActiveProcedure.MinDeposit` is reached, voting period starts. From there, bonded Atom holders are able to send `TxGovVote` transactions to cast their vote on the proposal.
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```Go
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type TxGovVote struct {
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ProposalID int64 // proposalID of the proposal
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Option string // option from OptionSet chosen by the voter
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ValidatorPubKey crypto.PubKey // PubKey of the validator voter wants to tie its vote to
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}
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```
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Votes need to be tied to a validator in order to compute validator's voting power. If a delegator is bonded to multiple validators, it will have to send one transaction per validator (the UI should facilitate this so that multiple transactions can be sent in one "vote flow").
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If the sender is the validator itself, then it will input its own GovernancePubKey as `ValidatorPubKey`
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Next is a pseudocode proposal of the way `TxGovVote` transactions can be handled:
|
||
|
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```
|
||
// PSEUDOCODE //
|
||
// Check if TxGovVote is valid. If it is, count vote//
|
||
|
||
upon receiving txGovVote from sender do
|
||
// check if proposal is correctly formatted. Includes fee payment.
|
||
|
||
if !correctlyFormatted(txGovDeposit) then
|
||
throw
|
||
|
||
else
|
||
if !exists(txGovVote.proposalID) OR
|
||
|
||
// Throws if
|
||
// proposalID does not exist
|
||
|
||
throw
|
||
|
||
else
|
||
retrieve initProcedureNumber from txGovVote.ProposalID
|
||
retrieve initProcedure from initProcedureNumber // get procedure that was active when vote opened
|
||
|
||
if !initProcedure.OptionSet.includes(txGovVote.Option) OR
|
||
!isValid(txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey) then
|
||
|
||
// Throws if
|
||
// Option is not in Option Set of procedure that was active when vote opened OR if
|
||
// ValidatorPubKey is not the GovPubKey of a current validator
|
||
|
||
throw
|
||
|
||
else
|
||
retrieve votersList from txGovVote.ProposalID
|
||
|
||
if sender is in votersList under txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey then
|
||
// sender has already voted with the Atoms bonded to ValidatorPubKey
|
||
|
||
throw
|
||
|
||
else
|
||
retrieve proposal from txGovVote.ProposalID
|
||
retrieve InitTotalVotingPower from txGovVote.ProposalID
|
||
|
||
if (proposal.VotingStartBlock < 0) OR
|
||
(CurrentBlock > proposal.VotingStartBlock + initProcedure.VotingPeriod) OR
|
||
(proposal.VotingStartBlock < lastBondingBlock(sender, txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey) OR
|
||
(proposal.VotingStartBlock < lastUnbondingBlock(sender, txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey) OR
|
||
(proposal.Category AND proposal.Votes['Yes']/InitTotalVotingPower >= 2/3) then
|
||
|
||
// Throws if
|
||
// Vote has not started OR if
|
||
// Vote had ended OR if
|
||
// sender bonded Atoms to ValidatorPubKey after start of vote OR if
|
||
// sender unbonded Atoms from ValidatorPubKey after start of vote OR if
|
||
// proposal is urgent and special condition is met, i.e. proposal is accepted and closed
|
||
|
||
throw
|
||
|
||
else
|
||
// sender can vote, check if sender == validator and add sender to voter list
|
||
|
||
add sender to votersList under txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey
|
||
|
||
if (sender is not equal to GovPubKey that corresponds to txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey)
|
||
// Here, sender is not the Governance PubKey of the validator whose PubKey is txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey
|
||
|
||
if sender does not have bonded Atoms to txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey then
|
||
throw
|
||
|
||
else
|
||
if txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey is not in votersList under txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey then
|
||
// Validator has not voted already
|
||
|
||
if exists(MinusesList[txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey]) then
|
||
// a minus already exists for this validator's PubKey, increase minus
|
||
// by the amount of Atoms sender has bonded to ValidatorPubKey
|
||
|
||
MinusesList[txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey] += sender.bondedAmountTo(txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey)
|
||
|
||
else
|
||
// a minus does not already exist for this validator's PubKey, initialise minus
|
||
// at the amount of Atoms sender has bonded to ValidatorPubKey
|
||
|
||
MinusesList[txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey] = sender.bondedAmountTo(txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey)
|
||
|
||
else
|
||
// Validator has already voted
|
||
// Reduce option count chosen by validator by sender's bonded Amount
|
||
|
||
retrieve validatorOption from votersList using txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey
|
||
proposal.Votes['validatorOption'] -= sender.bondedAmountTo(txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey)
|
||
|
||
// increase Option count chosen by sender by bonded Amount
|
||
proposal.Votes['txGovVote.Option'] += sender.bondedAmountTo(txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey)
|
||
|
||
else
|
||
// sender is the Governance PubKey of the validator whose main PubKey is txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey
|
||
// i.e. sender == validator
|
||
|
||
retrieve initialVotingPower from InitVotingPowerList using txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey
|
||
|
||
|
||
if exists(MinusesList[txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey]) then
|
||
// a minus exists for this validator's PubKey, decrease vote of validator by minus
|
||
|
||
proposal.Votes['txGovVote.Option'] += (initialVotingPower - MinusesList[txGovVote.ValidatorPubKey])
|
||
|
||
else
|
||
// a minus does not exist for this validator's PubKey, validator votes with full voting power
|
||
|
||
proposal.Votes['txGovVote.Option'] += initialVotingPower
|
||
|
||
if (proposal.Category AND proposal.Votes['Yes']/InitTotalVotingPower >= 2/3)
|
||
// after vote is counted, if proposal is urgent and special condition is met
|
||
// remove proposalID from ProposalProcessingQueue
|
||
|
||
remove txGovVote.ProposalID from ProposalProcessingQueue
|
||
Rearrange ProposalProcessingQueue
|
||
ProposalProcessingQueueEnd--
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
|
||
## Future improvements (not in scope for MVP)
|
||
|
||
The current documentation only describes the minimum viable product for the governance module. Future improvements may include:
|
||
|
||
- **`BountyProposals`:** If accepted, a `BountyProposal` creates an open bounty. The `BountyProposal` specifies how many Atoms will be given upon completion. These Atoms will be taken from the `reserve pool`. After a `BountyProposal` is accepted by governance, anybody can submit a `SoftwareUpgradeProposal` with the code to claim the bounty. Note that once a `BountyProposal` is accepted, the corresponding funds in the `reserve pool` are locked so that payment can always be honored. In order to link a `SoftwareUpgradeProposal` to an open bounty, the submitter of the `SoftwareUpgradeProposal` will use the `Proposal.LinkedProposal` attribute. If a `SoftwareUpgradeProposal` linked to an open bounty is accepted by governance, the funds that were reserved are automatically transferred to the submitter.
|
||
- **Complex delegation:** Delegators could choose other representatives than their validators. Ultimately, the chain of representatives would always end up to a validator, but delegators could inherit the vote of their chosen representative before they inherit the vote of their validator. In other words, they would only inherit the vote of their validator if their other appointed representative did not vote.
|
||
- **`ParameterProposals` and `WhitelistProposals`:** These proposals would automatically change pre-defined parameters and whitelists. Upon acceptance, these proposals would not require validators to do the signal and switch process.
|
||
- **Better process for proposal review:** There would be two parts to `proposal.Deposit`, one for anti-spam (same as in MVP) and an other one to reward third party auditors.
|