61 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
61 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
# Network Privacy in Blockchains
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018.06.27 13:00-14:00 - Isis Agora Lovecruft - Part 1
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
This workshop about the privacy in propagation protocol within blockchain networks and
|
|
de-anonymization of transactions.
|
|
|
|
List of papers on blockchain network privacy: [https://github.com/isislovecruft/library--/tree/master/anonymity%20&%20circumvention/bitcoin](https://github.com/isislovecruft/library--/tree/master/anonymity%20&%20circumvention/bitcoin)
|
|
|
|
(Go up the path in the repo for more exciting papers)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Separate groups discussion on the network anonymization protocols (Some are fictional at this point):
|
|
|
|
- Dandelion
|
|
- MimbleWimble / [Grin](https://github.com/mimblewimble/grin)
|
|
- Whisper Protocol ([Ethereum](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Whisper))
|
|
- Tumblers
|
|
- Noise networks
|
|
- Use Tor / Use Signal
|
|
- Use [Wireguard](https://www.wireguard.com/)
|
|
- Broadcasted Encryption
|
|
- Randomized Transaction Handling
|
|
- [Kovri](https://github.com/monero-project/kovri) - used in Monero. Onion routing style like tor but different approach (DHT Node discovery, Uni-directional routing (closer to free route mixnets), designed for low latency networks, probably works well for P2P but may not work well for client-server architecture).
|
|
- Mixnets
|
|
|
|
Each group posted their proposals on the window and the rest put star stickers on their preferred proposals:
|
|
![Proposals Scored by stars with a view of Montreal under construction](/img/network-privacy-in-blockchains.JPG)
|
|
|
|
Top Rated:
|
|
- Kovri
|
|
- Dandelion
|
|
|
|
|
|
Research Ideas:
|
|
- Node Random Path selection
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
2018.06.27 14:10-15:10 - Isis Agora Lovecruft - Part 2
|
|
|
|
|
|
... [missed the beginning of the discussion]
|
|
|
|
Discussion:
|
|
- Discussion regarding how Dandelion Protocol works, One example: [Grin Spec](https://github.com/mimblewimble/grin/blob/master/doc/dandelion/dandelion.md)
|
|
- Timing attacks by an entity that runs multiple (many) nodes in the network
|
|
- Issue with being always online on the protocols like Signal
|
|
- Mix networks High latency privacy network, pool up transactions to achieve anonymity
|
|
- Chose a route in advance by the client
|
|
- None of the nodes have access to where the transaction comes from and leaves to
|
|
- Not good when nodes are not consistently online, need more stable networks
|
|
- Cascade mixing
|
|
- At least requires one honest node on a path for everyone to use this one path
|
|
- Traffic Analysis Resistant Messaging: [katzenpost](https://github.com/katzenpost)
|
|
- Originally designed for e-voting and e-mail
|
|
- If used in Blockchain networks, it can't be used for miner nodes, as the high latency might lead to network forks and higher rate for orphaned blocks.
|
|
- Some discussion on possible attacks such as [eclipse attack](https://www.usenix.org/node/190891), [sybil attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack), 51% attack.
|