235 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
235 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
# Bringing Privacy to Cosmos
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The Zcash Foundation wants to bring privacy to the Cosmos ecosystem. Zcash is
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unique among privacy solutions in that it has strong network effects: new users
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gain anonymity from all prior transactions of existing users, while in turn
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contributing to a greater anonymity set for the entire system. Our plan is to
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take advantage of these network effects by giving Cosmos users access to this
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anonymity set through an IBC-enabled pegzone. This work will proceed in two
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phases, with the design of the first phase enabling the features of the second
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phase. In the first phase, the pegzone will provide tokens backed by ZEC in
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the existing Zcash shielded pool. These tokens can be sent throughout the
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Cosmos ecosystem, allowing Cosmos users to trade and use ZEC. In the second
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phase, we plan to add a shielded pool to the pegzone itself, providing shielded
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staking, shielded IBC assets, and shielded cross-chain transfers. This plan
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provides an increasingly useful privacy layer for the Cosmos ecosystem, while
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growing the anonymity set of Zcash.
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## What is a pegzone?
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[Cosmos] is designed to enable cross-blockchain asset transfers. These transfers
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are accomplished by the Inter-Blockchain Communication (IBC) protocol, which
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provides a standardized way to lock up assets on one chain and provide bearer
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assets on another chain.
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This provides horizontal scalability by allowing different “zones” –
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blockchains with sovereign consensus mechanisms – to easily interoperate, or,
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as the Cosmos slogan puts it, to provide an “internet of blockchains”.
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IBC requires transaction finality on each of the chains. However,
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proof-of-work systems only have probabilistic finality: if miners produce a
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longer block chain, transactions could be removed. However, there's still a
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conceptual gap between absolute finality required by IBC and the probabilistic
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finality provided by a proof-of-work chain.
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The gap is addressed by a [pegzone], a blockchain that works as an adapter for
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probabilistic finality by declaring transactions to be final after some number
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of confirmations.
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## Project phasing
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Our pegzone design proceeds in two phases, providing a minimum viable pegzone
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in the first phase with a path to a full privacy layer for Cosmos in the second
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phase.
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- **Phase 1**. The Zcash pegzone will provide an IBC-compatible asset, called
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PZEC, backed 1:1 with ZEC held in the Zcash shielded pool. PZEC can be sent
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throughout the Cosmos ecosystem, traded and used in other zones, and redeemed
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for ZEC on the Zcash chain. This allows Cosmos users access to the anonymity
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set of the Zcash shielded pool, with PZEC in Cosmos functioning similarly to
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Zcash t-addresses, while laying the groundwork for full shielding in the
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second phase using a novel shielded-compatible staking mechanism described
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below.
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- **Phase 2**. In the second phase, we'll add a Sapling-style shielded pool to
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the pegzone itself and implement shielded staking. This allows shielded
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transfers from the pegzone to Zcash and vice versa. We also intend to allow
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any IBC assets to move into the pegzone's shielded pool, coordinating to
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ensure that the ongoing Zcash user-defined-asset (UDA) support is
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IBC-compatible.
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We plan to build the Zcash portions of this project using the [Zebra]
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libraries, which provide modular, reusable components for working with the
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Zcash chain.
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## Phase 1 mechanism design
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The pegzone will be a proof-of-stake chain. The mechanism design for the
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pegzone has three parts: the staking mechanics, the peg mechanics, and the fee
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mechanics.
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### Staking mechanics
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As a proof-of-stake chain, the pegzone requires a staking token, and the
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pegzone must be able to control the supply of the staking token.
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However, rather than employ staking rewards as in the Cosmos Hub, we propose a
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new design based on a pair of tokens, “SZEC” and “DZEC”, with a predetermined,
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time-varying exchange rate. The key advantage of this mechanism is that it is
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future-compatible with shielded staking, by eliminating the requirement for
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delegators to claim rewards.
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The staking token is a new token called SZEC. SZEC is obtained at a 1:1 ratio
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by burning ZEC on the Zcash chain. This avoids distributional issues about the
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initial holders of the staking token: all ZEC holders have the option to obtain
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SZEC if they choose to do so. SZEC is always freely transferable, as it
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represents an unstaked state of the staking token.
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SZEC can be converted to DZEC by delegating it with a validator, and DZEC can
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be converted to SZEC by removing it from delegation. SZEC and DZEC are not
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exchanged at a 1:1 rate, but at a blockheight-dependent rate `D(h) <= 1` which
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measures the cumulative depreciation of SZEC relative to DZEC from
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genesis to blockheight `h` and decreases monotonically in `h`.
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Delegating 1 SZEC at height `h_1` results in `D(h_1)` DZEC bonded to a
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particular validator. Undelegating 1 DZEC at height `h_2` results in
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`1/D(h_2)` SZEC. This transaction is only settled after some unbonding period,
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during which the DZEC may still be slashed in the event of validator
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misbehavior.
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This can be thought of as treating all DZEC as if it had been delegated since
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(pegzone) genesis, and pre-debiting the staking rewards over the period before
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they began delegation, so that when they undelegate, they receive rewards only
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over the delegation period. Crucially, this means that all DZEC is fungible up
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to the choice of validator, because there is no need to track how long
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particular DZEC has been delegated.
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This is economically equivalent to staking rewards as used on the Cosmos Hub,
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but because the staking reward is instead priced in to the SZEC/DZEC exchange
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rate, there is no requirement for delegators to claim rewards, and all
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delegators are rewarded at the same rate (e.g., there is no question about the
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compounding interval). Removing staking rewards makes it relatively easy to
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add shielded staking in phase 2 of the project, described in more detail below.
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### Peg mechanics
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The Zcash pegzone will provide an IBC-compatible asset, called PZEC, backed 1:1
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with ZEC held in the Zcash shielded pool. PZEC can be sent throughout the
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Cosmos ecosystem, traded and used in other zones, and redeemed for ZEC on the
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Zcash chain.
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Zcash Sapling addresses have a [capability-based key hierarchy][saplingkeys],
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splitting each logical capability related to that address's funds into a
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different key. The incoming and outgoing viewing keys will be replicated
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across all validators, allowing any validator to individually inspect the
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pegzone funds. To authorize spending, the validators will share control of the
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address' spend authorization key using [FROST], a round-optimized threshold
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multi-signature scheme designed in collaboration between the Zcash Foundation
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and the University of Waterloo.
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Upon receipt and confirmation of a z2z transaction on the Zcash chain, the
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validators issue PZEC to a pegzone address specified in the transaction's memo
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field. Pegzone users can redeem PZEC in the pegzone to obtain ZEC on the Zcash
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chain, less some fees described below. To do this, they create a transaction on
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the pegzone that burns PZEC and specifies a destination z-addr on the Zcash
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chain. As the pegzone validators reach consensus on the PZEC transaction, they
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perform distributed signing on the spend authorization key to prepare a
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shielded Zcash transaction that sends ZEC from the pegzone address to the
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user-specified address.
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We handle key rotation and validator set changes using a single epoch
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mechanism. The system fixes an epoch length parameter, measured in pegzone
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blocks, and chosen to be a relatively short interval (e.g., approximately one
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day). A relatively short key rotation interval is preferable to a long one,
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because it makes the key rotation mechanism impossible to ignore in client
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software, reducing the risk of unexpected surprises.
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Validator set changes can only occur at epoch boundaries, not at every block
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(as in the Cosmos Hub). Each epoch has a primary z-addr controlled by that
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epoch's validator set. The previous epoch's z-addr stays active until the end
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of the current epoch, and its validators are responsible for rolling any funds
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sent to it by mistake to the current epoch's address, while the next epoch's
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z-addr is generated at the beginning of the current epoch so that it is
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available in advance. This provides a constant, pre-coördinated key rotation
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mechanism, without requiring precise alignment between the pegzone blockheight
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and users' clocks.
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### Fee mechanics
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The security of the pegzone is provided by the strength of the validator's
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incentives for correct behaviour: their stake. This means that the cost of
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providing PZEC is the cost of capital staked to insure its security, integrated
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over the length of time the PZEC is held in the pegzone. It's important for
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the fee structure to respect that cost structure, to prevent perverse
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incentives for behavior on the part of validators or pegzone users.
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As an example, someone who sends 100 ZEC to the pegzone, holds it in the
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pegzone for a year, then redeems for ZEC should pay essentially the same fees
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as someone who sends 100 ZEC to the pegzone and moves the corresponding PZEC
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back and forth once per month.
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In particular, the fee structure should not penalize movement across the peg
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and into the shielded pool, because the first phase of the pegzone is
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unshielded, so PZEC will function similarly to t-addrs in Zcash, where privacy
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requires careful movements into and out of the Zcash shielded pool.
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The proposed fee mechanism for PZEC is therefore similar to the staking
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mechanism. Rather than a 1:1 rate, PZEC is converted to ZEC at rate `F(h) < 1`,
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which measures cumulative fees from genesis to blockheight `h` and decreases
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monotonically in `h`.
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Sending 1 ZEC to the pegzone at (pegzone) height `h_1` results in issuance of
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`1/F(h_1)` PZEC. Redeeming 1 PZEC at (pegzone) height `h_2` results in
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distribution of `F(h_2)` ZEC.
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This can be thought of as treating all PZEC as if it had been pegged since
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(pegzone) genesis, and pre-crediting the user for fees up to the time of
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creation. This design removes the requirement to track how long PZEC has been
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held in the pegzone, while ensuring that the fees charged are related to the
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cost of capital required to secure the peg.
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The excess ZEC withheld in distribution is kept by the validators and their
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delegators.
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One disadvantage is that fees are not collected on an ongoing basis, but only
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when assets move through the peg. However, because the fee amount is not
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affected by when and how assets move through the peg, avoiding moving funds
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does not help users avoid paying fees.
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The fee rate should be as low as possible (to incentivize pegzone usage), but
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high enough to cover the cost of capital required for security. One mechanism
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to accomplish this would be an automatic fee adjustment analogous to the one
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used on the Cosmos Hub to control staking rewards. This would fix a minimum
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collateralization ratio for the pegzone, and increase the fee rate to
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incentivize staking as the collateralization ratio declines towards the
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minimum.
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## Phase 2 mechanism design
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In the second phase, we plan to add a Sapling-style multi-asset shielded pool
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to the pegzone itself and implement shielded staking. Shielded staking will
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provide delegator privacy, not validator privacy. Each validator will have a
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publicly-visible stake weight, but unlike on the Cosmos Hub, the identities of
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their delegators and the distribution of delegators to each validator will be
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protected. Validators can be pseudonymous, if there is market demand for
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pseudonymous validators – no strong identity is required. The shielding design
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follows straightforwardly from the SZEC/DZEC design, which ensures that all
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DZEC staked with the same validator is fungible.
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The pegzone has a main multi-asset shielded pool for SZEC and any other IBC
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assets moved into the shielded zone, as well as a single-asset shielded
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delegation pool for each validator's DZEC. Delegation transactions move SZEC
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from the main shielded pool into the validator's delegation pool, escrowing the
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portion of the delegated funds that will be slashed in case of validator
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misbehavior. A user can undelegate their funds by moving funds back to the
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main shielded pool. The unbonding period of the Cosmos Hub can be replicated
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by requiring a long settlement period for this transaction. Slashing is
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implemented by burning all of the escrowed portion of the delegated funds,
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allowing users to withdraw the rest.
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[Cosmos]: https://cosmos.network
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[pegzone]: https://blog.cosmos.network/the-internet-of-blockchains-how-cosmos-does-interoperability-starting-with-the-ethereum-peg-zone-8744d4d2bc3f
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[Zebra]: https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra
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[saplingkeys]: https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#addressesandkeys
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[FROST]: https://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/frost/
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